Bradford v. State - Felony Murder Conviction Appeal

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: February 1 7, 2026 S26A0 194. BRADFORD v. THE S TATE. P ETERSON, Chief Jus tice. Xavier Bradfo rd ap peals his con victi ons fo r felo ny murder an d other c rim es rel ate d to th e sh ootin g de ath o f Ken eish a Car r. 1 1 Keneisha died on January 14, 2011. I n April 20 1 1, a F ulton County grand jury returned an indictment against Br adford, Pr inston Blackwel l, a nd Kerwin Tate. Bradford was c harged with violation of the Street Gan g Terrorism and Pre vention Act (Count 1), malice murder (Count 2), felony murder (Counts 3 and 4), aggravated assault against Keneisha (Count 5), aggravated assault against Derrick Carr (Count 6), aggr avated assault against Brandon Swann (Count 7), attempted armed robbery (Count 8), and possession of a firearm during t he commission of a felon y (Counts 9, 10, and 11). Bradford was tried alone in August 20 12, and at that trial, h e was found not guilty on Count 2 and g uilty on all remaining counts. Bradford was sentenced to serve life in prison on Count 3, a 15 - y ear priso n term on Co unt 1 to run consec utive ly to Count 3, 20 - year prison term s on Counts 6 a nd 7 to ru n consecutive ly to Count 3 and to e ach other, a 10 - year prison term o n Count 8 to run consecutively to Count 7, and five- year prison terms for Counts 9, 10, and 11 to run consecutive ly to Cou nt 8 and to e ach other. The remaining cou nts were merged or vacated by operation of law. See Leeks v. State, 296 Ga. 515, 524 (2015). Bradford, through counsel (Dolly M. Fairclough), ti mely filed a motion for new trial in Aug ust 2012, but it took 13 years for the tri al court to rule on NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre me Court Rule 27, the Court ’s recons ideratio n, and edit orial rev isions by t he Report er of Decisi ons. The ver sion of the opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geor gia Report s, desig nated as th e “Final Co py,” will replace a ny prior version on the Court ’s websi te and docket. A bound volu me of the Georgia Reports will contai n the final a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 that motion. No order allowi ng counsel to withdr aw is in the record. Bradfor d filed several pro se pleadings over the ye ars, making repeate d requests for trial transcripts to pursu e habeas corpus relief, noting a t several points that he wa s indigent and that h is trial counsel had not provided them to him. The trial court (Judge T. Jackson Bedford, J r.) denied these req uests becaus e Bradford had not made a showing of necessity, er roneously believin g that the time for a direct appeal had lapsed and th at there was no pending p ost - conviction mo tion. T he trial court (Jud ge John J. G oger) denied a nother request for tr anscripts because Bradford fa iled to submit an affidavit of indigen cy or show that his attorney was not su pplied a copy of the transcrip ts. Bradfor d made addit ional requests for the records and fo r appoin ted counsel, and ne w counsel (Cynthia Wright Harrison) made an appe arance in August 2016. Appellate counsel then filed a motion for transcripts i n March 201 8, stating that t he court reporter (Cheryl D. Gilliam) failed to meet s everal deadlines to d eliver them. The transcripts appear t o have been filed sometime in 2018, but multiple diff erent counsel (K enneth W. Shepp ard, Lucile M. Ruiz, Dillon P. McConnell, an d Elizabeth A. Geoffroy) began representing Bradford thereafter; new couns el amended the motion for new trial but mostly filed motion s to continue and notices of leaves of absence. To its credit, the State (repr esented by Kevi n Armstrong and the n Virgin ia L. Davis) filed motions for st atus conferences in 2017 and 2022, noting the significa nt delay in post - convictio n proceedings and that no amended motion for new tr ial had been filed. The reafter, in Jul y 2023, appellate counsel f iled an amended mot ion for new trial, r aising for the first time an allegation of ineffective assist ance of trial counsel. T he court finally held a hearing i n April 20 25 and denie d Bradford’s moti on for new tr ial later that month. Bradfo rd timely appea led, and his appeal w as docketed to this Court’s term beginn ing in Dec ember 20 25 and submi tted for a decision o n the briefs. This inordinate delay was unaccept able. W e regrettably find it necessary to say, yet again, that “it is the duty of a ll those involved in the criminal jus tice system, including trial cour ts and prose cutors as well a s defense counsel and defendants, to ensu re that the appropriate post - c onviction motions a re filed, litigated, and d ecided with out unnecessa ry delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 259 (2018). Although we n ote that some of the del ay was caused by delays in having transcripts prepared, even whe n the transcripts were comple ted in 2018, it took ano ther five y ears for Brad ford’s attorneys to review them before filing an amended motion for ne w trial. Altho ugh a complete record is necessary to pursue a direct appea l, the rest of the delay (a nother seven ye ars) seems to have be en caused at least in par t by our preced ent that ineffec tiveness

3 Bradf ord argues th at th e evi den ce was insuffi cient to conv ict h im; the t rial cou rt m ade a nu mber of ev identi ary err ors; he rec eived ineffe ctive assist ance of couns el; and the combi ned prej udice fr om the tri al court’s errors and trial cou nsel ’s in effecti ven ess wa rran ted a new tri al. As explai ned below, none of thes e cl aims have meri t, s o we affi rm. 1. The tr ial ev iden ce View ed in the l igh t most fav ora ble t o th e verd ict s, t h e trial eviden ce show ed the foll owin g. Brad for d was a membe r of Red Kartel, a cri min al stre et g ang, h ad “K artel ” tatt ooed on h is face, and app eared in a rap video in which he wore a swea tshirt wit h “Kartel Shoot er” p rinted on the back. The individua ls in t hat rap video, includin g Brad ford, had red ba ndanas, which indica ted their Blo od claims of trial counsel nee d to be ra ised on direct appeal, which requires a hearing to develop the factual record and trial counsel to be replaced by another counsel pur ely to allow the def endant t o pursue these possi ble claims. See Schoicket v. State, 3 12 Ga. 825, 830 & n.6 (2021) (describing “ta ngle [d] ” and “confusing” post - convict ion procedure th at has largel y developed as a result of our prece dent requiring Six th Amendme nt claims of ineffec tive assistance of counse l to be raised on direct appeal); High tower v. State, 287 Ga. 586, 593 (2010) (a defendant cann ot raise an i neffectiveness claim on appeal where he continues to be represent ed by trial counsel).

4 gang membe rship; used th e ph rase “S oowoo,” whi ch was a c ommon greeti ng to o ther Blood m embe rs; and flas hed Blood g ang h and signs. Red Kartel membe rs als o ha d tattoo s with the lette rs “NFL,” whi ch stood for “Nev er F orget L oyalty.” Jessi ca Corley, who se former hu sband was the leade r o f Red Ka rtel, testified t hat s he w as a memb er of th e gan g, had an “N FL” tat too on th e si de of he r ear, and wa s told that the locati on of the tattoo would be “wh ere th e bullet [would ] go” if sh e bet rayed th e gan g. Corley a lso test ified that Bradf ord was ass ociat ed wi th the g ang, that the gang sold drugs a nd commi tted a rmed ro bberies, an d th at memb ers ear n ed t heir “f lag,” or band ana repre senti ng th eir me mbersh ip i n the gang, by robbing someon e, commi tti ng an other cri me that prov ide d money for the gang, or sho oting someon e. Corley also testif ied that whe n funds were low, h er fo rmer hu sban d woul d direc t mem bers to com mit crime s to bring in money, and that any time a m ember of th e gang commi tted a cri me th at earned money, a porti on o f it had to be paid to th e gang, akin to pa ying dues. A crim inal street g ang ex per t testi fi ed tha t R ed Kart el

