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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Anderson

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: H051905

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.7K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/13/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051905
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2016556)

v.

MILO WILLIAM ANDERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE PEOPLE, H051906
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2016556)

v.

EDWARD LEE ALLEN, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

A group of men including defendants Milo William Anderson and Edward Lee
Allen, Jr. robbed Jacob Cabral at gunpoint in the garage of his San Jose home. A
member of the group, Tyrone Lampley, was found dead near the home after the robbery.
Police searched Lampley’s phone after obtaining consent from Lampley’s mother and
found text messages implicating Allen in the robbery, which then led to the discovery of
additional evidence.
After the trial court denied a defense motion to suppress evidence found on
Lampley’s phone, Anderson pleaded no contest to second degree robbery and Allen
pleaded no contest to first degree residential burglary, with each admitting firearm and
prior strike allegations. The court sentenced Anderson to three years in prison and Allen
to four years.
In this consolidated appeal, Anderson and Allen contend the evidence from
Lampley’s phone should have been suppressed because law enforcement violated the
California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) (Pen. Code, § 1546 et
seq.)1 in searching the phone without obtaining a warrant. We conclude suppression of
this evidence was not required, and we will affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Cabral lived at a home in San Jose with family members and his girlfriend. Cabral
grew marijuana in his backyard, hung the leaves in his garage, and would frequently have
people over to the garage to smoke marijuana. A later search of Cabral’s garage found
items including marijuana, marijuana packaging, scales, grinders, and ammunition. A
search of Cabral’s backyard found 27 marijuana plants.
Cabral would leave the side door to the garage unlocked. On the night of the
charged offenses, Cabral was in the garage with two other people. Cabral testified at a
preliminary hearing that he was playing video games and the other two people were
smoking marijuana when two masked people came to the garage’s side door and “laid
[him] down.” Cabral testified that both men were armed with handguns and they
remained in the garage for about a minute as Cabral laid on the ground not able to see
much of the men. Cabral testified that he kept about $40,000 in cash inside the garage’s
walls and after the men left, he noticed $20,000 was missing.
Cabral’s neighbors heard gunshots after the robbery, and a man fell to the ground
in a yard near Cabral’s home. Law enforcement later found Lampley’s body lying on the
ground. Law enforcement found a cell phone in Lampley’s pocket, and a gun and a bag

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
of marijuana with the body. Lampley was believed to have participated in the robbery of
Cabral’s garage.
A police officer notified Lampley’s mother of Lampley’s death. Lampley’s
mother provided Lampley’s phone number and consented to police searching the contents
of the phone found in Lampley’s pocket. At the preliminary hearing, the police officer
testified that Lampley’s mother was Lampley’s “next of kin.”
One week after Lampley’s death, police undertook a data extraction of the phone
and found messages implicating Allen. Police then obtained a warrant for Lampley’s call
detail records and the records of other suspected robbery participants, finding calls
between the suspected participants leading up to the charged offenses.
About a week after Lampley’s body was discovered and Lampley’s mother
consented to the search of the phone, law enforcement released Lampley’s vehicle keys
and key fob to Lampley’s mother.
Before the preliminary hearing, Anderson moved pursuant to section 1538.5 to
suppress all evidence relating to the search of the phone found in Lampley’s pocket. The
motion asserted law enforcement violated CalECPA and suppression was required to
remedy the violation. Allen joined Anderson’s motion. The magistrate denied the
motion without elaboration and held Anderson, Allen, and a codefendant to answer.
Anderson then moved the trial court to dismiss the attempted murder charge
against him under section 995 and to suppress evidence obtained from Lampley’s phone,
renewing his earlier suppression motion. Anderson asserted the prosecution presented
insufficient proof that Lampley’s mother was an authorized possessor of the phone
pursuant to CalECPA, and the CalECPA violation required suppression of the evidence
from the phone. The prosecution opposed the motion, contending the consent from
Lampley’s mother was valid and even if law enforcement violated CalECPA, suppression
was not required.

3
After argument at which Allen joined in Anderson’s motion and after
supplemental briefing, the trial court denied the defense’s motion. The trial court found
Lampley’s mother was the authorized possessor of the phone, citing “circumstantial
evidence” indicating Lampley’s mother “was given control and custody of certain
property after Mr. Lampley expired.” The court stated it was reasonable for law
enforcement to believe Lampley’s mother was an authorized possessor of the phone
because the phone “is property that would normally transmit to her.” Thus, the trial court
found the magistrate properly denied the defense’s section 1538.5 motion at the
preliminary hearing.
Anderson and Allen each then entered pleas pursuant to plea agreements.
Anderson pleaded no contest to one count of second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5,
subd. (c)) and admitted allegations that he was armed with a handgun (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)) and he had sustained a prior strike conviction (§§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7,
subd. (c)). Allen pleaded no contest to one count of first degree residential burglary
(§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), also admitting handgun and prior strike enhancements
(§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (c), 1192, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced
Anderson to prison for three years and imposed a four-year prison term upon Allen.
These appeals timely followed.2

2
This court ordered the appeals by Anderson and Allen considered together for
purposes of oral argument and disposition. Neither Anderson nor Allen obtained a
certificate of probable cause in conjunction with their notices of appeal. However, under
CalECPA, a motion to suppress electronic information “shall be made, determined, and
be subject to review in accordance with the procedures set forth in subdivisions (b) to (q),
inclusive, of Section 1538.5.” (§ 1546.4, subd. (a).) Under section 1538.5,
subdivision (m), “[a] defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or
seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that the
judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty.” “[I]ssues relating to the
validity of a search and seizure, for which an appeal is provided under section 1538.5,
subdivision (m)” may be raised on appeal following a no contest plea without a certificate
of probable cause. (People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 780.)

4
II. DISCUSSION
Anderson and Allen both assert the search of Lampley’s phone violated CalECPA
and thus the trial court erred in denying the defense’s motion to suppress evidence found
on the phone. Both defendants argue the evidence did not demonstrate Lampley’s mother
was an authorized possessor of the phone as defined in CalECPA, the good faith
exception does not excuse the warrantless search, and suppression of the evidence
obtained from the phone is required.
The Attorney General responds that law enforcement did not violate CalECPA
because they reasonably believed Lampley’s mother was the authorized possessor of the
phone. The Attorney General further asserts that even if the search violated CalECPA,
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies and thus suppression is not
required.
We conclude that even assuming law enforcement violated CalECPA by searching
the phone pursuant to Lampley’s mother’s consent, the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defense’s
suppression motion, and we will affirm the judgments.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Effective January 1, 2016, CalECPA states a government entity shall not “[a]ccess
electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic
communication with the electronic device.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (a)(3).) A government
entity may access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or
electronic communication with the device only in listed situations, including “[p]ursuant
to a warrant” (id., subd. (c)(1)) and “[w]ith the specific consent of the authorized
possessor of the device” (id., subd. (c)(4)). “Any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding
may move to suppress any electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or of this chapter. The motion shall

