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State v. Jackson - Felony Sentence Opinion

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Filed March 12th, 2026
Detected March 13th, 2026
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Summary

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a felony sentence for Jalen Jackson, ruling that the sentence was not reviewable on appeal because the trial court imposed a base sentence within the range agreed upon by the parties in the plea agreement. The opinion addresses R.C. 2953.08 regarding reviewability of sentences.

What changed

The Ohio Court of Appeals, in the case of State v. Jackson (Docket No. 115167), affirmed a felony sentence imposed on the defendant, Jalen Jackson. The court's decision, based on R.C. 2953.08, determined that the sentence was not subject to appellate review because the trial court adhered to the sentencing range agreed upon by the parties in the plea agreement. This ruling clarifies the scope of appellate review for agreed-upon sentences in Ohio.

This opinion serves as a precedent for legal professionals and courts in Ohio regarding the finality of sentences that fall within an agreed-upon range. For criminal defendants and their legal counsel, it underscores the importance of carefully negotiating plea agreements and understanding that sentences within the agreed range may not be appealable. The court's affirmation implies that the defendant's sentence, as imposed, is upheld.

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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Jackson

Ohio Court of Appeals

Syllabus

Felony sentence; R.C. 2953.08; not reviewable; agreed sentence; range; indefinite sentence. Where the trial court imposed a base sentence within the recommended sentencing range set forth by the parties in the plea agreement, the sentence was not reviewable on appeal.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jackson,
2026-Ohio-833.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115167
v. :

JALEN JACKSON, :

Defendant-Appellant. :


JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 12, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-23-683231-A and CR-23-685374-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Adrienne E. Linnick, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.

Susan J. Moran and Michael T. Fisher, for appellant.

TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J.:

Defendant-appellant Jalen Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals from his

felony sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History

This is an appeal from multiple criminal cases. Because the cases

were resolved with a plea agreement, our summary of the facts is limited to what

was placed on the record at the sentencing hearing.

On July 25, 2023, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-683231 (“case no.

683231”), a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jackson on one count of burglary

in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2); one count of theft in violation of R.C.

2913.02(A)(1); and one count of vandalism in violation of R.C. 2909.05(A). This

case arose from the burglary of an apartment in Cleveland, Ohio. The victim

reported that money and items were taken from his apartment. Jackson was

identified as a suspect in this case because blood near a broken window at the

apartment’s entrance matched Jackson’s DNA.

On October 4, 2023, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-23-685374 (“case no.

685374”), a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jackson on one count of

receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A) and one count of

obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) with a furthermore

clause. This case arose from a woman reporting that her vehicle and its spare key

were taken from her at gunpoint. Jackson was identified as a suspect, and a warrant

was issued for his arrest.

On December 19, 2024, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-24-697745 (“case

no. 697745”), a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jackson in a third case. He

was charged with two counts of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B); aggravated
robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); grand theft of a motor vehicle in violation

of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); two

counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); discharge of a firearm

on or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3); failure to comply

with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B); having

weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); involuntary

manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A); vehicular assault in violation of R.C.

2903.08(A)(2)(b); trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2); possession of a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A); trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); and possession

of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A).

This case arose when Jackson approached an Amazon delivery driver

in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, with a firearm and stole the delivery vehicle. Jackson

engaged police in a high-speed chase from Cleveland Heights to the west side of

Cleveland. Jackson drove the delivery vehicle the wrong way on I-90 and crashed

head-on into a sedan. The driver of the sedan was pronounced dead at the scene,

and Jackson proceeded to flee on foot.

Jackson and the State ultimately reached a plea agreement to resolve

all three cases, and the court held a plea hearing on March 31, 2025. Pursuant to

the plea agreement, in case no. 697745, Jackson would plead guilty to one amended

count of involuntary manslaughter, one count of aggravated robbery with a three-

year firearm specification and a forfeiture specification, one count of discharge of a
firearm on or near prohibited premises, one count of failure to comply with an order

of a police officer with a three-year firearm specification, and one count of having

weapons while under disability. In case no. 685374, Jackson would plead guilty to

one count of receiving stolen property. In case no. 683231, Jackson would plead

guilty to one count of burglary. The remaining counts and specifications in all three

indictments would be dismissed.

While the State was outlining the terms of the plea agreement on the

record, the following exchange took place:

THE STATE: And the parties are agreeing to a recommended sentence
of a range of 26 to 34 years with no early release.

THE COURT: 26 to 34 years. That’s the underlying base sentence, 26
to 34 years because then there’s still the indefinite part, the tail, right?

THE STATE: Right. That would not include the tail, the Reagan Tokes
tail.

THE COURT: So if we’re looking at this, is it left to the Court to decide
how to craft whatever it is to get between 26 and 34?

THE STATE: That is my understanding of how the parties are
presenting it, that is the agreed recommended range and the Court is
free to obviously sentence however the Court deems appropriate, but if
going by that agreed recommended range, that 26 would be the full –

THE COURT: Yes.

(Tr. 9-10.) After the State outlined the aforementioned terms of the plea agreement,

the court confirmed with Jackson’s counsel that the State had accurately described

the agreement. Defense counsel stated:

The prosecuting attorneys have accurately stated our agreement. My
client is aware of his constitutional rights. He’s aware of the possible
penalties that you may impose upon him. He does understand the
agreed upon recommended range that would encompass all three files.
I believe he’ll enter pleas today knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.

(Tr. 15.)