5 origi nall y sta rted as a rap gr oup but b ecam e a g an g affi li ated w ith the Bl oods gan g, and th e grou p’s c rim inal activi ties w ere pri maril y drug s ales and ar med robberi es. H e testi fied that m oney is a big par t of the gan g li fe, hel pin g the g ang mai ntain structu re and order, and that mem bers are expected to p arti cipat e in cri min al acti vity to ea rn revenu e o r inc ome in ord er to “con tribute t o th e ove rall i ncr ease of the gan g.” T he ex pert al so tes tified th at a gan g mem ber has to “pu t in w ork,” o r per form c rimi nal activi ties fo r the gang, i n orde r to gai n respec t an d stan di ng, and thos e who gai n t he m ost r espec t are th ose who are willing to commit violent acts. He also tes tified that res pect is a f oundatio nal princ iple o f a gang, a llowing the gang to “build a kin d of isl and of s afety ” to prev ent chall enges by oth er pe ople and t o “pro tect the ir financia l gain.” On Jan uary 14, 201 1, B rand on S wann was retu rni ng t o his grandm oth er’s a partmen t in Ful ton C ounty after cash in g a che ck. Swann ha d a coup le of hundred d ollars in c ash. S wann stop ped by a Sto p and Shop to buy a dr ink for his f riend Ken eish a, and then walk ed back to S wann’s grandm other ’s a partm ent, whe re h e was

6 sta ying. As he app roached t he apartme nt, two men with guns app roached him, telling him t o “ [g] ive it up.” Swann r esponded that he did not ha ve anything and began ye lling for h elp f rom D erri ck Carr, w ho also liv ed at the apar tmen t wi th Ken eish a. Wh en Derri ck opene d th e ap artm ent d oor, Swan n moved t owa rd t he ap artmen t, at whi ch poi nt one o f the m en began t o pist ol - whip S wann, told Der ric k to “ back the f**k up,” and f ired a s hot. Derric k testifie d that the other “ guy ” had “ covered u p h is f ace.” Derrick tol d h is wife t o get down becaus e “ the y ” were abo ut to “star t shoot ing in the hous e. ” S wann r an inside the a partme nt and gunshot s rang out. Swann and Kenei sha w ere s truck, and Kenei sha di ed from a gun shot w ound. Swann was shown a pho to lineup a nd made a positi ve identi fic ation of th e p erson wh o pist ol - whipped him, but S wann was not a sked to make an in - court identif icat ion. Tabath a Mar tin al so li ved at th e apartm ent with th e Carrs and Swann, and she te stifie d tha t she went to a win dow when she h eard Swann scream ing outsi de the apart ment. She s aw one m ale pointing a gun towards th e door and an oth er mal e with a b lack hoo die further

7 away who w as “t ry ing to cove r hi s f ace.” M artin could not hear what was go ing on through t he windo w but he ard the s hooting. One neig hbor, We ndell Ha rrell, describ ed se eing the tw o m a les follo w i ng Swann. Harr ell sa id tha t one of the m ales was “tall” a nd was weari ng a bl ack shi rt an d a black hoodie. Harr ell also sai d th at “that one ther e,” ap par ently re ferring to Brad ford, 2 ha d “ little drea ds in his head ” and had a bi g tat too on h is face that look ed li ke a crown. Harrell wa s washing hi s car whe n the men wa lked p ast him and beli eved t he two m ales were “up to som ethin g” as they follow ed th e “sho rt guy” (Sw ann). A fter the three m ales turn ed the corner, H arrell heard “Hey, man, y’all stop. M an, d on’t hu rt me. Don’t kill me. … I ain’t got n o money. ” Harre ll looked ar oun d the buil din g and tol d th e m ales to l eave the “short guy” alone, at whic h point the male w ith the tat too fired a shot at Harre ll. Harrel l took c over and then hear d “some lady” c ursing and at tempti ng to defen d the “ little s hort guy. ” Harrell heard on e gu nshot before the door 2 The record does n ot reflect a clear in - court identificatio n of Bradford, but he was the only defendant on tr ial.

8 slammed. H arrel l then saw the tal ler m ale take the gun f rom t he other m ale and fir e into t he apartme nt thr ough the d oor and window. Har r ell con firm ed that th e “ guy ” with the tatt oo on his face was th e pe rson w ho pi stol - whipped the “little shor t guy” and fired a shot at Har rell. Detecti ve S cott D emeester f ound six .380 - cali ber sh ell casing s at th e crim e scen e, and a bal li stics expe rt de termi ned th at all of t he recove red c asin gs were fired fro m the sam e gu n. Sw ann told Detecti ve D emeester tha t he beli eved on e of the su spects wh o sh ot him had b een at the Stop and Shop while Swann wa s there. Detecti ve Dem ee ster se cured surv eil lance fo otage from the St op and Sho p and interv iew ed Shel don Brown, wh o had be en identif ied in that video a nd was known as “Poop ydoo. ” Based on his inv estiga tion, incl udi ng an i nte rview with Brow n, Detec tive D emeester arres ted Prinst on Blac kwell, who went b y “Tank,” a nd Kerwin Tate, who went b y “Elmo.” Black well was in ter viewed a fter waiving his M iranda 3 r ights 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).

9 and lat er cha rged along with Bradf ord an d Tate. Bl ackwel l testi fie d at Brad ford ’s tri al as part of h is plea d eal, stating that he was a membe r of Red Kart el, had “NFL” ta ttooed on his right c heek, and had pl eaded g uilty to murde r in this case and a greed to testi fy again st Brad for d. Blackwe ll testif ied that he ha d pre viously repor ted th at Brad ford and T ate were w ith him at the ti me of th e murder. A fter testifyi ng that h e and B radfo rd w ere chil dhood frie nds and being asked w hethe r B radfor d had an “N FL” tat too on his fa ce, Bl ackw ell’s testi mony was pau sed an d re sumed the n ex t day. 4 When B lac kwel l was re called, h e was treated as a h ostil e witnes s, 5 and he genera lly testif ied that he d id not remember giving any i nforma tion im pli cating Brad ford to D etect ive Dem eeste r or to the p rosecut or. The S tate e nded its q uestio ning when B lackwe ll said that he did not wa nt to testify. Detecti ve Dem eester t estifi ed af ter Bl ack well and gav e an 4 The bench co nference on th e matter wa s not transcribed, b ut it appears that the State had asked for Blackw ell’s testimon y to be postponed. 5 Prior to being recal led, Blackwell filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

10 accoun t of B lack wel l’s cus todi al intervie w in which he descr ibed comm itting the shoo ting with “Shooter” and “Elmo, ” which wer e Bradf ord’s and Tat e’s n ickn ames r espectiv ely. 6 The trial court ultimat ely st ruck Detecti ve De meest er’s tes timony regardi ng Black well’s c ustodial int ervie w and inst ructe d the jury to dis regard it. 7 Detecti ve D emeester als o testifie d that he s eiz ed Bl ackwel l’ s and Tat e’s c ell p hones duri ng th eir arr ests. Dete ctiv e Deme ester looked throu gh T ate’s cont acts on h is ph one, an d he found a numb er (the “ target nu mber ”) assoc iated with “ Fish. ” Bradford was kn own 6 In his custodial interview, Blackwell said that on the day of Ke neisha’s murder, he received a call from Poopydo o, later identified as Brown, who said there was a “guy in the [S top and Shop] with a lot of m oney.” Bas ed on Poopydoo’s instructi ons, Elmo drove Blackwell and Shoote r to an apartmen t complex, where S hooter appro ached the victim, demanded t he victim’s personal belongings, and began to pis tol - whip the victi m when the victim resisted. Blackwell said that Shoo ter, carrying a .380 - caliber handgun, beg an firing into an apart ment whose do or had bee n opened. Blac kwell and Shoo ter fled, got back into E lmo’s car, and they all left the are a together. 7 Although Bra dford did not initi ally object to Detective Demeest er’s testimony about Bla ckwell’s custodi al interview, he obje cted on Confrontatio n Clause grounds when th e State atte mpted to admi t a recording of that interview. The tr ial court sust ained that objec tion and later struck Detectiv e Demeester’s testimo ny about Blac kwell’s custodial inte rview.