5
be made, determined, and be subject to review in accordance with the procedures set
forth in subdivisions (b) to (q), inclusive, of Section 1538.5.” (§ 1546.4, subd. (a).)
“Prior to the passage of CalECPA, California law did not require law enforcement
officials to obtain a warrant to access most electronic information. Proponents of
CalECPA sought to update the law for ‘the digital age’ and ‘properly safeguard the robust
constitutional privacy and free speech rights of Californians, spur innovation, and support
public safety by instituting clear warrant standards for government access to electronic
information.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Meza (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 520, 545, fn. 15
(Meza).)
“[A] defendant moving pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress
evidence obtained as the result of a warrantless search must set forth the factual and legal
bases for the motion by making a prima facie showing that law enforcement authorities
acted without a warrant. [Citation.] A defendant’s moving papers, however, need not
anticipate the prosecution’s justifications for the warrantless search or seizure, because
‘[l]aw enforcement personnel, not defendants, are in the best position to know what
justification, if any, they had for proceeding without a warrant.’ [Citation.] Accordingly,
the burden of proving the justification for the warrantless search or seizure lies squarely
with the prosecution. [Citations.]” (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 723.)
“At a preliminary hearing on a felony complaint, the defendant may move to
suppress evidence that the defendant claims was obtained as a result of an invalid search
or seizure. [Citation.] If the motion is denied and the defendant is held to answer, the
defendant may renew the suppression motion in the superior court under the standards
governing a section 995 motion. [Citation.] In a section 995 proceeding, the superior
court ‘merely reviews’ the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing; it does not
substitute its judgment on the weight of the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence.
[Citation.] The role of the superior court ‘ “ ‘is similar to that of an appellate court
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a judgment and involves the

6
determination of a legal issue only.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Price v. Superior Court (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 13, 34, fn. omitted (Price).)
“In reviewing a section 995 order, itself reviewing a magistrate’s order denying a
suppression motion at a preliminary hearing, ‘ “we, in effect, review the magistrate’s
decision directly, deferring to the magistrate’s factual findings.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “We must
draw all presumptions in favor of the magistrate’s factual determinations, and we must
uphold the magistrate’s express or implied findings if they are supported by substantial
evidence.” ’ [Citation.] But, like the superior court, we independently determine
whether the search or seizure was reasonable. [Citations.] That is, ‘ “[w]e judge the
legality of the search by ‘measur[ing] the facts, as found by the trier, against the
constitutional standard of reasonableness.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at p. 34.)
B. Analysis
Although Anderson and Allen assert that Lampley’s mother did not qualify as an
authorized possessor of Lampley’s phone under CalECPA, we need not decide the issue
because law enforcement had a good faith belief Lampley’s mother could consent to the
phone’s search. Thus, suppression of the evidence is not required.3

1. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to searches under CalECPA. CalECPA “does not require the suppression of any electronic information. Rather, it authorizes any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding to move to suppress any

3
“Federal law provides that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not
be vicariously asserted.” (In re Rudy F. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131.)
Conversely, CalECPA provides that “[a]ny person” may move to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the act. (§ 1546.4, subd. (a).) Based
on this statutory provision, the prosecutor acknowledged in motions practice that
Anderson and Allen had standing to challenge the search of Lampley’s phone. The
Attorney General does not argue here that Anderson and Allen lack standing under
CalECPA to challenge the search based on the fact the phone did not belong to them.

7
electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or
CalECPA.” (Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 58.) Thus, the Court of Appeal in Price
concluded the good faith exception applicable to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule also applies to CalECPA violations. (Price, supra, at p. 60.) (Cf. People v. Clymer
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 140 (Clymer) [citing Price in stating the good faith exception
“arguably” applies to CalECPA violations]; Meza, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 546, fn. 17
[declining to address the issue]; id. at p. 547b (statement by Liu, J., dissenting from
denial of review) [“It is not clear whether [the good faith] exception applies to violations
of CalECPA, and there are plausible arguments on both sides of the question”].)
In addition, the Court of Appeal in People v. Campos (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1281,
1295 (Campos) concluded CalECPA does not require suppression of evidence for all
violations of the statute, though the court did not specifically address the good faith
exception. The court in Campos noted both CalECPA’s legislative history and the
statute’s statement that suppression motions are to be reviewed in accordance with
section 1538.5. (Campos, supra, at p. 1295.) Section 1538.5 “does not establish or alter
any substantive ground for suppression of evidence or return of property.” (§ 1538.5,
subd. (n).) Thus, the Campos court concluded that evidence is not automatically
excluded when it was obtained in violation of CalECPA. (Campos, supra, at pp. 1296-
1298.) The court in Price cited a similar rationale, reviewing several CalECPA
provisions to conclude that “[n]one of these provisions direct a court to impose a
particular remedy for a CalECPA violation; they leave the determination of the
appropriate remedy to the court considering the suppression motion, civil action, or
petition alleging the CalECPA violation.” (Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.)
We find Price well reasoned. We agree CalECPA does not require suppression of
all evidence obtained in violation of the act. Instead, the good faith exception to the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to CalECPA violations. As the Court of
Appeal in Price concluded, the language of CalECPA—which does not mention the good

8
faith exception one way or the other—does not show “that the Legislature intended such
a sweeping change to this well-established exception without express clarity.” (Price,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.) “The Legislature is presumed to know existing law,
including case law [citation], and nothing in CalECPA suggests that the legislation was
intended to vitiate’ ” case law establishing the good faith exception in the Fourth
Amendment context. (Price, supra, at p. 60.)
Legislative history supports our conclusion. As the court in Campos observed,
when CalECPA legislation was first introduced, section 1546.4, subdivision (a) would
have provided that “ ‘no evidence obtained or retained in violation of this chapter shall be
admissible in a criminal . . . proceeding . . . .” ’ (Sen. Bill No. 178 (2015-2016 Reg.
Sess.) as introduced Feb. 9, 2015.)” (Campos, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 1295.)
“According to a report from the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, the California
State Sheriffs’ Association opposed the bill on multiple grounds, including the following:
‘ “[W]e are concerned about the breadth of the exclusionary provisions of proposed
section 1546.4. Whether evidence should be admitted or not should be based on a motion
to suppress under . . . section 1538.5 and should be based on violations of the Fourth
Amendment. Technical violations of the ‘chapter’ that do not implicate a person’s right
to privacy should not result in the suppression of evidence.” ’ (Assem. Com. on Public
Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 178 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 7, 2015,
p. 12.)” (Id. at p. 1296.) The Legislature removed the language in section 1546.4
requiring suppression of all evidence obtained in violation of CalECPA and substituted
language stating that a motion to suppress shall be made, determined, and subject to
review under section 1538.5, evincing “a rejection of the proposal to exclude all
evidence obtained in violation of the CalECPA.” (Campos, supra, at p. 1296.) The court
in Clymer cited the same legislative history in concluding it “arguably suggests” the good
faith exception remains operative under CalECPA. (Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 140.)

9
Our review of the legislative history similarly supports the conclusion that
CalECPA does not require suppression for any violation of the act, and the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule remains operative under CalECPA. Anderson and
Allen point to nothing in the act’s legislative history to indicate a contrary conclusion.
Anderson and Allen argue the principles for suppressing evidence obtained in
violation of wiretap laws should apply to CalECPA violations. In support of this
argument, they cite People v. Jackson (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129 (Jackson), which
concluded evidence obtained under federal or state wiretap laws cannot be admitted
under the good faith exception applicable to the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment
violations. (Jackson, supra, at pp. 153-154.) We conclude Jackson does not support
their argument.
In Jackson, the Court of Appeal held the good faith exception “does not apply to a
motion to suppress unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence” where the wiretap evidence
was unlawfully obtained by failure to identify any targets of the wiretaps. (Jackson,
supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 136.) The reviewing court stated that while the Fourth
Amendment good faith exception is a judicially crafted exception to the judicially created
exclusionary rule, suppression under the federal wiretap law is statutorily mandated. (Id.
at p. 153.) Citing United States Supreme Court precedent that the exclusionary rule does
not apply to federal wiretap violations, the Court of Appeal stated: “If suppression of
wiretap evidence ‘does not turn on the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule’ we fail to
see how it can turn on a judicially fashioned exception to the judicially fashioned
exclusionary rule.” (Ibid.)
The reasons the Court of Appeal enunciated in Jackson to support this position do
not apply here. The court in Jackson stated the California wiretap law authorized “a good
faith defense to a criminal or civil action for violation of the statute but not to a motion to
suppress unlawfully obtained evidence,” demonstrating the Legislature was aware of the
good faith exception “and deliberately chose not to incorporate a good faith exception

