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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Doe v. Johnson CA2/8

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B338030M

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.4K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/13/26 Doe v. Johnson CA2/8
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JANE DOE, B338030

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV42590)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION,
TAZMAN JAMES JOHNSON, DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING, AND DENYING
Defendant and Respondent. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed
March 3, 2026 is denied, the request for judicial notice filed
March 10, 2026 is denied, and the opinion filed February 27, 2026
is modified as set forth below. To the extent Doe insists that
Presiding Justice Stratton recuse herself, that request is denied.
To the extent Doe requests publication of the opinion filed
February 27, 2026, that request is also denied. There is no
change in the judgment.

On page 9, in the first full paragraph, delete the final two
sentences:
Finally, we note that in her reply brief, which she filed in
pro. per., Doe raises several new arguments. Because those
arguments were not raised in her opening brief, we do not
consider them. (See Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115.)

After the first full paragraph on page 9, add the following
paragraphs:

While this appeal was pending, Doe filed a supplemental
brief. Johnson filed a brief responding to Doe’s supplemental
brief. Both briefs were filed with our permission.
In her supplemental brief, Doe argues that the trial court
acted in excess of its jurisdiction by allowing Johnson to file a
sur-reply and supplemental declaration in support of his motion
to vacate the default and default judgment after the time for
filing a reply brief had elapsed. We disagree. As we noted above,
the trial court allowed Johnson to file those documents to respond
to arguments that Doe raised for the first time at the hearing on
the motion to vacate and which were not raised in her written
opposition to that motion. In other words, the trial court allowed
Johnson to file the sur-reply and supplemental declaration to
respond to arguments that he did not have the opportunity to
respond to in his original reply to Doe’s opposition.
It is well-settled that a trial court has the inherent power
to exercise its discretion and control over all proceedings relating
to litigation before it. (Johnson v. Banducci (1963)
212 Cal.App.2d 254, 260.) As part of that inherent discretion, a
trial court may, as the court did here, allow a party to file
additional briefs and supporting evidence to respond to new

2
arguments that an opponent raised after filing his or her original
moving or opposition papers. (See Cornerstone Realty Advisors,
LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771,
804.)
Doe also argues in her supplemental brief that the trial
court should have denied Johnson’s motion to vacate because
Kaufman is employed by the executor of Johnson’s family trust,
not by Johnson himself. Doe claims that Kaufman answers
directly to the family trust, and not to Johnson himself, and, as a
result, Johnson was not entitled to have the default and default
judgment vacated. This argument lacks merit. There is ample
evidence in the record showing that Kaufman represented
Johnson directly. One of Kaufman’s attorneys testified that the
law firm represented Johnson individually in other criminal and
civil cases and that it was Johnson’s “counsel of record” in this
case. In addition, the caption pages for Johnson’s motion to
vacate and supporting documents state that Kaufman’s lawyers
are “Attorneys for Defendant, Tazman James Johnson.” Because
Johnson is Kaufman’s “client,” Johnson was entitled to relief
under section 473, subdivision (b). (See SJP Limited Partnership
v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 511, 520 [noting
that mandatory relief under 473, subdivision (b) is available to
the attorney’s “ ‘client,’ ” and not to individuals or entities who
are not represented by the attorney at fault].)
To the extent Doe argues in her supplemental brief that the
trial court should have denied Johnson’s motion to vacate
because Johnson engaged in intentional misconduct that caused
entry of the default and default judgment, we reject that
argument because, as we discussed above, substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding that Johnson was not at fault.

3
Finally, to the extent Doe raises arguments in her reply
brief that were not raised in her opening brief or supplemental
brief, we decline to address those new arguments because
Johnson did not have an opportunity to file a written response to
them. (See Doe v. California Dept. of Justice, supra,
173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1115.)

The petition for rehearing filed by appellant Jane Doe is
denied.
There is no change in the judgment.

STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J. SCHERB, J.

4
Filed 2/27/26 Doe v. Johnson CA2/8 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JANE DOE, B338030

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV42590)
v.

TAZMAN JAMES JOHNSON,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Anne Hwang, Judge. Affirmed.
The Firm LA, Eric Edward Menoyo; and Jane Doe, in
pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Kaufman Law Group and Gary J. Kaufman for
Defendant and Respondent.

---

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jane Doe appeals from the trial court’s order
granting defendant Tazman James Johnson relief from default
and default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 473,
subdivision (b), based on the neglect of Johnson’s attorney. On
appeal, Doe contends the trial court erred in granting Johnson
relief because, among other reasons, insufficient evidence
supports the court’s finding that Johnson did not engage in
intentional misconduct contributing to entry of the default and
default judgment. We conclude substantial evidence supports the
court’s findings and that the court properly granted Johnson
relief from default and the default judgment. Accordingly, we
affirm.