11 to go by th e nam e “Fi sh,” as w ell as “Sho oter. ” Du ring Bradfo rd’s cust odial int erview, he did not deny u sin g that number and st ated that no one e lse other than his gir lfrie nd used his phone. D uring his custodi al in terv iew, B radf ord s ta ted th at he w as at h is f ather’s hous e on the day of the shoot ing and th at he nev er lef t the h ouse. Bradf ord admi tte d that h e kn ew Bl ackwel l and T ate but sta ted that he did not know the m “ t hat well. ” Cell s ite rec ords i ndi cated tha t the p hon e w ith the targ et number, alon g wi th n umbers conn ected t o Bl ackw ell an d Tate, all ping ed off a t ower with in on e mil e of the murd er s cene a t the time of th e sho oting and all pi ng ed off the sam e cell tow ers im medi atel y afte r the shoo ting. The subs criber na me for th e ta rget number wa s “Kartel Sho oter. ” Cell pho ne reco rds s howed th at th e targ et n umber sen t a text message on January 21, 2011, say ing, “Da pol ic e got T ank n Elm o. A lot of shyt.” Bla ckwel l (T ank) an d Tate (El mo) were both arr ested on January 21. Th e next d ay th e targ et nu mber s en t a text m essag e to so meone t o “ Take dat shy t str8 hme n pt it up. Dnt neva bring it

12 out t ill I say so.” In ex plain in g the con text of thi s mes sage, Detect ive Demees ter t estifi ed that th e murder w eapon was n ever foun d. T ext message s and cel l ph one call s ce ased fr om the targ et num ber on January 22, 2 011, and a n ew phon e nu mber was a cti vated th at had the same subsc ri ber nam e (Kart el Shooter) a nd s ame add ress associ ated w ith the targ et nu mber. On January 22, a text was sen t from th at new number sa ying, “Fish new num.” In r espons e to a text questi on abou t why the su bscri ber ch ange d hi s nu mber, th e subscri ber said, “ alot going… wit da p olice n shyt. Alot of s hit.” The subscri ber also ment ioned T ank and E lmo goin g to court, and Bradf ord’s girl fri end t old t he subscr iber, “dont tell nobo dy wh ere you at a nd dont talk on the phone cuz t hat’s how they got [s omeone else ] so jus t text an d e rase em.” When th e subs cribe r res ponded that he had chan ge d his num ber, B rad ford’s girl frien d resp onded that “the y” co uld st ill “find that out” based on getting “you r old n um ber. ” A lso on Janu ary 22, som eone texted the new nu mber, saying that “Tank s aid to get rid of that,” to which the subs criber res ponded, “Dat be n gne last nit e.” The follow ing day, in a text exch ange,

13 someon e ask ed th e subsc riber, “Bra i s th at gun hot [?],” and the new subscri ber resp onded, “Hel l y ea[. ]”Det ectiv e Dem eester expl ained that a “hot” gun w as eith er stol en or u se d in a murder. In a subsequ ent mess age sent to th e new num ber, th e messeng er used Bradf ord’s first name, Xav ier, s tat ing, “I hear ya, X avier. ” At trial, Br adfo rd assert ed an ali bi def ense, presentin g eviden ce th at h e was h ome at th e tim e of th e mur der. 2. The ev idenc e was suff icien t. Bradf ord argu es on appeal that the evide nce wa s insufficie nt as a matt er of cons tituti onal due pro cess to support his co nvictio n s. Bradf ord argu es t hat th e Stat e’s ca se re lied pr imarily on t he hearsay testim ony of co - indic tee Blac kwell and circum stan tial eviden ce in the f orm of cel l phone re cords and rel ated he arsay evide nce. Bradf ord a rgues that thi s hea rsay ev iden ce coul d not support a convi ction be cause it had no pro bative va lue unde r the versio n of the Evi dence Cod e that gove rned h is tri al 8 and that it a lso did not 8 Because Bradford was tried in 2 012, his case is controlle d by the old Evidence Code.

14 exclu de eve ry reason able the ory o f i nnocen ce at tri al. He als o argu es that wit h resp ect to his cr iminal str eet ga ng convict ion, t he State failed to p rove a nexu s betw een the p redicate acts and an inte nt to furthe r the i ntere sts of th e gang. We dis agree. In con sideri ng a claim th at evi den ce w as not sufficie nt as a matter of feder al cons titutio nal due pr ocess u nder Jack son, 9 “our revie w is limited to an eva luation o f whether the tr ial evidenc e, when view ed in the l ig ht most favorabl e t o th e verd icts, is suffi cien t to auth orize a rati onal t rier of f act to find t he def endan t gu ilty beyond a r eason abl e doubt of the c rimes of wh ich h e w as con vict ed.” Goodm an v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 766 (202 2) (quotati on mark s omitted). “ We pu t asi de any ques tion s about c onfl icti ng eviden ce, the cred ibility o f witnesses, or the weight of the e vidence, leaving t he resol ution of suc h th ing s to the dis creti on of th e tri er of fa ct.” I d. at 766 – 67 (quotati on marks om itt ed). In determining t he suf ficienc y of the evi den ce, w e cons ider al l of the evi dence admit ted by th e trial court, even erron eo usly a dmitted evide nce. Bradshaw v. State, 296 9 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979).

15 Ga. 65 0, 653 (2015). But in a suffic iency ana lysis for ca ses tried under the pre - 2013 Evidenc e Cod e, which ap plied to this tria l, we do not cons id er im properl y ad mitte d hears ay evi den ce, which wa s consi dered to h ave n o pro bati ve va lue. I d. at 65 3 n.2. (a) The tr ial evide nce th at w e can co nsider on suffi cie ncy rev iew. Befor e engaging in our suf ficiency a nalysis, we must addr ess Brad ford’s argument that m uch of the evide nce point ing to his guilt was hea rsay evi dence tha t had no pr obative v alue. H is h earsay argum ents la ck merit. With res pec t to th e cell p hone ev idence, a Metro PCS record s cust odian te stified th at th e cell phone r ecords in th is cas e, including text mess ages an d cell s ite towe r in formati on, were kept in the ordinary cou rse of bu sin ess, d escri b ing how those re cords were creat ed and t hat, unless ther e wa s a leg al reques t for the rec ords, the reco rds we re p urged wit hin six mont hs. Given t his te stimony, Bradf ord has failed to show th at a proper fou nda tio n was lacki ng to precl ude th e admissi on of the cell phon e record s as busi ness record s as an excep tion to th e hears ay rul e under f ormer OCGA § 24 -3- 14.

16 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Sta te, 2 99 Ga. 38 5, 391 (2016) (cell p hone record s cust odia n testi fied that rec ords w ere made i n the regular cours e of busin ess at o r nea r th e ti me tha t th e phon e calls w ere m ade and th e cel l tow ers d etect ed th e p resen ce o f the ph ones); Kilgor e v. State, 295 G a. 72 9, 730 –32 (2014) (because th e app ellant fail ed to show t hat “ fo undatio nal ” el ement was missi ng, cel l ph one reco rds wer e admissi ble as bus iness records based on testi mon y from record s cust odia n that cell p hon e re cords w ere kept in ordinar y cours e of busi ness). Bradf ord als o argu es that De tect ive D emees ter ’s testi mon y that two ce ll phone numbe rs ass ociat ed with subs cribe r “Kar tel Shoot er ” belon ged to Bradf ord w as based on h ears ay, becaus e it was based on Metro P CS records and a sta tem ent from Tate. 10 W e h av e alread y con clud ed th at the M etro PCS reco rds quali fied as bu sin ess 10 We had held that, under the ol d Evidence Code, un less it w as the rare case in which the conduct of an investig ating officer was a matter need ing to be explained, it was error to permit a n investigating officer to testify, under the guise of explaini ng the officer’s cond uct, to what oth er persons said to th e officer during the investigation. See, e.g., Weems v. State, 269 Ga. 577, 5 79 (1998).

