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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Carrington Mtge. Servs., L.L.C. v. Israel

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 839
• Docket Number: 115296

• Judges: Sheehan

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.8K)

• PDF

Syllabus

Adoption of magistrate's decision; abuse of discretion; summary judgment; default judgment; unknown spouse; pro se litigant; foreclosure. Judgment affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate's decision granting summary judgment against defendant-appellant and default judgment against defendant unknown spouse. Specifically, summary judgment was appropriate because appellant failed to file any opposition brief or to properly present any defenses or counterclaims to the foreclosure action pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. A pro se litigant is held to the same standard as all other litigants, and they must comply with the rules of civil procedure as well as accept the consequences of their own mistakes. Default judgment against unknown spouse was also appropriate because they did not file an answer to the complaint.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as Carrington Mtge. Servs., L.L.C. v. Israel, 2026-Ohio-839.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE :
SERVICES, LLC,
:
Plaintiff-Appellee,
: No. 115296
v.
:
PRINCESS ADA ISRAEL, ET AL.,
:
Defendants-Appellants.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 12, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CV-24-999054

Appearances:

LOGS Legal Group LLP and Tamara Gurchik, for
appellee.

Princess Ada Israel, pro se.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J.:

{¶ 1} This appeal arises from a foreclosure action filed by plaintiff-appellee

Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC (“Carrington”) against defendant-appellant

Princess Ada Israel (“Israel”) and defendant Unknown Spouse, if any, of Princess

Ada Israel (“Unknown Spouse”). The final appealable order at issue is the trial
court’s entry of judgment and adoption of a magistrate’s decision granting

Carrington summary judgment against Israel and a default judgment against

Unknown Spouse. For the forthcoming reasons, the judgment below is affirmed.

{¶ 2} After our review of her appellate briefing in this matter, it is evident

that Israel’s appeal is, in part, based on her misunderstanding regarding the purpose

behind naming an unknown spouse as a defendant in a foreclosure action as well as

the relevance of the default judgment entered in this action. In particular,

Carrington’s naming of Unknown Spouse as a defendant is a proper and common

method employed by plaintiffs in a foreclosure action to identify the existence

(if any) of a dower interest in the subject real property that must be accounted for

during any judicial sale of that property. Contrary to Israel’s belief otherwise, it is

not a nefarious method employed by Carrington to improperly obtain a default

judgment in this action.

{¶ 3} Additionally, it appears that Israel mistakenly believes that the

default judgment below was entered against her. However, the record demonstrates

that default judgment was only entered against Unknown Spouse for failing to

answer the complaint. Rather, the trial court entered summary judgment against

Israel based on her failure to file any opposition to Carrington’s motion for summary

judgment or to otherwise properly present any defense to the foreclosure action

pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. Moreover, moving for a default judgment

against Unknown Spouse was an appropriate procedure to confirm the lack of any

dower interest in the subject property and had no relevance to whether summary
judgment against Israel on the merits of Carrington’s foreclosure action should be

granted by the trial court. For these same reasons, Israel’s arguments regarding her

“intentional exclusion” from the default hearing are misplaced and lack merit. In

short, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Carrington’s naming of

Unknown Spouse as a defendant or subsequently seeking default judgment was

done for any improper purpose. Accordingly, Israel’s assignments of error Nos. 1,

2, 3, 4, and 8 relating to the trial court’s entry of default judgment below lack merit.

{¶ 4} Assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 generally address Israel’s

allegations regarding fraud in the underlying mortgage transaction. The trial court

found that Israel failed to properly raise these issues with the court. The trial court

also found that Israel failed to oppose Carrington’s motion for summary judgment

against her. Consequently, the trial court entered judgment adopting the

magistrate’s decision awarding Carrington summary judgment because Carrington

had satisfied its burden of proof in demonstrating that summary judgment was

appropriate under Civ.R. 56(C). Based on our independent review of the record, we

find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s

decision and entering summary judgment in favor of Carrington. Thus, the merits

of Israel’s claims of fraud in the underlying mortgage transaction are not before us

and assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 are overruled.

{¶ 5} Last, assignment of error No. 7 alleges that the trial court erred by

failing to rule on Israel’s numerous motions below within 14 days as required by

Civ.R. 6(C). However, Civ.R. 6(C) sets forth the time for a party to respond to a
pending motion, not the courts. There is no rule of law requiring that a trial court

expressly rule on every pretrial motion pending before it or to rule within a certain

time. Accordingly, assignment of error No. 7 is not well taken.

{¶ 6} The judgment below is affirmed.

