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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Swb v. Kjp

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 375010
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.8K)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

SWB, UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2026
Petitioner-Appellee, 10:57 AM

v No. 375010
Washtenaw Circuit Court
KJP, LC No. 24-002429-PH

Respondent-Appellant.

Before: WALLACE, P.J., and GARRETT and ACKERMAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent, KJP, appeals the trial court’s issuance of a personal protection order (PPO) to
petitioner, SWB, on February 5, 2025 following a hearing on that date, and the subsequent denial
of respondent’s timely motion for reconsideration. On appeal, respondent contends the trial court:
(1) abused its discretion in denying its authority to consider respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of the issuance of the PPO; (2) violated respondent’s right to due process in
permitting petitioner to amend the allegations supporting his petition at the MCR 3.705 hearing;
and (3) abused its discretion by granting a PPO where petitioner did not allege facts that constitute
“stalking” as defined by MCL 750.411h. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner brought the present action for the issuance of a personal protection order (PPO),
via a November 27, 2024 ex parte petition alleging that:

 on October 1, 2024, respondent, as one of a group of anti-landlord activists at an Ypsilanti
City Council meeting, “repeatedly body slammed [p]etitioner[,] attempting to block his
path” to exit the meeting;

 on October 30, 2024, respondent led approximately 20 people to petitioner’s residence
where they then destroyed his children’s Halloween pumpkins and threw toilet paper, eggs
and tomatoes and other vegetables and launched bottle rockets at the home for more than
10 minutes; and

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 on November 26, 2024, petitioner saw respondent twice while he was driving in a remote
area.

On November 27, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying the ex parte PPO, finding
the petition lacked sufficient facts demonstrating that “immediate and irreparable injury will occur
because of the delay for notice of hearing or that notice itself will precipitate adverse action before
an ex parte order can issue.” The order advised petitioner of his right to a hearing on his petition
within 21 days.

A hearing ultimately took place on February 5, 2025. In his testimony, petitioner stated
that his first public interaction with respondent was on October 1, 2024, when he attended an
Ypsilanti City Council meeting. According to petitioner, a number of anti-landlord activists
attended this meeting, and respondent was a major instigator of that group’s disrespectful, hostile,
screaming and yelling conduct. Respondent screamed and yelled at petitioner that he evicted
respondent at one point, that he was not part of the community, was a scumbag, and screamed
“murderer” at him multiple times. Petitioner testified that this conduct embarrassed him, that these
activists hyped each other up and got so unruly that “it became a dangerous scene, and the police
had to be called,” and the mayor terminated the city council meeting and kicked everyone out of
city hall. According to petitioner, the only person that ended up being physically restrained by the
police was respondent because respondent refused to leave the council chamber and continued
yelling and screaming. Petitioner testified that the city manager recognized the crowd was so
hostile toward him that he could not safely exit like everyone else and took petitioner to a back
exit in the basement of city hall so he could “escape this hostile mob.” These events caused
petitioner to feel “frightened” and that he was “definitely in danger,” because there were “at least
20 very hostile, angry, super hyped up people ready to physically attack me as soon as I left city
hall,” which is why the police responded and detained respondent.

Petitioner then testified that the next time he encountered respondent was at an October 15,
2024 Ypsilanti City Council meeting. Respondent’s counsel objected to any testimony regarding
events occurring on October 15, 2024, because the petition for PPO makes no allegations
pertaining to that date. Notably, petitioner acknowledged that his petition listed the wrong date
and that respondent’s offensive physical contact with him and attempt to block his exit alleged
therein actually occurred at the October 15, 2024 Ypsilanti City Council meeting, rather than on
October 1, 2024. Respondent’s counsel objected to such “new allegations” (i.e., changing the date
respondent physically contacted and obstructed petitioner from October 1, 2024 to October 15,
2024), claiming a violation of due process, where respondent thereby was deprived of the
opportunity to speak with potential witnesses who were at the October 15, 2024 Ypsilanti City
Council meeting. The trial court overruled the objection, noting that such notice is necessary in
criminal proceedings, but not in a non-emergency PPO hearing, and that respondent’s due process
right would be satisfied by respondent’s counsel’s ability to cross-examine the petitioner regarding
the events of October 15, 2024.

