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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Santillan CA2/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B341960

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.5K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/13/26 P. v. Santillan CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B341960

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA118824)
v.

JUAN FRANCISCO SANTILLAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

A jury convicted defendant Juan Francisco Santillan of
several sex offenses against two young victims, his
granddaughter and niece. On appeal, he argues the trial court
erred in admitting pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1101,
subdivision (b) and 11081 prior uncharged sexual offenses against
two other young, female family members and excluding “good”
evidence from one victim’s two siblings, who, defendant claims,
would have rebutted the propensity evidence admitted under
section 1108. Section 1108 expressly allows the admission of
prior sexual conduct as propensity evidence in a sex offense case.
Defendant has failed to show admission of this evidence was
prejudicial under section 352, which is the central issue on
appeal. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of the prior uncharged sexual conduct.
Assuming the trial court erred in excluding the aforementioned
“good” act evidence, we also conclude that error was not
prejudicial. We thus affirm the judgment of conviction. We,
however, remand for the trial court to modify the judgment to
reflect 1,021 instead of 1,016 days of presentence custody credit.

BACKGROUND

1. The People charge defendant with multiple sex offenses against two young family members The People charged defendant with two counts of a lewd act upon a child under age 14 involving K.L. based on conduct occurring between January 1, 2016 and January 1, 2019. The People also charged defendant with two counts of lewd act upon a

1 Statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless
otherwise indicated.

2
child under age 14 and one count of sexual penetration with a
child under 10 involving A.V. based on conduct occurring between
August 2014 and August 2017. The People alleged the charges
fall within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.61,
subdivision (j)(2), that is, the victim was under the age of 14, and
Penal Code section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4), that is, there were
multiple victims. Defendant pleaded not guilty to all counts.

1. Defendant opposes the People’s pretrial motion to admit evidence of uncharged prior sexual offenses including against other female family members Prior to trial, pursuant to sections 1101 and 1108, the prosecutor moved to introduce the testimony of Y.P., G.S., A.B., Y.G., I.S., N.M., and D.P. According to the prosecutor, defendant touched each of these victims when they collectively were ages nine through 20, and these incidents occurred between 2000 and
2. The conduct included touching and digital penetration of a victim’s vagina. The prosecutor argued under section 352, that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. Defendant opposed. Defendant contended, among other arguments, that admitting the testimony of seven witnesses would constitute an undue consumption of time, likely confuse the jurors, and exacerbate the inherently prejudicial nature of propensity evidence. At a hearing, the prosecutor indicated that she intended to call only two witnesses, and the trial court stated it “does believe that the burden has been met under [section] 1108. The court does exercise its discretion under [section] 352 to allow” Y.P. and G.S. to testify.

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3. Evidence presented at trial
Victim K.L., defendant’s niece, testified that when she was
11 years old (in approximately 2016), defendant woke her up one
night when he touched and tickled her feet. K.L. felt defendant’s
hand move up her leg close to her vagina. On a different night,
K.L. awoke when defendant touched her legs and rubbed her
thigh and knee. When K.L. was 12 years old, she was asleep on a
top bunk bed, and defendant tickled her feet. After K.L. told her
mother about defendant’s conduct, K.L.’s mother confronted
defendant and defendant said that “he was sorry if he ever did
those things, but he doesn’t recall doing any of that.” Defendant
did not identify to what “that” referred.
Victim A.V., defendant’s granddaughter, testified
defendant touched her every other day when she was in first
grade until she was in fourth grade (beginning in approximately
2014). A.V. did not remember every time it happened. She
testified he touched her vagina “maybe every other day. It was
pretty often.”
A.V. described four incidents. Once, defendant touched her
over her clothes, put her hand on his penis, and put his hand on
her vagina. Defendant told A.V., “[D]on’t say anything.” During
a second incident, when she was about six years old, she sat next
to defendant under a blanket. Defendant touched A.V. under her
clothing and touched outside and inside her vagina. Defendant
hurt A.V. During a third incident, defendant tried to pull A.V.’s
pants down, but she was able to hold them up. During a fourth
incident, defendant made A.V. touch defendant’s penis
underneath his clothing.
J.A., defendant’s son, testified A.V. told him defendant
touched her in a manner she did not like.