Statement of Facts

Underlying Mortgage Transaction

{¶ 7} In February 2020, Israel purchased real property located in Cleveland

Heights, Ohio. In connection with her purchase, Israel executed various loan

documents including a promissory note in the amount of $232,500 and a mortgage

on the subject real property as security for the promissory note. Carrington is the

holder of the promissory note and mortgage.

{¶ 8} From April 2020 to September 2021, Israel made payments on the

loan. No further payments were made after the September 2021 payment.

However, because of foreclosure restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic and

Veterans Administration backed loans, no action was taken to foreclose on the

subject property at that time.

Foreclosure Action

{¶ 9} On June 17, 2024, Carrington filed its complaint for foreclosure

naming Israel and Unknown Spouse as defendants. The underlying matter was

referred to a magistrate on June 18, 2024.

{¶ 10} On June 20, 2024, the initial summons and complaint were sent to

the subject property in Cleveland Heights. Also, on June 20, 2024, Israel filed a
motion with the trial court to not serve Unknown Spouse and remove him from the

complaint because she was not married. The trial court denied this motion generally

stating that it is the plaintiff’s decision as to whom to name as a party in their

complaint.

{¶ 11} On June 21, 2024, Israel filed a motion with the trial court to change

her address from the Cleveland Heights address to her new address in Texas. On

July 15, 2024, the trial court granted her motion to change address and,

subsequently, service of the summons and complaint to both Israel and Unknown

Spouse was attempted at the Texas address. Certified mail receipts were returned

indicating mail was “tendered to agent for final delivery” and on August 14, 2024,

return of service receipts were returned stating that they were unable to serve Israel

and Unknown Spouse. Consequently, Carrington initiated service by publication on

August 19, 2024, and proof of publication was subsequently filed September 13,

2024.

{¶ 12} Israel filed her answer to the complaint on August 22, 2024. While

her answer sets forth numerous allegations regarding fraud in the underlying

mortgage transaction, Israel did not expressly admit or deny the averments of the

complaint and did not set forth any affirmative defenses or assert any counterclaims

as set forth by Civ.R. 8 and 13. Within her various allegations, however, Israel

admits to executing the loan documents. Additionally, Israel did not move to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12 or seek to add additional parties to this

action under Civ.R. 14, 18, or 19. Neither did Israel conduct any discovery
authorized under Civ.R. 33, 34, or 36. No answer was filed on behalf of Unknown

Spouse.

{¶ 13} On November 8, 2024, Carrington filed a motion for default

judgment against Unknown Spouse and a motion for summary judgment against

Israel. Israel did not file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On

November 19, 2024, the trial court issued an order setting an in-person default

hearing on December 12, 2024. On November 21, 2024, Israel filed a motion to

allow her to attend the default hearing via telephone. The trial court did not rule on

this motion prior to the default hearing. After the default hearing, the trial court

issued an order denying Israel’s motion as moot. Further, the judgment entry stated

that the court attempted to reach Israel by telephone at the time of the hearing, but

she did not answer. The court also noted that the hearing only addressed default

judgment against Unknown Spouse and did not relate to Israel because she had filed

an answer.

{¶ 14} Subsequently, on December 18, 2024, the magistrate issued her

decision. Regarding Carrington’s motion for default judgment against Unknown

Spouse, the magistrate found that all necessary parties had been served, that

Unknown Spouse had failed to file an answer, and that the motion for default

judgment was unopposed. Thus, the magistrate granted default judgment against

Unknown Spouse.

{¶ 15} Regarding its motion for summary judgment, the magistrate

determined that Carrington met its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 to demonstrate
its right to foreclosure. With respect to Israel’s reciprocal burden to demonstrate

that summary judgment was not appropriate the magistrate stated the following:

The Magistrate finds that Defendant Princess Ada Israel filed an
answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. In the Answer filed, Defendant fails to
identify any recognized legal defenses to this case and instead argues
that she is not the owner of the subject property, despite taking
ownership of the property by deed as set forth in Plaintiff’s title work,
due to an alleged point of sale inspection. The Defendant did not file a
timely brief in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Magistrate further finds that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
judgment is supported by affidavits and evidence admissible pursuant
to Civ.R. 56(F). Reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion
which is adverse to the Defendant Princess Ada Israel. Therefore, it is
ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Default Judgment is hereby unopposed and granted.

Magistrate’s Decision dated December 18, 2024.

{¶ 16} Israel filed her objections to the magistrate’s decision on December

29, 2024. In her objections, Israel argued that the trial court failed to provide her

with proper notice of the magistrate’s decision and failed to rule on her motion for a

new default judgment hearing. Israel also reiterated her allegations regarding

Carrington’s naming of Unknown Spouse as a defendant to improperly obtain

judgment against her and of fraud in the underlying mortgage transaction.

{¶ 17} On July 3, 2025, the trial court issued its final order overruling

Israel’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, adopting the magistrate’s decision,

granting summary judgment in favor of Carrington and against Israel, and granting

default judgment in favor of Carrington and against Unknown Spouse. Specifically,

the trial court found the following:
The Court overrules the objection/motion to set aside the magistrate’s
decision. In the objection, Defendant objects to the granting of default
judgment as to the John Doe unknown spouse however Defendant
indicates that this party does not exist. The remainder of the objection
deals generally with issues concerning the sale of the property and the
point of sale inspection. Complaints as to point of sale inspections,
issues with the City of Cleveland Heights, and problems with the sellers
of the subject property have not been properly raised by Defendant
Israel as defenses to this foreclosure. It should also be noted that
Defendant Israel did not file a brief in opposition to the Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, the objection lacks merit and
is hereby overruled.

Judgment Entry dated July 3, 2025. The trial court ordered the subject real

property to be foreclosed and awarded Carrington the sum of $225,313.04, plus

interest at the rate of 3.125% per annum from September 1, 2021. Id. This appeal

follows.

Law and Analysis

Standard of Review

{¶ 18} We review a trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision under an

abuse-of-discretion standard. Van Dress Law Offices Co., L.L.C. v. Dawson, 2017-

Ohio-8062, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Agnew v. Muhammad, 2014-Ohio-3419,

¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Butcher v. Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). The Ohio

Supreme Court has defined abuse of discretion as “an ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable use of discretion, or as a view or action that no conscientious judge

could honestly have taken.’” State v. Kirkland, 2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 67, quoting State

v. Brady, 2008-Ohio-4493, ¶ 23.
Pro Se Litigants

{¶ 19} Ohio law provides that “pro se litigants are held to the same standard

as all other litigants: they must comply with the rules of civil procedure and must

accept the consequences of their own mistakes.” Bikkani v. Lee, 2008-Ohio-3130,

¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363

(8th Dist. 1996). “Pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and

legal procedures and are held to the same standards as litigants who are represented

by counsel.” N. Star Med. Research, L.L.C. v. Kozlovich, 2025-Ohio-5410, ¶ 17

(8th Dist.), quoting In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 2013-

Ohio-5478, ¶ 22. “Although a pro se litigant may be afforded reasonable latitude,

there are limits to a court’s leniency.” Id., citing Henderson v. Henderson, 2013-

Ohio-2820, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.). “Pro se litigants are ‘not to be accorded greater rights

and are bound to accept the results of their own mistakes and errors, including those

related to correct legal procedures.’” State v. Fields, 2009-Ohio-6921, ¶ 7

(12th Dist.), quoting Cat-The Rental Store v. Sparto, 2002-Ohio-614, ¶ 5

(12th Dist.). “‘[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse, and Ohio courts are under no duty

to inform civil pro se litigants of the law.’” Loreta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2012-Ohio-

3375, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), quoting Jones Concrete, Inc. v. Thomas, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS

6151, * 4 (9th Dist. Dec. 22, 1999).

Assignments of Error Nos. 1 -4 and 8 – Default Judgment

(1) A default judgment was granted against Ms. Israel, who filed a
timely answer and was ready to defend her position, default judgment
is for parties that do not answer the complaint.
(2) The Trial Court failed to answer motion, to grant Ms. Israel’s
attendance via telephone for default hearing or include court
telephone.

(3) The Trial Court ruled, in part, for default judgment, because the
Unknown Spouse of Princess Ada Israel, did not object to the claims.

(4) [Plaintiff’s attorney] failed to notify Ms. Israel, at her known
forwarding address provided to loan servicer prior to complaint filed.

(8) Same type of case, same loan servicer, same attorney, same
courthouse, different judges/magistrates with irregularities in the two
foreclosure proceedings.

{¶ 20} Assignments of error Nos. 1-4 and 8 each generally raise Israel’s

objections to the default judgment entered against Unknown Spouse. Israel

primarily objects to Carrington’s naming of Unknown Spouse as a defendant and

her “intentional exclusion” from the default hearing. She believes that this was

improper and only done to obtain a quick default judgment against her. Israel’s

arguments rest on a lack of understanding regarding the purpose of naming an

unknown spouse as a defendant in a foreclosure action as well as the significance of

a default judgment entered in this action. Moreover, there is no evidence in the

record demonstrating that Carrington named Unknown Spouse as a defendant or

subsequently sought default judgment for any improper purpose. Accordingly, we

overrule these assignments of error.

{¶ 21} R.C. 2103.041 applies to actions involving the judicial sale of real

property such as a foreclosure proceeding. This statute requires as part of the

process of satisfying claims of any creditors of the owner of an interest in that
property that a spouse may be made a party to that judicial action to determine the

existence of any dower interest. See generally Mid Am. Mtge., Inc. v. Scott, 2018-

Ohio-1403 (8th Dist.) (illustrating the general requirements of a dower interest in a

foreclosure action). In general, a dower interest must be accounted for during the

“marshalling of liens” and a determination made as to whether any of the proceeds

from a judicial sale of the property must be set aside for a spouse. The naming of a

John Doe or unknown spouse in a complaint is commonly used when the marital

status of the property owner is unknown to the plaintiff. See generally Deutsche

Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Smith, 2008-Ohio-2778 (8th Dist.) (illustrating use of John

Doe spouse in foreclosure action); Treasurer of Cuyahoga Cty. v. Unknown Heirs

of Weisner, 2022-Ohio-2668 (8th Dist.) (illustrating use of John Doe spouse). In

turn, pursuant to Civ.R. 55 an entry of default judgment is appropriate when a party

named in a complaint fails to answer or otherwise respond. Thus, where an

unknown spouse has failed to respond to a foreclosure complaint, the entry of

default judgment confirms the lack of a dower interest that must be accounted for

during the judicial sale of the real property. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams.

(illustrating use of default judgment). Moreover, the entry of default judgment

against an unknown spouse has no significance to whether judgment on the merits

is appropriate against any other parties to the foreclosure action.

{¶ 22} We will now briefly address each assignment of error related to the

default judgment entered below.
{¶ 23} In assignment of error No. 1, Israel asserts that the trial court erred in

granting default judgment against her because she timely filed an answer to the

complaint. The record, however, demonstrates that default judgment was entered

solely against Unknown Spouse. In other words, the trial court did not enter a

default judgment against Israel. Accordingly, assignment of error No. 1 lacks merit.

{¶ 24} Assignment of error No. 2 raises Israel’s objections related to the trial

court’s failure to rule on her motion to attend the default hearing by telephone prior

to the date of the hearing, as well as her belief that she was intentionally excluded

from the default hearing in order to improperly obtain a default judgment against

her. Specifically, Israel argues that Civ.R. 6(C) required the trial court to rule on her

motion to attend the default hearing within 14 days. However, Civ.R. 6(C) sets forth

the time for a party to respond to a pending motion, not the courts. Indeed, “there

is no rule of law requiring that a trial court expressly rule on every pretrial motion

before it.” N. Star Med. Research, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-5410, at ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). “In

general, if a trial court fails to mention or rule on a pending motion, the appellate

court presumes that the motion was implicitly overruled.” Siemientkowski v. State

Farm Ins. Co., 2005-Ohio-4295, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.), citing Fed. Home Loan Mtge.

Corp. v. Owca, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5405, *4 (9th Dist. Nov. 17, 1999). The trial

court’s failure to rule on a pending motion does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Id., citing Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. at *4. Accordingly, the trial court did not

err in failing to rule on Israel’s motion to attend the default hearing prior to the date

of the hearing.
{¶ 25} Additionally, as discussed above, Carrington did not seek default

judgment against Israel but only against Unknown Spouse. Further, as noted by the

trial court, the default hearing did not address the merits of Carrington’s foreclosure

action against Israel individually. In other words, Israel’s rights were not affected

by the default hearing. We also note that the trial court attempted to reach Israel by

telephone during the default hearing, but she did not answer. Thus, there is no

evidence in the record supporting Israel’s allegations that she was intentionally

excluded from the default hearing in order to obtain a default judgment in this

action. Assignment of error No. 2 is overruled.

{¶ 26} Under assignment of error No. 3, Israel objects to Carrington’s

naming of Unknown Spouse as a defendant in this action and alleges that it was an

improper attempt to obtain default judgment against her. Again, default judgment

was not entered against Israel and the naming of an unknown spouse in a

foreclosure action is proper and a common method of determining the existence

(or lack of) a dower interest in the property. There is no evidence in the record that

suggests that Carrington named Unknown Spouse as a defendant in this action or

subsequently sought default judgment for any improper purpose. Assignment of

error No. 3 is overruled.