Petitioner testified that at the October 15, 2024 city council meeting, the “angry mob” of
anti-landlord activists came with musical instruments (mostly drums and drumsticks) and for
approximately three hours they “physically beat on city hall to intimidate the people that were
inside the meeting.” He testified that “[i]t was truly terrifying,” and that it was his impression that
respondent, who was present, was the ringleader of the group. When he tried to leave the meeting,

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respondent physically impeded, “bang[ed]” into him, and blocked him from leaving. Petitioner
was then assisted by some police officers to exit the meeting. Once he exited city hall with a police
officer, “at least 25 people tried to attack me,” including respondent, who threw a full Mountain
Dew bottle at him, and petitioner and the police officer retreated back to city hall and they were
eventually able to leave the area in a police car, with the activists surrounding and rocking the car,
trying to overturn it. Petitioner described these events as “scary,” “terrifying,” and testified that
“I felt like I was being terrorized.”

As to the allegations regarding the events of October 30, 2024, petitioner testified that he
observed

25 masked attackers on my front lawn . . . . They threw more than 150 eggs,
tomatoes, pumpkins, celery, apples, toilet paper, used -- used kitty litter at the front
of my house. And I can see that they were carrying weapons. They had baseball
bats, they had long pipes. They were chanting, screaming . . . “f*ck [petitioner].”

Petitioner checked on his minor children to make sure they were safe, his wife called the police,
and he was standing inside his front door and was going to step outside to try to engage the
individuals, when they began shooting “fireworks or some sort of explosion devices at me and at
my house.” He then went back into his house, called the police again, and the people dissipated
into the neighborhood shortly thereafter.

While petitioner testified that he saw respondent in the crowd and recognized respondent
screaming “f*ck [petitioner]” just as respondent had done at the city council meeting, respondent
contrarily testified that respondent was at home with two children that entire night.

Petitioner likewise described the events of October 30th event as “terrorizing,” “the worst
thing that ever happened to me,” “[m]y family was in grave danger and I . . . felt in grave danger,”
and since that event he: replaced his car because people were following him, hired “security
people,” and moved because of these threats to him and his family’s safety. He and his family
have also avoided attending public events because of these incidents and the threats of physical
violence to which he and his family were subjected.

Finally, petitioner described unexpectedly seeing respondent in a rural area on November
26, 2024, which caused him to feel that he was being followed and stalked by respondent.
Petitioner testified that at this time he saw respondent on a dirt road outside of a car arguing with
someone inside the car, and that respondent gave him repeated menacing looks as he was driving
by.

Respondent testified that respondent had previously leased premises from petitioner in
2014, but terminated the lease early due to harassment consisting of petitioner sending late fees
that had not actually been incurred. Regarding the meeting on October 1, 2024, respondent said
the city council took a break when the public comment became heated, after which respondent and
others confronted petitioner with various complaints, including second-hand accounts of ceilings
caving in at units petitioner rented out. When the meeting reconvened, respondent testified that
the crowd was chanting and escalating its opposition to the resolution on the table, which resulted
in the meeting finishing early, after which attendees were ordered out of the council room. After

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being asked to leave a second time, respondent “replied to the police officer that I would leave
when [petitioner] left.” Respondent testified that, if everyone was being ordered to leave, it seemed
proper that petitioner would likewise be required to leave. Police reacted by placing respondent
in handcuffs, after which respondent had a conversation with the police chief, was released from
the handcuffs, and left out the front door. Respondent testified that respondent was at home with
children on October 30, 2024. Respondent recalled this date because respondent’s spouse was
working that evening until 10:00 p.m., and because an online activity log indicated that respondent
spent the two-hour period between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. watching videos on the internet. With
regard to November 26, 2024, respondent testified that respondent may have been in the rural area
referenced by petitioner or near that date; however, respondent essentially testified that any contact
between respondent and petitioner would have been coincidental because respondent had traveled
to that area for reasons completely unrelated to petitioner.

The trial court declined to hear the testimony of a witness for respondent whom
respondent’s counsel represented would testify that they did not see any physical contact or
threatening behavior between respondent and petitioner at the October 1, 2024 city council
meeting, stating, ad seriatim:

 “The decision that I make is not going to be based on any finding of fact that would indicate
there was or was not physical contact on October 1st, so I don’t think I need to hear from
them, but please thank them for being here.”

 “I’m not considering any physical contact from October 1st in making a decision.”

 “The October 1st issue is not the basis for any decision I’m making.”

