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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Price CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B341108

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/13/26 P. v. Price CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B341108

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA078445)
v.

SHANTIC PRICE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kristen Inberg and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

Shantic Price, who is currently serving a three-strike
prison sentence of 52 years to life, appeals from the superior
court’s order resentencing him under Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3) (Senate Bill 483),
codified as Penal Code section 1172.75 (formerly section 1171.1).1
The court struck Price’s two one-year prior prison term
enhancements under section 667.5, former subdivision (b),
reducing his aggregate sentence from 52 years to life to 50 years
to life. But Price contends the court abused its discretion when it
refused to strike his firearm enhancement and declined to
dismiss one or both of his prior strike convictions under section
1385. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Facts
In March 2005 at around 10 p.m. Ebony Leslie was driving
alone in her pickup truck on her way to pick up her fiancé. She
slowed down when she saw her fiancé, and he approached the
car. Leslie then noticed Price standing on the passenger side of
her truck with a gun in his hand. Price fired his gun and shot
Leslie six times, in the middle finger of her left hand, her pelvic
area, her leg, and her stomach. Price kept firing, her fiancé
began running away from the truck, and Leslie drove away.

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective
January 1, 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered to section
1172.75 with no change in text. (Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)

2
Leslie drove to El Segundo Boulevard, flagged down a
sheriff’s deputy, and reported the crime. Paramedics arrived and
took her to a hospital in an ambulance.
As a result of her gunshot wounds, Leslie had two
surgeries. She was hospitalized several times, including an
initial five-day stay and later to have a bullet removed that was
blocking her intestines. When Leslie was released after her first
hospitalization, she needed help showering, combing her hair,
and performing other basic tasks. She had continuing pain in her
stomach and hand as a result of her injuries, and she could not
bend her middle finger.

B. Conviction and Sentence
The People charged Price with attempted murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664, count 1), shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246,
count 2), and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b), count 3). In 2005 a jury found Price guilty of counts 2
and 3. On count 2, the jurors additionally found true the
allegations that Price personally used a firearm, intentionally
discharged a firearm, and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)).
As to both counts, the jury found true the allegation that Price
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The
jurors could not reach a verdict on count 1, and the court
dismissed it. Price waived his right to a jury trial on, and the
trial court found true, the allegations that Price had served two
prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)) and suffered two
prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) for robbery (§ 211) in 1993
and voluntary manslaughter (§ 192) in 1995.

3
After denying Price’s Romero motion2 to strike his prior
strike offenses, the court sentenced Price as a third striker to 52
years to life on count 2: 25 years to life, plus 25 years to life for
the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
plus two years for the section 667.5, former subdivision (b), prior
prison term enhancements. The court stayed the sentence on
count 3 under section 654 and also stayed the sentence on the
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), great bodily injury enhancement.
We affirmed the judgment on May 14, 2007. (People v. Price
(May 14, 2007, B188602).) [nonpub. opn.].)

C. Section 1172.75 Resentencing
In 2021 the Legislature invalidated all section 667.5,
former subdivision (b), prior prison term enhancements that were
imposed before January 1, 2020 and did not arise from
convictions for sexually violent offenses. It also enacted section
1172.75, which provides a procedure for resentencing inmates
serving terms that include those now-invalid enhancements.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
In July 2024 Price petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.75. He asked the court to strike the now-invalid section
667.5, former subdivision (b), enhancements and conduct a “full
resentencing,” applying “ameliorative changes in the law”
enacted since his original sentencing, including, as relevant here:
(1) Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81),
which amended section 1385, governing the dismissal of certain
enhancements in the interest of justice (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1);
and (2) Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

4
amended sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 to grant discretion to
trial courts to dismiss or reduce firearm enhancements in the
interests of justice (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 1).
As part of the full resentencing, Price requested the court
“grant a Romero motion as to his prior strike(s), impose a lesser
gun enhancement, and dismiss other enhancements in the
interest of justice.” He argued the court was now required under
section 1385 to give “ ‘great weight’ ” to the following mitigating
circumstances: (1) multiple enhancements applied to his
sentence, (2) application of the enhancements resulted in a
sentence over 20 years, (3) his offense stemmed from childhood
trauma, and (4) his prior convictions were over 10 years old (from
1993 and 1995) (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), (C), (E), (H).) Price also
asked the court to exercise its discretion to strike the firearm
enhancement or to reduce it to one of the lesser included
enhancements in section 12022.53.
In support, he submitted certificates showing he completed
numerous rehabilitative programs while incarcerated, along with
letters from program and work supervisors and supporters. He
had earned his GED in 2010 and had participated in college-level
courses since 2015. His prison record showed no violence, drug
use, or theft since he entered incarceration in 2006. He
committed two rules violations: possession of inmate-
manufactured alcohol in 2008 and possession of a wireless
communication device component in 2022. Price had been
conditionally accepted into a long-term reentry program. Price
also described his significant childhood trauma, including living
with a drug- and alcohol-addicted mother who died by suicide in
front of him.

5
The People opposed any reduction in Price’s sentence
beyond dismissing the two section 667.5, subdivision (b), prison
prior enhancements. They argued a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.
In August 2024 the court vacated Price’s sentence and
resentenced him. The court indicated it had reviewed the
resentencing motion, the People’s responsive motion, the
probation officer’s report, the transcript of the original
sentencing, the original minute order, and the abstract of
judgment. It declined to strike either prior strike conviction or to
dismiss or reduce the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), firearm
enhancement. The court stated it was aware of its discretion to
dismiss the strike priors and the firearm enhancement, but
declined to do so “based on the defendant’s criminal history and
the violent nature of the instant matter.” It explained the strike
priors remained “within the spirit of the Three Strikes law.”
The court sentenced Price to 50 years to life for count 2,
calculated as 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law plus a
consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. On
count 3, the court sentenced Price to six years (the middle term),
plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a))—both stayed under section 654. The court
struck the two section 667.5, former subdivision (b), prior prison
term enhancements. Price’s new aggregate sentence is 50 years
to life.
Price timely appealed.

6
DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 483 added section
1172.75 to the Penal Code. (People v. Christianson (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 300, 310.) Section 1172.75 provides that “[a]ny
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Section
1172.75, subdivision (b), instructs the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) or county correctional
administrator to “ ‘identify those persons in [its] custody
currently serving a term . . . that includes an enhancement’ ” for
a prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and
“ ‘provide the name of each [such] person . . . to the sentencing
court that imposed the enhancement.’ ” (Christianson, at p. 310,
quoting § 1172.75, subd. (b).) For the identified persons, the
sentencing court “shall review the judgment” and verify that the
judgment includes a prior prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (c).) “If the court determines that the current judgment
includes [such] an enhancement . . . the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Ibid.; see Christianson,
at p. 310.) “ ‘By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
“invalid” enhancements.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 340, 359.)
Section 1172.75 outlines “specific instructions” for
resentencing. (People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.)
The resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed

7
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety,” and further, resentencing “shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1).) Additionally, the sentencing court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) “The court
may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to,
the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)3
Senate Bill 81 created a change in law the court must apply
at a section 1172.75 resentencing. (See People v. Cota (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 318, 334.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill
81 amended section 1385 by adding subdivision (c). Subdivision
(c)(1) provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any

3 The court is also required to appoint counsel for the
defendant and, unless the trial court originally imposed the
upper term, may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle
term unless circumstances in aggravation that justify the upper
term have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true
beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4), (5).)