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G.S. testified that in 2003, when she was about 10 years
old, defendant, her uncle, squeezed her butt and it made her
uncomfortable.
Y.P. testified that in 2009, when she was about 16 years
old, defendant, her uncle, touched her when she was sleeping.
Defendant touched her lower buttocks, near her vagina.
A.V.’s mother recorded two calls and one voicemail from
defendant. A.V.’s mother testified defendant was in Mexico at
the time of the first call, and she did not know when he returned
from Mexico.
The prosecutor played the recordings for the jury. In the
first call, when asked “if you did something,” defendant
responded, “I don’t remember having done anything.” Defendant
said, “I don’t remember having done those things” but the
“things” are not identified. Defendant said, “I don’t remember
having done anything with anybody.” In the second call, A.V.’s
mother told defendant she wanted him “to be honest and to tell
the truth.” Defendant responded he already told her he did not
remember. Defendant then said, “I don’t know how to say it . . .
uh, in a way for you all . . . to be able to understand me . . . . that
I didn’t do that, sweetie.” Defendant does not further identify
“that.” When A.V.’s mother asked what defendant meant by he
did not remember, defendant said, “I mean that I didn’t do
that . . . .” A.V.’s mother then asked, “[S]o you, you’re telling me
that you never touched” A.V. and defendant responded, “Yes.”
Defendant also said, “[I]f she [A.V.] says that I . . . I touched
her . . . I don’t know why she’s only telling you now.” “Why didn’t
she, why didn’t she tell you before?” Defendant later said, “I
don’t know what the story is that she’s telling you. I also ask
myself whether I touched her.” Defendant said, “I feel that, I feel

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that that didn’t happen. I feel that I never did that to her.” “In
my mind it didn’t . . . happen.”
Defendant left A.V.’s mother the following voice recording:
“I just want to ask your forgiveness, sweetheart. For everything
that’s happening. I want to ask your forgiveness, yours and
[A.V.]’s. Even though . . . I already told you . . . what I told
you . . . when you asked me things. But I love you very much,
sweetheart. I love you. And I love your daughter too. And I love
the whole family. I just ask for forgiveness. From you and her,
and all of you. Especially you, and her. . . . And hopefully one
day . . . you all will forgive my mistakes.”
Expert witness and clinical psychologist, Jayme Jones,
testified about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is a group of
concepts describing abused children and explaining that sexual
abuse usually happens in secret, the children are typically
helpless, and children typically do not fight back. Jones further
testified children often learn to accommodate the abuse and delay
in disclosing it. Jones reiterated, “[T]ypically when child sexual
abuse occurs, there are not active witnesses.”
Defendant presented no witnesses in his defense.

1. Verdict and sentence Jury deliberations lasted less than four hours. The jury found defendant guilty of all counts and found K.L. and A.V. were under the age of 14 and there was more than one victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for 115 years to life and awarded him 1,016 days of custody credit.

6
DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Demonstrates No Error in the Admission
of Y.P.’s and G.S.’s Testimony
Citing sections 1101, 1108, and 352, defendant argues the
trial court erred in admitting Y.P.’s and G.S.’s testimony and also
contends admission of this testimony violated his right to due
process. As explained below, section 1108 is an exception to
section 1101’s general prohibition against admitting prior bad
acts to prove propensity. Section 1108 expressly allows the
admission of prior sexual offenses to prove propensity in a
prosecution for a sexual offense.
The only limitation on admission of prior sexual offenses is
section 352, that is, “if [the evidence’s] probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (§ 352.)
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting Y.P.’s and G.S.’s
testimony because defendant has failed to show prejudice within
the meaning of section 352. Defendant’s due process claim thus
necessarily fails because we disagree with its premise that the
prejudicial effect of this testimony outweighed its “minimal
probative value.” We thus do not address defendant’s due process
challenge further.

1. Relevant legal principles People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790 (Daveggio) sets forth the legal principles applicable to a defendant’s challenge to propensity evidence in a sex offense case.

7
First the evidence must be relevant: “[T]hat is, it must have
some ‘tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action’
[citation]. A plea of ‘not guilty’ ‘place[s] all material issues in
dispute’ [citation], including a defendant’s intent [citation].” (Id.
at p. 822.)
Daveggio explains the limitation in section 1101 on the
admission of propensity evidence: “Specifically, section 1101(a)
instructs that ‘evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or
her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct)
is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.’ Subdivision (b) clarifies that subdivision (a)
does not prohibit the admission of evidence relevant ‘to prove
some fact . . . other than [the person’s] disposition to commit such
an act,’ such as the person’s ‘motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, [or] identity.’ [Citations.]”
(Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 823.)
This is not true, however, for evidence of prior sexual
offenses in the prosecution of a sexual offense: “[S]ection
1108 . . . carves out an exception to . . . section 1101. It provides
that ‘[i]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a
sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section
1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.’
(§ 1108, subd. (a); see also § 1101(a) [‘Except as provided in . . .
Section[ ] . . . 1108 . . . .’].) . . . . It follows that if evidence satisfies
the requirements of section 1108, including that it is not
inadmissible under section 352, then the admission of that