The trial court granted the petition for PPO, noting three instances of conduct and that the
October 30, 2024 incident in particular made a strong impression upon the court, and that petitioner
was convincing in his testimony that respondent was among those present there. Regarding
petitioner’s earlier experiences with respondent, the trial court noted it was “not saying everything
was true as [petitioner] presented it,” but that they are “on two different sides of a politically
charged position,” and respondent is permitted to engage in the constitutional right to free speech,
but that going to petitioner’s family’s home at night and shooting off fireworks and the like to
scare and intimidate him and his family crosses the line. “And I do think that [petitioner] was
targeted and harassed by a course of conduct from a group of people and . . . he has identified
[respondent] as one of these people” and “I do find it to be harassing. I do find that he has, as any
reasonable person, to be frightened” and “he’s been frightened . . . since that [October 30th]
occurrence.”

On February 5, 2025, the trial court entered a PPO with an expiration date of July 6, 2025,
which was then personally served on the respondent on that same date.1 Notably, the PPO did not

1
While the PPO has expired in the course of this appeal, “identifying an improperly issued PPO
as rescinded is a live controversy, and thus not moot” for appeals purposes upon its expiration.
TM v MZ, 501 Mich 312, 319; 916 NW2d 473 (2018).

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bar respondent from attending Ypsilanti City Council meetings, but barred respondent from
approaching petitioner if he is present at the meeting.

Respondent filed a timely motion for reconsideration contending the trial court committed
“palpable error by granting the PPO on the basis of a single event,” where MCL 600.2950(a)
requires a “pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2 or more separate noncontinuous acts
evidencing a continuity of purpose.” The motion further asserted palpable error based on the
court’s misunderstanding that a Facebook post petitioner made stating that “no one can rattle me”
occurred on September 29, 2024 rather than after the October 1, 2024 city council meeting, and
that the trial court disregarded respondent’s alibi testimony from the night of October 30, 2024.
Petitioner filed a response to the motion for reconsideration noting his testimony at the hearing
regarding “multiple events demonstrating a pattern of harassing and intimidating conduct by
[r]espondent.” The trial court thereafter entered an order denying the motion that provided, in
pertinent part:

Subchapter 3.700 of the Michigan Court Rules which governs Personal Protection
Proceedings does not provide for motions for reconsideration. Respondent has the
right to appeal the ruling under MCR 3.709. Respondent may also file a motion to
modify or terminate the PPO if good cause exists to warrant the relief requested.
Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

Respondent then filed a timely appeal of right.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The granting of a PPO is “within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” SP v BEK, 339 Mich App 171, 176; 981 NW2d 500
(2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Hayford v Hayford, 279 Mich App 324,
325; 769 NW2d 324 (2008) (“We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination
whether to issue a PPO because it is an injunctive order.”). A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are
likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sherry v E Suburban Football League, 292 Mich
App 23, 32; 807 NW2d 859 (2011). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision resulted in
an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.” SP, 339 Mich App at 176 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “A court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of
law.” TT v KL, 334 Mich App 413, 438; 965 NW2d 101 (2020).

We review constitutional issues de novo. Id. We likewise review issues of statutory
interpretation de novo. Hayford, 279 Mich App at 325.

We review a trial court’s findings of fact, including such findings as they pertain to a PPO,
for clear error. Id. Under the clear-error standard, we give deference to the lower court and hold
that the court clearly erred only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” Jonkers v Summit Twp, 278 Mich App 263, 265; 747 NW2d 901 (2008)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

Findings of fact by the trial court may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In
the application of this principle, regard shall be given to the special opportunity of

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the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.
[MCR 2.613(C)].

The trier of fact is in the best position to consider the demeanor of each witness in weighing
the credibility of their respective testimonies. See SP, 339 Mich App at 176.

III. ANALYSIS

A. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A PPO ORDER

Respondent argues the trial court erred in finding that motions for reconsideration are not
permitted in personal protection proceedings under subchapter 3.700 of the Michigan Court Rules.
We agree.

Subchapter 2.000 of the Michigan Court Rules addresses “general provisions” pertaining
to “civil procedure” and MCR 2.001 defines the applicability of rules to such proceedings as
follows:

The rules in this chapter govern procedure in all civil proceedings in all courts
established by the constitution and laws of the State of Michigan, except where the
limited jurisdiction of a court makes a rule inherently inapplicable or where a rule
applicable to a specific court or a specific type of proceeding provides a different
procedure.