8
initiative statute.” Subdivision (c)(2) provides: “In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove
that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” As relevant here, mitigating circumstances
include the following: “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a
single case,” “[t]he application of an enhancement could result in
a sentence of over 20 years,” “[t]he current offense is connected to
prior victimization or childhood trauma,” and “[t]he enhancement
is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(B)-(E), (H).)
If the court finds dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety, “consideration of the mitigating factors in
section 1385, subdivision(2) is not required.” (People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 297 (Mendoza); see People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033 (Walker).) But a court is not
required to find that dismissal of an enhancement would
endanger public safety to deny dismissal of an enhancement
under section 1385, subdivision (c). (Walker, at p. 1036; see id. at
p. 1033 [§ 1385, subdivision (c)(2), “does not erect a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissal that can only be overcome by a
finding that dismissal endangers public safety”].) But “if the
court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety,
the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will

9
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the
sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal
of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Walker, at
p. 1029, italics added.)
The new section 1385 provisions regarding dismissal of
enhancements under subdivision (c) do not apply to strike
offenses. (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243-244;
see People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744 [“The
Three Strikes law is a penalty provision, not an enhancement.”].)
However, the trial court has discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), to dismiss in furtherance of justice “allegations or
findings that a defendant has previously been convicted of a
serious and/or violent felony that would otherwise count as a
‘strike’ under the ‘Three Strikes’ law.” (People v. Dain (2025)
18 Cal.5th 246, 252; see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.) “In deciding whether to exercise its
discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction in the interests of
justice, a trial court ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature
and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the [sentencing] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence
should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (People v. Nunez
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 370-371; see People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161; People v. Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at
p. 358.) “[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing
norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart

10
from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its
decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony); see Rogers, at p. 358.)
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision
not to strike a sentence enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c). (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) We
similarly “review a trial court’s ruling on a Romero motion under
the deferential abuse of discretion standard, which requires the
defendant to show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary.” (People v. Avila, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1140;
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.) “That deferential
standard asks not whether the trial court’s decision was correct in
the sense that it is the same decision we would have made;
rather, it asks whether the court’s decision falls within the range
of outcomes permitted by the controlling law.” (People v. Bernal
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1170.) “A trial court may abuse its
discretion where ‘its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it,’ ‘where the trial court was
not “aware of its discretion” ’ to dismiss a sentencing
[enhancement] under section 1385, or ‘where the court considered
impermissible factors in declining to dismiss.’ ” (Nazir v.
Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490.)

B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining To
Dismiss or Reduce the Firearm Enhancement
Price argues the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to dismiss or reduce his section 12022.53, subdivision
(d), firearm enhancement. In declining to do so, the court

11
indicated it was “aware of [its] discretion to strike that allegation
pursuant to . . . section 12022.53, subdivision (h),[4] as well as
[section] 1385.” The court indicated it would not strike the
firearm enhancement based on the violent nature of the instant
offense, as well as Price’s past criminal history.
Price first contends the court failed to consider his
postconviction mitigating evidence, as required under section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(3). The record does not support that
claim. At the hearing, the court stated it had reviewed Price’s
motion, which included 20 exhibits, including a relapse
prevention plan, prisoner progress reports, and letters from
supporters. Although the court did not explicitly address the
postconviction factors on the record, it did not have to. “Unless
the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is
deemed to have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set
forth in the rules.” (People v. Parra Martinez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322; see also People v. Ramirez (2021)
10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 [“ ‘Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it’ ”]; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.4095 [“[r]elevant factors enumerated in
these rules must be considered by the sentencing judge, and will
be deemed to have been considered unless the record
affirmatively reflects otherwise”].) “[N]o particular language was

4 Section 12022.53, subdivision (h), provides: “The court
may, in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the
time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise
required to be imposed by this section. The authority provided by
this subdivision applies to any resentencing that may occur
pursuant to any other law.”
5 Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