{¶ 27} Regarding assignment of error No. 4, Israel asserts that Carrington

manipulated the rules relating to service of the summons and complaint to obtain

the default judgment. Our review of the record demonstrates that Carrington

appropriately followed the rules of service outlined in Civ.R. 4 and, as more fully
discussed below, Israel failed to properly raise any affirmative defenses below

including those related to service of process; therefore, this defense is waived.

See generally Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-3159

(discussing how a party waives defenses related to in effective of service of process).

There is no evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that Carrington

manipulated the rules of service to obtain a “quick” default judgment in this matter.

Assignment of error No. 4 is not well taken.

{¶ 28} In assignment of error No. 8, Israel continues her allegations

regarding alleged judicial bias by the trial court in excluding her from the default

hearing by comparing the docket in this instant action to the docket from a separate

and distinct foreclosure action before a different court. Initially, we note that a court

has wide discretion to manage its docket including the disposition of pending

motions, scheduling of hearings, and its general management of its caseload.

See generally Ellis v. Setjo, LLC, 2025-Ohio-4844, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), quoting

Williams v. Hung, 2024-Ohio-4682, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (“It is well established in Ohio

that a trial court has ‘broad discretion in managing its docket, setting case

schedules, and scheduling orders.’”). Further, we cannot consider evidence not

included in the record below. See generally Cleveland Hts. v. Watts, 2026-Ohio-

126, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). Under App.R. 9(A)(1), the record on appeal consists of “the

original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court, the transcript of

proceedings, if any, including exhibits, and a certified copy of the docket and journal

entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court.” Israel’s reference to information
contained in the case docket of another separate and distinct case is not part of the

record before us, and we cannot consider Israel’s arguments under assignment of

error No. 8. Thus, assignment of error No. 8 is overruled.

Assignments of Error Nos. 5 and 6 — Summary Judgment

(5) Cleveland Heights Point of Sale Inspection (POSI) city ordinance
was not executed for the February 14, 2020 transfer.

(6) [Plaintiff’s attorney] failed to join the necessary parties, relief
cannot be granted from Ms. Israel.

{¶ 29} Assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6 repeat the allegations regarding

fraud in the underlying mortgage transaction made by Israel before the trial court.

Based on our review of these assignments of error, we will treat them as Israel’s

objections to the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision granting

Carrington summary judgment against her. Specifically, we will address whether it

was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that Israel’s allegations of

fraud in the underlying mortgage transaction were not properly raised in the lower

court and, consequently, whether its award of summary judgment to Carrington was

improper.

{¶ 30} A pro se litigant such as Israel may be afforded reasonable latitude by

the courts when it comes to compliance with legal rules and procedures. However,

there are limits to that leniency and a pro se litigant is expected to know the law and

to comply with applicable legal procedures, including the rules of civil procedure.

The record below demonstrates that Israel failed to comply with the basic rules of

civil procedure regarding preparation of her answer and, specifically, the
presentation of any defenses or counterclaims she may have had to the foreclosure

action.

{¶ 31} For example, Israel’s answer does not admit or deny the allegations

of Carrington’s complaint, does not assert any affirmative defenses to the

foreclosure action including the failure to name necessary parties or ineffective

service of process, and also does not present any counterclaims as set forth by Civ.R.

8, 13, and 14. Additionally, Israel did not move to dismiss the complaint under

Civ.R. 12 or seek to join additional parties under Civ.R. 18 or 19, and she conducted

no discovery authorized under Civ.R. 33, 34, and 36. Notably, Israel did not file any

opposition to Carrington’s motion for summary judgment against her as set forth by

Civ.R. 56. Based on these particular facts, we find that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by concluding that Israel failed to properly raise her allegations of

fraud in the underlying mortgage transaction with the trial court. As a result, the

merits of Israel’s claims of mortgage fraud are not before us. See Watts, 2026-Ohio-

126, at ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, we overrule assignments of error Nos. 5 and 6.

Assignment of Error No. 7 — Failure to Rule on Motions

(7) Throughout the proceedings, motions were not answered within 14
days or not answered, due to the case was closed, abruptly after the
order of sale.

{¶ 32} In assignment of error No. 7, Israel asserts that the trial court erred

by failing to rule or timely rule on her numerous pending motions. Specifically,

Israel again relies on Civ.R. 6(C) to demonstrate that the trial court erred in failing

to rule on her motions within 14 days. As set forth above, Civ.R. 6(C) sets forth the
time for a party to respond to a pending motion, not the courts. There is simply no

rule requiring a court to rule, or to rule within a certain time, on the pending motions

before it. Accordingly, Israel’s reliance on Civ.R. 6(C) is misplaced, and assignment

of error No. 7 is overruled.

{¶ 33} Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

---

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR