Strong v. State - Felony Murder Conviction Appeal

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: Ma rch 3, 2026 S25A110 7. STRONG v. THE STATE. L A G RUA, J ustice. Appe llant Aaro n E dward St ron g challe nges his 2023 convic tio ns for felony mur der a nd other crimes in conne ction wit h the fatal s tabbi ng of his wife’s 32 - y ear - old son, M aur ice Arn old, and the sta bbing of her 22 - year - o ld g r andson, Dean dre A rnol d. 1 This 1 The crimes occurred on August 24, 2 015. On June 8, 20 17, a Cobb County grand ju ry indicted Strong on s even counts arising out of the death of Maurice and th e sta bbing of Dean dre. A t a trial in 2017, Strong was convicted of felony murder in the death of Maurice, two counts o f aggravate d assault, and two counts of possession of a knife during the co mmission of a felony but was acquitted on tw o counts: malice murder in M aurice’s dea th and aggrav ated battery against Dea ndre. This Court rev ersed. See Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295 (2020). From Fe bruary 6 to 9, 2023, Strong wa s retried o n the counts on which he was convicted in the 2017 trial: fe lony mur der, two counts of aggr avated assault, and two co unts of possession o f a knife during the commission of a felony. The jury found hi m guilty of all ch arges. The trial court se ntenced Strong to serve life in prison witho ut the possibil ity of parole for the felon y murder of Maurice, a consec utive term of 20 years in prison f or the aggra vated assault against Deandre, and two cons ecutive five - y ear pr ison terms for the knife- possession cou nts. The ot her aggravated assault ve rdict merg ed into the felony murder conviction. Strong fil ed a timely motion for ne w trial, which he NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre m e Cou rt Rule 27, the Co urt’s rec onsiderat ion, a nd editori al revisi ons by t he Report er of Decis ions. Th e versio n of the opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geo rgia Repo rts, d esignat ed as the “Fi nal Copy,” will replac e any prior version on the Court’s websi te and docket. A bound volu me of t he Georgia Repo rts will contain the f inal a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 Court reve rsed S trong ’s c onvi ction s af ter his fir st trial. See Stro ng v. State, 309 G a. 295 (2020). In chall engi ng his convict ions aris ing from hi s secon d t rial, Strong cont ends that (1) the tri al court abu sed its dis cret ion in exclud ing tex t messa ges sent to Maur ice shor tly befo re his deat h; (2) the tria l court abuse d its discret ion in allo wing the pr osecu tor, i n cl osin g argu ment, to ref er to S tr ong’s r efusal on cross - exam ination to d e mons trate how th e st abbi ngs occur red; (3) the tr ial cour t erred in fa ili ng to ch arge the j ury on mistake of fact; and (4) his tr ial counse l was co nstitutio nally inef fect ive wi th resp ect to th e text mess ages and i n f aili ng to obj ect wh en the p rosecu tor refer red re peat edl y to Stron g’s t estim ony fr om h is fi rst trial. As explai ned bel ow, th ese claim s fail, and we affi rm. T he evi dence presen ted at trial s howed that t he stabb ings occurr ed late in the eve ning on Augus t 24, 2 015, a t th e Cobb C ounty home w here S trong a nd his wife Fe licie Strong lived wit h Maurice amended twice thro ugh new counsel. A f ter an evidentiary hearing on Ju ly 15, 2024, the trial court entered an order d enying the motion on August 1 2, 2024. Appellant filed a ti mely notice of appeal, and the case wa s docketed in this Court to the August 2025 ter m and oral argument w as held on August 27, 2025.

3 and D eandre. 2 Strong had a tro ubled re latio nship with Ma urice and Deandr e. Al thou gh som etimes they got alon g, th e re were f requ ent argum ents due to S trong “ try [ing] to control [Felicie ] and the hous e” and Stron g’s di ss atisfa ction with M aurice ’s and De andre ’s fail ure to move ou t and becom e ind epen dent. A ccord ing to Feli cie, w hen Stro ng was drink ing, his c ontr olling at titude worse ned. The day be fore the stab bin gs, Stron g and Fel ici e retu rned home l ate i n th e ev enin g aft er a w eeken d tri p to Fl ori da. The follo wing day, Stron g wen t to a fr ien d’s hou se f or a few hou rs, and when he re turne d, he app eared to be d run k, although St rong and his fr iend test ified tha t Strong ha d consum ed only two sh ots of bourbon. After retur ning ho me, Strong beg an to berat e Dean dre about d irty dish es th at rem ain ed in the si nk ov er the week end. Deand re we nt to his bedroom, whe re his frien d Tay lor Durand was, and Str ong followe d him and continue d his “ tira de,” forcefully 2 Because this case i nvolves ques tions of harm less error and prejudice stemming from ineffectivenes s of cou nsel, we set out the evid ence in de tail and weigh it as we woul d expect reasonabl e jurors wo uld hav e, instead of vie wing it in the light most favorabl e to the jury’s verdict s. See Wa llace v. State, 320 Ga. 272, 273 n.2 (20 24).

