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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Casique CA2/5

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B337972

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (1)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/13/26 P. v. Casique CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B337972

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA066123)
v.

ERNEST JOHNNY CASIQUE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Lauren Sanchez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Ernest Casique appeals from an order denying
his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.6.1 Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that he could still be convicted of
felony murder as a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Conviction

1. Factual Background2

Andrew Cachu, Silverio Rodriguez-Garcia, and Carlos
Monroy were members of the Down as Fuck gang. Defendant
was a member of the Palmas 13 Kings gang. Cachu’s brother was
in a relationship with defendant’s sister, and defendant spent a
lot of time with Cachu and his girlfriend, Kaylee Fuentes.
On March 31, 2015, at 8:30 p.m., Fuentes, Cachu,
Rodriguez-Garcia, and Monroy drove to visit defendant at his

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section
1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we will refer to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

2 We judicially notice the record in defendant’s direct appeal.
(People v. Casique (May 23, 2019, B284052) [nonpub. opn.].) We
state the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment below.
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)

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home. Upon their arrival, they met defendant, who was in his
front yard. Defendant approached the car and asked the driver,
Cachu, for a ride to Palmdale Boulevard (in Palmdale, California)
because he wanted to find someone who had argued with
defendant’s friends earlier that day. Cachu agreed, and
defendant got into the backseat of the car.
As the group drove down Palmdale Boulevard, they passed
a burger restaurant, at which point defendant stated, “He’s right
there, let me out.” Cachu then drove the car to a nearby parking
lot and four of its occupants, Cachu, Rodriguez-Garcia, Monroy,
and defendant, got out of the car. Cachu told Fuentes, who
remained in the car, to drive to the burger restaurant. The four
men then walked towards the restaurant.
Nicole King was the girlfriend of the victim, Louis Amela.
Amela had traveled by bicycle to meet King at the burger
restaurant where the two sat at a window nearby where Amela
had left his bicycle. Defendant entered the restaurant and made
a loud ruckus at the counter. Defendant then walked out, hitting
the doors loudly with his hands. He then started to ride away on
Amela’s bicycle. Amela ran out of the restaurant, caught
defendant, and the two men began to punch one another. After a
few minutes, two more individuals, including Cachu, approached
the combatants. Defendant and one of the individuals grabbed
Amela by his jacket: defendant held onto Amela’s right side and
the other man held onto Amela’s left side. Amela jumped a few
times to get away and get out of his jacket to escape. Cachu then
shot Amela twice in the back. After the shooting, defendant
jumped up and down, saying, “Yeah.” He then rode away on
Amela’s bicycle. Amela died from a gunshot wound to the chest.

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2. Procedural History

On July 7, 2016, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
filed a two-count amended information against defendant and
Cachu. Both defendants were charged in count 1 with murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), and in count 2 with second degree robbery
(§ 211). The District Attorney alleged firearm allegations for
count 1 based on the use and discharge of a firearm by a principal
causing great bodily injury pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1); a gang allegation pursuant to
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4) for count 1; and a gang
allegation pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) for
count 2.
Defendant and Cachu pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a
jury trial. On July 20, 2016, the jury found defendant guilty of
first-degree felony murder and second-degree robbery. The jury
found all firearm and gang allegations to be true. The jury also
found Cachu guilty on both counts and found the sentencing
enhancements to be true.
On July 10, 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25
years to life on count 1 and imposed a consecutive 25-year
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and
(e)(1) (intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily
injury), for a total term of 50 years to life in state prison. The
court further applied enhancements pursuant to sections 186.22,
subdivision (b) (gang sentence enhancement of 10 years), and
12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (e)(1) (firearm sentence
enhancements of 10 and 20 years), which were stayed by the
court pursuant to section 654. On count 2, the court sentenced
defendant to five years, with a consecutive 10-year enhancement

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pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b). The court also stayed
the sentence for count 2 pursuant to section 654.
Defendant appealed. In a nonpublished opinion, we
modified the judgment by striking the gang and firearm
enhancements, and affirmed the judgment as modified. (People v.
Casique, supra, B284052.) Defendant’s sentence was modified to
25 years to life.