17 record s and t hus did no t cons titute he arsay. And contrary to Bradf ord’s arg umen t, Detec tive D emees ter did not obt ain the initial target phon e nu mber fo r Br adfor d based on any stat ement f rom Tate. Det ectiv e Demees ter t estified that he obtained t he phone num ber by ac cessi ng Tate’s c ell ph one an d f ound the numbe r under the conta ct fo r “F ish,” wh ich w as on e of B radf ord’s ni cknames. This num ber was confi rmed by the Metr o PCS re cords c ustodian as having a su bscri ber accou nt nam e d “K artel Shoo ter. ” Thus, t he evide nce linking the “ Kartel Shoote r ” cell p hone numbe rs to Bradf ord was not bas ed on hea rsay, and Brad ford ’s argu men t theref ore fai ls. Bradf ord als o argues that the custod ial statements of co - indi ctee Bl ackw ell, whi ch were introduced t hrough the testimo ny of Detecti ve Dem eester, were h earsay. We need not re solve this questi on, how ever, bec ause that e viden ce was u lti mately stri cken from the ju ry’s con side ration and, thus, is n ot a pa rt of our

18 suffic iency review. 11 (b) The e vidence was suf ficien t t o e stabli sh B radfo rd’ s involv emen t in th e crimes. Disco unting Blac kwell’s custod ial stat ements (bec ause th ey were s trick en), the evi denc e bef ore th e jury w as s uffici ent t o establ ish Bradf ord’s inv olvem ent i n the cri mes for which he was convi cted. We fi rst c onsi der whet her the evi denc e was suffi cient to show B radfo rd’s inv olvem ent in the c rimes as a g eneral matt er, and then an alyz e se parat ely his arg ument that the evi dence w as insuffic ient t o show a v iolation of the Stree t Gang Act. In Bl ackwel l’s l imited testi mony that was res pon sive t o the Sta te’s quest ions, he s pecifica lly testif ied that he had plea ded guilty to the crimes i n t his case, an d that he tol d the prose cuto r previ ousl y that Br adford and Tate we re wit h h im at t he tim e of th e mur der. 11 The trial cou rt struck Bl ackwell’s cu stodial statement s under the Confrontation Cla use of the Si xth Amendment to the United St ates Constitution, despit e the fact that Blac kwell testified and Bradford was able to cross - examine him. But s ee Burney v. State, 309 Ga. 273, 282 – 8 3 (2020) (th e Sixth Amendment ’s right o f confrontatio n provides defen dants with “t he right physically to face those wh o testify agai nst him, and th e right to conduc t cross - examination.”).

19 B ecause B lack well was an eyewitness by vir tue of his own part icipat ion in the crime s, his testim ony constit uted dir ect eviden ce, so the circu mstan ti al evi den ce sta tute (for mer OC GA § 24 - 4- 6) does not apply in our suffic iency ana lysis. See Bra dley v. Sta te, 318 Ga. 142, 14 4 (2 024) (“ And if there is a ny direct ev idence presen ted by the Stat e, the circum stantial ev iden ce statu te does no t app ly in a suff iciency ana lysis.” (quota tion mark s om itted)). 12 Addit ional indep endent evi den ce imp licat ed Bradf ord. 13 Sever al eyewit nesse s, including Swann, testified about the ir 12 In his appellate brief, Bradford ma kes passing refere nces to the circumstantial evid ence in this case, bu t he does no t cite former O CGA § 24 -4- 6, or its successor in the curre nt Evidence Cod e, OCGA § 24 - 14 - 6, which provides that w here a conviction is based on ci rcumstantial e vidence, “ the proved facts shall not only be consi stent with the hypot hesis of guilt, but shall exclude every ot her reaso nable hypot hesis save that of the guilt of the accused[.]” To th e extent he t ries to r aise a clai m under for mer OCGA § 24 -4- 6, it also fails. See Blevins v. St ate, 291 Ga. 814, 816 (2 012) (whether an alternative hypothe sis was a reasonable one under former OCGA § 24 -4- 6 was principally a questio n for the jury). 13 In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Bradford makes no argument that Bl ackwell’s testimony ne eded to be corrobo rated. See Crawford v. State, 2 94 Ga. 898, 900 – 01 (2014) (un der f orme r OCGA § 2 4 -4-8 (now OCGA § 24 - 14 - 8), in felony cases where the only witness im plicating the defenda nt is an accomplice, th e accomplic e’s testimo ny must be sup ported by inde pendent corroborating evide nce that “either dire ctly connect[s] the defendant wi th the crime or justif[ies] a n inference that he is guilty.”).

20 observa tions of event s lea ding to the attem pted a rm ed rob bery an d Kenei sha’s d eath. That eyew itnes s testimon y est abl ished that two males followe d Swann; o ne man pulled a gun on hi m, pis tol - whip ped him, de mande d money from him; and one of the men fire d shots into the ap artmen t that kille d Kene isha. Alt hough Swa nn and De rrick did not mak e a positi ve in - court ide ntific ation of the assailant s, Harre ll also witnesse d the shooting a nd te stifie d that “t hat one there, ” apparen tl y re ferring t o B radfo rd (t he only def endan t on tria l), was the pers on who pistol - whip ped S wann, while the ot her assa ilant was “covering his face,” which wa s consis tent with Martin ’s and Der rick ’s testi moni es t hat one assai lan t poin ted a gu n while the other was tr ying to “cove r his face.” 14 No do ubt, Harre ll’s descri ption of Brad ford as “tha t on e there” was no t a crys tal - cle ar ident ificati on, bu t his testim ony c orr oborate d Blackw ell’s t esti mony. 14 Harrell also said t hat “that one ther e” had a tat too on hi s face th at looked like a “ cro wn or something.” Detective D emeester testified t hat Bradford had a tattoo of “NFL” on his f ace but did not mention whether it was in the shape of a crown. B lac kwell said he had a crown t attoo on his face. To the extent there was some conflict in t he evidence, th at w as for the jury to resolve. See Goodm an, 313 Ga. a t 766 – 67.

21 Rega rdless o f which of the two m ales a ctually sho t into the apartmen t, t he e vid ence re coun ted a bove never theless e stablish ed Bradf ord’s parti cipati on in the cri mes, at least as a party to a crime. See McIntyre v. State, 312 Ga. 53 1, 53 4–3 5 (20 21) (a sho oting is a reason ably foreseea ble con sequ ence of an armed robb ery and the jury wa s authorize d to find defenda nts guilty of conspir acy to commi t armed r obbery and felon y mu rder wh ere t hey agre ed to commi t an ar med r obbe ry, took a su bstan ti al step tow ard commi tting that offen se and an overt act in furth eran ce of the conspi racy, and cau sed a de ath in th e proces s). See also OCGA § 16 - 2- 20 (b)(1) – (4) (a d efend ant m ay be f ound gui lty of a crime i f he dire ctly co mmitt ed it or wa s a “party t hereto,” meaning h e m eaning he “cau se[d]” an other pers on t o comm it the cri me, “aid[ed] or abet[ted]” i ts commi ssion, or “[i ]nten ti onall y advi se[d ], encour age[d], h ire[d], cou nsel [ed], or pr ocur e[d] anoth er t o comm it the cri me”). In add ition t o the ey ewitnes s test imony, t he cell phone eviden ce corroborat ed Blackw ell’ s tes timon y th at Bra dford was

22 presen t and p rovi ded p roof of Br adfor d’s shar e d criminal int ent. See Glenn v. State, 306 Ga. 550, 553 (201 9) (proof of s hared crimi nal intent may b e infer red f rom the d efendant ’ s pre sence, compan ion shi p, and con duc t with anoth er pe rpet rator befo re, durin g, an d after the cri mes). Cell s ite eviden ce sh owed th at a phone belo nging to Br adfor d w as in the area of th e cri me during the t ime of th e attemp ted robb ery an d shooti ng o f Ke n e isha and that it travel ed wi th ph ones associ ated wit h Tate and B lack well before a nd after th e crime. The cel l phon e r eco rds al so show ed that aft er Ta te’s and Bl ackw ell ’s arr ests, Brad ford chan ged h is ph one num ber, explai ni ng in text mess ages th at h e did s o becaus e there w as “al ot going…wit da polic e n shyt. Alot of shit. ” An d despite telling Detecti ve Dem ee ster th at he di d not k now B lackw ell and T ate very well, Bradf ord se nt an d recei ved n umerou s tex t me ssages after th e crime tha t show ed an inter est in Bla ckwell ’s and Tate’s ar rest s and schedu led cou rt appe aran ce s an d that refl ected hi s effo rts to help Bl ackwe ll hide o r dest roy e vidence, as he con firm ed th at h e got “ri d of t hat,” a s Blackwell w anted. Although t he “ tha t ” in t he text

23 message was n ot cl ear, th e jury cou ld i nfer th at thi s refer red to th e murder wea pon, as B radfo rd c onfirm ed i n a subsequ ent text mess age that the gun wa s “hot, ” wh ich D ete ctive D emeester expla ined refer red to the gun bei ng u sed in a cri m e. Lastly, in several tex t exch anges betwe en Bradford and his girlfr iend after Black well ’s and T ates’s ar rest s, there w as d iscus sion about Bradford not t elling anyo ne wher e he was and avoid ing talking on the p hone in order t o avoid pol ice det ecti on. All o f t hese tex t message s provi de d circum stan tial eviden ce of gu il t. See, e. g., Adams v. State, 318 Ga. 105, 1 12 (2024) (attempt to h ide f rom o r elud e po lice c onsti tutes circum stan tial evi dence of cons cio usness of gu ilt); Morrell v. Stat e, 313 Ga. 2 47, 256 (2022) (“ Geo rgi a law h as lon g recogn ized th at eviden ce th at a d efend ant a ttemp ted t o obst ruct ju sti ce … can s erve as c ircumsta ntial evid ence of guilt. ”); St ate v. O rr, 305 Ga. 729, 741 (2019) (conce alment is evi dence of cons ciou sness of gui lt). Consi derin g all of the ev iden ce reco unted above, t h at evi dence w as suffic ient as a matter of consti tut ional due proc ess to estab li sh Bradf ord’s pa rtici pation in the cri mes.

