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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

FRIEDLANDER v. TAMARACK JUNCTION RACE & SPORTS BOOK (CIVIL)

Nevada Supreme Court

• Citations: 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 23

• Docket Number: 89527

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (668)

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Combined Opinion

142 Nev., Advance Opinion ,c:3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

STEVE FRIEDLANDER, AN No. 89527
INDIVIDUAL,
Appellant,
VS.

TAMARACK JUNCTION RACE &
SPORTS BOOK, OPERATED BY
MAR 1 2 2026
WILLIAM HILL RACE & SPORTS
BOOK WILLIAM HILL,
Respondent. DEPUTY CLERK
CH

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for judicial
review of a Nevada Gaming Control Board decision. Second Judicial
District Court, Washoe County; Lynne K. Jones, Judge.
Affirmed.

Dragon Law Group, PLLC, and Joseph A. Dragon, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

McDonald Carano LLP and Adam Hosmer-Henner, A.G. Burnett, and
Philip Mannelly, Reno,
for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
In resolving disputes, the terms of a gaming wager are
construed according to an establishment's house rules, so long as patrons

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have sufficient notice of those rules. Nev. Gaming Cornin'n Reg. (NGCR)
22.150. In this case, appellant Steve Friedlander disputed the payout terms
of two wagers he placed at a William Hill nonpari-mutuel sports book.
Despite William Hill's house rules explicitly limiting odds on the wagers he
placed, Friedlander maintained that he was entitled to full track odds

payout. The Nevada Gaming Control Board determined that William Hill
was justified in denying this payout because the signage at the sports book
was sufficient to provide notice of the limited odds and, accordingly, those
limited odds controlled. Friedlander petitioned the district court for judicial
review, without success, and now appeals. Because we conclude that the
Board's determination was supported by evidence and was not arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise contrary to the law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Friedlander, an experienced sports bettor, orally placed three
winning wagers on the 2019 Kentucky Derby at Tamarack Junction Race &
Sports Book in Reno. Two of those wagers are at issue here.' One was a
boxed exacta—selecting the first and second place horses, to finish in any
order—consisting of 12 bets of $100, totaling $1,200. The other was a boxed
trifecta—selecting the first, second, and third place horses, to finish in any
order—consisting of 24 bets of $40, totaling $960.
William Hill operates the Tamarack Junction race book as a
nonpari-mutuel betting location, meaning winning bets are paid not from
the public collective betting pool, as with pari-mutuel betting, but from
William Hill's own assets. Accordingly, William Hill limits odds on some of
the wagers placed at the Tamarack Junction sports book. Pertinent to this

'Friedlander cashed out his third winning wager without issue.
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case, William Hill caps nonpari-mutuel exacta wagers at 150-to-1 and
trifecta wagers at 500-to-1.
At the time Friedlander placed his wagers, the Tamarack
Junction sports book displayed several signs indicating these limited odds.
Two signs read: "This William Hill Race and Sports Book is a non pari-

mutuel location. Please refer to the William Hill House Rules and
Regulations regarding pools available and payout odds limits. William Hill
Customer Support (855-754-1200)." One of these signs was located on the
counter where bets are placed. The other was displayed on the wall next to
the betting sheets. The William Hill house rules referenced in those signs
include the limited odds for exacta and trifecta wagers. These rules are
available online. More notably, a printout of the "Non Pari-Mutuel Race
Rules and Limits" page listing the exacta and trifecta odds limits was
displayed on the counter where bets are placed. Relevant to Friedlander's
bets, the Kentucky Derby betting sheets also listed the exacta and trifecta
odds limits.
Friedlander did not use a betting sheet in placing his wagers
and asserted that he did not see the signs disclosing the limited odds. While
the ticket writers usually try to warn patrons that the odds are limited,
particularly with large bets, Friedlander alleges he was not so notified.
Rather, Friedlander asserts, he only learned of the odds limits when he tried
to cash in his winning wagers. The full track odds for exacta wagers for the
Kentucky Derby were 1,503.8-to-1, and for trifecta wagers, 11,475.3-to-1.
William Hill's 150-to-1 and 500-to-1 respective limited odds reduced the
total payout on the two wagers from $609,492 to $35,140.
When William Hill refused to pay the full track odds payout
amount, Friedlander filed a complaint with the Board, urging it to order
William Hill to pay the full track odds amount because he was not aware
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that the odds were limited. After an investigation, a Board agent denied
Friedlander's request, determining that the Tamarack Junction sports book
had sufficient signage to indicate that it was a nonpari-mutuel betting
location and that the exacta and trifecta odds were limited. Friedlander
petitioned the Board for reconsideration. After a hearing, the Board

affirmed the denial of payment, describing the signs at the Tamarack
Junction sports book and concluding that they "were in conspicuous places
and readily accessible by all patrons," providing "adequate notice" of the