4 pushing open the doo r. Mau rice h eard th e argument and con front ed Stro ng, te lling him “ you’r e not go ing to bully” De andre. The argum ent betw een S trong and M au rice contin ued, and th e tw o men got int o a “pushing cont est.” Aaron D ay, a ne igh bor who had been playing video g ames online wit h Maur ice whe n the argum ent sta rted, came over “to mak e sure every thin g was okay,” after hea ring “ver y loud ye lling ” thr ough his game consol e head set and becom ing concerned by how h eated the ar gument soun ded. Day tri ed t o in terven e be tween Mauric e and Stro ng after he “re aliz ed the i nten sity” of the ar gu ment. As the argum ent continued, Feli cie le ft the hou se becau se sh e could not “ca lm them down” a nd “[t] hey wo n’t shut up. They d on’ t list en.” She drove t o a ne arb y parki ng lot a nd sat in he r car, planning to “ stay gone l ong en ough for th em to cool off.” After Felicie le ft, Da y w alked o utside wit h Mauric e, Dea ndre, and Durand. Durand d ecid ed to go hom e, and Day, Mauric e, an d Deandr e deci ded to go to Day’s house a nd “cool down.” Stro ng ca me out to the fr ont p orch and y elled t o Mauric e and Day, sa ying “I got

5 some thing co ming fo r both of y’all . .. from Mia mi. [3 ] Just wa it on it; just wa it on it. ” Mauri ce respond ed, “ Th at’s s ome b*t ch s * t” … [w]e’re leav ing.” Howev er, D eand re and Mauri ce d ecide d to col lect some of their bel ongi ngs before le avi ng an d went back i nsi de th e house; when Maurice w ent ba ck insid e, he did not ha ve a nything in his hands. Day sta yed out side in the ya rd, and St rong remain ed o n the front porch. A few m inutes late r, as Mau rice exit ed t he house and wa lked by Strong, Stron g “lung ed” at Ma uri ce, an d Mau rice h unch ed ov er and beg an scr eam ing, “Help, help, he’s s tabbi ng m e!,” as Stron g sta bbed him wit h a lar ge hunting knif e with a seven - inch b lade. 4 D eand re rushed outside and saw Str ong pinning Maur ice in the corner of th e por ch an d stab bin g hi m repeat edly. As Deandre tri ed to pull Strong away from Mau rice, Stro ng start ed stabbing Dean dre, too. D ay sta rted to run up to the porch, bu t M auri ce yel led at h im 3 Strong was born in Miami. 4 Day admitted th at i n prior te stimony he had desc ribed the fi ght on th e porch as a “bar f ight” and that afte r the stabbing s, Mau rice and Deandre “slammed” Strong d own on the porc h.

6 not to com e up but to call 91 1, which Day d id. Although Dea ndre was sta bbed m ul tipl e times, he was abl e to f orc e Stron g t o the ground, a nd ev entually, Strong dropp ed th e kni fe. D eandr e had a fold ing poc ketknife in his po cket, but “it d idn’t dawn on [him] ” to use it. Day testi fi ed th at Mauri ce an d D eandre w ere u narme d. Dean dre crawl ed off th e porch, called Felic ie, and tol d h er th at Stron g st abb ed Mauri ce. 5 After D eand re ca lled Feli cie, she returned h ome quick ly. Sh e saw Ma urice ly ing on the p orch, and a s she walk ed up to t he porch and re ached out to touch him, Strong “ jumped out with a knif e and point ed it at” he r, say ing, “ Se e wh at you mad e me do? This is your fault.” When p olice offi cers arri ved at the h ouse, Stron g was on t he porch looki ng ov er the bani ster; he was “v ery, v ery, v ery, cal m” and “somewh at n onch alan t ab out th e si tuati on.” Stron g told the o ffic ers 5 Day spoke to police at th e scene an d later at police headqu arters. His statement at po lice headqu arters was a udio - a nd video - reco rded, and a portion was played for the jury. P olice intervie w ed Dean dre sever al days after the stabbing wh ile he was still in th e hos pital, recover ing from surg ery, and a portion of the audio- recording of the i nterview wa s played at trial.

7 the knif e wa s on the banist er, a nd he comp lied wit h the of fice rs’ comman ds to c ome of f the p orch and l ay on th e grou nd wi th h is hands visi ble. S tron g t old o fficers th at “s omeon e” h ad tri ed to kil l him, but off icers did not o bserve any visible injur ies o n him and did not re cover a ny weapons other t han the hunting knife, which appear ed to h ave bl ood on it. On e of t he offi cers test ifi ed th at S tron g smell ed st rongl y of al cohol. Mauri ce and Dean dre w ere t aken to the hospi tal, both with multiple stab wounds. Deandre had su rgery to repai r his wou nd s and re mained in t he hospita l for five day s. Maurice died s hortly afte r reaching t he hospit al. One o f Ma urice’s wo unds was describe d as an “evi sce rati on ” by a res pondi ng EMT, and t he medi cal ex ami ner testifi ed that thr ee of M aurice’s wou nds w ould have been fat al b y themsel ves. The jury also h ea rd eviden ce that during a n argum ent in 2 010, Mauri ce “put a pistol in [Strong’s] face ” and pulled the trig ger, bu t the gun j amme d. In c onnec tion with t hat inc ident, Maur ice was

