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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Klimp Minors

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 375799
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3K)

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Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2026
11:37 AM
In re KLIMP, Minors.

Nos. 375799; 375800
Wexford Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-031319-NA

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BORRELLO and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal as of right an order terminating their
parental rights to four adopted children, MK, TK, KK, and OK. The court terminated their parental
rights to MK and TK under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (physical injury caused by parent), (j)
(reasonable likelihood of harm if child returned to parent), (k)(iii) (severe physical abuse of child
or sibling), (k)(iv) (serious impairment of an organ or limb of the child or a sibling), and (k)(v)
(life-threatening injury to child or sibling). It terminated respondents’ parental rights to KK and
OK under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(iii), (iv), and (v).1 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2024, MK was admitted to a Tennessee2 hospital following a seizure. Subsequent
investigation led the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to initiate a petition

1
The case also involved three additional children, DK, THK, and FK, who were biological children
of respondents. With regard to these children, the trial court found that there were statutory
grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(iii), (iv), and (v), but it declined to terminate
respondents’ parental rights to these three children after conducting an analysis of their best
interests.
2
The family was apparently visiting Tennessee temporarily.

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seeking immediate termination of respondents’ parental rights to their seven minor children.
Medical evidence established that both MK and TK were gravely underweight, exhibited stunted
growth, and presented with neurological abnormalities consistent with severe malnutrition. A
treating physician opined that, absent intervention, MK and TK faced a substantial risk of mortality
while in respondents’ custody. DHHS further adduced evidence that respondents compelled MK
and TK to consume pureed food from bottles and to wear diapers, notwithstanding their ages
rendering such measures developmentally inappropriate. Additional evidence demonstrated that
MK and TK were confined to locked rooms, required to sleep in plastic storage containers—
sometimes without blankets—and subjected to punitive measures including exposure to extreme
cold without clothing, resulting in MK presenting with symptoms of frostbite at the time of hospital
admission. The remaining children were witnesses to, and at times participants in, the
maltreatment. Following placement in foster care, MK and TK rapidly achieved age-appropriate
dietary habits, gained weight, and discontinued use of diapers.

The trial court determined that respondents had perpetrated severe abuse against MK and
TK and accordingly ordered the termination of respondents’ parental rights with respect to those
children. The court also terminated respondents’ parental rights to KK and OK—both adopted
children—upon finding that their behavioral issues rendered them vulnerable to harm if returned
to respondents’ care. By contrast, the court declined to terminate parental rights concerning the
three biological children, citing their placement with grandparents in stable familial environments
and the anticipated establishment of guardianships.

Throughout the proceedings below, respondents remained incarcerated in Tennessee,
facing criminal prosecution arising from their treatment of MK and TK. Notwithstanding their
incarceration, respondents participated in the child protective proceedings via videoconference.
II. ANALYSIS

A. AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES

Respondents assert that all four termination orders should be vacated on the grounds that,
while DHHS alleged aggravated circumstances and sought termination at the initial disposition,
the court did not render a finding of aggravated circumstances until the termination hearing was
already underway—after respondents’ prior pleas of no contest to jurisdiction. Respondents
maintain that this procedure was improper because, in their view, a finding of aggravated
circumstances must occur at the inception of the proceedings. They further contend that the court’s
failure to do so deprived them of their statutory right to reasonable reunification efforts. This
argument, however, is predicated on an incorrect interpretation of the governing law and is
therefore unavailing.

MCL 712A.19a(2) states, in pertinent part:

Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except
if any of the following apply:

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(a) There is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child
to aggravated circumstances as provided in section 18(1) and (2) of the child
protection law, 1975 PA 238, MCL 722.638.

Aggravated circumstances include: “(iii) [b]attering, torture, or other serious physical
harm,” “(iv) [l]oss or serious impairment of an organ or limb,” and “(v) [l]ife threatening injury”
to a child or sibling of the child. MCL 722.638(1)(a). The trial court concluded that all these
circumstances applied.

Respondents acknowledge on appeal that the trial court made the requisite findings of
aggravated circumstances during the initial dispositional hearing, concurrently with its
determination that statutory grounds for termination had been established pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3). The record does not reflect any error in this regard. Our Supreme Court has held
that the aggravated-circumstances determination mandated by MCL 712A.19a(2)(a) must occur at
the initial dispositional hearing. See In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich __; __ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 167745), slip op at 16. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a trial court may not
terminate parental rights at the initial disposition absent a finding that one of the exceptions under
MCL 712A.19a(2) applies. See In re Walters, ___ Mich App __; __ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket
No. 369318), slip op at 1. In this matter, the trial court did not terminate respondents’ parental
rights at the initial disposition without first determining that at least one enumerated exception
under MCL 712A.19a(2) was present. Accordingly, respondents have failed to establish any
reversible error. Id.; In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16.

Respondents rely on MCR 3.965(C)(4) to argue that the trial court was obligated to make
an aggravated circumstances determination at the inception of the proceedings. This reliance is
misplaced. MCR 3.965 governs preliminary hearings and, in relevant part, obligates the trial court
to determine “whether reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child have been made or
that reasonable efforts to prevent removal are not required” only in situations where the court has
placed a child with an individual other than the custodial parent, guardian, or legal custodian at the
preliminary hearing. (Emphasis added.) The rule does not require the court to make findings
under MCL 712A.19a(2) at this stage. Respondents’ argument on this issue conflates the statutory
requirements for findings regarding reasonable efforts to prevent removal with those relating to
reasonable efforts toward reunification—distinct determinations that occur at separate procedural
junctures. See In re Barber/Espinoza, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 16 (“At the preliminary hearing,
the trial court must determine whether reasonable efforts have been made to prevent removal,
MCR 3.965(C)(4), not whether reasonable reunification efforts between removal and termination
may be excused, MCL 712A.19a(2).”). Accordingly, we find that this argument is devoid of both
legal and factual merit. Therefore, respondents are not entitled to any relief on this ground.

B. ZOOM APPEARANCE

Respondents further assert on appeal that their due process rights were infringed upon by
being compelled to appear via Zoom at both the partial3 adjudication trial and the dispositional

3
Respondents pled no contest mid-trial.

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hearing. As a threshold matter, due process claims present questions of law subject to de novo
review by this Court. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 268; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).

It is undisputed that, at all relevant times during these child protective proceedings,
respondents were incarcerated in Tennessee on pending criminal charges. Tennessee authorities
refused to permit respondents to travel out of state to attend the Michigan proceedings in person.
Consequently, respondents participated in the Michigan proceedings via videoconference.
Following respondents’ motion to appear in person at the adjudication trial, the trial court stated
that it was unaware of any legal authority empowering it to compel Tennessee officials to produce
respondents physically or obligating the court to stay the child protective proceedings pending
respondents’ in-person appearance. The court indicated it would provide reasonable
accommodations for respondents’ videoconference participation, including enhanced audio
arrangements and opportunities for confidential attorney conferences. The court further
acknowledged its lack of control over the duration of the Tennessee incarceration and articulated
its obligation to balance the parents’ interest in personal appearance against the children’s interest
in expeditious resolution of the proceedings.4 On appeal, respondents advance the erroneous
contention that due process guarantees an absolute right to physical presence at child protective
proceedings in all circumstances. As recognized by the trial court, while in-person attendance is
generally preferable, the impediment to physical appearance in this instance was respondents’
incarceration in a different jurisdiction. Michigan law is clear that physical presence at such
proceedings does not constitute an absolute right. See In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 49; 501
NW2d 231 (1993).