capped terms.
In coining to its determination, the Board referenced NGCR
22.150, which requires gaming establishments to "adopt, conspicuously
display at its licensed premises, and adhere to written, comprehensive
house rules governing wagering transactions with patrons." Because
William Hill had conspicuously displayed the capped terms in compliance
with NGCR 22.150, the Board reasoned, Friedlander knew or should have
known about the limited odds and thus the limited odds determined the
payout. With full track odds payout again denied, Friedlander then
petitioned the district court for judicial review of the Board's determination.
The district court denied the petition and affirmed the Board. Friedlander
now appeals.
DISCUSSION
With exceptions not relevant here, disputes over gaming
payouts are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to resolve. NRS
463.361(2)(a); Sengel v. IGT, 116 Nev. 565, 568-69, 2 P.3d 258, 260 (2000).
A patron may not challenge a gaming payout with a breach of contract

claim; instead, the matter must be referred to the Board. NRS 463.361(1);
NRS 463.362(1). Upon receiving such a complaint, the Board assigns an
agent to investigate the claim and determine whether the gaming debt
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should be paid. NRS 463.362(3). If a patron is aggrieved by the Board
agent's decision, they may petition for reconsideration by the Board, NRS
463.363, and subsequently for judicial review by a district court, NRS
463.3662(1). An appellate court may further review the decision, assuming
the same role as that of the district court. NRS 463.3668; Sengel, 116 Nev.
at 571, 2 P.3d at 262.
On appeal, board decisions receive deference. Redrner v.

Barbary Coast Hotel & Casino, 110 Nev. 374, 378, 872 P.2d 341, 344 (1994).
Reviewing courts may, however, remand or reverse the Board's decision if
the substantial rights of the petitioner have been
prejudiced because the decision is:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction of the Board or the hearing examiner;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Unsupported by any evidence; or
(e) Arbitrary or capricious or otherwise not in
accordance with law.
NRS 463.3666(3). Friedlander challenges the Board's determination under
prongs (d) and (e), arguing that his substantial rights were prejudiced
because the decision was unsupported by the evidence and was both
arbitrary and capricious.2 We disagree.

2Friedlander also argues that his constitutional "right to contract"
was violated. Because he fails to provide any authority or argument beyond
passing conclusory statements, we decline to address this argument. See
Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280,
1288 n.38 (2006) (holding that this court need not consider claims that are
not cogently argued or supported by relevant authority).

5
The Board's determination is supported by the evidence
First, Friedlander argues that no evidence supports the Board's

finding that William Hill conspicuously displayed the limited odds at the
Tamarack Junction sports book. He contends that the signage did not list

the specific caps or the "actual amounts to be paid on the winning wagers."
Instead, the signage "simply refers patrons to an unspecified external
,
source," requiring additional steps to learn a material term." With respect
to the betting sheets, Friedlander argues they were "buried in clutter" and
he was not directed to them. Finally, he argues he should have been orally
notified about the caps when he placed his wagers.
As noted, one of the bases for reversing a Board decision is a
lack of evidentiary support. NRS 463.3666(3)(d). The court will defer to the
Board's decision, however, if there is "any evidence whatsoever" to support
it, "even if that evidence is less than 'that which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Sengel, 116 Nev. at 570, 2 P.3d
at 261 (quoting City of Las Vegas v. Laughlin, 111 Nev. 557, 558, 893 P.2d
383, 384 (1995)).
The record before us includes evidence of the signage at the
Tamarack Junction sports book, including pictures of its content and
placement. Two signs specifically identified the Tamarack Junction sports
book as a nonpari-mutuel location. Although a nonpari-mutuel designation
does not necessarily indicate that odds are limited, at what ratio, or for
which wagers, the signs indicated "payout odds limits" and referenced the
William Hill house rules, which do identify the exacta and trifecta odds
limits. One of those signs was on the counter of the betting station,
accompanied by a printout of the house rules that explicitly displayed the
exacta and trifecta odds limits. Those specific odds were also printed on the

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Kentucky Derby betting sheets. All of these notices were posted in the
betting area where they would be encountered by patrons.
Even without a warning from the ticket writers or using a
betting sheet, three signs indicated odds were limited, two of which were
posted on the counter where Friedlander placed his wagers. The Board
found that the signs sufficiently notified Friedlander about the limited odds.
We conclude that evidence in the record supports that determination and
therefore defer to the Board's finding.
The Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to
law
Next, Friedlander argues that the Board's decision was
arbitrary and capricious because it disregarded that his wagers were
enforceable contracts and failed to apply settled principles of contract law.

Because the signs were insufficient to establish the payout term of the
gaming contract, Friedlander argues, he had a contract with William Hill
that was silent as to the payout term. He argues that industry custom
should supply the missing term and compel a full track odds payout and
that William Hill needed to expressly indicate different terms to deviate
from that custom. William Hill responds that Friedlander's contract-based
arguments are irrelevant because Nevada does not impose contractual
liability for gaming debts and that, in any case, the payout term was
provided by the William Hill house rules.
As detailed, reversal of a Board decision is warranted if the
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. NRS 463.3666(3)(e). In
evaluating a challenge on this basis, we examine whether the Board's
analysis is flawed. Redmer, 110 Nev. at 379, 872 P.2d at 345. A decision is
arbitrary or capricious if it is "founded on prejudice or preference rather
than on reason." State v. Eighth Ad. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927,

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(9th ed. 2009)). It may also be considered arbitrary or capricious if it is
"contrary to the evidence or established rules of law," id. at 932, 267 P.M at

780 (quoting Capricious, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)), or if it fails
to follow gaming regulations, Nev. Gaming Cornm'n v. Consol. Casinos
Corp., 94 Nev. 139, 141, 575 P.2d 1337, 1338 (1978).
NRS 463.361(1) explicitly states that gaming debts absent a
credit instrument are "void and unenforceable." The statute further

provides that gaming debts "do not give rise to any administrative or civil
cause of action" by patrons. Such clear statutory language dispatches
Friedlander's argument that the Board's decision was arbitrary or
capricious in failing to consider his wager an enforceable contract. While
wagers are not enforceable by a patron through a claim for breach of
contract, their terms necessarily remain subject to interpretation pursuant
to contract law principles when the Board exercises its exclusive authority
to resolve a patron's claim for the payment of a gaming debt.
By way of example, in Redmer v. Barbary Coast Hotel & Casino,

we affirmed the Board's decision enforcing the plain language of the wager
rules because, as a contract, the express terms therein controlled. 110 Nev.
at 379, 872 P.2d at 345. In doing so, we referenced Watson v. Watson, 95
Nev. 495, 496-97, 596 P.2d 507, 508 (1979), which interpreted a property
settlement agreement, for the proposition that courts cannot "distort the
plain meaning of an agreement" under "the guise of interpretation." In a
different case involving a malfunctioning slot machine, Sengel v. IGT, we
interpreted the rules of play as a contract defined by the terms expressly
stated on the face of the machine. 116 Nev. at 568, 571-72, 2 P.3d at 259,
262. Our precedent refutes William Hill's claim that contract law is
inapplicable in evaluating Board decisions. A decision that wholly ignores
relevant principles of contract law would be arbitrary or capricious.

8
As articulated in Sengel, expressly stated terms define the
parameters of a contract, including a gaming wager. 116 Nev. at 572, 573,
2 P.3d at 262, 263. With respect to payout terms, the Board recognizes that
an establishment's house rules define those terms. NGCR 22.150 (stating
generally that the house rules govern wagering transactions with patrons);

Nev. Garning Control Bd., Minimum Internal Control Standards: Race and
Sports, https://www . gaming. nv. gov/siteassets/content/divisions/audit/mics/
v9-raceandsports.pdf (last accessed Mar. 3, 2026) (instructing auditors to

ensure that payouts on nonpari-mutuel tickets "were made in accordance
with the posted house rules"). NGCR 22.150 contemplates, however, that
the house rules are conspicuously displayed such that patrons are put on
notice of the terms of play. And under Sengel, displaying gaming terms on
the face of a slot machine is sufficient to establish those terms as controlling.
116 Nev. at 572, 573, 2 P.3d at 262, 263.
Here, the Board found that the payout term of Friedlander's
wagers was determined by the house rules, of which Friedlander had
constructive knowledge due to the signage on site. Accordingly, the Board
found that William Hill was justified in paying Friedlander the limited odds
payout amount. Not only does this finding heed contract principles with
respect to express contract terms, but it also recognizes that payout terms
are established by house rules. The Board underpinned its decision with
NGCR 22.150, focusing on how the house rules—specifically the limited
odds—were displayed at the Taniarack Junction sports book. Based on the
content, placement, and amount of signage, the Board found that the
limited-odds term was conspicuously posted. As a result of that conspicuous
display, the Board determined that that term governed Friedlander's
wager, regardless of whether Friedlander actually knew about it. In

making this decision, the Board considered the evidence, relevant contract
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principles, and applicable gaming regulations. The decision is consistent
with our precedent and does not exhibit a flaw in the Board's analytical
reasoning. Therefore, we conclude that the Board's decision was not
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law.
CONCLUSION
We defer to the Board's resolution of gaming disputes unless a
decision lacks any evidentiary support or exhibits arbitrary or capricious
reasoning. In this case, the Board found that William Hill sufficiently
displayed its limited-odds term via signage at its nonpari-mutuel Tamarack
Junction sports book. It found that the signage effectively put Friedlander
on notice that the odds for exacta and trifecta wagers were capped and that
those limited odds thus controlled the payout term of his wagers. The
Board's decision was supported by the evidence and was not arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. We therefore affirm the district
court's judgment upholding the Board's decision.

Ai4at..12 J.
Stiglich

We concur:

, C.J.
Pickering

Bell

J.
Cadish !Lee
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