8 arrest ed an d spe nt s even month s i n jai l, b efor e b eing releas ed. 6 A dditio nally, witn esses des crib ed Mau rice as “s hort - tem per ed,” testifyi ng tha t it did not take much “ to set him o ff,” an d that he was “bip olar ” and not t aking medi cati on for that condi tion. The jury a lso heard evi denc e that on the day of the sta bbing s, Mau rice had be en drinking alcohol; had a .0 72 blood - al cohol l evel; 7 a nd had th reaten ed to th row a b rick th rough the w inds hiel d of S trong ’s tru ck. 8 At tria l, Stron g t estifi ed th at the day befo re the stabbi ngs, he and Fel ici e retu rned h ome from a weeken d trip, and on the d ay of the s tabbings, he visite d a friend in the lat e after noon where h e had two sh ots of b ourbon. Wh en Strong returned hom e f rom h is f riend ’s house, Felic ie was sitting in the kitche n loo king angr y. He a sked her what w as wron g, s ayin g “[t]h e kit chen i s di rty agai n, s o what’s the 6 Maurice ple ad ed g uilty to aggrav ated assault and si mple battery and was sentenced to five years in prison for aggravated assault and a concurrent twelve- month sent ence for simple batt ery, to ser ve seven mont hs based on credit for time serve d after his arres t. 7 The medical exami ner obtained t he blood sample tha t was tested. 8 At trial, Deandre a cknowledged t hat when he was int erviewed in t he hospital after his surgery, he to ld the officer abo ut Maurice’s threatening to throw a brick, b ut he testif ied that he did not remember Maurice making that threat. Strong ackn owledged th at he n ever mentione d Mau rice threatening to throw a brick but sa id “[he] couldn’t remember ev ery detail.”

9 probl em? Wh y are y ou sittin g ther e, lo okin g li ke you ’re l ookin g?” Felicie did not answe r him, and inst ead, she wa lked out of the ho use and dr ove aw ay. After s he le ft, S trong asked Mauri ce and Deand re why they had no t cle aned up the kit chen, and a n argument e nsued. Stron g chas tised Mau rice an d D ean dre fo r not clea ni ng u p. He di d not “go any f urth er with the con vers ation ” but wen t to hi s ro om. H e “didn ’t feel easy about the con ver sation,” “felt a li ttle tensi on,” an d put his k nife in his poc ket and la y down on the bed, “napping o ut.” Stro ng was a lmost aslee p when his “d oor got kic ked in.” Stro ng s aid he go t up an d wen t to th e porch becau se h e hea rd Mauri ce and Dean dre lau ghi ng and tal kin g. Mau ric e, Dean dre, and Day w ere on th e por ch, an d Str ong walk ed up to M auri ce and aske d why Mauri ce kick ed in h is door. Dean dre beg an t o move t owa rds Strong, and S tro n g ask ed him, “Wh ere ar e you g oin g? Wh at are y ou doing? ” At that point, Mauric e took a “sw ing” at Stro ng and knock ed his glasses off his f ace. Mau rice had an obj ect i n hi s rig ht hand, which St rong thought was “either a b ottl e or a b at.” Stron g used his left han d to g rab Mauri ce’s w rist t o prev ent Mau ric e from using the

10 object. S trong could not se e we ll without his glas se s and wa s not sure i f the obj ect Mauri ce was holdi ng was a bottl e or a b at. Deandre imm ediately jum ped on Stron g’s back and sta rted ch oking hi m. Stro ng “dippe d [his] nec k down real tight so [Deand re] didn’ t get the grip he wa nted to get, ” and then Stro ng pulled the knife out of his righ t pock et. St ron g’s tes timon y co ntin ued: What happ ens n ext i s w hen D ea ndre grabs me, th at’s when I p ulled my knife. He pulls me back, and I hit [Maur ice] like that (indic ating). He pulls m e back ag ain, and I p ulled the knife bac k with me a nd I pulled it away from hi m, and I h it [Mau rice ] agai n becaus e now he h as this o bject, tr ying to hit me with it, in his right hand. And I was hit ting at his ha nd, tr ying to get him to drop it, while Dea ndre was steadily p ulling me back. And I think I hi t [Mau rice ] on e mor e tim e. D eandr e pu lled m e back again, and that’s wh en I h eard Mau rice f all, but the obje ct lande d, I t hink, on the gro und that he had in his hand to hit me wit h, the bo ttle he ha d in his hand to hit me with. And n ow I’v e got to k ind of squ are m ysel f of f and try t o get De andr e off my back bec ause he was choking me rea lly well. When I turne d at the angle that I did turn, now I s lip ped dow n on th e floor b ecau se Mau rice h ad bl ed some an d bl ood g ot und er my san dal s, and I sli pped rig ht on the floor. I think Dea ndre winds up on to p of me. Stron g expl ained that Dean dre remai ned on top of hi m, hi tting him, and th at Strong told hi m to stop it becaus e S trong wanted t o get up and h elp Mauri ce. H owev er, D eandr e di d n ot sto p, s ayin g,

