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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Ward

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 838
• Docket Number: 115328

• Judges: E.T. Gallagher

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Syllabus

Murder; felonious assault; sufficiency; manifest weight; ineffective assistance of counsel; cumulative error. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where eyewitnesses testified that they observed appellant shoot and kill the victim. Appellant failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The cumulative-error doctrine was inapplicable where appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of any error.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Ward, 2026-Ohio-838.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115328
v. :

DAVION WARD, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 12, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-691136-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Adrienne E. Linnick, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.

Tyresha Brown-O’Neal, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

Defendant-appellant Davion Ward (“Ward”) appeals his convictions

and claims the following errors:

1. The conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence.

2. The conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

3. Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation
   of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
   Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

4. Cumulative error deprived defendant of a fair trial.

We find that Ward’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence

and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We also find that Ward was

not prejudiced by either ineffective assistance of counsel or cumulative error. We,

therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Ward was charged with two counts of murder and other related charges

in connection with the shooting death of Christian Collier (“Collier”) on April 1,

1. Ward pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

Officer Eric Sands (“Officer Sands”) of the Warrensville Heights Police

Department testified at trial that on the evening of April 1, 2024, police received a

notification from ShotSpotter, a gunshot detection system, that several gunshots

were fired near a particular home on Longbrook Road in Warrensville Heights (the

“Longbrook residence”). Officer Sands approached the area and found a body lying

in the street in a pool of blood. He could see that the individual, later identified as

Collier, had been shot in the head. Officer Sands and other officers secured the scene

and looked for eyewitnesses.

Detective Robert Stetka (“Detective Stetka”) of the Warrensville

Heights Police Department investigated Collier’s death. He testified that when he

responded to the crime scene, he learned that Ward was the prime suspect. (Tr. 533-
534.) He also learned that there had been an altercation at the Longbrook residence

earlier that day and that three females who lived at the house had been assaulted.

One of the females, L.W., was injured during the altercation, and she was taken by

ambulance to South Pointe Hospital on Warrensville Center Road. The other two

females were the daughters of T.L., the owner of the Longbrook residence.

As a result of the altercation, T.L. called her son, Ward, to come to the

house to protect them because a man from the group that assaulted her daughters

had brandished a gun and threatened to return. (Tr. 412 and 428.) Shortly

thereafter, T.L. and her cousin, J.M., drove to the hospital to check on L.W.

J.M. testified that on the day of the murder, he was on his way to a gun

range with his AR-15 rifle when he received a call from one of his nieces to go to the

Longbrook residence because there had been a man at the house who threatened

them with a gun. (Tr. 383, 418, and 428.) When he arrived at the house, he placed

the AR-15 behind a TV stand with the butt of the gun sticking out. He also called for

an Uber to take Ward to the Longbrook residence to be with their family members

while he, J.M., was at the hospital. The Uber was scheduled to get Ward at

approximately 7:26 p.m., and Ward confirmed via text message to J.M. that he was

in the Uber at 7:43 p.m. J.M. testified that when he left the house to go to the

hospital, the AR-15 behind the TV stand was not loaded.

T.L. testified that while she and J.M. were visiting L.W. at the hospital,

Collier, who had dated L.W. on and off, came to visit her. (Tr. 311 and 430-431.)

L.W. also dated Ward. (Tr. 431.) T.L.’s daughter, K.M., testified that Collier had
cheated on L.W. and that L.W. believed Collier had given her a sexually transmitted

disease. (Tr. 451.) According to T.L., L.W. indicated that she did not want Collier

there at the hospital, and they asked him to leave. (Tr. 413-414.) Collier left the

hospital and went to the Longbrook residence.

Montega Roberson (“Roberson”), a family friend, was sitting in a car on

the driveway at the Longbrook residence smoking marijuana with T.M., her little

sister “Marie,” and Roberson’s younger brother. (Tr. 321.) While they were sitting

in the car, Collier arrived and parked his car on the street in front of the Longbrook

residence. T.M. got out of Roberson’s car and told Collier, “You have to go. You’re

not allowed here.” (Tr. 431.) Collier refused to leave, and Ward exited the house

holding a gun. (Tr. 436-437.)

T.M., K.M., and their aunt, C.M., tried to push Ward back toward the

house while also telling Collier to leave. (Tr. 336-437.) T.M. explained that Ward

“pushed us out of the way” and “that’s when the shots got fired.” (Tr. 438.) Seeking

clarification, the prosecutor asked, “We’re talking about Davion right after he

pushed past you. And that’s when you see Davion shoot Chris?” T.M. replied, “Yes.”

(Tr. 438.) T.M. told her sister to call the police, and her sister called the police after

calling her mother to report the shooting. (Tr. 439.)