10
into the statutory exclusionary rule.” (Jackson, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 154.) No
such good faith defense to a criminal or civil action is specified in CalECPA. The
Jackson court noted that the United States Supreme Court had not yet recognized the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule at the time the federal wiretap statute was
enacted, and thus Congress could not have contemplated such an exception. (Jackson,
supra, at p. 155.) Here, the good faith exception was embedded in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence well before CalECPA’s enactment. The court in Jackson expressed
concern that “nonconstitutional violations of the wiretap statute would be more likely to
lead to the suppression of evidence than constitutional violations.” (Jackson, supra, at
p. 155.) Anderson and Allen have articulated no such concern regarding CalECPA
violations.
Finally, the Jackson court stated the United States Supreme Court adopted the
good faith exception because “if the search warrant procedure was defective, it is not the
police officer who is to blame,” but the magistrate who signed the warrant. (Jackson,
supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 158.) In contrast, the Jackson court stated, “the procedure
for obtaining a wiretap order shows Congress was not satisfied it could fully trust a
magistrate with the far-reaching invasion of privacy possible through a wiretap,” instead
requiring the person seeking the order to first obtain the personal approval for the wiretap
from the United States Attorney General or a statutorily authorized designee. (Id. at
p. 159.) In this situation, the Court of Appeal stated, “the government cannot place the
blame on the magistrate who issued the order.” (Id. at pp. 159-160.) This rationale does
not apply in the instant situation, where CalECPA provides for no such special approval
process for searches comparable to that in wiretap statutes. Jackson, which was based on
the language, purpose, and procedures of wiretap statutes rather than CalECPA, does not
control here.
Therefore, consistent with Price, we conclude that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies to searches challenged under CalECPA.

11
2. Law enforcement acted in good faith by relying on the consent of
Lampley’s mother to search the phone.
We review the application of the good faith exception de novo, examining whether
a reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search was illegal despite the
consent obtained. (See Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) “ ‘[T]he government has
the burden to prove facts warranting application of the good faith exception.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)4
When the officer obtained Lampley’s mother’s consent to search the phone, he
informed Lampley’s mother that Lampley was deceased. Because Lampley had died, he
was no longer the authorized possessor of the phone. At that point, law enforcement
acted in objective good faith in believing Lampley’s mother as Lampley’s “next of kin”
was an authorized possessor of the phone. Law enforcement understood Lampley’s
mother to be Lampley’s “next of kin,” and they later released other personal property of
Lampley to Lampley’s mother. Nothing in the appellate record indicates anyone else
besides Lampley’s mother had a stronger claim to possession of the phone. Any
deterrence rationale does not support suppressing the evidence in situations where law
enforcement reasonably believes a family member is the authorized possessor of a
deceased person’s electronic device. In addition, as the Attorney General notes, no case
law existed concerning the definition of “authorized possessor” at the time law
enforcement obtained consent to search the phone, and nothing in the statutory definition
should have caused law enforcement to believe Lampley’s mother was not authorized to
consent to the phone’s search. (See Price, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 51 [good faith
exception applied because at the time a geofence warrant was issued, no published cases
existed analyzing the constitutionality of such warrants].)

4
The good faith exception generally applies to warrantless searches; in such a
situation, “[t]he prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts
justifying a warrantless search.” (People v. Smith (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 375, 382-383.)