11 “I’ ve been want ing to do this,” and ke pt swinging a t Strong. Strong could have p icked up the knif e, which wa s by his leg, t o stab Deandr e, “bu t it w asn’t an y mor e, y ou kn ow, damag e to do to anoth er per son. He couldn’ t hurt me wit h his - - his only right ha nd.” Day starte d yel lin g that t he p oli ce were comi ng an d jum ped o ff th e por ch, and Dean dre k ep t tell ing Day to “sh oot, s hoot, sho ot.” Wh en p olice offic ers a rrive d, St rong tol d th em tha t Mau ric e and Deand re atta cked him a nd trie d to kill him. On cross - exami nati on, th e pro sec utor a sked S tron g to use a replica kn ife t o d emonst rate h ow the sta bbing s occu rred. Str ong respon ded, “I’m n ot goi ng to p ut t hat i n my han d, m a’am.” D efens e couns el obj ect ed, saying, “Having the defe ndant wa ve a knife ar ound in fro nt of the jury, I do n’t …,” and the t rial co urt sust ained the objecti on. 1. Strong cont ends tha t the trial cour t improp erly exclud ed t e xt message s sen t to Mauri ce sh ortly b efore h is d eath, argu ing that the text m essag es s how th at the s end er of the m ess ages w as c once rned about how ups et an d an gry M auri ce was. At trial, the tri al cou rt

12 determi ned th at the tex t mess ages were h ears ay an d so were inadmis sible. Stro ng c halle nged tha t ruling in h is mot ion for new trial. I n denyin g that motion, the trial cour t rejected his claim — but on a dif fere nt basis, concluding t hat th e tex t mes sag es we re n ot relevan t. On app eal, S trong contends that t he text mess ages wer e not hea rsay an d th at they w ere rel evant. A s expl a ined bel ow, we pret ermit the resolut ion o f thes e i ssues becau se we conclude t hat Stron g has fail ed to sh ow any h arm st emmin g f rom th e ex cl usion of the t ext me ssag es. We rev iew a tri al court ’s d ecisi on t o admi t or exclu de evidence for a n abuse of discr etion. See Mbungu v. Sta te, 322 Ga. 564, 567 (202 5). “ Bu t we wil l revers e a c onv iction based on a tri al c ourt ’s abus e of discr etion in exc luding evid ence only if t he exclus ion was harmf ul, ” and the test for noncons titut ional harmles s err or “is wheth er it i s hi ghly p robable that t he er ror di d not contri but e to th e verdict.” Id. at *608 – 09 (quota tion marks om itte d). Stron g attem pt ed to in trodu ce t he text m essag es at issue during t he cros s examinat ion of Detective Ronson Smith of t he Cobb

13 County Po lice Departme nt. On direc t, Detect ive Smith testi fied that he pe rforme d a data extra ction of Mauri ce’s cell phone. The S tate offer ed int o evid en ce, witho ut objec tion, a n e xhibit sh owin g part of the cal l l og for M auri ce’s cell pho ne for the evening o f August 24. 9 On cross - exami n ation, Str ong questioned Detect ive Smith a bo ut an entry on Mauri ce’s call lo g that refle cted th at Mau rice ’s phon e receiv ed an inco mi ng cal l at 11: 07 p.m., l astin g 46 second s, from a contact nam ed “ Big head G irl I L ove.” 10 Strong the n att empted t o introd uce a differen t exhibit sh owi ng th e content of t ext mess ages receiv ed by Ma urice’s cell phone from “ Bighead Girl I Love” imm ediately afte r the 4 6 - sec ond p hone cal l, bu t th e State object ed that th e text m essag es were hears ay. The discussio n ab out the exhibit then co ntinued outs ide the pres enc e of th e ju ry. Accordi ng to def ens e couns el, the tex t m essag es to Mauri ce’s 9 Detective Smith testified tha t Maurice ’s cell phone call log showed an outgoing call on August 2 4 at 11:16 p. m. t o Felicie. Felicie testified that a fter she left home on August 24, she receiv ed a brief phone ca ll from Maurice, and based on that p hone call, she did n ot expect him t o be a t home when she returned. 10 As discussed in D ivision 4 bel ow, Joanna D eutsch, who had been dating Maurice at t he time of his d eath, testifi ed at the motion for new trial hearing that she wa s the contact la beled “Bighead Girl I Love.”

14 cell p hone from “Bighead Girl I Love ” sa id, “ W hat are yo u talking about? Man, fk that s* t. Ign ore i t. L et it f *kin g go, an d wh at the fk? D on ’t do st. F **k it. You have d one s o goo d.” 11 T he St ate reitera ted its o bjecti on th at the t ext m essag es w ere hears ay. Defens e coun sel c oun tered that th e mes sag es we re n ot bei ng offer ed to show that M au rice “has, in fact d one s o good,” but to s how th at “Mauri ce was up set,” arguing: We ’ re o fferi ng i t to sh ow th at M aurice was u ps et, th at when he ha d tha t 46 - second p hone ca ll with Big He ad Gir l I Love, he com mu nicated t o her a f eeli ng of fru str ation, and so when she r espo nded to him, she se nt the se message s di rectl y to h im to cal m hi m dow n or whatever have y ou be caus e he commu nicat ed to h er that he was upset. And s o her -- th e decl arant ’ s sta te of mind, Big Head Gi rl I Love, was that she w as aware th at M aurice was upset a t the ti me that … they h ad a 46 - second pho ne call. The tri al cou rt e xclu ded the ex hibi t as hea rsay, which, subject to 11 The exhibit is not i ncluded in the trial exhibits but was ad mitted into evidence during the motion for n ew trial heari ng. The exhibit co ntains th e following text mes sages from “Bighea d Girl I Love,” which were sent between 11:04 p.m. and 11: 19 p.m.: “What are u talking about” “man f* that s*** ignore it let it f ****** go” [a sterisks in original] “What the fk. Don ’t do st. F** k it. You have done s o good.”