The court then engaged in a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy with Jackson,

during which the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises to you if you enter a
guilty plea other than the agreed recommended range that was
outlined?

JACKSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: They have?

JACKSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What else were you promised?

JACKSON: Six years mandatory with 26.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s what’s been placed on the record.

THE COURT: I’m sorry, what?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think he misunderstood. That’s what’s been
placed on the record, the mandatory time and the firearm specification
and the recommended range of 26 to 34. Other than that, has anybody
promised you anything?

THE COURT: I see, other than that?

JACKSON: Oh, no.

THE COURT: I was confused. Sorry about that.

(Tr. 17-18.)

The court proceeded with the plea colloquy. The court explained the

potential penalties involved in all three cases, including the application of the

Reagan Tokes Law to two of the cases. The court specifically reiterated the agreed
recommended sentencing range, stating: “And the plea agreement is that you will

serve a base sentence from anywhere to 26 to 34 years.” (Tr. 27.) The court further

reiterated that the sentences in all three cases would be served concurrently, and

specifically confirmed that Jackson understood that he would receive an indefinite

sentence:

THE COURT: But within that range, those will still be subject to an
indefinite sentence of Reagan Tokes depending on how I craft it. So do
you have any questions about what you’re pleading guilty to or the
potential penalties?

JACKSON: No, sir.

(Tr. 28-29.)

The court ultimately accepted Jackson’s plea as outlined above and

referred him to the court psychiatric clinic for a presentence investigation (“PSI”).

On April 30, 2025, the court held a sentencing hearing. The assistant

prosecuting attorney addressed the court, reiterated the agreed recommended

sentencing range of 26 to 34 years, and requested the court impose a sentence of 34

years. The assistant prosecuting attorney also read statements from two of the

victims. Defense counsel addressed the court and requested the court impose a

sentence of 26 years. Jackson also addressed the court.

The court sentenced Jackson to a total aggregate sentence of 30 to 35

and one-half years. This sentence was comprised of two to three years on the

burglary conviction in case no. 683231; one year on the receiving-stolen-property

conviction in case no. 685734; and 11 to 16 and one-half years on the involuntary-

manslaughter conviction, 11 years on the aggravated-robbery conviction, two years
on the discharge-of-a-firearm conviction, two years on the failure-to-comply

conviction, and two years on the having a weapon-while-under-disability conviction

in case no. 697745, together with the attendant firearm specifications.1 In case no.

697745, the court order the involuntary-manslaughter sentence to be served

consecutively to the aggravated-robbery and failure-to-comply sentences.

Jackson appealed. He now raises a single assignment of error for our

review:

The trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences which were not
supported by the record and were contrary to law.

Law and Analysis

As an initial matter, we note that although Jackson’s appeal concerns

his sentence in all three of the cases described above, Jackson did not appeal from

his sentence in case no. 697745. No notice of appeal was filed in that case, and the

notice of appeal in the instant appeal only includes a reference to case nos. 683231

and 685734. App.R. 3(D) provides that a notice of appeal “shall designate the

judgment, order or part thereof appealed from[.]” “‘Failure of an appellant to take

any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity

of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the court of appeals deems

appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.’” State v. King, 2023-Ohio-

2390, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), quoting Perozeni v. Perozeni, 2023-Ohio-1140, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.),

1The court imposed a one-year firearm specification on the involuntary-
manslaughter conviction, to be served concurrently to the three-year firearm
specifications imposed on the aggravated-robbery and failure-to-comply-convictions,
which were ordered to be served consecutively to each other and the underlying offenses.
quoting App.R. 3(A). See also Loc.App.R. 3(B)(1). Here, because all three cases

were resolved with a global plea agreement and our record includes the transcript of

the plea and sentencing hearing for all three cases, we exercise our discretion to

address the merits of Jackson’s appeal.

In Jackson’s sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by imposing excessive sentences that were not supported by the record and

were contrary to law. Specifically, he argues that the trial court inappropriately

imposed the maximum sentence for the offenses of involuntary manslaughter and

aggravated robbery. Because the aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court falls

within the jointly recommended sentence agreed to by the parties, Jackson’s

sentence is not subject to review.

R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) provides that “[a] sentence imposed upon a

defendant is not subject to review under this section if the sentence is authorized by

law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the

case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” Further, ““‘[i]t does not matter if the

jointly recommended sentence is a range or a specific term, as long as the sentence

is authorized by the law, the sentence is not reviewable.’”” State v. Cook, 2025-Ohio-

2776, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Curry, 2023-Ohio-1571, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Grant, 2018-Ohio-1759, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). “When ‘a defendant

stipulates that a particular sentence is justified, the sentencing judge no longer

needs to independently justify the sentence.’” State v. Bennett, 2023-Ohio-4412,

¶ 26 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 25.
Jackson does not cite any law or make any argument as to how his

sentence is reviewable by this court. Jackson’s sentence was within the range the

parties agreed to pursuant to the plea agreement and was authorized by law.

Therefore, Jackson’s arguments that the trial court did not properly explain its

imposition of maximum sentences is not well-taken. Jackson’s sole assignment of

error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

TIMOTHY W. CLARY, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR

Source

Analysis generated by AI. Source diff and links are from the original.

Classification

Agency
Federal and State Courts
Filed
March 12th, 2026
Instrument
Enforcement
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Minor

Who this affects

Applies to
Courts Legal professionals Criminal defendants
Geographic scope
State (Ohio)

Taxonomy

Primary area
Criminal Justice
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Sentencing Appeals

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