12
required for the trial court to decline to dismiss” the firearm
enhancement. (People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144,
1157 (Bravo).) We further note that section 1172.75 permits a
court to consider postconviction factors, but does not require the
court to give them dispositive weight. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)
[the court “may consider postconviction factors,” emphasis
added].)
Second, Price contends the court failed to give the
statutorily required weight to “at least two” mitigating factors
enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c), namely the fact that
the 25-year enhancement resulted in a sentence of greater than
20 years (subdivision (c)(2)(C)) and the fact that Price’s offense
was connected to prior childhood trauma (subdivision (c)(2)(E)).6
Under section 1385, subdivision (c), the court was required to
“consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present” and to dismiss the firearm
enhancement “if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)-(2).) “[S]ection 1385, subdivision (c)(2)’s
mandate to give ‘great weight’ to enumerated mitigating
circumstances requires a sentencing court to ‘engage[ ] in a

6 To the extent Price suggests section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(C)’s language stating an enhancement “shall be dismissed”
if it could result in a sentence of over 20 years creates a
mandatory rule requiring dismissal, he is mistaken. (People v.
Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 444 [collecting cases].)
Instead, “the mitigating circumstances listed in [section 1385,]
subdivision (c)(2) [including in subdivision (c)(2)(C)] merely guide
the court’s discretion in determining whether a dismissal is in
furtherance of justice.” (Mazur, at p. 445; see also Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.)

13
holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated
mitigating factors.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1034.) The
enumerated mitigating circumstances “are entitled to ‘increased
significance and importance in the [court’s] overall balancing of
factors’ under section 1385.” (Id. at p. 1036.)
“[S]ection 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not preclude a trial
court from relying on countervailing aggravating factors, apart
from a danger to public safety, to uphold an enhancement,
despite the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances.”
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1028-1029; see Bravo, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157 [“the trial ‘court retains the discretion
to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns
significant value’ to the presence of any listed mitigating
circumstances”].) The sentencing court must find “substantial,
credible evidence” of aggravating factors sufficient to “neutralize
even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that
dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.”
(Walker, at p. 1029.)
In discussing what courts should consider in determining
whether dismissal of an enhancement would be in “furtherance of
justice,” Walker cited with approval the advisory committee
comment to rule 4.428, the complementary rule to section 1385.
(See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.) That comment
provides that “in determining the ‘furtherance of justice’ the court
should consider the constitutional rights of the defendant and the
interests of society represented by the people; the defendant’s
background and prospects, including the presence or absence of a
record; the nature and circumstances of the crime and the
defendant’s level of involvement; the factors in aggravation and
mitigation including the specific factors in mitigation of section

14
1385(c); and the factors that would motivate a ‘reasonable judge’
in the exercise of their discretion.” (Advisory Com. com., rule
4.428, italics added; see People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
438, 446 [“the controlling furtherance of justice standard . . .
allows the court to consider the nature and circumstances of the
crimes and the defendant’s background, character, and
prospects”].)
Here, in declining to strike or reduce the firearm
enhancement, the court emphasized the “violent nature of the
instant matter” and Price’s criminal history. The court’s failure
to specifically indicate that it found these factors neutralized the
mitigating factors does not suggest the court failed to give the
mitigating factors due weight. (See People v. Myers (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“the fact that the court focused its
explanatory comments on [a particular sentencing factor] . . .
does not mean that it considered only that factor”]; see also
People v. Dozier (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 700, 709, review granted,
Feb. 11, 2026 (S294597) [“section 1385, subdivision (c), does not
require the court to make any findings when it declines to
dismiss an enhancement”].) “Nothing in the record demonstrates
the trial court failed to assign significant value to the evidence of
his childhood trauma [or the length of his sentence] or otherwise
misunderstood or misapplied section 1385(c).” (Bravo, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1157.) The court indicated it reviewed
Price’s motion that included his statements about his childhood
trauma. We presume the court considered the sentence length
and trauma history and gave these factors special emphasis,
where the record does not affirmatively establish otherwise.
(People v. Parra Martinez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 323; see
Bravo, at p. 1157 [rejecting defendant’s argument that court