15 certain exc eption s, is genera lly not ad missible. See OCGA § 24 -8- 802. As not ed ab ove, i n denying the mo tio n for new trial, t he trial court d etermi ned that th e text m ess ages we re la ckin g in relevan ce becaus e “thei r m eani ng w as far too s pecul ativ e. ” On appeal, S tr ong con tend s that th e tex t mes sages were n ot offer ed t o est abli sh the tru th of the matt er as se rted but we re offer ed to show th e state of min d of the d ecl arant wh o sent the texts — that the declaran t “ was ups et th at Ma uri ce was ups et and a bout t o d o somethi ng and h e was angry an d u pset.” St ron g thus conte nds that the t ext m essag es were not hears ay under OCGA § 24 -8- 801(c), which defines h ears ay as “a s tate ment, othe r than one made by the dec larant while tes tifying a t the t rial or hearing, offere d in evid ence to prove t he truth of the mat ter ass erted. ” St ro ng also contend s that the mess ages wer e rel evant to his claim of self - defen se. W e need n ot d eci de wh ether t he text m essag es were a dmissib le as rel evant, non - hears ay evid ence b ec ause we concl ude th at, even if t he tr ial co urt abuse d its d iscret ion in ex cluding t he text messag es, Stron g has f ail ed to sh ow harm. As detai led ab ove, the jury hea rd

16 ample oth er ev iden ce ab out Ma uri ce’s an ger at Strong minutes befor e the stab bin gs, Mau rice ’s volatile st ate of mind, and Mauric e’s past thre ats agai nst S trong. And t here w as su bstan tial eviden ce o f Stro ng’s guilt, includ ing an eyew itnes s who t esti fied that Str ong stabbe d Mau ric e wi thou t pr ovocat ion and testimo ny abo ut the susta ined a nd vicio us nat ure of the st abbing s of b oth Mau rice an d Deandr e. Addit ionally, St rong’ s self - se rving te stimony tha t he thought Ma urice ha d a “ bottle” or a “ bat ” was not s up ported by the eyewi tness test im ony, and th e va gue tex t messag es would not have added substantial sup port to his self - defense claim. Accor dingly, we conc lude tha t it is highly pro bab le that any erro r in the ex clu sion of the text me ssag es did not cont ribu te to th e verdict. See Mb ungu, 322 Ga. at 568 (co ncluding tha t exclusi on of ev idenc e of vict im’s th reats again st defen dan t was h armless where th e exclu ded evi dence was simi lar to oth er ev iden ce th at was ad mitte d an d wh ere d efend ant’s self - def ense cl aim was weak); Tar ver v. State, 3 19 Ga. 165, 171 – 73 (202 4) (any erro r in excl usion of ev iden ce abou t pri or ac ts of th e victi m to sh ow th e defen dan t ’ s state o f mind when h e sho t the vic tim

17 was harm le ss g iven that the exclu ded ev iden ce w as la rgely cumulat ive o f admitted evidence and the def endant ’ s sel f - defens e claim was we ak); Hender son v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 713 – 14 (2021) (any error i n excl udi ng ev idence of veil ed th reat the vict im made to the de fendant was harmle ss in the light of admitt ed test imony about more expl icit t hreats the vi ctim and an ass ocia te ma de to th e defen dant, an d the stron g evid ence of th e defen dant ’ s guilt). Accor dingly, th is clai m prov ides no basi s fo r rev ersi ng St rong ’s convic tio ns. 2. Strong argues that the t rial c ou rt ab used its disc retio n in allowing the State to ref eren ce in clo sing arguments St rong’s refu sal to demon stra te h ow th e sta bbing s oc cur red. 12 A closing ar gument must be jud ged in the conte xt in which it is mad e, a nd it is well settled th at a prosecuto r is gra nted “wide latitud e” in the cond uct of 12 Before closing argu ments, the prosecut or said she wanted c larification from the trial court about whether she could mention i n closing that Strong did not want to do the demonstr ation. Strong responded that such an argument would be improp er, but th e trial court s aid th at the prosecu tor could m ention “ in closing that he was given the oppor tunity to show how it was se lf -defense and he declined to d o so.”