8
evidence does not violate section 1101.” (Daveggio, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 823.)
Daveggio cautions trial courts to weigh carefully evidence
of prior sexual offenses against the prejudice flowing from
admission of such evidence, and sets forth the relevant factors
governing that weighing process: “ ‘Rather than admit or exclude
every sex offense a defendant commits, trial judges must consider
such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness,
the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of
confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main
inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial
impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending
against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less
prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as
admitting some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses,
or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding
the offense. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th
at pp. 823–824.)
Significantly, Daveggio describes the kind of prejudice that
would merit exclusion of prior sexual offenses evidence under
section 1108: “ ‘ “ ‘ “Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term is
used in a section 352 context, merely because it undermines the
opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent. The
ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant. The code speaks
in terms of undue prejudice. Unless the dangers of undue
prejudice, confusion, or time consumption ‘ “substantially
outweigh” ’ the probative value of relevant evidence, a section 352
objection should fail. [Citation.] ‘ “ The ‘prejudice’ referred to
in . . . section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to
evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual

9
and which has very little effect on the issues. . . .” ’ ’’ ’ ” ’ ‘ “ ‘ “The
prejudice that section 352 ‘ “is designed to avoid is not the
prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from
relevant, highly probative evidence.” [Citations.] “Rather, the
statute uses the word in its etymological sense of ‘prejudging’ a
person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.” ’ ” ’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 824.)
Finally, we review a trial court’s rulings admitting evidence
under section 1108 for abuse of discretion. (Daveggio, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 824.)

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Y.P.’s and G.S.’s testimony because defendant has failed to show prejudice Because section 1108 permits in a sexual offense prosecution, the admission of evidence of prior sexual offenses, the pivotal issue on this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the probative value of Y.P.’s and G.S.’s testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect within the meaning of section 352. Defendant argues the prejudicial nature of Y.P.’s and G.S.’s testimony about the prior incidents exceeded their probative value because the incidents were remote in time, ranging from approximately five to 11 years prior to the charged conduct. Defendant contends admission could also cause the jury to punish defendant in this case for prior conduct that went unpunished as to the prior sexual offenses. Defendant also contends the prior uncharged misconduct “were minimally probative.” Au contraire; Y.P.’s and G.S.’s testimony was highly probative of defendant’s disposition to commit sexual offenses against young female family members. After all, Y.P. and G.S.

10
were his nieces and the two victims in the crimes before us, K.L.
and A.V, were his niece and granddaughter. In sex offenses
cases, prior uncharged conduct is admissible precisely to show
propensity to commit sex offenses. (People v. Falsetta (1999)
21 Cal.4th 903, 907.) The evidence cannot be characterized as
only “minimally probative.”
Y.P.’s and G.S.’s testimony was not prejudicial in the sense
prohibited by section 352, i.e., that it would lead to prejudging
the person based on extraneous factors. (Daveggio, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 824.) Defendant identifies no extraneous factors
in the testimony. The prosecution limited the testimony to two
witnesses describing only two incidents of uncharged conduct,
notwithstanding the prosecution’s pretrial request to admit the
testimony of seven witnesses. Y.P.’s and G.S.’s testimony did not
describe acts more egregious than those described by K.L. and
A.V. The testimony did not consume substantial trial time. In
short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence under section 352 because the evidence was highly
probative and the prejudice flowing from it was merely the
prejudice that “naturally flows” from relevant, highly probative
evidence. (See Daveggio, at p. 824.)
Defendant’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive.
Theoretically, a defendant’s uncharged acts that do not result in
criminal conviction may “increase[ ] the danger that the jury”
may be “inclined to punish defendant for the uncharged offenses,
regardless whether it considered him guilty of the charged
offenses . . . .” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405
(Ewoldt).) Here, the jury was not told whether defendant was
punished for his conduct involving Y.P. and G.S. Defendant’s
premise that the propensity evidence could cause a jury to punish