24 (c) The evidence w as suf fici ent to support a violati on of the Street G ang Act. Bradf ord argues t hat the e vidence wa s insuff icient t o supp ort his Street G ang Act con vi ction be cause the S tate d id n ot establis h a nexu s betw een th e predicat e acts (su ch as f elon y mu rder, a ttemp ted armed ro bbery) and an inten t to furth er the gang ’s inter ests. We disag ree. The St reet Gang A ct mak es i t “ unl awfu l for any pe rson... assoc iated with a cr iminal st reet gang to ... p articipa te in crimina l gang activ ity th rough th e com mission of” cert ain en umer ated offense s. OCGA § 16 - 15 - 4(a). To establ ish a viol ati on of the Str eet Gang Act, th e State is r equire d to prove four eleme nts: (1) th e existen ce of a “crim inal stre et gang,” defi ned in OCGA § 16 - 15 - 3(3) as “any o rgani zati on, ass oci atio n, or group of th ree or more p ersons as soci ated in f act, whether for mal or inf ormal, whic h enga ges in c riminal ga ng activi ty”; (2) the d efend ant ’ s associat ion with the gang; (3) that the d efend ant com mitt ed any of sev eral enum erat ed crimina l offe nses, includ ing thos e “invo lving vio lence, posses sion of a weap on, or use of a weapon ”; an d (4) that the cri me was in tended to f urth er th e int erest s of th e ga ng. Rook s v. St ate, 317 Ga. 743, 75 3 (2023) (c leaned up).

25 Bradf ord only challe nges the sufficienc y of the ev idence a s t o the f ourt h element, so we limit our analy sis to th at elem ent. See Blocke r v. Stat e, 316 Ga. 568, 575 – 76 (202 3) (in suffic iency r eview, cons idering only ele ments of Street Gang A ct chal leng ed by th e app ellant). T hi s fou rth el ement req ui res som e nexu s betw een the a ct and t he intent to furt her stree t gang act ivity. Ro driguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 80 7 (200 9). The State may meet th is r equirem ent in a num ber of way s. F or examp le, evi dence of a defen dan t ’ s association with a gang and particip atio n in its activitie s before and d uring the crimes cha rged may “provi de th e requi red n exus b etwe en hi s crimina l acts and the intent to further the ga ng ’ s interests.” Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 342 – 43 (2016). S ee al so Rodriguez, 284 Ga. at 807 (“M anagem en t of or par ticipat ion with o thers in ... criminal str eet gang activit y neces sarily implie s knowle dge of the gang ’ s crimi nal acti vi ties and a speci fi c inten t to fu rther its crim inal purposes.”). In a ddition, evi dence that a gang com mits certai n crimes in orde r to financ e the gang co uld estab lish such a ne xus. Se e Strip ling v. State, 304 Ga. 13 1, 134 (201 8). Further, d iscus sions

26 between fel low gan g memb ers after the ch arged cri mes, including about attempts t o avoi d get ting caugh t, may p rovide pro of of a nex us between the cri mes and the gan g ’ s i nter ests. See Boyd v. St ate, 306 Ga. 204, 2 11 – 12 (2019). Here, the evi den ce desc ribe d abo ve show ed tha t Red K artel was e ngaged in criminal a ctivit ies prima rily ce ntered o n selling drugs and com mitt ing armed robbe ries. Detect ive De meester testifi ed th at th e gang memb ers w ere exp ected to pa rtici pate in crimina l activit y in orde r to earn reve nue tha t would help the gang’s interes ts. Likew ise, C orl e y tes tified th at Red K arte l gang mem bers commi tted cri mes, including ar med robber ies, to bene fit t he gang by payin g a porti on of t he pro ceeds to the g ang l eader. 15 The ev idence 15 As part of his sufficiency argument, Bradford co mplains about aspe cts of Corley’s testi mony in which she des cribed an ar med robber y she part icipated in with fellow Red Kartel memb ers. Br adford argues that this testimony w as improperly admitt ed beca use this Court ruled in State v. Jeff erson, 302 Ga. 435 (2017), that OC GA § 16 - 15 -9 violate d a defendant’s conf rontation right by allowing for the admission of “the co nvictions of non - testifying no n - parties as evidence of a criminal str eet gang.” Jef ferson, 302 G a. at 44 3. Bradford makes no independent clai m about the admissi bility of this testimo ny, and as we have said before, in considering suffici ency under the old Evid ence Code, we consider all the evidence, even im properly admitted evidence (except for hearsay evidence), in evaluating suffici ency. Moreover, Jefferson would not seem to

27 was th erefore su fficient as a mat ter of f ederal consti tuti onal du e proces s to all ow th e jury to c oncl ude th at B radfo rd had the inte nt here t o commit t he armed rob ber y in order to furt her th e in teres ts of Red Ka rtel. See Butler v. State, 3 10 Ga. 892, 897 – 98 (2021) (ne xus establ ish ed when the gan g used prostitu tion and robbe ry of “j ohn s” to finan ce th e gang and th e shooti ngs res ulted f rom that s ort of activity). In sum, t he evid ence wa s sufficie nt to authori ze th e ju ry to fi nd Bradf ord gu il ty of al l th e crim es f or w hich he was co nvi cted. 3. M any of B radford’s chall enges to parts o f Detectiv e Demee ster’ s test imon y we re not pres erved for review. Bradf ord argue s th at the t rial court erred i n al lowi ng Dete ctive Demees ter t o te stify that two c ell phone nu mbers bel onge d t o Bradf ord b ecaus e that tes timon y was bas ed on hears ay eviden ce. W e brie fly cons idered the extent to which this testimon y was bas ed on hears ay evi dence above in setti ng out w hat evi dence we coul d rev iew in our s ufficie ncy analy sis. We need n ot con sid er the h earsay apply in this c ase, becau se Jefferson involved “no n - testifying no n -parties,” where as Corley did testify and wa s subject to cross-exa mination.

28 challe nge furth er becau se B radfo rd di d not objec t to th is te stimony on hears ay groun ds, me anin g th at this claim was not pres erved for appell ate revi ew under the ol d Ev iden ce Cod e. See Eleby v. St ate, 319 Ga. 2 34, 247 (202 4) (under th e forme r Evi dence C ode, the fa ilure to obje ct to t esti mon y precl uded appell ate r eview, and ther e was n o plain error revi ew avail able). Similar ly, we need n ot con sider B radf ord’s arguments regardi ng Dete cti ve Dem eester’s testi mony abou t Bl ackw ell’s custodi al statem ents. Ev en if B radf ord o bject ed to thi s tes tim ony initiall y, which he did not, the trial court ultimate ly struck t his tes timony, so the is sue w as moot ed. 4. Bradford has faile d to show that th e tria l court abuse d its discr etion i n admitti ng the r ap video on th e bas is t hat it was mor e unduly pr ejudic ial than p robative of Bradford’ s associat ion w ith a crimin al str eet gan g. In thi s cl aim, Brad ford provi des a recitat ion of the discu ssion surr ounding the admis sion of th e rap vide o evide nce, includ ing his objecti on on rel evan ce an d und ue preju dic e grou nds. But he makes no argu ment i n h is brief as to w hy the evid ence w as prej udi cial,