J.M. testified he believed it was approximately ten to twenty minutes

after Collier left South Pointe Hospital that he received a phone call from one of his

nieces, who was screaming. T.L. also received a call from her daughter, K.M., who

was crying. Thereafter, J.M. returned to the Longbrook residence where he met with
police. L.W. checked herself out of the hospital and returned to the Longbrook

residence with T.L.

J.M. testified that when he arrived at the Longbrook residence, he saw

Collier’s body lying in the street and checked to see if his AR-15 was still behind the

TV stand, but it was gone. (Tr. 390.) He realized that someone had taken his gun

and used it to shoot Collier. (Tr. 391 and 397.) As a result, he told police that he was

taking responsibility for Ward. (Tr. 397-398.) T.L. told police that Ward had been

on his way to the house when she and J.M. went to the hospital and that his phone

was still on the scene. (Tr. 418.)

During the investigation, police went to the house across the street

from the Longbrook residence. The owner of the home, James Fleming (“Fleming”),

told police that a few bullets entered his home, and police found multiple bullet holes

in his walls. (Tr. 364-365.) One of the bullets hit a wall one and a half inches from

where Fleming had been sitting. (Tr. 372.)

Police recovered six 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge cases at the scene. Sara

Dranuski (“Dranuski”), a firearms expert with the Cuyahoga County Regional

Forensic Science Laboratory, testified that the cartridge cases recovered from the

scene are the kind of cartridge typically associated with a rifle. The rifle itself was

never recovered.

Detective Stetka testified that the ShotSpotter notification system

detected seven gunshots from 8:12:29 p.m. to 8:12:32 p.m. in the vicinity of the

Longbrook residence. (Tr. 543.) Detective Stetka explained that ShotSpotter
guarantees accuracy of an 82-foot radius from where the gunshots are fired and that

the actual accuracy is “closer to 10 to 30 feet.” (Tr. 543.)

Detective Stetka also obtained a search warrant to search Collier’s car

“[t]o see if there were any sort of weapons that would have caused this reaction from

Davion Ward.” (Tr. 544.) Detective Stetka testified that he found no weapons in

Collier’s car when he searched it. (Tr. 545.) There were also no weapons found on

Collier’s person at the scene. (Tr. 483 and 545.)

Dr. Alison Krywanczyk (“Dr. Krywanczyk”), a deputy medical

examiner at the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Officer, performed the

autopsy on Collier’s body. She testified that Collier sustained two fatal gunshot

wounds to the back of the head as well as several superficial “shrapnel-related”

injuries. (Tr. 515, 519, and 525-526.) According to Dr. Krywanczyk, Collier was

healthy at the time of the shooting and his death was caused by the two gunshot

wounds to the head, neither of which was survivable. (Tr. 526 and 528.)

The jury found Ward guilty of two counts of murder in violation of

R.C. 2903.02(A) and 2903.02(B); two count of felonious assault in violation of

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and 2903.11(A)(2); one count of discharge of a firearm on or near

a prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162; and one count of improperly

discharging a firearm at or into a habitation or a school safety zone in violation of

R.C. 2923.161(A)(1). The jury also found Ward guilty of the one- and three-year

firearm specifications attendant to the murder and felonious-assault charges. The
court sentenced Ward to life in prison with eligibility for parole after 20 years. Ward

now appeals his convictions.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight

In the first and second assignments of error, Ward argues his

convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and that his convictions are

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Although the terms “sufficiency” and “weight” of the evidence are

“quantitatively and qualitatively different,” we address these issues together because

they are closely related, while applying the distinct standards of review. State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).

The test for sufficiency is whether the prosecution met its burden of

production at trial. State v. Bowden, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). The relevant

inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus.

In contrast to sufficiency, “weight of the evidence involves the

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence.” Thompkins at 387. While

“sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law . . . weight of the evidence addresses

the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25,
citing Thompkins at 386-387. “In other words, a reviewing court asks whose

evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” Id.

In a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, the reviewing court

must consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, and the

credibility of the witnesses to determine “‘whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins

at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

Ward was convicted of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and

(B). R.C. 2903.02 provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the
unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy.

(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of
the offender’s committing or attempting to commit an offense of
violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a
violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code.

Ward was also convicted of felonious assault in violation of

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2). R.C. 2903.11 provides, in relevant part:

(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:

(1) Cause serious physical harm to another or to another’s unborn;

(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to
another’s unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous
ordnance.
Ward argues the evidence was insufficient and was against the

manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence showed that Ward acted in

self-defense. To claim a self-defense claim, the defendant must establish

(1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving
rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he
[or she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that
his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of
such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat
or avoid the danger.

State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d

21, 24 (2002).

The second element of a self-defense claim is a combined subjective-

and-objective test. State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330 (1997). The test first

requires evidence establishing that the accused had reasonable grounds to believe

or an honest belief that he or she was in imminent or immediate danger of death or

great bodily harm. Id.

[T]he jury first must consider the defendant’s situation objectively, that
is, whether, considering all of the defendant's particular characteristics,
knowledge, or lack of knowledge, circumstances, history, and
conditions at the time of the attack [he or] she reasonably believed [he
or] she was in imminent danger.

(Emphasis sic.) Id. If this objective standard is met, the jury must then subjectively

determine if the defendant had an honest belief, even if mistaken, that he or she was

in imminent danger of death or serious injury. Id. at 331.

Ward’s 14-year-old sister, K.M., testified that, at the time of the

shooting, Collier “was going in his pocket like he had something.” (Tr. 458.)

However, no other witnesses testified that Collier reached into his pocket or that he
otherwise appeared to be a threat to anyone. As previously stated, no weapons were

found either on Collier’s person or in his vehicle. Therefore, there was insufficient

evidence to support a claim of self-defense, and self-defense was not presented as a

defense at trial.

To the contrary, T.M. testified that Ward pushed her, her sister, and

her aunt out of the way in order to approach Collier and shoot him. (Tr. 438.) T.M.

testified that she observed Ward shoot Collier, who was unarmed. Therefore, there

was sufficient evidence establishing that Ward knowingly caused serious physical

harm to Collier (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)) and that he caused Collier serious physical

harm by means of a deadly weapon (R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)), namely a rifle. The same

evidence also established that Ward purposely caused Collier’s death

(R.C. 2903.02(A)) and that he caused the death as a proximate result of committing

felonious assault, an offense of violence. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to

support Ward’s murder and felonious-assault convictions. And because there was

virtually no evidence to contradict T.M.’s eyewitness testimony, we see no reason to

doubt the veracity of her testimony. We, therefore, conclude that Ward’s murder

and felonious-assault convictions are not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

Ward was also convicted of improper discharge of a firearm on or near

a prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) and improper discharge

of a firearm at or into a habitation or school in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1).

R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) provides that “[n]o person shall . . . [d]ischarge a firearm upon
or over a public road or highway.” R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) provides that “[n]o person,

without privilege to do so, shall . . . [d]ischarge a firearm at or into an occupied

structure that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any individual. . . .”

The undisputed evidence showed that Ward fired seven gunshots at

Collier, who was standing in the street. Some of those gunshots traveled across the

roadway and entered Fleming’s home. Fleming testified that he was present in the

house when the bullets penetrated his house and that they almost struck him. Police

also observed bullet holes in the walls of Fleming’s house. Therefore, there was

sufficient evidence to support these convictions and Ward’s convictions are not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In the third assignment of error, Ward argues his trial counsel was

ineffective because they (1) failed to assert a claim of self-defense, (2) asserted that

police have blanket immunity during voir dire, (3) objected to the removal of a juror

for cause after the juror stated that he was having trouble sleeping and

concentrating, (4) failed to object to the prosecutor’s leading questions on direct

examination, and (5) failed to rehabilitate T.M.’s testimony on cross-examination.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must

demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonable representation and that he or she was prejudiced by that deficient

performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). Defense
counsel’s performance will not be deemed deficient unless it fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. To establish prejudice, the defendant must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

A reviewing court “‘need not address both prongs of Strickland if an

appellant fails to prove either prong.’” State v. Yancy, 2025-Ohio-5135, ¶ 55 (8th

Dist.), quoting State v. Carter, 2017-Ohio-8847, ¶ 27 (9th Dist.). In applying the

Strickland test, courts are always mindful that a properly licensed attorney is

presumed competent and that trial counsel must be afforded deference regarding

trial strategy. Id., citing In re Roque, 2006-Ohio-7007, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.).

1. Self-Defense

Ward first argues that his trial counsel was deficient because they

failed to assert a claim of self-defense. However, “[t]he failure to do a futile act

cannot be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor could such a

failure be prejudicial.” State v. Knox, 2013-Ohio-1662, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Ford, 2007-Ohio-5722, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Davis, 2021-Ohio-4015,

¶ 26 (8th Dist.) (“Failure to assert an unviable defense does not constitute ineffective

assistance.”).