11
defendant for the prior uncharged crimes in rendering its verdict
in the case involving the charged crimes is thus speculative. In
addition, even where a defendant is not convicted of uncharged
offenses, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting
the uncharged offenses if other factors militate in favor of their
admission. (Ibid. [affirming the admission of uncharged acts to
show a common design or plan].) Defendant admits the “inherent
admissibility of the uncharged misconduct evidence involving
[Y.P.] and [G.S.] under . . . section 1101, subdivision (b).”
Defendant concedes, “[T]he evidence probably met the low
threshold qualifications for showing intent, which requires the
least degree of similarity between the charged and uncharged
misconduct.”
Defendant’s belief that the uncharged incidents were
remote because they occurred five and 11 years prior to the
charged conduct is belied by the case law. Cases have held longer
periods of time between charged and uncharged conduct did not
render the uncharged conduct impermissibly remote. (See
Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 405 [passage of 12 years did not
lessen probative value of evidence]; People v. Waples (2000)
79 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395 [passage of 20 years not remote].)
Finally, defendant’s reliance on People v. Harris (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 727 is misplaced. In Harris, a jury convicted the
defendant, a mental health nurse, of several sex offenses against
a current mental health patient, including licking the patient’s
breasts and rubbing her clitoris, and going to the house of a
recently released former patient and taking off her clothes and
mouthing her breast and vagina. The uncharged conduct
comprised of entering the victim’s apartment when he was the
assistant manager of the apartment complex, beating the victim

12
unconscious, stabbing her in the chest with an ice pick, and using
a sharp instrument to rip muscles in her vagina through her
rectal area. (Id. at pp. 733–734.) The appellate court held,
although evidence of an uncharged sexual offense is admissible
under section 1108, the trial court should have excluded the
evidence under section 352 because the uncharged conduct was
“inflammatory in the extreme” and “described a viciously beaten
and bloody victim . . . .” (Id. at p. 738.) In contrast, the charged
crimes involved the “ ‘taking advantage’ of two emotionally and
physically vulnerable women” and were “of a significantly
different nature and quality than the violent and perverse attack
on a stranger that was described to the jury.” (Ibid.)
In the case before us, the uncharged conduct was not
significantly different from the charged conduct and no more
inflammatory than the charged offenses themselves.

B. Defendant Demonstrates No Prejudicial Error in the
Exclusion of A.L.’s and R.L.’s Testimony
Prior to trial, defendant sought to call K.L.’s two younger
siblings to testify that defendant was not inappropriate with
them. Defense counsel argued the testimony would refute the
section 1108 propensity evidence. The trial court found the
evidence inadmissible and defendant challenges that finding on
appeal.
Assuming arguendo the trial court erred in excluding the
evidence, the error was not prejudicial under either the Chapman
or Watson standard.2 Contrary to defendant’s contention, this
was not a close case. The evidence of defendant’s guilt was

2Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

13
overwhelming. K.L.’s and A.V.’s testimony was unrebutted.
Defendant offered no evidence at trial in his defense.
On appeal, defendant reasserts that K.L.’s siblings’
testimony would have rebutted the propensity evidence. Even if
so, K.L.’s and A.V.’s testimony concerning the charged conduct
was undisputed. Defendant argues K.L. and A.V. lacked
credibility because no one else in the house observed the abuse.
This argument ignores the undisputed expert testimony that
sexual abuse of children typically occurs when there are no
witnesses. Defendant argues he never admitted the abuse in his
calls with A.V.’s mother. It is debatable whether defendant’s
apology for his “mistakes” in his voicemail to A.V.’s mother was
tantamount to an admission. Assuming arguendo it was not, the
absence of an admission does not undermine the undisputed
nature of the evidence against defendant. Finally, defendant
argues he could have stayed in Mexico if he were guilty. There
was no evidence why he went to Mexico in the first place, or why
he returned. Defendant’s purported inference is thus mere
argument absent some evidence to create the inference defendant
asks us to make. In sum, defendant fails to show prejudice even
if the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of K.L.’s
siblings.

C. The Parties Agree Defendant’s Presentence Custody
Credits Must Be Corrected
Defendant argues, and respondent agrees, defendant was
entitled to 1,021 days of presentence custody credits and the trial
court erroneously awarded only 1,016 days. We agree as well.
Penal Code section 2900.5 provides, “[A]ll days of custody of the
defendant . . . shall be credited upon his or her term of
imprisonment . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 2900.5, subd. (a).) Defendant

14
was in custody for 1,021 days. He was arrested on January 21,
2022 and sentenced on November 6, 2024.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting 1,021 days of
custody credits and to forward the amended abstract of judgment
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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