29 much les s unduly prej udicial. See Mil ler v. State, 277 Ga. 707, 709 (200 4) (under th e form er Evidenc e C ode, rel evan t ev idence could be exclud ed if its probative v alue w as substant ially outwe ighed b y the dang er of undue prejud ice). Ther efore, Bra dford ha s fai led to c arry his burden of s how ing error. Se e Hende rson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 402 (19 83) (“[T] he burd en is on th e appel lan t t o sh ow, from the record, that er ror occurred. ”). 5. Bradford fai led t o pres erve the argume nt that t he t r ia l court abused its d iscreti on in admitti ng recordi ngs of his j ail phone calls. Bradf ord argu es th at t he trial cou rt abuse d its d iscret ion i n admitti ng Stat e’s E xhi bit 1 25, record ing s of Brad ford ’s jai l ph on e calls, becaus e the recordi ngs we re ir relev ant an d thei r preju dici al effect outweig hed any p roba tive v alu e. Br adford also argu es th at th e Sta te fa iled to lay a fo undation for Detect ive Dem eester t o ident ify the voi ces on on e reco rdin g as b elong ing to Bradf ord an d Je rmick a Wyatt, his girlfr iend. Br adford ha s not p reserv ed th ese arg ument s for ap pell ate rev iew. When t he State m oved t o admit t he exhib it co ntaining the

30 record ing s, Br adfor d ma de n o obj ection. N or did B radfor d obj ect when Dete ctive D emeester test ified that he cou ld rec ogni ze the v oice of Brad ford an d Wyatt on the reco rded cal ls. Becaus e Bra dford m ade no obj ecti ons on t he grou nds h e rais es on appe al, h e failed to preserv e these arg umen ts for ap pellate revi ew, and p lain err or revie w is unavaila ble unde r the old Evide nce Code. See Eleby, 3 19 Ga. at 247. 6. Bradford has n ot esta blished th at t rial cou ns el pro vided ineff ective assista nce. Bradf ord argu es th at tri al coun sel was i neffe ctive on sev eral ground s. N one of h is clai ms have m erit. T o prev ail on hi s inef fectiv en ess cl aim, Bradf ord must sho w that (1) his trial couns el ’ s perform an ce was cons tituti onall y deficien t and (2) h e was preju dic ed by cou nsel ’ s defi cien t perf orman ce. Se e Stric kland v. Washi ngton, 466 US 668, 68 7 (1984). If Bradf ord fails to establ ish one of th ese tw o pro ngs, “we need n ot exami ne th e other. ” Robinson v. Stat e, 30 8 Ga. 543, 553 (2 020). To show d efici ent perfo rmanc e, th e defen dant m ust demonst rate that c ouns el

31 perfo rmed coun sel ’ s duties in an objec tively unr easonab le way, cons idering all o f the circums tances and in the light of preva iling profess ion al n orms. See Strickl and, 466 US at 687 – 88. In e valuating alleg ed d eficie ncy, we aff ord a “stro ng presum ption t hat couns el ’ s perfo rmanc e fel l wi thi n a wi de range of reason able p rofessional cond uct, and that counse l ’ s deci sion s wer e made i n the exe rcis e of reason able p rofession al ju dgmen t.” Wr ight v. State, 314 G a. 355, 35 7 (202 2) (quotati on marks omitte d). And “d ecisions about t rial t actics and str ateg y in particu lar m ay not fo rm t he basi s of an ineffe ctiveness claim unl ess th ey were s o paten tl y un reasona ble that no competen t attorn ey w ould have f ollow ed s uch a c ourse.” Warren v. Stat e, 314 Ga. 598, 602 (2022) (quotation marks omit ted). To esta blis h prej udi ce, Bradf ord “must sho w that there is a reason able p robabili ty th at, but f or c ounsel ’ s un prof ession al e rror[], the re sult of the proc eeding wo uld have been different.” Stri cklan d, 466 US at 694. “In r eviewing a ruling o n a cla im of ineffec tive assist ance of cou nsel, we de fer t o th e tri al cou rt ’ s findings o f fact unl ess they are cl early er rone ous, bu t we apply the law to the facts

32 de novo.” Stat e v. Spratlin, 305 G a. 585, 591 (2019). (a) Trial cou nsel w as not d efici ent f or f ail ing to s eek suppr essi on of t ex t mes sage s to and from Br adfo r d’s phone. Bradf ord argues that tria l counsel was ineffect ive for failing to move t o su ppress the text mess ages to and from his phon e bec ause, altho ugh the S tate secured a court order to ob tain those text message s from Metro P CS, there i s no in dicati on th at a p roper petiti on wi th th e requi red s howi ng of p robable cau se had been filed. We dis agree. Because Bradfor d claim s tha t tri al cou nsel was ine ffective fo r failing t o fi le a motio n to suppres s, he ha s t he burden “ to mak e a strong s how in g that th e damag ing eviden ce wo uld h ave b een suppres sed h ad c ouns el made th e m otion. ” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 73 3 (201 5). To make t his showing, he has to es tab lish that the motion to su ppre ss would “clea rly h ave su cceed ed” on the g round alleg ed had his tria l couns el raised it. Ward v. State, 3 13 Ga. 265, 275 (2022). He h as fai led to c arry t hat bu rden. Bradf ord a rgues that th e State di d not compl y wi th th e Stor ed

33 Commu ni cations Act, 18 U SC § 27 03 (a), which requi re s a w arrant to obtai n the di sclos ure of cell ph one mes sages pu rsuan t to th a t provis ion, or the complem entary p rovisi on u nder th e Georgia C ode, OCGA § 16 - 11 - 66.1 (a). At th e moti on fo r n ew tri al h earing, B radfo rd noted that the m otion s suppo rting th e requ est f or th e cell phon e record s w ere no t i n th e recor d or m ade avai la ble t o the def ense and argue d that without th ese mo t ion s it was n ot cl ear wh ether the State foll owed th e correct proc edure or h ad a su ffici ent justi ficati on for th e rec ords, so t rial coun sel shou ld h ave fil ed a motion to suppres s t o “hash that out.” Bradf ord’s claim fai ls. S hortly after Br adfor d’s tri al in Aug ust 2012, we held, a s a matt er of fi rst impres sion, tha t defendan ts general ly h ad n o rea sona ble ex pect ation of p riva cy in thei r cel l phone r ecords an d ther efor e lack ed stan din g to rais e a Fou rth Amen dment chal leng e to the discl osure of the recor ds and t hat t he suppres si on of e vi dence wa s not an availabl e re medy u nder th e Stored Comm unicati ons A ct or OCG A § 16 - 11 - 66.1(a). S ee Regist e v. State, 29 2 Ga. 154, 156 – 57 (20 12), ov erru led by C ar penter v. U nited

34 States, 585 US 296 (2 018). Although this pr ecedent no lo nger app lies, at l east wi th resp ect to s tan din g, se e Outlaw v. S tate, 311 Ga. 396, 401 (2021), ha d t rial cou nsel raised a chal len ge to the cell phone re cords at the time of trial, it lik ely w oul d hav e been rejected. Counse l cann ot be sai d to be de fici ent for having fa il ed to advanc e a legal t heory t hat would have require d an exte nsion of e xisting preced ents or the adopti on of an u nproven theory of law. See Esp ri t v. State, 305 Ga. 429, 438 (2019). Therefore, t his ineff ective ness claim f ails. (b) Trial c oun sel was n ot def ici ent for failin g to obj ect to treat ing B lackw el l as a h ostile witn ess or ta k e other c orre ctiv e acti on. As in dicated above, the parties a greed to p ause Black well ’s testim ony. Whe n he w as cal le d the n ext day, the prosec utor inform ed th e court t hat Blackwe ll, throug h his attorney (who was in the co urtroom), had jus t filed a motion to withdra w his guilty p lea. The cou rt decl in ed to t ake the m atter up in the mi ddle of B radf ord’s trial, but al low ed th e Stat e to tr e at Blac kwell a s a hostile witness on accou nt of his mot ion. The pros ecutor asked a se ries of questi ons

35 about B lackw ell ’s a rrest and g uil ty pl ea, but wh en the p rosecu tor bega n asking him abo ut his custo dial st atement, Bla ckwe ll’s attorn ey obj ected and sai d that Blackwell wa s “reinvo king his Fif th Amendm ent rig ht to not incrimina te hims elf” by virt ue of ha ving just f iled a motio n to withd raw his guilt y plea. The pros ecut or respon ded th at B lackw ell h ad wai ved thi s rig ht at his plea heari ng and had alread y test ified, and that h is atto rney c oul d not i nvoke Black well’s Fif th Amendme nt right s for him. The c ourt ag reed and allow ed the pr osecu tor to ask leading q uestio ns about Blac kwell’ s custodi al stat emen ts tha t implicat ed B radfo rd. During q uest ioning by th e Sta te, B la ckwel l denied making t he state ments or sa id that he did not remember giv ing infor matio n that implica ted Bradf ord. When t he State pointed out t hat Blac kwell h ad ag reed t o coop erat e with the St ate, B lackw ell res ponded th at i t wa s not his ch oice, sugges ting tha t it was his prio r counse l’s dec ision. Blackwe ll’s attorn ey then object ed to the State ’s questi oning, and alth oug h overru led by th e cou rt, the S tate en ded its dir ect ex amination when Black well said that he did not w ant to talk. Duri ng cros s -

36 exam ination, Bradford asked B lack well onl y one questi on a bou t wheth er his custo dial stat ements we re volunta rily given, a nd Black well respon ded that they w er e not. Bradf ord arg ues th at trial cou nsel shou ld have obj ected to the State ask ing lea ding questi ons abou t the cont ents of Black well ’s custodi al sta tem ents. But Black well’s cou nsel obj ecte d to the se ques tions on the s ame basi s Brad ford s ays couns el sh ould h ave — that Blackwe ll was a sserting his Fift h Amendme nt right s — and t he trial cou rt impli citly overru led t hi s objecti on. Bradford does n ot argue, much less show, th at a simi lar o bjecti on from his counsel woul d have b een merit orious gi v en the trial cou rt’s pri or ruling. Thus, he ha s not shown tha t trial couns el’s f ailu re to o bject w as objecti vely unr eason able and t h us has f ail ed to sh ow that couns el perf orme d defic iently. (c) Any f ailure t o obj ect t o Det ectiv e Demeest er’s test imony about t he conte nts o f Blackwel l’s cust odial sta temen ts wa s no t pre judicial. Bradf ord argu es th at the admis sion of Blackwe ll’s custo dial statem ents th rough D etective D emees ter ’s testi m ony v iolated h is

37 confr ontatio n rights and that there is a re ason able proba bili ty that the ju ry w ould have acqu itted him if t rial c oun sel h ad obj ected t o this testim ony. We di sag ree. As di scussed above, alth ough tri al cou nsel did n ot object to th is testim ony, th e tri al court ulti mat ely st ruck i t and i nstru cted th e jury to disreg ard it. We pr esume th a t the jury follo wed the t rial c ourt ’s ins truction to disrega rd that ev id ence. See Taylor v. State, 306 G a. 277, 28 2 – 83 n.17 (2 019) (“q ualified jurors under o ath ar e presumed to follow the in stru ctions given by the tri al court” (quota tion mark s omitted)). Thus, even if t rial co unsel was defic ient in fa iling to o bject to Dete ctive De meest er’s testimo ny, 16 tha t evidence was not consi dered by th e jury i n cons id erin g Brad ford’s g uil t. As a res ult, Bradf ord c annot show that he w oul d have b een acquitt ed had couns el obj ect ed, an d thi s inef fecti veness clai m fai ls. 16 It is doubtful that counsel w as deficie nt for failing to object on this ground, since, as dis cussed above, Bl ackwell testified and was subject to cross - examination. Moreo ver, Blackwell’s s tatements to Detec tive Demeester were seemingly admissibl e as a prior inconsist ent statement. See White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 33 (199 7) (under old Evid ence C ode, holding that a prior inconsiste nt statement of a co - conspirat or who takes the stand and is subject to cross - examination is adm issible as substanti ve evidenc e).

38 (d) Tri al c ounsel w as n ot defi cien t for fa ilin g to obj ect to Detect ive D eme ester ’s test imony th at Brad ford w as not trut hful during hi s pos t - a rrest in tervi ew. Bradf ord argu es that tri al cou nsel shoul d have obj ecte d when the S tate asked Detective Dem eester to opin e on B radf ord’s demea nor during his cust odial inte rview, r unning a foul of fo rme r OCGA § 24 -9- 80, 17 which prov ided that “[t] he credibi l ity of a wi tness is a m atter to be determ ined by the jury under pr oper in struc tions from the cou rt.” We dis agree that trial coun sel was defi cient. In ana lyzing a simila r cla im under OCGA § 24 -6- 62 0, the succes sor st atut e to former OCGA § 24 -9- 80, we con clu ded that tri al couns el was not defi cien t in fai l ing to obje ct to stat ements that purpo rtedl y spok e to the cr edibil ity of a non - testifying d efe ndant. See Saw yer v. Sta te, 308 Ga. 375, 382 – 83 (20 20). We rea ched this conclu sion bec ause past preceden t had he ld t ha t the form er s tatu te app lied to defend ants who te stified o n their own beha lf at tria l and so becam e witness es; there was no p rece dent indic ating tha t OCGA 17 This provision was carried forw ard into the current Evid ence Code with minor revision s. See OCGA § 24-6- 620.

39 § 24 -6- 620, inc luding pr ecedent on former OCGA § 24 -9- 80, applie d to a def endan t who di d not tes tify; and, therefor e, tri al cou nsel w as not deficient fo r failing to ra ise a novel arg ument. Id. Becau se th e argum ent Br adfo rd rai ses w as co nsidered n ovel i n 20 20 when we decid ed Sawyer, it woul d hav e been nov el at the ti me of B radf ord’s trial, and h is cl ai m of d efici ency t her efore fail s. (e) Trial c oun sel was n ot def ici ent in failin g to o bject to th e prose cutor ’s stat ement du ring cl osing a rgument t hat B lac kw ell recan ted h is p rior stat ements and refu sed t o ack nowled ge th em becau se of B radf ord ’s in timid ation. In clos ing argum ent, th e pros ecut or sugges ted that Bla ckwell recante d because he was afraid of Bradf ord, arg uing that whe n Black well gave impl icati ng i nfor mation to Det ectiv e Dem eeste r, Bradf ord was not in th e room at the ti me, while Brad ford was in t he room w hen Blackwell wa s test ifying. The pr osecu tor also argued that Blackwe ll did not fo llow through wit h his ple a agre ement to testify agai nst B radf ord be caus e Brad ford h ad a “p ack of wolv es at his disp osal ” (i.e., oth er gan g membe rs). In his a ppella te brief, Bradf ord argues that beca use Blac kwell denie d on dire ct

40 exam ination t hat either Br adford or the R ed K artel ha d threaten ed him, t he prosecu tor’ s st atemen t amoun ted to a vi olation of O CGA § 17 -8- 75, an d tri al couns el sh ould h ave object ed. We di sagre e. Under OCGA § 17 -8- 75, w hen a pr osecu tor mak es “ stat ements of pr ejudic ial matter s which ar e not in evide nce, it is the dut y of the court t o in terpos e and preven t the same.” Although this statute requir es tha t clos ing argum ents be based on the ev id ence pre sented at tri al, s ee Wi lliams v. Harv ey, 3 11 Ga. 43 9, 445 (2021), a prosecu tor has “ wi de latit ude t o argue i nfer ences fro m the evi den ce.” Hendri x v. Stat e, 298 Ga. 60, 66 (2015) (qu otati on marks omitte d). Bradf ord has not establish ed th at th e pro secu tor’s statem en t was out of b ounds. A lthough Black well test ified that no on e had threatene d hi m not to tes tify, that testim ony was not conc lusive a nd a jury was ent itled to c oncl ude oth erwi se. Se e Alexander v. Sta te, 118 Ga. 2 6, 28 (1903) (“ What the person himse lf testif ies is not necess aril y con clus ive, bec ause the ju ry i s auth oriz ed to appl y th e homely maxim that ‘ actions spea k lou der th an w ords, ’ and fr om one ’ s ac ts th ey m ay determ ine that the inten ti on was dir ect ly

41 opposi te f rom wh at he s ays it was. ”); see als o Head v. State, 316 Ga. 406, 4 12 (20 23) (“T he j ury is als o entitle d to disbelieve the tes timony of a witn ess o r d e fendant beca use the jur y is the judge of the cred ibility o f witnesse s. ” (clean ed up)). M oreov er, trial eviden ce showed that Re d K artel gan g me mbers, including Blac kwell, had tattoos w ith th e lette rs “NF L,” which stood fo r “Neve r Forg et Loyalt y,” and th at th e gang w oul d ret aliate by killi ng a mem ber wh o betray ed the g ang. Bas ed on th e evidence present ed, the State ’s argum ent was within t he wide range of accep table closing argum ent, and cou nsel ’s fai lure t o object to i t did not c onsti tute defici ent p erformance. See H endrix, 298 G a. at 6 6 (trial c ounse l not ineffe ctive for fai li ng to object to pros ecut or’s closi ng argu ment abo ut witne ss intimida tion where one wit ness was “obvio us[ly] ” reluc tant to testif y agains t the defenda nt and two eye witnes ses receiv ed phon e cal ls to disc ourag e th eir co oper ation wit h the pol ice). (f) Trial cou nsel w as n ot in effe ctiv e fo r goin g beyon d th e sc ope of the prose cutor ’s exam inati on of Det ective De meest er, th ere by allow ing t he St ate t o argu e ev iden ce r elated to B lack well ’s con fessi on as substan tiv e evid ence.

42 In h is def ense, Br adford cal led two witnesses — Brown and an alibi wit ness. Aft er the def ense res ted, th e t rial cou rt all owed the Sta te to recall rebut tal wit nesses, inc luding Detecti ve Deme est er. B efore the dete cti ve was cal led, th e cou rt info rmed the pa rties that it was go ing to tell the j ury to disr egard Detectiv e D emeeste r’s prior testim ony con cern in g Blackwel l’s cu stodial stat emen ts. The co urt also i nstru cted the p rose cuto r that h e was precl u ded from argu ing about t hos e cus todi al sta tements. During Detecti ve D emees ter ’s tes ti mony o n rebut tal, he f irst review ed his intervie w with Brown, whic h include d details about havi ng rev iewed th e surv eill ance video f rom th e Stop and Sh op. Detecti ve Dem ee ster al so tes tifie d about Bradford and his gir lfrie nd having pho ne ca lls disc ussing ge tting individ uals to be quiet and to tell th e poli ce tha t Bradf ord w as ho me at the ti me of the m urder. O n cross - exam ination, substi tut e cou nsel 18 ask ed D etec tive D emeest er whethe r he ever o btained any vid eo fo otage that sho wed Br adford at 18 Substi tute counsel made a limited app earance because tri al counsel was apparently exp eriencing a med ical condition at th e time.

43 the St op an d Sh op vid eo, and the detective responded that h e did not. Counse l then aske d whet her any wit nesse s ident ified Br adfor d as bein g at the st ore, and Dete ctiv e Dem eest er s aid there w as n one. Coun sel th en ask ed whether there wer e any w itn esses, asi de fr om the two othe r peo ple ch arged i n th e case (T ate and Black well), who ident ified B radfo rd as being prese nt at th e sto re or at the s cen e o f the cri me, and D etective D emees ter said no. In clo sing arg ument, s ubstit ute counsel r ecount ed all the tria l witn esses an d n oted th at n one o f them ident ifi ed B radfor d as a part icipant in the cr ime. With r espect to Blackwe ll, subst itute couns el argu ed t hat som e peo ple w oul d do anyt hin g to cut a d eal, and t hat Black well could no t finish his test imony because he “knew it was a lie” an d c oul d not sen d Br adford to pri son f or som ethin g h e did not do. C ouns el also argu ed th at the re was n o ph ysical evid ence lin king Bradford to the crime, that only Tate and Bl ackwel l implica ted Bradford, and that Tate and B lackw ell could not “follow thro ugh ” on t ryin g to send Brad ford to pri son f or so meth ing he di d not do.

44 Bradf ord a rgues that i t w as unr easonable t rial strateg y f or defen se cou nsel to open the do or to t estimon ial evidence th at Black well and T ate iden tifie d Bra dfor d as a parti cipant in t he crim e becaus e the t rial cour t had al ready rul ed that i t was goin g to tell the jury t o disr egard Detective D emee ster’s testi mony about B lackw ell ’s cust odial stat ements. But he has faile d to e stablish tha t subst itute couns el’s conduc t w as defi cien t. Bradf ord has not met his burden to over come th e presumpt ion of reason ablen ess, becau se [d] ecisi ons a bou t what ques tion s to ask on cross - exam ination are q uintesse ntial trial s trategy and will rarely consti tut e ineff ective assi stan ce of couns el. And decisi ons a s to w hat evidenc e to presen t are ordi naril y matters of t rial s trategy and p rovide n o g round for reversal. Ealey v. State, 32 2 Ga. 509, 522 – 23 (2 025) (c leaned up). Because subst itute counse l elicited testimony that on ly tw o p eopl e — Black well and T ate — had a ctually ident ified Bradf ord as a part icipant in the crime s, and arg ued t o the j ury that it should not cons ider thei r stat emen ts be caus e they di d not provi de ac tual

45 testim ony t o impl icate B rad ford, substit ute c ounsel’ s dec ision to “open the d oor” to ce rtain evid ence, as B radfo rd argu es, was not paten tly u nreaso nable. See Gomez v. State, 301 Ga. 445, 459 (2 017) (no de ficien t per form ance w he re co unsel coul d reas on ably det ermine that b est stra teg y was to f orgo o bjecti on t o cert ain tes timon y and inste ad use it to challenge t he State ’ s th eory o f th e case). (g) There was n o d eficien cy in f ailing to requ est an accomplic e- corrobor ation charg e. Bradf ord argu es th at becau se B lackw ell w as an ac compl ice witnes s, the court was requ ired to inst ruct the jury that hi s tes timo ny needed to be corrob orated, and that trial coun sel w as def icient for failing to request this instruc tion. This claim f ails. At the tim e of Bradf ord’s trial in 2012, “the cont rolling preced ent was that t her e is n o error in d ecli ni ng to g ive an ins truction on ac compli ce co rrob oration, ev en if su ch a charg e is reques ted, w here the accompl ic e ’ s t estimon y is in f act corrob orated by indepen dent e vid ence. ” Ly man v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 322 (20 17) (quotati on m ark s omitt ed). That hold ing was subseq uently

46 overru led, bu t not until af ter Bradford ’s trial. See Robinso n v. Stat e, 303 Ga. 32 1, 325 (201 8) (noti ng ch ange i n law i n 2014). B ecaus e trial couns el had no duty t o anticipa te this change in the la w, he was not defici ent f or failin g to re quest a n ac compli ce - cor roboration ch arg e. Id. 7. There i s no cumu lativ e prej udi ce. In h is las t claim, B radfo rd arg ues that hi s convict ions should be reve rsed d ue to t he cumulativ e pre judice re sulting f rom t he trial court’s erro rs and trial coun sel’s ineff ecti venes s. This claim fails. To estab lish cumula tive er ror, a defend ant m ust de monstra te that “at leas t two er rors w ere comm itted i n the course of the trial ” and “c onsi dered t ogethe r alon g wi th the enti re re cor d, the m ulti ple errors so i nfe cted th e ju ry ’ s del iber ation th at they denied t he petiti oner a fun damen tally fair tri al.” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (202 0) (clea ned up). Wh en cons ideri ng the “cu mu lati ve effect of presum ed e rrors by trial c oun sel and the t rial cou rt,” t his C ourt “consi der[s ] col le ctivel y the prej ud icial effe ct, i f a ny, of trial cou rt errors, al ong w ith the prej udic e cau sed by an y d efici en t perf orman ce

47 of couns el. ” Patterson v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 181 (2022) (punctuat ion omitted). Here, Bradford’ s claim fails be cause he ha s not shown multip le errors, eith er on the pa rt of th e co urt or trial c ounsel. W e assumed that counsel wa s ineffe ctive in o ne insta nce and concluded that n o prejudi ce r esul ted from th is one as sumed defici ency. Becau se th ere are no other e rrors t o cumu late, Bradf ord’s c umulative - pre judice claim f ails. Judgment affirmed. All t he Ju stice s concur.