18 her clos ing argu ment and may a rgue “ reas onable in ferences from the evid ence, inc luding any t hat addre ss the cred ibility o f the witnesses.” Johnso n v. State, 924 SE2d 451, 457 (Ga. 2025) (quotati on m arks omitt ed). We rev iew the tri al cour t’s ru lin g on an objecti on to the closi ng argumen t for an a buse of di screti on. Se e Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 45 6 (2025). As set forth abov e, on cros s - exam in ation, Strong w as as ked if he wou ld dem onstra te how th e stabbing s occu rred us ing a repli ca knife. Before his coun sel c oul d object, St rong sai d, “ I’m n ot goin g to put t hat in my hand, ma’a m.” Strong ’s c ouns el o bjec t ed, witho ut pro viding a legal ba sis f or th e obj ecti on, and the t rial c ourt respon ded, “ Susta ined,” witho ut elabo rating on t he ruling. Stron g’s couns el did not m ove to s tri ke Stron g’s respon se f rom th e re cord or ask tha t th e tri al court i nst ruct the ju ry to di sregar d it. During the State’ s cl osin g argument, the p rosec utor suggested that Stron g refus ed to act ou t th e scen ario h e d escri bed in h is tes tim ony bec ause that s cena rio w as fal se. Strong points to the follo wing port ion of the Sta te’s clos ing argume nt:

19 I gave him a n opport unity. I sa id, Here, s how us. Show us. Exp lain how you we re so afraid; show us. You kno w, normal ly th ey sa y, Well, don’ t ju st l et som eone t ake i t away f rom y ou on cr oss; righ t? A nd I l eft i t wi de open. Here. H ere i s a kn ife; s how u s wh a t you d id. S how us ho w you we re so scared. I’m not putt ing that thing in my hand. On appeal, S tron g conten ds that this argument w as i mprop er becaus e the State ’s prior requ est for Strong to dem ons trate how the stabbi ng occu rred was itse lf im prop er 13 and becaus e th e trial co urt susta ined Strong ’s objec tion. Howev er, as n ote d above, be fore Stron g’s de fense couns el obj ect ed, Str ong respon ded to th e prosecu tor ’s que sti on by s ayin g, “I’m n ot going t o put tha t in my hand.” A nd a lthou gh def ense co uns el obj ected af ter S tron g mad e this st ateme nt, his couns el did not also move to st rike th at tes timony. Strong fail s to cit e an y case, and we h ave found n one, 13 In sup port of his enumeration that t he prosecutor’s comments in closing argument were imp roper, Stron g suggests that t he prosecutor’s req uest did not meet the req uirements for a dmitting demonstra tive evidence and cites Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 434 (2016) (discussing provisions in current Evidence Code applicable to admissibility of “demonst rative” evidence, including “re -enact ments”). A n amicu s brief filed by the Gwinn ett County District Attorney’s office collects research fro m federal and st ate courts addressing requests for simil ar demonstratio ns. Because the trial cou rt sustained Strong’s objection to the qu estion, whether it was prop er for the State to ask Strong to show how he acted in self -defense is n ot an issue before us in this appe al.

20 holdi ng that a ju ry is n ot auth orize d to con sid er evi dence p resen ted befor e an obj ectio n is made and sust aine d, whe re t he evi denc e has not been st ricken from the r ecor d. Thus, althou gh i t does n ot appe ar that we h av e address ed this part icul ar issu e befo re, w e con clude that Stron g’s answer to the p ros ecuto r’s questi on, which was not strick en an d wh ich th e ju ry was n ot tol d to dis rega rd, was ev idenc e befor e the j ury. 14 Addit ionally, the S tate went on to argu e that Strong ’ s testim ony a bout how th e atta ck an d sta bbing s un folded w as n ot tru e 14 We note that feder al courts and co urts of our sis ter states have hel d, as a general mat ter, that where a witness answ er s a questio n despite the trial court sustaining an objection, the witne ss’s response is evidence befor e the jury unless the trial court instr uct s the jury to disregard the evidence or order s it stricken from the record. S ee, e.g., Mich ael Graham, 2 Hand book of Fed. E vid. § 103:3 (10th ed.) (Nov. 2025 updat e) (“[E]ven though an objection to inadmissible evide nce actu ally presente d before the trier of fact is sustained, the evidence m ay ne vertheless b e considered b y the t rier of fact in the a bsence of a motion to strike.”) (citing U nited States v. Zaccaria, 240 F.3d 75, 8 2 (1st Cir. 2001); Rodriguez v. State, 903 SW 2d 405, 410 (Te x. Ap p. 1995) (“ Where an objection is made and susta ined, but no motion is m ade to st rike the answer o r to instruct the jury not to conside r, the testimony is b efore the jury for whatever it is worth. ”); California v. Anguiano, 2015 W L 12546 32, *1, n.2 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. March 17, 2015). (unpublis hed) (“Thus, we apply the principle — frequently taught in trial advoc acy classes, but ra rely encounte red in practice— that onc e testimony has been given, even if th ere is an objection, a nd even if the obj ection is sustained, the jury can still cons ider it unl ess, in addition, a motion t o strike is mad e and granted.”).

21 and that’ s wh y S trong did n ot w ant t o d emon strate how the stabbi ngs oc curr ed, conclud ing this po rt ion of the a rgume nt by saying t hat Str ong had not “t hought ab out how [he ] would act it out. That’ s why he didn’t put that knif e in his hand. Commo n sense, ladie s and g entleme n; credib ility. ” V iewed i n cont ext, the prosecu tor ’s c ommen ts were based on evi denc e t he jur y hea rd a nd were fo cused on chal leng ing Stro ng ’s cr edibilit y. W e there fore conclu de tha t th ese com ments w ere withi n th e bound s of prop er clos ing arg ument as they were bas ed on p ermi ssibl e i nferen ces and suppor ted by facts in eviden ce. Se e Johnson, 924 S E2d at 45 6–57 (Ga. 2 025) (rejec ting clai m that pros ecut or’s com ments in cl osin g argum ent we re i mprop er, wh ere c ommen ts w ere based on permis sible in feren ces an d suppor ted by the fac ts in evidence); Py ne v. State, 319 Ga. 776, 785 (20 24) (e xplaining t hat a prosecu tor ’s “wide latit ude” in closing a rgume nts includ es b eing aut hor ized to “discu ss and dra w in ference s fro m factu al m atter s relati ng to the credi bili ty of wi tn esses”) (qu otati on m arks omitt ed). Accordingly, the t rial co urt d id not a buse it s discr etio n in ove rruling the ob jectio n

22 and a llowing the ar gument. See Johnso n, 92 4 SE2d at 456 – 57. Thus, this claim f ails. 3. Strong al so conte nds that the tri al cou rt erred by refus ing, over hi s objec tio n, to cha rge the jury on mi stake of fact given his tes timony that h e bel ieved M auri ce was holding a bat or a bottl e. However, a mistak e - of - fact i nstru ction is not re qui red, even upon reques t, i f the ‘mi stake’ or ‘mi sap prehen sion ’ al leg ed by the d efend ant is the bel ief that the v icti m pos ses sed a weapon or w as about to us e d eadl y for ce ag ain st the defen dant, s o lon g as the tri al c ourt fully instruc ts the jury o n justif icat ion and se lf - defe nse, inc luding ana logo us princi ples of ju sti ficati on an d rea son able belie f. Reddi ng v. Sta te, 311 Ga. 7 57, 759 (2 021). See a lso Mb ungu, 322 G a. at 569 (hold ing that there was n o error in tri al court ’s refus al t o gi ve mistake - of - fact ins truc tion where the only mistak e of fact claim e d was t he defendant ’s mista ken belief that the victim had a gun). Here, t h e trial cou rt charged the j ury fully on just ifica tion a nd self - defen se, including c har ging that a def endan t claiming self - de fe n se must have a reas onabl e belief “ th at th e use of su ch f orce i s ne cessary to preven t deat h or se rious bod ily inj ury.” Acc ording ly, Strong has

23 not sh own er ror i n th e trial cou rt’s refu sal to give an inst ruct ion on mistake of fact. Id. Reco gnizing tha t Re dding is fa tal to his cla im, Stron g argues that R edding was w rongl y d ecide d bec ause it impro perly con flated separa te affirmat ive def enses est abli shed by the G en eral A ssem bly and se t out in OCGA §§ 16 -3- 5 (mistake of fact) and 16 -3- 21 (just ifica tion). Ho wever, Strong do es not eng age in the type of stare dec isis ana lysis tha t over ruling Re dding — a nd the cases dating ba ck to at lea st 1965 on which it w as based — would req uire, and we declin e to do s o. See Pr ofet v. State, 322 Ga. 731, 738, n.3 (2025). Theref ore, thi s clai m lack s meri t. 4. Finally, Stro ng asse rts tha t his tria l counse l was cons titut ionally ine ffec tive in two respects. To prevail on his cla im of ineff ectiv e assi stance of couns el, St rong mu st prov e defici ent perfo rmanc e and resu lti ng prej udi ce. See Str ickland v. Washi ngton, 466 US 668, 68 7 (1984). To est ablis h deficien t perf orm ance requires a sho wing that Stron g’s attorney ’s acts or omission s were obj ect ivel y unreas onabl e, c on sideri ng al l th e circu mst ances at the ti me an d in

24 the light of preva iling pro fes sional norm s. See id. at 687 – 90. Decisi ons r ega rdi ng tri al t actics an d st rategy, including the decis ion abo ut which witne sse s to call, may form the basis for an ineff ective ness claim only if such dec isions are so pa tently unreas onabl e th at n o com peten t a ttorn ey w ould hav e fol lowed the same cours e. Se e Davis v. State, 315 Ga. 252, 262 (2022). To est ablish the require d pre judice, Stron g must sho w that, but for his attorn ey’s u npro fess ional err ors, t here i s a “r eason able proba bili ty” that th e resu lt of t he pro ceed in g woul d have been diff eren t. Stric kland, 466 US at 694. “If eith er Stri ckla nd prong is n ot m et, this Court n eed n ot examin e the o th er pron g.” Copn ey v. State, 322 Ga. 794, 798 (2025) (quotati on m ark s omitte d). (a) Strong cont ends tha t his trial c ounse l was defic ient in failing t o sub poena the au thor of th e text mess ages t o tes tify a t tri al. At the m otion for new trial hear in g, Joann a Deu tsch, Mau ri ce’s girlfr iend, testi fied that sh e w as the contac t lab eled “ Bighea d Girl I Love ”; tha t she had a b rief pho ne call w ith Maur ice shortl y bef ore h is dea th; th at, during tha t co nversatio n, he sa id he

25 was ha ving a ver bal ar gument with Stro ng and was planning to leave th e house; that he did not say he was pla nning any so rt of viol ence agai nst Stron g; an d that she sen t the t ext m essages aft er the p hone conve rsat ion. Trial co unsel te stified that he had call ed D euts ch, but once he ident ified himse lf as re prese nting St rong, she hung up on him. Trial couns el also beli ev ed that Deu tsch w oul d have testi fied that th e text message s mean t someth ing other than wh at coun sel believ ed they showed and th at i t was ri sky to cal l her as a witn ess. The t rial c ourt credi ted tri al cou nsel’s tes timon y and d etermi ned th at Stron g fail ed to show that tri al couns el’s deci sion n ot to subp oen a Deu tsch w as def icient. Under th ese f acts, Str ong fai led t o esta bli sh th at tri al coun sel’s dec ision was obje ctiv ely unreason able. He re, th e record refl ects that trial coun sel ma de a st rategi c de ci sion not to call Deut sch, who w as host ile and unlikely to pro vide testim ony in sup port o f the de fense theory. Tri al cou nsel ’s de cision not t o subp oena a h ostil e witn ess who w ould disp ute th e d efen se th eory was n ot so pat ently

26 unreas onabl e th at n o com peten t a ttorn ey w ould hav e fol lowed the same c ourse. See Carr v. Sta te, 30 1 Ga. 128, 129 – 30 (2017) (co ncluding tha t appellan t fai led to show that trial co unsel wa s def icient for no t call ing a witnes s whose te stim ony w ould be “mor e harmf ul than he lpful”). And mo reover, S trong ha s not shown t hat but for th e failu re to subpo ena Deu tsch to testi fy, the re is a reas onable probability t hat the result of the tria l would hav e been differen t. As we co nclude d in Divis ion 1, the re was n o harm f r om the exclu sion of th e tex t me ssag es, an d given Deu tsch ’s testi mony at th e motio n for ne w trial he aring t hat Ma urice w as not p lanning viol ence, we c ann ot say that any deficie ncy in failing t o present her as a wit ness at trial was p rejudic ial. Thus, this cla im fa ils. (b) St ron g also conte nds his t rial co unsel wa s inef fect ive in failing t o o bject to the pro secu tor’s referen ces to St rong ’s “prior tes timony” in ques tions posed on cr oss - examination a nd in clo sing argum ent. Howe ver, S trong has not preserv ed this c laim for appell ate r eview. W e have sai d that “[i] neff ecti venes s cla ims mu st be rai sed and pursue d at the ear lie st pra ctic abl e mo ment, whi ch f or

27 a claim of i neffec tiv en ess of tr ial counse l is at t he motio n for n ew trial s tage if th e def endan t is no l onger repr esent ed by th e at torn ey who re presen ted hi m at t rial,” or the cl aim is f orfe ited on appeal. Allen v. State, 317 Ga. 1, 12 – 13 (2023) (quotati on m arks omi tted). Stro ng did no t raise this c laim of ineffec tivene ss in his o rigina l or amended m otions for n ew tri al an d di d not r aise i t at the hea rin g on the mot ion. Although St rong que stione d his tria l counsel a bout this issue a t the hearing, “ ques tioning d uring t he motion -f or - new - trial hear ing, by its elf, is insuf ficie nt to amend a mot ion for ne w trial to add a claim where the t rial cour t d id not rul e on the clai m. ” Id. (quot ation m arks omi tted). T he t ria l court did n ot ad dress thi s clai m in its orde r denying the mo tion for new tri al. T her efor e, St rong h as forfei ted th e claim. 15 See i d. at 13. For thes e reas ons, Stron g’s cl aim s of in effec tive a ssi stanc e of couns el fail. 15 Strong asserted in his amended motion for new tria l that he was denied a fair trial by the prose cutor’s rep eated mention s of his prior testimon y. The trial court rejected this cla im, notin g that the prosecutor never men tion ed that the prior test imony wa s elicited at a prior tria l. Strong does not enume rate this ruling as error.

28 5. St rong also su mmarily asser ts th at “the cu mul ati ve eff ect of all err ors mu st be c onsi dered,” ci tin g State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (202 0). A t most t here was on e t rial court err or and one d eficien cy on the par t of tri al cou nsel, and even co nsider ing them colle ctive ly, we disce rn no com bined preju dic e warr anti ng a n ew trial. As deta iled above, the Stat e’s c ase included eye witness tes timony tha t Strong vicious ly attack ed Mau rice with out pr ovoc ation and attacked Deandr e wh en Dean dre t ried t o in tervene. Addit ionally, Str ong’s claim of self - defen se was not sup port ed by the ey ewi tness t esti mony and was cont radi cted by his initial c omme nt to Felicie, when he told her, “This is yo ur fault.” More over, even if the t ext mes sag es had been ad mit ted, eith er as n on - hear say or th rou gh D eutsch ’s tes timony, they would h ave been merel y cumulative of other eviden ce before the j ury. Acc ordingly, Strong’s clai m of cu mul ative error f ail s. Se e Asm elash v. S tate, 323 Ga. 33, 44 (202 5). Judgment a ffi rmed. Al l the Jus tices co ncur.