15
misapplied section 1385 because it “ ‘did not use the “great
weight” language or analysis’ ” when declining to dismiss an
enhancement].)
The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the violent nature of Price’s offense and his criminal history
neutralized the mitigating factors of the lengthy prison sentence
and Price’s childhood trauma. The court was entitled to consider
“the nature and circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s
level of involvement,” as well as “the presence or absence of a
record.” (Advisory Com. com., rule 4.428.) The evidence at trial
demonstrated Price shot Leslie six times at close range, with no
provocation. Leslie’s multiple gunshot wounds nearly killed her,
required two surgeries and extended hospital stays, and left
lasting pain and disabilities. With respect to Price’s criminal
history, the court had substantial, credible evidence before it that
at the time of the offense in question, Price was still under CDCR
supervision after serving a 16-year prison sentence for voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)). And just over a year before
committing that homicide, Price had committed robbery (§ 211),
for which he was sentenced to three years in prison, and had
other prior convictions. The court was entitled to consider these
factors when deciding whether dismissal would further justice.
(See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.)
In sum, nothing in the record demonstrates the trial court
failed to assign significant value to the evidence of Price’s
childhood trauma or the length of his sentence, or otherwise
misunderstood or misapplied section 1385, subdivision (c).
Rather, the record shows the court was aware of its discretion to
strike the firearm enhancement but ultimately concluded the
circumstances of Price’s shooting of Leslie and his past criminal

16
history outweighed those mitigating factors such that it would
not further the interests of justice to strike or reduce the
enhancement. (See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1033, 1038;
Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)7

C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining To
Dismiss the Prior Strike Convictions
Price contends that the resentencing court abused its
discretion by declining to dismiss either prior strike offense. We
are not persuaded.
Price claims the court relied only on “the violent nature of
the offense and [his] past criminal conduct,” and failed to
evaluate his current circumstances, rehabilitation, and future
prospects. The record does not support that characterization. As
discussed, the court stated it had reviewed the resentencing
motion, including its 20 exhibits documenting Price’s conduct and
progress in prison. As discussed, absent evidence to the contrary,
we presume the court considered all relevant factors (see People

7 Price compares his case to People v. Garcia (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 848, People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
215, and People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057.
However, the analyses in those cases focused on whether the trial
courts erred when they determined that a reduction in the
appellants’ sentences would endanger public safety. (See Garcia,
at pp. 857-858; Gonzales, at pp. 223-224; Williams, at p. 1061.)
As Price acknowledges, the court here did not determine his
release would endanger public safety. Rather, the court
concluded that countervailing factors rendered a dismissal of the
enhancement unwarranted. As discussed, the court did not need
to make a public safety finding to support that ruling. Those
cases are thus inapplicable.

17
v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102), including Price’s
“ ‘present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects’ ” (People v. Nunez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 370-
371).8
We have discussed Price’s criminal history and the serious,
violent nature of the instant offenses. Notably, having been
released from prison for voluntary manslaughter, Price was still
under CDCR supervision when he committed the instant offense.
This is not an “extraordinary case” where “no reasonable
minds could differ” about the failure to strike Price’s prior
conviction allegations. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378;
People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 640.) Price thus

8 Price also suggests that under section 1172.75, the court
had to make a public safety finding before denying further relief.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), states that the resentencing
shall result in a lesser sentence “unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.” But Price did receive a lesser sentence—
the court struck the section 667.5, former subdivision (b), prior
prison enhancements and reduced his aggregate sentence from 52
years to life to 50 years to life. (See People v. Rhodius (2025)
17 Cal.5th 1050, 1060 [“In the typical case in which a defendant
who is serving a longer term of imprisonment because of a
repealed enhancement that was imposed and executed, to
eliminate adverse effects of the section 667.5(b) enhancement will
indeed mean imposing a shorter (unstayed) sentence relative to
the enhanced one.”]; Bravo, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1156
[defendant received a “ ‘lesser sentence’ because the trial court
struck the [section] 667.5(b) enhancement”].) Thus, there was no
requirement that the court make such a finding that Price was a
danger to public safety.

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has not shown the court abused its discretion in denying his
Romero motion and concluding Price was within the spirit of the
Three Strikes law.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

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