Georgia Supreme Court Reverses Murder Convictions in Owens v. State

1 Suprem e Court o f G eorgia Kathleen Joyner, Public Information Officer 330 Capitol Ave, SE Atlanta, Georgia 30334 404-651-9385 joynerk@gasupreme.us SUMMARIES OF OPINI ONS Publis hed Tuesday, February 17, 2026 Please n ote: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Public Information Office for the general public and news media. Summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered of particular public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official opinions of the Court. The full opinions are available on the Supreme Court website at www.gasupreme.us. OWENS v. THE STATE (S25A1229) The Supreme Court of Georgia has reversed Maria Owen s ’s 2020 convictions in Fulton County Superior Court for murder and related offenses, stemming from the death of an 11- month-old boy who attended Owens’s daycare. In today’s opinion, authored by Justice Ch arlie B ethel, t he Supreme Court has unanimously agreed that the trial court gave an “erroneous and harmful” jury charge, which instructed the jury that it could not find Owens guilty of both involuntary manslaughter— a charge requiring criminal negligence— and aggr avated as sault an d fir st - deg ree child c ruelty — charges requiring criminal intent. However, the majority opinion has concluded that Owens is not e ntitled to a fu ll retrial. Instead, Owens may be retried for felony murder “because the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support the guilty verdicts on those counts,” today’s opinion states. Her conviction for child cruelty remains unchanged by the Supreme Court, because the erroneous jury charge did not affect that conviction—but, the Supreme Court has vacated her sentence on the child cruelty conviction, because the sentencing disposition of that count will depend on the ultimate resolution of Owens’s felony murder charges.

2 As today’s opinion notes, Owens’s case i s “a bi t of a mess.” Owens was fir st tried in 2013. A jury found her guilty of felony murder and involuntary manslaughter, among other charges, and she was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The S tate, represented in this case by the Atlanta Ju dicial Circuit D istrict Attor ney’s Office a nd the Office of the Attorney Ge neral of Georgia, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed Owens’s convictions in 2014, holding that the felony murder and involuntary manslaughter verdicts were mutually exclusive. However, the following year, the Supreme Court abrogated that precedent, concluding that guilty verdicts for negligence and intent crimes are not categorically mutually exclusive, because p roof of a more culpabl e mental s tate do es n ot negat e proof o f a less culpabl e mental state. Owens was ret ried and convi cted of felony murder in 2020. Following her second appeal, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Oct. 23, 2025. Today’s opinion agrees with Owens’s argument that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that guilty verdicts for negligence and inte nt crimes based on the same act would be mutually exclusive, relying on rescinded caselaw. “Here, t he trial court ap parent ly beli eved th e law of the cas e doctri ne requi red i t to appl y mutual exclusivity caselaw as it stood when we decided Owens I,” Justice Bethel write s in today’s opinion. “But the law of the case doctrine does not freeze all statutory and decisional law in place at the time of an earlier appeal; it pr ecludes rev isiting discrete issues ‘actua lly litigated and decided’ in that earlier appeal, even if the law applicable to the issue subsequently changed.” Owens I l itigated and decided whether the ambiguous felony murder and involuntary manslaughter verdicts issued by the first jury were mutually exclusive, but it did not address mutual exclusivity as to any other verdicts. Therefore, the trial court was not required or authorized to tell the jury in Owens’s second trial that it could not find her guilty of involuntary manslaughter predicated on reckless conduct, aggravated a ssault, and child cruelty. While t he majority opinion agrees with Ow ens’s argument that th ere is a r easonab le probability that the result of her retrial would have been different had the trial court issued a correct jury instruction regarding mutual exclusivity, she has not shown a reasonable probability that the verdict on the child cruelty count would have been different without the instructional error. Therefore, the child cruelty conviction stands. “Last ti me, we us ed a sl edgeham mer and di d so in corre ctly,” J ustice B ethel writes. “We now attempt a more precise approach.” Justice Carla Wong McMillian has authored a partially dissenting opinion, joined by Presiding Justice Sarah Hawkins Warren and Justice Verda M. Colvin, whi ch agrees w ith th e majority opinion’s reasoning regarding the trial court’s jury instruction error and decision to revers e Owens’s felony murder ch arge. “Where I depart from the majority opinion is its analysis of how the error affected the outcom e of the tr ial cou rt proceedi ngs and what t hat m eans for any retri al,” Just ice McMil lian writes. She furt her wri tes that, “[b]ecau se of t he intertwined nature of these counts,” the Court should have reversed all of Owens’s convictions affected by the error, including child cruelty, aggravated assault, and involuntary manslaughter, and allowed the State to determine whether to retry her and on which charges.

3 Attorney for Appell ant (Owens): Matthew K. W inchest er Attorneys for Ap pellee (State): Fani T. Willis, Atla nta Judicia l Circuit Distric t Attorney; K evin Armstrong, Deputy D.A.; Alex Bernick, Asst. D.A.; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Georgia; Beth A. Burton, Deputy A.G.; Clint C. Malcolm, Sr. Asst. A.G.; Eric C. Peters, Asst. A.G. LUCID GROUP US A, INC. v. STAT E OF GEORGIA et al. (S25A1139) A lawsuit c laiming that pa rts of the G eorgia’s Motor Ve hicle Franchise Practices A ct violate the Georgia Constitution will go back to a trial court, following today’s Supreme Court of Georgia opinion that affirms in part and vacates in part the trial cour t’s dismissal of the la wsuit. In the underlying lawsuit, Lucid Gro up USA, Inc., a direct - to -consumer se ller of newly manufact ured el ectric v ehicl es, sued t he State o f Georg ia in Fulton Coun ty Superior Court, following the Georgia Department of Revenue’s denial of its application for a dea lership license. As alleged in Lucid’s complaint, the Department of Revenue denied Lucid’s application based on Georgia Code § 10-1-664.1(a) and (c), collectively referred to in this case as the “Direct Sales Prohibition.” The first provision of the Direct Sales Prohibition generally prohibits manufacturers and their affiliated entities from owning or operating a new motor vehicle dealer, and the second provision generally requires manufacturers to sell their new motor vehicles through a franchised new motor vehicle dealer. As a result of these two provisions, new motor vehicle m anufact urers and th eir affili ates g eneral ly cannot sell t heir vehi cles i n the st ate direct ly to consumers and, instead, must use an independent franchised dealer as an intermediary to facilit ate the s ale. The Georgia Automobile Dealers Association intervened as a defendant in the lawsuit and joined the State in moving to dismiss it. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that Lucid’s due process and equal protec tion claims were barred by Article III, Sectio n VI, Parag raph II(c) of the Georgia Constituti on (“Paragra ph II(c)”), which authorizes the Gener al Assem bly to regulate c ertain aspect s of Geo rgia’s new mot or vehi cle indu stry without regard to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses “in order to preve nt frauds, unfair business practices, unfair methods of competition, impositions, and other abuses upon [Georgia’s ] citizen s.” Th e trial court fu rther r easo ned that Lucid fail ed to s tate a cl aim und er Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV of Georgia’s Constitution (“Paragraph IV”), which places certain l imit ations on the enact ment of “gene ral” a nd “speci al” law s, becau se th e Direct Sales Prohibition applies uniformly throughout the state. Lucid appealed the trial court’s decisions, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on Oct. 23, 2025. Today’s unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Verda M. Co lvin, has va cated the t rial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s due process and equal protection claims and has sent the case back to the tria l court for further consideratio n of those claims. “Becaus e the tri al court d ism issed L ucid’s d ue proces s and equ al prot ection claim s under Paragraph II(c) without first considering whether the Direct Sales Prohibition was enacted for the purpose of preventing the types of abuses specified in Paragraph II(c), the court’s dismissal was prematu re,” Justice Colv in writes.

4 The Supreme Court also affirmed in part and vacated in part the trial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s challenge of the Direct Sales Prohibition pursuant to Paragraph IV of the Georgia Constitution. Today’s Supreme Court opinion affirmed the trial court’s determination that the Direct Sales Prohibition does not violate Paragraph IV(a), which provides in relevant part that “[l]aws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout this state. ” The opinion states that “ the Dire ct Sales Prohi bitio n is a gen eral law b ecau se the clas sific ation s it draw s are r easonabl e and relevant to the purpose of the legislation at issue,” and that, “ as the tri al cour t correct ly concluded, the Direct Sales Prohibition operates uniformly for purposes of Paragraph IV(a) because it ‘operates alike on all who come within the scope of its provisions.’ ” The Supreme Court’s opinion further concluded that Lucid lacked constitutional standing to bring a Paragraph IV claim separately challenging OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a)(8), an exception to the Dire ct Sales Prohib ition that only applies to Tesla. The opinion explains that OCGA § 10-1- 664.1(a)(8) “has no impact on Lucid’s asserted right to sell new vehicles directly to consumers in the state,” and that “ Luci d has no t asserted that enforcem ent o f OCGA § 10 -1-664.1(a)(8) in particular (as opposed to the Direct Sales Prohibition) causes any particular injury to its legal rights by itse lf. ” However, the opinion states that the trial court failed to consider whether a 2015 amendmen t to t he Georgi a’s Mot or Vehicl e Franc hise P ractices A ct, wh ich s imultaneously created the Dir ect Sales Pro hibit ion and t he exception from that prohibition for Tesla, violated provisions of Paragraph IV prohibiting the enactment of certain “special law[s].” Previous Georgia c asela w, defines a speci al law as one that draws a “legi slati ve class ificati on” that is “arbitrary or unreasonable” in relation to the “purpose” of the legislation. “[T]he trial court did not consider whether it was possible for Lucid to prove within the framework of the complaint that the 2015 amendment as a whole, or a non-severable component of it, is a ‘special law … for which provision ha[d] been made by an existing general law’ (namely by the then-existing, unamended version of OCGA § 10-1-664.1), in violation of Paragraph IV(a), or a ‘special law relating to the rights or status of private persons,’ in violation of Paragraph IV(c),” Justice Colvin writes. “Accordingly, although we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim to the extent that Lucid directly and separately challenged enforcement of the Direct Sales Prohibition codified in OCGA § 10-1-664.1(a) and (c) and the exception for Tesla codified in OCGA § 10-1-664.1 (a)(8), we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of Lucid’s Paragraph IV claim to the extent that Lucid challenged the enforcement of the 2015 amendment. And we remand the case for further consideration of Lucid’s Paragraph IV challenge to the enforcement of the 2015 amendment.” [Presiding Justice Sarah Hawkins Warren is recused in this case.] Atto rneys f or Appell ant (Luc id Group USA): Keith R. Blackwell, S. Derek Bauer, Jeffrey R. Baxter, Andrew M. Grossman, Kristin A. Shapiro, Billy M. Donley Attorneys for Ap pellee (State o f Georg ia): Chri stopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Georgia; Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General; Ross W. Bergethon, Principal Deputy Solicitor General; Logan B. Winkles, Deputy A.G.; Ronald J. Stay, Sr. Asst. A.G. Attorneys for Ap pellee (Georgi a Autom obi le Dealers Associa tion): C arey A. Miller, Joshua B. Belinfante, Vincent R. Russo, Miles C. Skedsvold, Jane Ashley Ravry

5 Amicus C uriae in S uppor t of t he Appellant (Amer icans f or Pr osperit y Foundation - Georgia): John Lex Kenerly IV, Michael Pepson Amicus C uriae in S uppor t of t he Appellant (Pac ific Le gal Founda tion): Patrick Sillowa y, Ethan W. Blevins, Anastasia P. Boden Amicu s Curi ae in Su pport of th e App ellan t (America n Ins titute fo r Econom ic Resea rch): Holly A. Pierson Amicus C uriae in S uppor t of t he Appellant (Lega l and eco nomic scho lars): John J. Park, Jr. Amicu s Curi ae in Su pport of th e App ellees (Na tion al Au tomobi le Dealers As sociati on): Paul R. Draper, Jeffrey M. Harris, Steven C. Begakis, William Bock, IV Amicu s Curi ae in Su pport of th e App ellees (S tate au to deal ers asso ciati ons): B ryan P. Tyson WILMINGTO N TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. AMERITAS LI FE INSURANCE CORP. (S25Q1073) The Supreme Court of Georgia has concluded that a third party can be said to have procured or caused to be procured a life insurance policy on the life of another [Georgia Code § 33-24-3(i)], even if the insured played a role, and that courts should consider the totality of the circums tances when making that deter mination. This conclusion comes in response to three questions certified to it by the United Sta tes District Court for the N orthern Distri ct of Geo rgia, which arose from a lawsuit filed by Wilmington Trust again st Am eritas Li fe Insu rance Corp. in an attemp t to collect $6 million in death benefits payable under a life insurance policy issued by Ameritas’s predecessor company for the life of Jacqueline Leone. In its c omplaint, Wilming ton Trust alle ged that Amerita s failed to pay the death be nefit due under the policy and that the policy was valid and enforceable under Georgia law. Ameritas alleged t hat the policy is in violation of Georgia’s insurable interest laws and against public policy because it was procured or caused to be procured by third-party investors who lacked an insurable interest in the life of Mrs. Leone. The three certifi ed ques tions from th e federal co ur t are: 1. Can a life insurance policy be void as an illegal wagering contract if, at the time the policy was procured, a third party was complicit in the procurement of the policy? 2. If the answer to the first question is “Yes,” under what circumstances would a third party be consi dered “co mplici t” su ch that i t “procu red o r caused to be procu red” a personal insurance contract upon another individual? 3. Can a life insurance policy be deemed to constitute an unlawful wagering contract if the complicity of the third party does not rise to the level of “procured or caused to be procured?” If so, then the Court respectfully seeks further guidance a s to the circumsta nces that dete rmine when the “complicity” o f the third pa rty rises to the le vel of violating Georgia public policy prohibiting illegal human life wagering and when it does not. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on Aug. 27, 2025. In today’s unanimous opinion, authored by Justice John J. Ellington, the Supreme Court answers the first question by stating that ‘if a policy on a person’ s life is ‘procured’ by a third

6 party (someone other than the person whose life is insured) or ‘caused to be procured’ by that third party, it is void unless the benefits are payable to someone with an insurable interest in the life.” The opinion notes that Georgia’s insurable- interes t statute does n ot use the term “complic it” and ins tead us es the phrase “procured or caused to be procured.” In response to the second question, the Supreme Court disagrees with arguments made by Wilmington Trust— that is, tha t if an insured consents to a policy and participates in the application process, then the insured alone has procured the policy regardless of the role a third party may have played in the policy’s issuance—and by Ameritas— that a court should look solely to who paid the premium. Instead, the Supreme Court has concluded that courts “must consider the totality of the circums tances ” when evaluating whether a third party has proc ured or caused to be procured a life insurance policy on the life of another person. “Various circumstances could be relevant to this inquiry, including who paid the premiums on the policy; who located the potential insured; who participated in the formation of the policy; who prepared and controlled the content of the relevant documents; whether the policy was created for the benefit of the insured or investors; who had the power to name the trustee of a life insurance trust if one was created and who had control over the trust; the sophistication of the insured on financial matters; and the extent of the insured’s participation in the ins urance ap plicati on p rocess,” Justice Ellington wr ites. The Supreme Court does not expressly answer the third certified question, having determined that its answers to the first two questions make it unnecessary to answer the third. Attorney s for Appe llant (Wilmington Trust): Daniel D. Zegura, Julias A. Rousseau, III Attorney s for Ap pellee (Amerit as Life I nsura nce): Danielle Corin Le Je une, Luciana Aquino, Michael J. Miller, Gregory J. Star, Nicolas A. Novy ****************************************************************************** The Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld murder convictions and life pri son sentences for: *Xavier Bradford (Fulton Co.) BRADFORD v. TH E STATE (S26A0194) * Donald C arter (J ackson Co.) CARTER v. THE STATE (S2 5A1129) *Johnny Chapple (Baldwin Co.) CHAPPLE v. THE STA TE (S25A1158) *Lequan Dempsey (Gwinnett Co.) DEMP SEY v. THE ST ATE (S25A1111) *Joey Fournier (Bibb Co.) FOURNIER v. T HE STATE (S25A1272) *Willie Le e Jones (Gwinnett Co.) JONES v. THE STATE (S26A0423) *Dachavous Murphy (Richmond Co.) MURPHY v. THE STATE (S25A1429) *Karre Rivers (Gwinnett Co.) RIVERS v. T HE STATE (S25A1133) *Dyanta Samuels (Chatham Co.) SAMUELS v. THE STATE (S25A1404) IN LAWYER DIS CIPLINARY MATTE RS, the Georgia Supreme Court has d isb arred the following attorney: * Bryan Ma tthew Pritchett IN THE MATTER OF: BRYAN MATTHEW

7 PRITCHETT (S2 6 Y0 106)