BACKGROUND
In November 2021, Doe filed a complaint against Johnson,
alleging causes of action for sexual battery, gender violence,
battery, and assault. The next month, Doe filed a proof of service
showing that copies of the complaint, civil case cover sheet,
summons, notice of case assignment, “ADR information packet,”
and an amendment to the complaint were personally served on
“Tazmin James Johnson.” Johnson did not answer Doe’s
complaint.
In July 2022, Doe filed a request for entry of Johnson’s
default, which the trial court rejected.
On August 8, 2022, an attorney representing Johnson in a
different civil case notified the Kaufman Law Group (Kaufman),

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

2
which was representing Johnson in other civil and criminal cases,
about Doe’s lawsuit. That attorney informed Kaufman that
Johnson appeared to be unrepresented in this case and attached
copies of, among other things, the trial court’s docket and
excerpts from Doe’s complaint. Although Johnson had yet to
retain Kaufman to represent him in this case, the law firm
“indicated to [Johnson] that [it] would look into and handle this
matter.”
In mid-September 2022, Doe filed a second proof of service,
showing that copies of the complaint, summons, amendment to
the complaint, and a statement of damages were served on
Johnson by substituted service on August 10, 2022. On
September 15, 2022, the trial court rejected Doe’s second request
for entry of Johnson’s default.
On September 26, 2022, Doe filed a third request for entry
of Johnson’s default, which the court clerk entered that same day.
On July 3, 2023, the trial court entered a default judgment
against Johnson for around $5.3 million.
On December 28, 2023, Kaufman filed a motion to vacate
the default and default judgment on Johnson’s behalf under
section 473, subdivision (b). An attorney from Kaufman
submitted a supporting declaration.
Throughout the entirety of this lawsuit, Kaufman was
representing Johnson in two then-ongoing felony criminal cases.
Kaufman was also representing Johnson in a different civil case.
In July 2022, Johnson entered a plea agreement in one of those
criminal cases. As part of that plea agreement, Johnson was
required to enter an inpatient drug rehabilitation program for six
months. Johnson entered the program on August 10, 2022, but
he fled later that month. Kaufman had no contact with Johnson

3
until he turned himself into the authorities in May 2023.
Johnson was re-admitted to a different inpatient rehabilitation
program in July 2023, but he disappeared from the program in
early August 2023. Kaufman has had no contact with Johnson
since he disappeared.
Although Kaufman learned about this case in August 2022,
the firm was not retained to represent Johnson until after the
court entered his default in September 2022. Kaufman “was
tasked with investigating this action and addressing the default,
[but] counsel’s primary focus was targeted on litigating the felony
criminal cases.” Kaufman also “was very limited in its ability to
properly litigate both the criminal cases and this case due to
severely limited contact with [Johnson] during that time period.”
Accordingly, this case “fell below [Kaufman’s] radar while the
focus remained on the two felony matters.” Kaufman claimed
that entry of the default judgment “was the result of the mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or neglect of counsel” because “counsel
was focused on the criminal matters.”
Doe opposed Johnson’s motion to vacate. Among other
things, Doe argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule
on the motion because it was not timely filed.
The trial court held initial hearings on the motion to vacate
on February 5 and 9, 2024. At one of the initial hearings, Doe
argued for the first time that Johnson was barred from relief
under section 473, subdivision (b), because Kaufman was not
Johnson’s counsel of record when the motion was filed. The court
allowed Johnson to file a sur-reply to respond to Doe’s new
argument.
In support of the sur-reply, Kaufman submitted a
supplemental declaration from one of its attorneys. The attorney

4
confirmed that since July 2018, Kaufman has represented
Johnson in other civil and criminal matters. Johnson was
“relying on [the law firm] to protect his legal interests”
throughout the entirety of this case. The attorney clarified that
Kaufman first learned of Doe’s lawsuit after she filed her first
request for default in July 2022, which the trial court rejected.
After learning of the lawsuit, Kaufman indicated to Johnson that
it would “look into and handle this matter.” Because the law firm
was “increasingly focused and busy with [other] ongoing criminal
matters it was representing Mr. Johnson on,” it “mistakenly did
not turn its attention to this case in time to prevent the entry of
default.” Kaufman asserted that its “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect . . . was a proximate cause both of the entry of
the default and the subsequent entry of default judgment.”
On February 29, 2024, the trial court granted Johnson’s
motion to vacate. As a threshold matter, the court found
Johnson’s motion was timely because it was filed less than six
months after the court entered the default judgment in July
2023. The court then found that although Johnson had
apparently been personally served with the summons and
complaint in December 2021, he “was innocent of failing to file an
answer or otherwise ‘handle’ the matter” because Kaufman
represented that it “ ‘would look into and handle this matter.’ ”
According to the court, there was “no evidence that [Johnson]
should not have relied on the representation of counsel and
handle the matter on his own. Moreover there [was] no evidence
of intentional misconduct by [Johnson].” Ultimately, the court
found relief was mandatory because “entry of default was in fact
caused by counsel’s neglect[, and] [c]ounsel’s neglect was . . . the
cause of the entry of default judgment.”

5
On March 7, 2024, Johnson answered Doe’s complaint.
Doe timely appeals.2
DISCUSSION
Section 473, subdivision (b) includes two provisions for
relief from default and default judgment—one makes relief
discretionary, while the other makes relief mandatory. (Martin
Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th
432, 438 (Martin Potts).) Under the mandatory provision, which
is at issue in this case, “the court shall, whenever an application
for relief is made no more than six months after entry of
judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s
sworn affidavit attesting to the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by

2 While this appeal was pending, Doe filed a request for
judicial notice of the following items: (1) a copy of the trial court’s
February 5, 2024 tentative ruling, in which the court indicated
that it was inclined to deny Johnson’s motion to vacate because
Kaufman was not counsel of record when the default and default
judgment were entered (Exhibit A); (2) a copy of a notice of the
court’s February 29, 2024 ruling granting Johnson’s motion to
vacate prepared by Johnson, along with a copy of the court’s
February 29, 2024 minute order granting Johnson’s motion to
vacate (Exhibit B); and (3) a copy of the trial court’s order from a
different case, involving different parties, denying as untimely a
motion filed under section 1005, subdivision (b) (Exhibit C).
We grant Doe’s request as to Exhibits A and B and deny her
request as to Exhibit C, which is irrelevant to the issues raised in
this appeal. (See Associated General Contractors of California,
Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
243, 262, citing People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)

6
the clerk against the attorney’s client, . . . or (2) resulting default
judgment or dismissal entered against the attorney’s client,
unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact
caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b).)
“[A] party is entitled to mandatory relief under section
473(b), even when the attorney error is inexcusable, so long as
the attorney affidavit of fault shows the error was the fault of the
attorney rather than the client.” (Jimenez v. Chavez (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 50, 57–58.) We review a trial court’s finding that
section 473, subdivision (b)’s requirements for mandatory relief
from default or default judgment have been met for substantial
evidence. (Martin Potts, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 437.)
The trial court found that entry of the default and default
judgment were caused by Kaufman’s neglect. This finding is
supported by the record. As noted above, an attorney from
Kaufman submitted two declarations testifying that Kaufman
discovered Doe’s lawsuit nearly two months before the court
entered Johnson’s default. According to the attorney, Kaufman
then indicated to Johnson that the law firm would “look into and
handle this matter.” Kaufman failed to respond to Doe’s
complaint or otherwise take any action to prevent entry of default
because it was “focused” and “busy with [Johnson’s] ongoing
criminal matters.” According to Kaufman’s attorney, the law
firm “mistakenly did not turn its attention to this case in time to
prevent the entry of the default.”
Doe contends that the trial court erred in granting Johnson
relief from the default and default judgment because Johnson
was responsible for the default by failing to answer or otherwise
respond to her complaint after he was personally served with the

7
summons and complaint in December 2021. The trial court,
however, addressed this issue and found that Johnson was
“innocent” and did not engage in any “intentional misconduct”
that contributed to entry of the default or default judgment.
Those findings are also supported by the record. While it is true
that Johnson did not respond to Doe’s complaint after he was
served with it and the summons, nothing in the record
conclusively shows that Johnson intentionally obstructed
Kaufman from filing a responsive pleading or taking other
actions to prevent entry of the default and default judgment.
At most, there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether
Johnson’s conduct was a contributing factor to the default.
But “a conflict in the evidence does not render it insubstantial.”
(Martin Potts, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 444.) Accordingly,
“we have no basis to disturb the court’s factual finding regarding
causation.” (Ibid.)
This case is distinguishable from Lang v. Hochman (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 1225 and Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada,
Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, on which Doe relies to argue that
the trial court should have denied Johnson’s motion to vacate
because he was not “totally innocent” in contributing to entry of
the default and default judgment. (See Lang, at p. 1248.) In
Lang and Johnson, the reviewing courts affirmed the trial courts’
orders denying relief from default because evidence supported the
trial courts’ findings that the moving parties engaged in
intentional misconduct that contributed to the underlying
defaults. (See Johnson, at pp. 622–623; Lang, at pp. 1241, 1248–
1252.) As we just explained, the trial court in this case found
that Johnson did not engage in any intentional misconduct, and

8
that finding is supported by the record. Accordingly, Lang and
Johnson do not support Doe’s argument.
Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s findings that Kaufman’s neglect caused entry of the
default and default judgment and that Johnson did not engage in
any intentional misconduct contributing to entry of those orders,
we need not address the remaining arguments raised in Doe’s
opening brief. Finally, we note that in her reply brief, which she
filed in pro. per., Doe raises several new arguments. Because
those arguments were not raised in her opening brief, we do not
consider them. (See Doe v. California Dept. of Justice (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115.)
DISPOSITION
The order granting Johnson’s motion to vacate is affirmed.
Johnson shall recover his costs on appeal.

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

SCHERB, J.

9