12
The definition of “authorized possessor” in CalECPA—“the possessor of an
electronic device when that person is the owner of the device or has been authorized to
possess the device by the owner of the device”—does not state exactly who may consent
to a search when the owner of an electronic device dies. (§ 1546, subd. (b).) The parties’
briefs discuss Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th 131 to apply the definition to this
situation. The Attorney General argues Clymer demonstrates Lampley’s mother was an
authorized possessor of the phone, while Anderson and Allen assert Clymer is
distinguishable. While we need not decide whether Lampley’s mother met the definition
of an “authorized possessor” of the phone, we conclude Clymer—which was issued after
the search of the phone in the instant case—supports the conclusion that law enforcement
acted in objective good faith by relying on consent from Lampley’s mother.
In Clymer, Drew McKay was found dead in his bedroom from an apparent drug
overdose. (Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.) With the permission of McKay’s
parents, law enforcement searched McKay’s room and found a cell phone and a tablet on
a bedside table. (Ibid.) McKay’s parents repeatedly urged law enforcement to search the
devices to learn what happened to their son, and they provided the passcodes to the
devices. (Ibid.) Law enforcement searched the devices and found messages implicating
Clymer in selling oxycodone to McKay. (Ibid.) After the trial court partially denied
Clymer’s motion to suppress the evidence found on the devices, Clymer pleaded no
contest to possession of diazepam for sale. (Id. at p. 136.)
On appeal, Clymer asserted the search of McKay’s devices violated CalECPA and
therefore the evidence found in the search should have been suppressed. (Clymer, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 136.) The Court of Appeal concluded McKay’s parents were
authorized possessors of the devices and could consent to the search. (Id. at p. 140.) The
reviewing court noted McKay lived with his parents and “McKay, of course, was no
longer the corporal owner or possessor of the devices” upon his death. (Ibid.) The Court
of Appeal stated because McKay died in his bedroom in the family residence and the

13
devices were next to McKay’s bed, “the only persons who then actually possessed, and
could possess, the devices at the relevant time, were his parents.” (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal added: “Furthermore, McKay’s parents not only had uncontested physical
possession of the devices at the relevant time, but they also knew the passcodes and
therefore could access the devices. In short, on McKay’s death, there were no
‘authorized possessors’ of the devices other than his parents. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 140-
141.)
We acknowledge that some facts on which the Court of Appeal in Clymer relied
are not present here, and thus we do not hold that Lampley’s mother was necessarily an
authorized possessor of the phone under CalECPA. The court in Clymer noted that
McKay lived with his parents, the parents had the passcodes to McKay’s devices, the
devices were physically present in the family home, and McKay’s parents repeatedly
urged law enforcement to search the devices to learn what happened to their son.
(Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 140-141.) Those facts are generally absent here,
though the record suggests Lampley may have lived with his mother.5
Nonetheless, Clymer supports the conclusion that law enforcement acted in good
faith by relying on Lampley’s mother’s consent to search the phone. As in Clymer, “on
[Lampley’s] death, there were no ‘authorized possessors’ of the device[] other than his
parent[].” (Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 140-141.) An officer testified at the
preliminary hearing that law enforcement released Lampley’s vehicle keys and key fob to
his mother after his death, and that he understood Lampley’s mother to be Lampley’s
“next of kin.” While no evidence at the preliminary hearing described the meaning of the
term “next of kin,” this testimony evinces law enforcement’s understanding that

5
At the preliminary examination, the prosecutor asked a police officer if he and
another officer went “to Mr. Lampley’s home in Menlo Park to notify his family?” The
officer replied that he did so, speaking with Lampley’s mother. The record provides no
other information on this matter.