As previously explained, there was little to no evidence that could

justify a claim of self-defense. Only one witness, K.M., suggested that the victim

“was going in his pocket like he had something.” (Tr. 458.) She did not say that

Collier had a weapon, only that it looked like he had “something.” Although she also
stated that Collier was “[b]eing aggressive,” objective evidence shows that he

remained in the street. Indeed, the other eyewitnesses testified that Collier

remained by his vehicle in the street. (Tr. 338-340, 435-438, and 359.) There is no

evidence that he approached the house aggressively. There is no evidence that he

had a weapon or that he threatened anyone with a weapon. Moreover, Collier was

shot in the back of the head, which further suggests he was not threatening anyone.

Therefore, even if Ward’s trial counsel had asserted self-defense, it would not have

changed the outcome of the trial because any request for self-defense instruction

would have been denied.

1. Claim of Blanket Immunity

Ward argues his trial counsel was ineffective because they asserted

during voir dire that “police officers have a blanket immunity.” (Appellant’s brief at

p. 14.) Ward cites page 245 of the trial transcript in support of this argument.

However, after reviewing the transcript, including page 245, we find no references

to “blanket immunity.” Rather, defense counsel sought to remove juror No. 2 for

cause because he was a paramedic and a member of the Medina County Sheriff’s

Office’s SWAT team. In seeking to have the juror removed for cause, defense counsel

asserted that employees of law enforcement agencies are automatically excluded

from serving on a jury. He offered no legal authority to support his position, and the

trial court denied the request. (Tr. 248.)

Ward does not explain how or why counsel’s attempt to have juror

No. 2 automatically disqualified amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Nevertheless, juror No. 2 indicated upon further questioning that he could

“absolutely” be fair and impartial and there is nothing in the record to indicate that

he was prejudiced against Ward. Therefore, Ward cannot demonstrate that his right

to the effective assistance of counsel was violated when his trial counsel sought to

remove juror No. 2.

1. Sleepy Juror

Ward argues his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because

they objected to the removal of juror No. 12 for cause after he stated that he was

having trouble sleeping and concentrating. (Tr. 243.) However, Ward fails to

explain, much less demonstrate, how the removal of a juror who could not

concentrate prejudiced his defense. He, therefore, cannot establish that his trial

counsel was deficient for objecting to the juror’s removal or that he was prejudiced

by the removal of the juror.

1. Leading Questions

Ward suggests his trial counsel was ineffective because they failed to

object to the prosecutor’s leading questions on direct examination. (Appellant’s

brief p. 13.) However, he fails to cite any examples in the transcript of counsel’s

failure to object as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). He also fails to provide any legal

authorities in support of his argument as required by App.R. 16(A)(7).

The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal.

Taylor-Stephens v. Rite Aid of Ohio, 2018-Ohio-4714, ¶ 121 (8th Dist.). Appellate

courts are not advocates. Id. Therefore, appellate courts “‘cannot and will not
search the record in order to make arguments on appellant[’s] behalf.’” Id., quoting

Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 139 Ohio App.3d 231, 240 (7th Dist. 2000).

Ward’s brief fails to cite to any portions of the record that he believes

support his argument and it contains no legal authority to support his claim that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to leading questions as required by

App.R. 16(A)(7). Therefore, pursuant to App.R. 12 and 16, we disregard this

particular argument.

1. T.M.’s Testimony

Finally, Ward argues his trial counsel was ineffective because they

made no attempt to redeem T.M.’s testimony after she alluded to a prior conflict

between Ward and Collier. He refers us to page 436 of the transcript wherein T.M.

testified that “there was some anger between” Collier and Ward. He contends that

his trial counsel should have asked additional questions about the conflict between

Collier and Ward. However, defense counsel may have chosen not to inquire about

the conflict because it might have established a motive for Ward to kill Collier. We

cannot say that counsel’s failure to ask T.M. to elaborate on the dispute between the

shooter and the victim constituted deficient performance under these

circumstances, and we certainly cannot say that Ward was prejudiced by the failure

to develop this line of inquiry.

Therefore, because Ward cannot establish a claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel, we overrule the third assignment of error.
C. Cumulative Error

In the fourth assignment of error, Ward argues that cumulative error

deprived him of his right to a fair trial. He contends that “if the errors complained

of in the first three assignments of error, standing alone, do not call for reversal of

his conviction, cumulatively, they deprived him of a fair trial.” (Appellant’s brief

p. 14.)

Under the cumulative-error doctrine, a conviction may be reversed

when the cumulative effect of nonprejudicial errors “deprives a defendant of a fair

trial even though each of the instances of trial-court error does not individually

constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Garrett, 2022-Ohio-4218, ¶ 270, citing State

v. Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 223. “However, the doctrine of cumulative error is

inapplicable when the alleged errors are found to be harmless or nonexistent.” State

v. Allen, 2016-Ohio-102, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-5059,

¶ 48.

We overruled the first three assignments of error because we found

no errors. Therefore, the doctrine of cumulative error is inapplicable, and the fourth

assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR