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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ware v. Chasco CA2/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B342673

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.1K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/13/26 Ware v. Chasco CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ROBERT WARE, B342673

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCV08980)

SYLVIA CHASCO,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert Ware, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hausman & Sosa, Jeffrey M. Hausman and Larry D.
Stratton, for Defendant and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant Robert Ware filed a fraud action
against defendant and respondent Sylvia Chasco, his former
third level supervisor at the Department of Public Social Service
(DPSS). The trial court granted Chasco’s special motion to strike
the complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 425.16).1 Ware now appeals the trial court’s order. For
the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Ware has not met
his burden to show reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the
order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Ware’s lawsuit
Ware was an Eligibility Worker for DPSS until he resigned
on October 31, 2019. Chasco was Ware’s “third level” supervisor.
Ware reported to his direct supervisor, who in turn reported to
the Deputy District Director, who reported to Chasco. Chasco
retired on December 31, 2019. In 2020, Ware applied for
reinstatement of employment to his previous civil service position
under Civil Service Rule 17.01A.2 This application triggered a

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 Rule 17.01A states: “After approval by the director of
personnel, any person who has been separated from county
service without fault or delinquency may be reinstated by the
appointing power within two years from the date of such
separation, to any position held on an eligible basis prior to such
separation, or to any other position to which a transfer,
reassignment or voluntary reduction from that position would be
authorized by these Rules. Within two years of the date of
separation, former permanent employees may be reinstated to
appropriate temporary or recurrent positions. Also within two

2
statutory process to determine whether Ware was “without fault
or delinquency” at the time he separated from county service.
The DPSS Bureau of Human Resources investigated Ware’s past
employment and determined that he was ineligible for
reinstatement. The Bureau of Human Resources based this
determination on the fact that Ware was the subject of two
“substantiated” investigations. The background check also
revealed that Ware had violated DPSS’s attendance standards.
A. First substantiated investigation
The first substantiated investigation against Ware
pertained to a 2016 County Policy of Equity (“CPOE”) Section 5
complaint filed against Ware by a female coworker who informed
a mandatory reporting supervisor that she did not like Ware
touching her, and that he touched her again after she asked him
not to. DPSS initially suspended Ware for three days for this
conduct. Ware appealed the suspension, which was resolved
through arbitration. The arbitrator disagreed with DPSS that
Ware’s actions violated the CPOE and reduced the suspension to
a reprimand. The arbitrator nevertheless agreed that “[t]here
was proper and just cause for County Management to reprimand
Mr. Ware for his behavior, whether knowingly or
unknowingly . . . .” Ware alleged that he requested to have the
reprimand removed from his personnel record and stated that
when he reviewed his official personnel record there was no
record of any reprimand for an employee relations charge or any
internal affairs charges. Accordingly, Ware alleged, any record of

years of the date of separation, former recurrent employees may
be reinstated to appropriate temporary positions.” (Civil Service
Rule 17.01A)

3
this incident was in a “secret, false file used to conduct
background review checks.” Arnetta Counts, an administrative
services manager at the Bureau of Human Resources and the
director of Discipline Policy Litigation and Livescan stated in a
declaration that “Ware’s suspension letter was removed from his
Master Personnel File after the Arbitration Award was issued.
Nevertheless, the underlying investigation was still deemed
‘substantiated’ for purposes of the background check.” Counts
explained, “there are different files relating to an employee’s
employment that are treated differently. There is a difference
between removal of discipline from a Master Personnel File and
the retention of investigations in a CPOE file, whether or not the
allegations are substantiated.”
B. Second substantiated investigation
The second substantiated investigation against Ware
related to a 2017 investigation into Ware’s engagement in the
outside practice of law during work hours. This was the second
investigation against Ware for violating DPSS’ outside
employment policy; the first investigation was unsubstantiated.
The second investigation was substantiated. Nevertheless, Ware
was not disciplined because he had already been admonished
verbally by his supervisor before he was transferred to a new
work location.
C. Violation of DPSS attendance standards
Ware’s background check also revealed that at the time of
his separation in 2019, he had 96 hours of unauthorized absences
from 2017 and 2018. Ware also had over 200 hours of absences
using sick time and unauthorized absences. Chasco stated in her
declaration that her staff conducted Ware’s attendance review,

4
which she, as District Director, evaluated as part of her official
duties. She stated that she was not specifically asked to make a
recommendation on whether to reinstate Ware, and that the
Bureau of Human Resources made the decision. Any statements
she may have made relating to Ware’s attendance were made in
her official capacity, in discharge of her responsibilities as the
District Director and Ware’s third-level supervisor.
Based on the negative information disclosed during the
background investigation, the Bureau of Human Resources
denied Ware’s request for reinstatement on December 14, 2020,
and withdrew two contingent offers of employment. Ware
unsuccessfully appealed both decisions to the Department of
Human Resources.
On April 24, 2023, Ware filed a complaint alleging that
despite performing his duties “competently and satisfactorily,”
DPSS made “fraudulent representations” as “a pretext for
unlawful discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.”3 Ware
further alleged that Chasco, in her capacity as a DPSS employee
and “in a lust for revenge, discriminated and retaliated against
Mr. Ware.” Specifically, Ware alleged that Chasco: (1) engaged
in fraudulent misrepresentation by making “specific and false
representations as to [Ware’s] attendance record”; (2) engaged in
negligent misrepresentation by “negligently misrepresent[ing] to
[Ware] he had a good attendance record”; and (3) engaged in

3 Ware also filed three actions related to his employment:
Ware v. County of Los Angeles, case No. 21STCV04765 (motion
for summary judgment granted on August 8, 2023); Ware v.
County of Los Angeles, case No. BC675757 (motion for summary
judgment granted on February 9, 2019); Ware v. Sahak, case No.
22STCV10646 (demurrer entered December 6, 2023).

5
fraudulent concealment by “suppress[ing] or conceal[ing] the
fact[ ] that [DPSS] maintained a secret personnel file that LA
County used for [Ware’s] background review check.”
II. Defendant’s special motion to strike
On May 10, 2024, Chasco filed a special motion to strike
the entire complaint pursuant to section 425.16, and for
$7,084.00 in attorney’s fees. The motion asserted that Ware’s
claims arose out of protected conduct in furtherance of free
speech, since Chasco’s alleged representations were in connection
with an official proceeding authorized by law. The motion
further asserted that Ware could not demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on the merits of his claims, since Chasco, as a public
employee, was immune under Government Code sections 820.2,
818.8, and 821.6.
The trial court granted the motion. The trial court found
that Ware’s claims against Chasco were based on statements and
writings made by her in her capacity as an employee of DPSS and
in connection with internal proceedings, namely: (1) the
investigations into [Ware’s] grievance and background review for
reinstatement; (2) the complaint initiated against [Ware] by the
County Equity Oversight Panel; (3) the second investigation of
Ware after his transfer to Skid Row for violations of the County’s
outside employment policy; and (4) Ware’s “ ‘Complaint of
Discrimination’ ” with the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing in which he alleged that his October 11, 2016, transfer
was in retaliation for participating in a protected activity and
motivated by a perceived disability. Citing Hansen v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171
Cal.App.4th 1537, 1541, 1544–1545 (Hansen), the trial court
agreed with Chasco that these proceedings constitute “official

6
proceeding[s] authorized by law” for purposes of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(1) and (2). The trial court further found that
Ware’s evidence did not conclusively establish that Chasco’s
statements and writings were illegal as a matter of law. Thus,
the trial court found that Ware’s claims against Chasco arose out
of statements/writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by an official proceeding authorized by
law and were subject to a special strike. Accordingly, the trial
court found that Chasco sustained her first-prong burden.
Next, the trial court determined that Ware did not sustain
his burden under prong two of the anti-SLAPP framework to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of his
claims against Chasco. The trial court agreed with Chasco that
she was immune from Ware’s fraud claims pursuant to
Government Code section 822.2. The court further found that
although Ware argued that Chasco was not immune because she
was guilty of actual fraud, corruption, or actual malice, he failed
to provide any legal or factual support for this assertion, aside
from his own allegations. The only evidence Ware filed in
opposition to the motion to strike was his own declaration, which
did not contain any competent and admissible evidence to
conclude that Chasco was guilty of fraud. Thus, the trial court
found that Ware could not sustain his burden to demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on the merits, and struck the complaint
pursuant to section 425.16.
The trial court also found that Ware failed to show that
Chasco was not immune pursuant to Government Code section
820.2. Section 820.2 provides:
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a
public employee is not liable for an injury

7
resulting from his act or omission where the act
or omission was the result of the exercise of the
discretion vested in him, whether or not such
discretion be abused.”
(Gov. Code, § 820.2.) The trial court found that all of Chasco’s
alleged unlawful conduct was the result of the exercise of
discretion vested in her as DPSS personnel and as Ware’s
supervisor.
Next, the trial court found that Ware failed to set forth any
competent evidence demonstrating that his allegations had any
merit. Ware’s only evidence—his own declaration—did not
contain any competent evidence demonstrating that his fraud
claims had any merit. The trial court found that this was
another independent basis to strike the complaint.
Lastly, the trial court denied Ware’s request for attorney’s
fees after finding that Chasco’s motion to strike was not frivolous
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, and granted
Chasco’s request for attorney’s fees. Ware timely appealed.

8
DISCUSSION4
I. Legal framework and standard of review
Section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute provides: “A cause
of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
The Legislature enacted section 425.16 to prevent and
deter “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the

4 Ware requests that we take judicial notice of three
documents: (1) a reporter’s transcript of testimony given by
Wendy Ross on October 21, 2022, in Los Angeles Superior Court,
case No. BC609911; (2) an investigation report from the Los
Angeles County’s Office of County Investigations, case No.
202218839; and (3) the investigation report of the County Equity
Oversight Panel, case No. 2023-11876. Ware’s request does not,
however, include the last two documents as exhibits, and
therefore we are unable to take judicial notice of them.
As to the two-page excerpt of a transcript of Ross’s
testimony from a separate case, Ware claims that this testimony
“bears directly on Chasco’s credibility in that Ross’s testimony
contradicts Chasco’s declaration regarding the creation of Ware’s
attendance record from January 12, 2018 through January 31,
2018.” In his declaration filed along with the request for judicial
notice, Ware further alleges that “Ross’[s] testimony is offered to
show the inconsistency with practice and policy in the way
Chasco created Ware’s attendance record.” Ware fails to state
what Ross’s position is at DPSS, or explain how her testimony
allegedly undermines Chasco’s credibility or contradicts Chasco’s
declaration regarding the creation of attendance records. As

9
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) The purpose of the
anti-SLAPP law is “not [to] insulate defendants from any liability
for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.
It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) To accomplish this purpose,
the Legislature expressly specifies that section 425.16 “be
construed broadly.” (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)
Section 425.16, subdivision (e), describes four categories of
conduct “ ‘ “in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue” ’ ” which are protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019)
6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) These include “(1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection

such, we find that this document is not relevant to our analysis
and deny Ware’s request for judicial notice. (Grosz v. California
Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 428,
447, fn. 12 [appellate courts will not take judicial notice of
matters irrelevant to the dispositive point on appeal].)

10
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(e).)
The resolution of a special motion to strike under section
425.16 involves two steps. First, the trial court must determine
“whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity.”
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009
(Bonni).) A claim arises from protected activity “when that
activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1057, 1062.) At this stage, it is the defendant’s burden “to
identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show
how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category
of protected activity.” (Bonni, at p. 1009.)
If the defendant demonstrates the claims arise from
protected activity, the plaintiff must then demonstrate the claims
have arguable merit. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 871, 884.) “To do so, the plaintiff must show the
complaint is legally sufficient and ‘ “ ‘supported by a sufficient
prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” ’ (Taheri
Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 488.)
We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de
novo. (Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 953, 962.)
“Even though our standard of review is de novo, an appellant
‘still bears the “ ‘burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.’ ”
[Citations.]’ ” (Luo v. Volokh (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 1312, 1322.)

11
II. Ware fails to show reversible error in the trial
court’s conclusion that Chasco’s statements and
writings were protected by section 425.16
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
[Citations.]” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
We conclude that Ware fails to meet that burden.
First, Ware fails to show reversible error in the trial court’s
findings that his claims against Chasco were based on statements
and writings she made in her capacity as an employee of DPSS
and in connection with “official proceedings authorized by law”
for purposes of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2). The
conduct underlying Ware’s allegations—that Chasco was involved
in various schemes related to a “secret personnel file,” an
“internal affairs investigation,” and a “letter of reprimand”—all
arise from internal DPSS proceedings. (See Hansen, supra, 171
Cal.App.4th at p. 1544 [California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation “internal investigation [into employee misconduct]
itself was an official proceeding authorized by law” and
“communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing
of an official proceeding are within the protection of section
425.16”].) Moreover, in his original complaint, Ware conceded
that Chasco’s statements about his attendance were made “[i]n
connection with [his] applications for positions,” which further
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Chasco’s statements
were made “in connection” with an official proceeding. Ware fails
to demonstrate through citations to the record or relevant legal

12
authority that the various internal proceedings he objects to were
not “official proceedings authorized by law” under the statute.
(See Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 [an
appellant must present “legal authority on each point made and
factual analysis, supported by appropriate citations to the
material facts in the record; otherwise, the argument may be
deemed forfeited”].) Ware also claims that Chasco made false
statements that his attendance was rated “competent,” but does
not support this claim with citations to the record. It is not our
responsibility to search the appellate record for facts, or to
conduct legal research in search of authority to support a party’s
contentions on appeal. (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“[I]t is counsel’s duty to point out portions
of the record that support the position taken on appeal . . . .”].)
Moreover, Ware, as a self-represented party, is “not exempt from
the foregoing rules” and “ ‘is to be treated like any other party
and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than
other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) In short, Ware has not shown
that the trial court erred in concluding that Chasco’s conduct and
statements, as alleged in the complaint, arise from protected
activity.
Ware also fails to show reversible error with respect to the
trial court’s finding that his evidence did not conclusively
establish that Chasco’s statements and writings were illegal as a
matter of law. The Supreme Court has created a very narrow
exception to the application of the anti-SLAPP statute “where
either the defendant concedes the illegality of its conduct or the
illegality is conclusively shown by the evidence.” (Flatley v.
Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 316.) Chasco has not conceded that