14
Lampley’s mother was authorized to consent to the search of the phone as Lampley’s
next closest living family member. This understanding was reasonable, and neither
Anderson nor Allen has suggested any other person who would be the authorized
possessor of the phone after Lampley’s death.
Moreover, Clymer’s holding did not rest just on facts indicating McKay lived in
the family home and his parents had passcodes to the devices. The court in Clymer stated
its holding was “wholly consistent with the fundamental purpose of CalECPA, which is
to protect the privacy interests of owners and authorized users in their electronic devices
and electronic information.” (Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 141.) The court in
Clymer stated: “McKay’s privacy interest in his devices was extinguished upon his
death. ‘ “It is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be
asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded . . . .
[Citations.] Further, the right does not survive but dies with the person.” ’ [Citations.]
Thus, we fail to see how the search of a decedent’s electronic devices can be at odds with
CalECPA, particularly where, as here, the persons who are properly in possession of the
decedent’s devices at the relevant time, as were McKay’s parents, authorize a search of
the devices and supply the passcodes to do so.” (Ibid.)
Similar to Clymer, our conclusion that law enforcement acted in good faith by
relying on Lampley’s mother’s consent is consistent with CalECPA’s purpose. In
enacting CalECPA, the Legislature sought to protect rights of privacy and speech, and to
support public safety. (Meza, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 545, fn. 15.) Lampley’s
mother, believed to be his next closest living family member, provided the phone’s
number and consented to its search when she was notified of her son’s death. Law
enforcement was seeking information to investigate the robbery, but this situation also
involved Lampley’s apparent homicide. The holder of the privacy interest was deceased,
and law enforcement could in good faith seek consent to see the contents of his phone

15
consistent with CalECPA’s public safety purposes from the person who apparently was
now authorized to possess it. (Clymer, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 141.)
Anderson and Allen cite In re Scott K. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 395 and People v. Daniels
(1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 36 to argue parents generally do not have authority to consent to a
search of their children’s property. We do not find these cases to be of assistance in our
analysis. In Scott K., the California Supreme Court concluded that under the record
before it, a father could not consent to a search of his son’s toolbox, stating “[c]ommon
authority over personal property may not be implied from the father’s proprietary interest
in the premises,” and “[n]either may it be premised on the nature of the parent-child
relation.” (Scott K., supra, at pp. 404-405, fn. omitted.) The Court of Appeal in Daniels
upheld the denial of a motion to suppress where a mother consented to a search of her
adult son’s bedroom, though the reviewing court concluded that a search of a suitcase in
the room was unlawful because the mother had “no actual control” over the suitcase and
officers did not reasonably believe the mother had such control. (Daniels, supra, at
pp. 44-45.) Both cases were fact driven, and considered theories of common authority or
control of property. Of particular importance, neither Scott K. nor Daniels involved a
parent authorizing access to the personal effects of a deceased child. Thus, Scott K. and
Daniels do not persuade us that the good faith exception has no application here.
For these reasons, we conclude that even assuming Lampley’s mother was not the
authorized possessor of the phone as defined by CalECPA, the prosecution demonstrated
that law enforcement had an objectively reasonable belief Lampley’s mother could
consent to the search, and officers acted in good faith by relying on her consent to search
the phone. Thus, suppression of the evidence obtained from the phone was not required.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.

16

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Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

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Danner, J.

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Bromberg, J.

H051905 People v. Anderson

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Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

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Danner, J.

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Bromberg, J.

H051906 People v. Allen
Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court
Superior Court No.: C2016556

Trial Judges: The Honorable Nona L. Klippen
The Honorable Philip H. Pennypacker
The Honorable Evette D. Pennypacker
The Honorable Shelyna V. Brown

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
MILO WILLIAM ANDERSON: Richard M. Oberto,
under appointment by the Court of
Appeal for Appellant

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
THE PEOPLE: Rob Bonta,
Attorney General of California

Charles C. Ragland,
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Jeffrey M. Laurence,
Senior Assistant Attorney General

Bridget Billeter,
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General

Kelly A. Styger,
Deputy Attorney General

H051905
People v. Anderson
Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court
Superior Court No.: C2016556

Trial Judges: The Honorable Nona L. Klippen
The Honorable Eric S. Geffon

Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
EDWARD LEE ALLEN JR: Michelle D. Spencer,
Lori A. Quick,
under appointment by the Court of
Appeal for Appellant

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
THE PEOPLE: Rob Bonta,
Attorney General of California

Charles C. Ragland,
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Jeffrey M. Laurence,
Senior Assistant Attorney General

Bridget Billeter,
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General

Kelly A. Styger,
Deputy Attorney General

H051906
People v. Allen