Subchapter 3.700 of the Michigan Court Rules specifically addresses “personal protection
proceedings” and MCR 3.701(A) defines the applicability of rules to such proceedings, in part
pertinent to this appeal, as follows:

Except as provided by this subchapter and the provisions of MCL 600.2950, MCL
600.2950a, and MCL 691.1801 to MCL 691.1821, actions for personal protection
for relief against domestic violence or stalking and actions for extreme risk
protection are governed by the Michigan Court Rules. Procedure related to
personal protection orders against adults is governed by MCR 3.702 to MCR 3.709,
and procedure related to extreme risk protection is governed by MCR 3.715 to
MCR 3.722.

MCR 3.707(A) provides for motions to modify or terminate a PPO. However, looking to MCR
2.001, an action seeking a PPO is a civil proceeding, a motion for reconsideration is not inherently
inapplicable based upon any limitation on the court’s jurisdiction in personal protection
proceedings, and there is no indication that a motion to modify or terminate a PPO is intended to
supplant or foreclose a petitioner or respondent from filing a timely motion for reconsideration of

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a PPO pursuant to MCR 2.119. A motion to modify or terminate a PPO seeks different relief
pursuant to a different procedure than a motion for reconsideration.2

We accordingly conclude that the trial court erred in failing to substantively consider
respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s February 5, 2025 PPO order on the
basis that subchapter 3.700 of the Michigan Court Rules did not specifically provide for such
procedure. In next considering whether this error requires any substantive relief we turn to the
harmless error rule, MCR 2.613(A), which provides:

An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling
or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the
parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for
vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to
take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.

With regard to motions for reconsideration of a decision on a motion, MCR 2.119(F)(3)
provides:

Generally, and without restricting the discretion of the court, a motion for
rehearing or reconsideration which merely presents the same issues ruled on by the
court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. The
moving party must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties
have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must result
from correction of the error.

Contrary to respondent’s motion for reconsideration, the transcript of the February 5, 2025
PPO hearing is clear that the trial court did not grant the PPO “on the basis of a single event.”
Rather, four instances of conduct were addressed at the hearing: the October 1, 2024 city council
meeting, the October 15, 2024 city council meeting, the October 30, 2024 incident at petitioner’s
house, and the November 26, 2024 incident where petitioner encountered respondent on a road in
a rural area. In granting the PPO, the trial court noted that multiple instances of conduct were
addressed at the hearing, the October 30, 2024 incident in particular made a strong impression,
and it expressly declared that the October 30, 2024 incident was not its sole basis for entry of the
PPO. Rather, it held that “[petitioner] was targeted and harassed by a course of conduct from a
group of people and—and he has identified [respondent] as one of these people,” and further, that
“there is a course of conduct. I do find it to be harassing. I do find that he has, as any reasonable
person, to be frightened.” Further, petitioner’s response to the motion for reconsideration noted

2
Although not dispositive to this issue, we note that, while we have been unable to locate any
caselaw directly addressing whether a motion for reconsideration is procedurally permitted in a
PPO proceeding, there are numerous instances in our appellate jurisprudence of motions for
reconsideration in PPO proceedings being considered without objection or inquiry as to their
procedural propriety. See, e.g., Brown v Rudy, 324 Mich App 277, 287; 922 NW2d 915 (2018);
Lamkin v Engram, 295 Mich App 701, 710; 815 NW2d 793 (2012).

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his testimony at the hearing regarding “multiple events demonstrating a pattern of harassing and
intimidating conduct by [r]espondent.”

While the motion for reconsideration also asserted that the trial court misunderstood that
petitioner posted on Facebook that “no one can rattle me” on September 29, 2024, rather than
immediately after the October 1, 2024 city council meeting, petitioner testified that he “felt
frightened” and “was definitely in danger” at that meeting. Notably, respondent’s counsel did not
object or seek to correct the trial court’s misunderstanding when he moved to admit printed copies
of two Facebook posts at the PPO hearing and the Court stated “So, the first one is a post from
September 29th . . . .” An issue is not properly preserved for appeal if it is raised for the first time
in a motion for reconsideration.3 Dep’t of Environmental Quality v Morley, 314 Mich App 306,
316; 885 NW2d 892 (2015). Even considering that petitioner made that Facebook post after the
October 1, 2024 city council meeting rather than before it, the trial court noted that “[s]ince that
time, he’s had people come to his home on October 30th and he’s testified today under oath that
he believes [respondent] was among those people and he’s been frightened since—since that
occurrence.”

Finally, respondent’s motion for reconsideration claims it was palpable error for the trial
court to disregard respondent’s alibi testimony from the night of October 30, 2024. However, the
trial court heard respondent’s alibi testimony and concluded that petitioner “was convincing in his
testimony” that respondent was among the people who attacked his home. “[T]he trial court is in
the best position to determine the credibility of the parties, which will obviously include the
testimony, demeanor, and motive of the petitioner.” Pickering v Pickering, 253 Mich App 694,
792 n 3; 659 NW2d 649 (2002). In light of the trial court’s unique position to consider the
witnesses’ live testimony, we cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred in its factual finding,
i.e., we cannot definitely, firmly conclude that the trial court was mistaken. Jonkers, 278 Mich
App at 265.

Given the trial court’s explication of its resolution of the matter at the PPO hearing and the
foregoing analysis of respondent’s arguments, we do not find that respondent would have been
entitled to relief on a motion for reconsideration had it been substantively considered by the trial
court. We accordingly find the error of the trial court in failing to substantively consider the motion
for reconsideration was harmless and that allowing that order to stand is not inconsistent with
substantial justice.

B. AMENDING THE ALLEGATIONS OF A PPO PETITION AT THE MCR 3.705
HEARING

Respondent argues that by allowing petitioner to put forward evidence of the events that
occurred at and immediately following the October 15, 2024 city council meeting (where that
meeting was not referenced in the petition for PPO and the petitioner mistakenly indicated events
from that meeting instead occurred at the October 1, 2024 city council meeting that was referenced

3
Although this Court “may review an unpreserved issue if it is an issue of law for which all the
relevant facts are available.” Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 284 Mich App 513, 519;
773 NW2d 758 (2009).

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in the petition), the trial court essentially allowed petitioner to amend his petition for PPO during
the hearing and “surprise the respondent with unnoticed allegations.” Respondent’s counsel
objected to such “new allegations” at the PPO hearing, claiming a violation of due process, where
respondent was thereby deprived of the opportunity to speak with potential witnesses who were at
the October 15, 2024 Ypsilanti City Council meeting. On appeal, respondent contends this
violated respondent’s constitutional due process rights; MCR 3.703(B)(2), which requires any
petition for a PPO to “state with particularity the facts on which it is based”; and MCR 3.705(B)(2),
which requires the petitioner to “serve on the respondent notice of the hearing along with the
petition . . . .”

The due-process clauses of both the United States and Michigan Constitutions serve to
ensure that government cannot deny people “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. “Procedural due process limits actions by the
government and requires it to institute safeguards in proceedings that affect those rights protected
by due process, such as life, liberty, or property.” Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377, 382; 603
NW2d 295 (1999). “Due process is a flexible concept that applies to any adjudication of important
rights.” Thomas v Pogats, 249 Mich App 718, 724; 644 NW2d 59 (2002). It requires procedural
protections, including fundamental fairness, based upon what the individual situation demands.
Id. Fundamental fairness includes: (1) “consideration of the private interest at stake,” (2) “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,” (3) “the probable value
of additional or substitute procedures,” and (4) “the interest of the state or government, including
the function involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens imposed by substitute procedures.”
Dobrzenski v Dobrzenski, 208 Mich App 514, 515; 528 NW2d 827 (1995). “Due process in civil
cases generally requires notice of the nature of the proceedings, an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful time and manner, and an impartial decisionmaker.” Cummings v Wayne Co, 210 Mich
App 249, 253; 533 NW2d 13 (1995). A full trial-like proceeding is not necessary in providing “an
opportunity to be heard.” Id. Rather, it requires a hearing so as to provide a party with the
opportunity to learn of and respond to the evidence. Id.

The petitioner has the burden of proof to demonstrate reasonable cause for the issuance of
a PPO. Hayford, 279 Mich App at 326.

When making that determination, the circuit court is not limited to the four corners
of the petition itself; rather, it must consider the testimony, documents, and other
evidence proffered to determine whether a respondent engaged in harassing
conduct. Nothing in the statute or court rule suggests that the circuit court is limited
to considering the incidents alleged in the PPO petition. Instead, our court rules
specifically require the circuit court to go beyond the PPO petition and either
interview the petitioner or provide an evidentiary hearing. [Lamkin v Engram, 295
Mich App 701, 711; 815 NW2d 793 (2012).]

In light of this authority, respondent has not demonstrated a violation of respondent’s due
process rights process and notice requirements for the issuance of a PPO under the Michigan court
rules. Respondent was served with a PPO petition that asserted, in part, that respondent engaged
in offensive physical contact with and obstructed petitioner as he was attempting to exit a city
council meeting. Petitioner testified at the hearing on the PPO petition that respondent’s offensive
physical contact with and obstruction of him occurred at an October 15, 2024 city council meeting,

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rather than at an October 1, 2024 city council meeting as alleged in the petition. The trial court
overruled respondent’s counsel’s objection to this correction and permitted petitioner to offer this
testimony and be cross-examined by the respondent thereon. Respondent likewise had the
opportunity to testify regarding these allegations, and notably did not refute petitioner’s claim that
respondent engaged in offensive physical contact with and obstruction of petitioner at the October
15, 2024 city council meeting. Furthermore, respondent was afforded the additional procedural
safeguards of being able to file a motion to rescind or modify the PPO within 14 days of being
served with notice or receiving actual notice of the PPO, but respondent did not utilize that
opportunity. MCL 600.2950a(13); MCR 3.707(A).4 The relevant PPO statute and court rules
provide for notice and the opportunity to be heard,5 and this Court has held that these procedural
safeguards satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. Kampf, 237 Mich App at 383-386.
We therefore find the procedural due process and notice requirements for the issuance of a PPO
under the Michigan court rules were satisfied in this case.

C. WHETHER ALLEGED FACTS CONSTITUTE “STALKING” AS DEFINED IN
MCL 750.411h OR MCL 750.411i

Finally, respondent contends petitioner did not comply with MCL 600.2950a where he did
not “allege[] facts that constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct that is
prohibited under section 411s, of the Michigan penal code . . . .” MCL 600.2950a(1). Respondent
argues that the trial court erroneously “extrapolated a single event (October 30) into a ‘course of
conduct’ only because [respondent] and [petitioner] have a ‘prior history’ of political opposition”
and further, that “multiple events must evidence a continuity of purpose” which is absent from the
present record. We disagree.

As previously noted, in determining whether to issue a PPO pursuant to MCL 600.2950a,
the trial court is not limited to the allegations of the petition, but rather, “must consider the
testimony, documents, and other evidence proffered to determine whether a respondent engaged
in harassing conduct.” Lamkin, 295 Mich App at 711.

In part pertinent to the present appeal, MCL 600.2950a(1) provides:

Except as provided in subsections (27), (28), and (30), by commencing an
independent action to obtain relief under this section, by joining a claim to an
action, or by filing a motion in an action in which the petitioner and the individual
to be restrained or enjoined are parties, an individual may petition the family
division of circuit court to enter a personal protection order to restrain or enjoin an
individual from engaging in conduct that is prohibited under section 411h, 411i, or

4
As already discussed, respondent did seek timely reconsideration of the PPO pursuant to MCR
2.119(F), but did not seek to provide the court with evidence rebutting the allegation that
respondent offensively physically contacted and obstructed petitioner at the October 15, 2024
hearing at that time and, as noted above, the trial court’s failure to substantively consider that
motion was harmless error.
5
See MCL 600.2950a(13), (14), and (18); MCR 3.705(A)(4); MCR 3.707(A).

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411s of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328, MCL 750.411h, 750.411i, and
750.411s. A court shall not grant relief under this subsection unless the petition
alleges facts that constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct
that is prohibited under section 411s, of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328,
MCL 750.411h, 750.411i, and 750.411s.

MCL 750.411h(1) defines “harassment” and “stalking”:

(d) “Harassment” means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but
is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would cause a
reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim
to suffer emotional distress. Harassment does not include constitutionally protected
activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.

(e) “Stalking” means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or
continuing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person
to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that
actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested.

MCL 750.411h(1) defines “course of conduct” and “unconsented contact”:

(a) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
2 or more separate noncontinuous acts evidencing a continuity of purpose.

---

(f) “Unconsented contact” means any contact with another individual that
is initiated or continued without that individual’s consent or in disregard of that
individual’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued.
Unconsented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:

(i) Following or appearing within the sight of that individual.

(ii) Approaching or confronting that individual in a public place or on
private property.

(iii) Appearing at that individual’s workplace or residence.

(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by
that individual.

(v) Contacting that individual by telephone.

(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.

(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased,
or occupied by that individual.

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MCL 750.411i sets forth identical definitions of “stalking,” “harassment,” and “course of
conduct.”

MCL 750.411s(1)(b) addresses “post[ing] a message through the use of any medium of
communication . . . without the victim’s consent” (such as via a computer or the internet) “intended
to cause conduct that would make the victim feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested,” and is not at issue in the present case.

In the present case, as described above, the ex parte PPO petition alleged three instances
of conduct, October 1, 2024, October 30, 2024, and November 26, 2024. The ex parte petition
was denied, and at the subsequent hearing on the petition, while petitioner presented evidence of
four separate instances of conduct, on October 1, 2024, October 15, 2024, October 30, 2024, and
November 26, 2024, the trial court referred to only three instances of conduct in granting the
petition for PPO. The trial court noted that the October 30, 2024 incident at petitioner’s home
described in detail earlier in this opinion in particular made a strong impression upon the court,
and that petitioner was convincing in his testimony that respondent was among those present.
While the trial court twice indicated it would not consider any purported physical contact from
October 1st in making its decision (where petitioner testified that he mistakenly alleged in his
petition that respondent made offensive physical contact with and obstructed him on October 1st
rather than on October 15th) it then stated, “[t]he October 1st issue is not the basis for any decision
I’m making.”

However, respondent’s testimony did not refute petitioner’s testimony regarding what
transpired at the October 15th city council meeting. Petitioner’s uncontested testimony regarding
that day included:

 respondent physically impeded petitioner, “bang[ed]” into him, and blocked him from
leaving;

 petitioner, upon exiting city hall with police assistance, was attacked by at least 25 people,
including respondent, a full Mountain Dew bottle was thrown at him, and he and the officer
withdrew back into city hall and left via a police car that the activists also attacked and
tried to overturn; and

 petitioner found these events “scary,” and “terrifying,” and he “felt like [he] was being
terrorized.”

Finally, petitioner testified that, after three earlier instances of conduct with respondent, he
encountered respondent in a rural area on November 26, 2024, where he would never expect to
see respondent, giving him menacing looks as he drove by, which caused him to feel that he was
being followed and stalked.

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that these three separate instances
of conduct by respondent on October 15, 2024, October 30, 2024, and November 26, 2024
“constitute stalking as defined in section 411h or 411i, or conduct that is prohibited under section
411s, of the Michigan penal code . . . .” MCL 600.2950a(1). Respondent speculates that the trial
court did not specifically reference the November 26th incident in its ruling (beyond it being one

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of the three instances of conduct on which it was basing its ruling), because it was not sufficient
to “cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested . . . .” MCL 750.411h(1)(e). However, this conduct closely followed the earlier more
severe instances of harassment on October 15th and October 30th, and, given that context, and in
light of petitioner’s testimony, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it
constitutes “harassment,” i.e., “continuing unconsented contact that would cause a reasonable
individual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional
distress.” MCL 750.411h(1)(d). Accordingly, viewed in context, we are not definitely and firmly
convinced that the trial court made a mistake by finding that the November 26th unconsented
contact would make a reasonable person feel threatened or otherwise suffer emotional distress.
The trial court accordingly did not abuse its discretion by including respondent’s November 26,
2024 conduct in finding “a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment
of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested . . . .” MCL 750.411h(1)(e). Furthermore, in any
event, the required “course of conduct” need only comprise two “separate noncontinuous acts
evidencing a continuity of purpose,” and the acts of October 15th and October 30th alone meet
that threshold.

Respondent contends the PPO threatens respondent’s First Amendment right to speech and
“undermines democracy by inviting political opponents to weaponize PPO petitions.” However,
this issue is waived because respondent failed to raise it in respondent’s statement of questions
presented. Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514, 521; 934 NW2d 64 (2019). Further, in any
event, the trial court was appropriately sensitive to these First Amendment concerns where it ruled
that respondent has a right to be present at the city council meetings and “participate in any protest
that’s permitted by the rules that are established and the laws that are in effect”; noted that
“peaceful protests are permitted, but violent protests are not”; and ruled that “[r]espondent is not
prohibited from entering [Ypsilanti] city hall [and] attending Ypsilanti city council meetings, but
may not approach petitioner if he is present at a meeting.”

The trial court’s PPO is affirmed.

/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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