B. 1172.6 Petition

On July 30, 2019, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition,
declaring, among other things, that: an information was filed
against him allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder; at trial he was convicted of first degree murder
pursuant to the felony murder rule; and he could not now be
convicted of first degree murder because of changes made to
sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. The trial court
appointed counsel for defendant.
The District Attorney opposed the petition, asserting that
he was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, but conceded that defendant had made
a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. The trial court
issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing.
On May 2, 2024, the trial court, which had presided over
the trial, conducted an evidentiary hearing. The court took
judicial notice of the court file, trial transcripts, and a
stipulation.3 Following argument by the parties, the court denied

3 The parties stipulated to Cachu’s statements to undercover
law enforcement officers while in custody. Cachu stated among

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the petition, concluding that the prosecution had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant timely
appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that substantial evidence does not
support the trial court’s finding that defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life.4

A. Applicable Law

At a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, “the prosecution
bears the burden ‘to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under the law
as amended by Senate Bill [No.] 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)). In
addition to evidence admitted in the petitioner’s prior trial, both
‘[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or
additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.’ (Ibid.) ‘If
the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.)

other things that the shooting was “[n]eighborhood shit” and he
“was doin’ my own shot thing.”

4 Defendant does not dispute that there was sufficient
evidence he was a major participant in the underlying robbery.

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“[A] trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is
reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under this
standard, we review the record ‘“‘in the light most favorable to
the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’ [Citation.]”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
“A participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a [robbery] in which a death occurs is liable for
murder only if one of the following is proven: ¶ The person
was the actual killer. ¶ The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. ¶ The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
“Reckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave
risk of death.’ [Citation.] Examples include ‘the person who
tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or
the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery,
utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the
unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking
the victim’s property.’ [Citation.] Reckless indifference
‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’
[Citation.]

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“Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’
[Citations.] ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of
death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish
reckless indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly creating a
“grave risk of death”’ satisfies the statutory requirement.
[Citation.] Notably, ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an
armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used’ is not
sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life.
[Citations.]
“We analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether [the defendant] acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Relevant factors include: Did the defendant use or
know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many
weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically
present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to
restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of
the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the
victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal
force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks

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of violence during the felony? [Citation.] ‘“[N]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.”’ [Citations.]” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667,
676–677, citing People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 617–623
(Clark).)

B. Analysis

1. Physical Presence and Opportunity to Restrain Confederate or Aid Victim

Presence is important to culpability because it allows a
defendant to observe his cohort’s actions and demeanor and
determine whether his cohort’s behavior tends to suggest a
willingness to use lethal force. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 619.) Here, defendant was present at the shooting by design.
Had he merely sought to steal Amela’s bicycle, he could have
done so without entering the restaurant and drawing attention to
his theft. Instead, he lured Amela outside, where he would be
confronted by defendant’s cohorts. Even after the physical
altercation started, defendant could have aided Amela by letting
him go but instead held onto him as Cachu shot him. And,
following the shooting, defendant jumped up and down in
celebration and then rode away on Amela’s bicycle,
demonstrating that defendant had no intention to aid him.
Defendant’s physical presence and opportunity to aid the victim
weigh heavily in favor of a finding of reckless indifference.

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2. Efforts to Minimize Risk of Violence

The evidence supports a finding that defendant made no
efforts to minimize the risk of violence to Amela, but instead
sought out a violent altercation. It was defendant who asked
Cachu and others to help him find Amela. Further, as discussed
above, defendant lured Amela outside, which resulted in the fatal
shooting, and then celebrate the shooting afterwards. Thus,
defendant made no effort to minimize the risk of violence, a factor
that weighs in favor of a finding of reckless indifference.

1. Duration of Felony

“Where a victim is held at gunpoint, kidnapped, or
otherwise restrained in the presence of perpetrators for prolonged
periods, ‘there is a greater window of opportunity for violence’
[citation], possibly culminating in murder.” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 620, italics added.) Defendant went into the
restaurant to lure Amela outside, fought with Amela, and then
was joined by Cachu and another individual. He then restrained
Amela while Cachu shot him. The period of interaction between
the cohort and Amela therefore was sufficiently long to weigh in
favor of a finding of reckless indifference.

1. Youth

Defendant, who was nearly 21 years old at the time of the
crime, argues that his youth supported a finding that he did not
act with reckless indifference to human life. We disagree.
Although youth can be a relevant factor for determining whether
a defendant acted with reckless indifference (see People v. Keel

10
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558–559), it is not dispositive and
does not negate the substantial evidence of reckless indifference
present here.

IV. DISPOSITION

The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

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