13
her activity was illegal; on the contrary, in her declaration she
disputed the allegations of illegal conduct. Further, the trial
court found that Ware’s evidence did not conclusively establish
that Chasco fraudulently or negligently recorded or
misrepresented Ware’s attendance, or that Chasco or DPSS
maintained a secret personnel file and fraudulently concealed
that file. We conclude that Ware fails to show reversible error in
these findings, since he fails to submit any evidence, aside from
his own statements, to support his allegations. (Greshko v.
County of Los Angeles (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 822, 834 [“Affidavits
or declarations setting forth only conclusions, opinions or
ultimate facts” are insufficient as evidence of the fact sought to be
proved].)
III. Ware fails to demonstrate reversible error in the
trial court’s finding that he failed to demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on his claim
“Once the court determines the first prong of the statute
has been met, a plaintiff must provide the court with sufficient
evidence to permit the court to determine whether ‘there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’ (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).)” (DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior
Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 568, italics added.) To satisfy
that burden, a plaintiff must show that his claims have “minimal
merit.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) We
conclude that Ware fails to show that the trial court erred in
concluding that he did not carry that burden.
First, Ware fails to show error in the trial court’s
determination that Chasco, as a public employee acting in the
scope of her employment, is immune from liability under
Government Code section 822.2. That section provides: “A public

14
employee acting in the scope of his employment is not liable for
an injury caused by his misrepresentation, whether or not such
misrepresentation be negligent or intentional, unless he is guilty
of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.” (Gov. Code,
§ 822.2.) The trial court found that Ware’s causes of action for
fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment of
facts were covered by this immunity, and further, that Ware
failed to demonstrate Chasco was “guilty of actual fraud,
corruption, or actual malice.” In his opening brief, Ware repeats
his previous allegation that Chasco is not immune since she is
guilty of actual fraud, corruption, and actual malice, but he cites
no legal authority and proffers no facts to support his allegations.
Rather, Ware’s only evidence is his own statements, which
merely repeat the allegations of the complaint and state the
ultimate facts he needed to prove. Ware’s unsupported and
“conclusory allegations of corruption or malice [are not] sufficient
to bring a fraud action within the exception of Government Code
section 822.2.” (Curcini v. County of Alameda (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 629, 649.)
Second, Ware fails to show reversible error in the trial
court’s finding that Chasco is also immune pursuant to
Government Code section 820.2. This section provides: “Except
as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable
for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or
omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in
him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” (Gov. Code,
§ 820.2.) The trial court found that Chasco’s alleged unlawful
conduct was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in her
as DPSS personnel and Ware’s supervisor. This finding is
supported by precedent, since a civil service employee’s decision

15
to investigate allegations of misconduct, institute disciplinary
proceedings, and decide what discipline to impose involve the
exercise of discretion entitling him or her to immunity under
Government Code section 820.2. (Kemmerer v. County of Fresno
(1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1438, disapproved in part on another
ground in Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 798.) Ware fails to show reversible error in this finding
as well. Instead, he simply repeats his prior assertions that
Chasco’s actions were ministerial and not protected as
discretionary acts. The trial court found that Ware “failed to
provide any legal or factual support” for this assertion. On
appeal, he still fails to do so.
IV. Ware fails to demonstrate error in the trial court’s
finding that he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success
To overcome an anti-SLAPP motion, “the plaintiff ‘must
demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39
Cal.4th 260, 291; see also HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 [“In opposing an anti-SLAPP
motion, the plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of the
complaint, but must produce evidence that would be admissible
at trial”].)
In his opening brief, Ware does not challenge the trial
court’s finding that notwithstanding immunity, he failed to set
forth any competent evidence demonstrating his allegations had
any merit. It is well established that failure to raise an issue in
an opening brief forfeits the issue. (Aptos Council v. County of

16
Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7 [Any issue an
appellant does not raise in the opening brief is deemed forfeited];
Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555 [“ ‘Even when our review on appeal “is
de novo, it is limited to issues which have been adequately raised
and supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.]
Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or
abandoned.” ’ ”].)
Construing Ware’s argument in his opening brief that he
stated a claim for fraud as a challenge to the trial court’s finding
on this issue, we conclude that Ware still failed to show a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his case. As the trial
court repeatedly emphasized, the record is devoid of evidence or
legal authority supporting Ware’s allegations and contentions.
Accordingly, Ware does not demonstrate reversible error in the
trial court’s determination that he failed to show that his claims
have “minimal merit.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009
[“[F]or each claim that does arise from protected activity, the
plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.” ’ ”].)

17
DISPOSITION
The order granting defendant’s special motion to strike is
affirmed. Chasco is awarded her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

18