It is axiomatic that parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
companionship, custody, and management of their children, as safeguarded by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 409; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). Nevertheless, this right
is not absolute. The state maintains a legitimate and compelling interest in safeguarding the moral,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of minors, and, under certain circumstances, may properly
separate neglectful parents from their children. Id. at 409-410. Procedural due process mandates
that, prior to state interference with a fundamental right, at least minimal procedural protections
must be afforded. Id. at 410. Nonetheless, “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.” In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 111; 499 NW2d 752
(1993) (quoting Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 332, 334; 96 S Ct 893, 901, 902 (1976)).
Fundamental fairness is the touchstone of due process, assessed by reference to applicable
precedent and a careful balancing of the competing interests implicated in each case. In re Rood,
483 Mich 73, 92; 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (opinion by Corrigan, J.). The essential requirement is
the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. To ascertain
the specific procedural protections required, courts apply the familiar balancing test set forth in
Mathews, which considers the following factors:

“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,

4
Respondent-mother sought interlocutory leave to appeal, which this Court denied. In re Klimp,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 30, 2024 (Docket No. 372938).

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and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” [In re Brock, 442 Mich at 111, quoting Mathews, 424
US at 335.]

Here, the private interest implicated is the respondents’ fundamental right to the custody
of their children. We certainly recognize this as a paramount constitutional right. And while the
risk of erroneous deprivation of such an interest may be heightened where a respondent parent is
wholly absent from proceedings and unrepresented by counsel. See In re Render, 145 Mich App
344, 349; 377 NW2d 421 (1985) (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation is increased in the parent’s
absence.”) But those circumstances are not present here. The record demonstrates that
respondents participated via videoconferencing technology and were represented by counsel, who
advocated vigorously for their interests. Importantly, the trial court affirmatively facilitated
respondents’ remote participation in the Michigan proceedings, accommodating respondents
despite their incarceration in another state.

The State of Michigan’s compelling interest in safeguarding the welfare of the children in
this matter is likewise of the highest order. See In re Brock, 442 Mich at 112-113. Beyond the
potentially considerable financial and administrative burdens associated with transporting
respondents from Tennessee to Michigan, the record suggests that securing their physical presence
was effectively precluded by determinations made by Tennessee officials.

Our review of the record in this matter leads us to conclude that the trial court did not
deprive respondents of a fundamentally fair process or a meaningful opportunity to be heard by
permitting their participation through contemporary videoconferencing technology. See In re
Rood, 483 Mich at 92; In re Brock, 442 Mich at 111. This Court recognized decades ago that,
considering then-existing telecommunications, alternatives to physical presence could satisfy due
process requirements for incarcerated parents at dispositional hearings. In re Vasquez, 199 Mich
App at 48-49. That observation is even more salient given present-day technological advances.
Furthermore, respondents have wholly failed to engage with the Mathews factors in their appellate
briefing and have not demonstrated any deprivation of due process in this case, leading us to
conclude that respondents are not entitled to relief on this issue.

C. STATUTORY GROUNDS AND BEST INTERESTS REGARDING OK AND KK

Respondents further assert that the trial court committed reversible error by invoking the
doctrine of anticipatory neglect as a predicate for terminating their parental rights to OK and KK.
Additionally, respondents challenge the sufficiency of the evidentiary foundation upon which the
trial court determined that termination of their parental rights served the best interests of OK and
KK.

The statutory framework governing termination of parental rights requires the trial court to
make an initial determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one statutory ground
for termination exists. MCL 712A.19b(3). Appellate review of both the trial court’s factual
findings and its ultimate determination regarding the existence of a statutory ground is conducted

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under the clear error standard. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). A finding
is deemed clearly erroneous when, despite some evidentiary support, the reviewing court is left
with a definite and firm conviction that an error has been made.

This Court also reviews for clear error a lower court’s decision that termination is in a
child’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial
court terminated respondents’ parental rights to KK and OK under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(iii), (iv),
and (v).

MCL 712A.19b(3) states, in pertinent part:

The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

---

(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, the abuse included
1 or more of the following, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will
be harmed if returned to the care of the parent:

---

(iii) Battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.

(iv) Loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb.

(v) Life-threatening injury.

Solely for the sake of this argument, respondents concede that the statutory grounds for
termination are satisfied as to MK and TK. However, they assert that the trial court committed
reversible error by extending these grounds to OK and KK, given that the alleged abuse was
confined to MK and TK. Respondents challenge the applicability of the doctrine of anticipatory
neglect, which holds that a parent’s treatment of one child is probative of the likely treatment of
another. See In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 730; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). Respondents
analogize this matter to In re LaFrance, where this Court reversed termination of parental rights
as to three older children based solely on medical neglect of the youngest child, noting the absence
of evidence that either parent had ever abused or neglected the older siblings. Id. Unlike
LaFrance, however, this matter involves two minor children who directly witnessed egregious and
deliberate abuse perpetrated against their older siblings. Respondents further disregard the
controlling statutory language of MCL 712A.19b(3)(k), which expressly authorizes termination of
parental rights where a child’s sibling has been abused by a parent.5 Under these facts, respondents
have failed to establish that the trial court’s findings regarding the statutory grounds for
termination were clearly erroneous. See In re Mason, 486 Mich at 152.

5
“Sibling” means “a child who is related through birth or adoption by at least 1 common parent.”
MCL 712A.13a(1)(l).

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Respondents also contend that the trial court erred by finding that it was in the best interests
of OK and KK to terminate respondents’ parental rights. “If a trial court finds that a statutory basis
for terminating parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence, it is required to terminate
parental rights if it finds from a preponderance of evidence on the whole record that termination
is in the children’s best interests.” In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad, 305 Mich App 623, 637; 853
NW2d 459 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also MCL 712A.19b(5).

The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests. To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the
court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond to the parent, the
parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s
history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).]

The trial court’s conclusion regarding the best interests of OK and KK is amply supported
by the evidentiary record. The foster-care supervisor testified that MK and TK were subjected to
sustained and severe abuse. She further noted that the other two adopted children, KK (eight at
the time of the hearing) and OK (six), not only witnessed this abuse but, according to forensic
interviews, displayed troubling perceptions of such conduct as normative.6 For instance, OK
indicated that MK and TK “liked” sleeping in “buckets,” and sometimes assisted in feeding them
with bottles. KK stated that it was “okay” for MK and TK to sleep in taped-shut totes, as this
prevented their escape from the home. The supervisor opined that, by witnessing and at times
participating in the maltreatment of their siblings, KK and OK suffered significant emotional and
psychological harm.

KK and OK were placed together in a pre-adoptive foster home and were doing well,
although they had some emotional issues such as yelling, screaming, and hitting. KK and OK had
bonds with their foster parents. They had been in care for over a year. The foster-care supervisor
believed it was in the best interests of the children for respondents’ parental rights to be terminated.
She said that all the children were being looked after appropriately in their placements. KK and
OK’s foster mother said that the two children were doing well in her home and excelling at school.
She said that they were “thriving” and that she and her husband were willing to adopt them.7

Notably, KK and OK exhibited emotional and behavioral disturbances, including yelling,
screaming, and hitting. Under these circumstances, KK and OK were similarly situated to MK

6
An expert psychologist stated that witnessing what occurred to MK and TK “could not not have
impact,” such as causing a child to conflate what is normal or abnormal.
7
It is also of note that the children’s guardian ad litem advocated for terminating respondents’
parental rights to KK and OK.

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and TK and thus exposed to a comparable risk of harm if returned to respondents’ care.
Respondents’ purported justification for the abuse of MK and TK centered on perceived behavioral
issues, further underscoring the peril faced by the remaining children. Moreover, unlike the three
biological children, KK and OK were not placed with relatives, a factor which, under In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43, might otherwise weigh against termination.

Considering all relevant circumstances, specifically the egregious treatment inflicted upon
the children by their parents, the trial court did not commit clear error in determining that
termination of the respondents’ parental rights with respect to OK and KK served the best interests
of the children. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40.

Affirmed.

/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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