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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Martinez CA2/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B337700

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/13/26 P. v. Martinez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337700

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA061436)
v.

SANTIAGO MARTINEZ, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Judith Levey Meyer, Judge. Reversed.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Charles Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

This appeal follows defendant Santiago Martinez, Jr.’s
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1
Defendant argues and we agree the trial court abused its
discretion in denying him a continuance to obtain documents
from the California Department of Corrections (CDCR). We
conclude that the error prejudiced defendant because the trial
court lacked potential information relevant to exercising its
discretion. Additionally, the record does not show that when it
denied the requested continuance, the court understood the full
scope of its discretion. We reverse the judgment and remand for
a new resentencing hearing.

BACKGROUND
In 2005, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder
and found that in the commission of the murder, he used and
discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). The jury also found true a
dangerous weapon allegation under section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1), and defendant admitted two prior felony
convictions under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The record on
appeal does not include the background facts describing the
murder.2
The original trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to
life for the murder and an additional 25 years for the personal

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 Although the parties on appeal refer to the opinion from
defendant’s appeal from the judgment of conviction (People v.
Martinez (Mar. 22, 2006, B181429) [nonpub. opn.]), the opinion is
not included in the record and it does not appear the trial court
considered it.

2
discharge of a firearm enhancement. The original trial court also
sentenced defendant to one year for a section 12022, subdivision
(b) enhancement and one year for a section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement. The parties agree defendant’s case was set for
resentencing because he had a prior prison term enhancement
that was no longer valid in his case.
On March 15, 2023, the resentencing trial court appointed
counsel for the resentencing. The resentencing trial court
scheduled the resentencing for May 10, 2023. On May 10, 2023,
the court continued the hearing because defendant wanted to be
present. The court subsequently continued the hearing to
November 3, 2023, and then continued it to December 18, 2023.
On December 18, 2023, defendant did not appear because he was
a “miss-out,” and the court continued the hearing to December
27, 2023.
On December 27, 2023, the court denied defendant’s
Marsden3 motion. After the court denied defendant’s request for
new counsel, defendant asked, “Can you entertain the idea of
going pro per?” Defendant stated, “I would like to go pro per at
this point” and the court responded, “Okay. Let me get the form.”
The court reviewed the form with defendant and informed him he
would not have a “backup” or “extra attorney.” Defendant asked,
“Even if I ask for co-counsel, it’s denied?” After an additional
discussion about law library privileges, the court denied
defendant’s motion to represent himself.
The court continued the resentencing hearing to
January 30, 2024. On January 30, 2024, the court continued the

3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

3
resentencing hearing to March 14, 2024 and then advanced it to
March 12, 2024.

March 12, 2024 Hearing
At the March 12 hearing, defendant’s counsel requested the
court continue the resentencing hearing because counsel was
unable to obtain all of defendant’s records from the CDCR.
Counsel represented that the CDCR did not release the
documents because they were HIPAA protected. The court
responded: “Murder is murder. I am not going to give probation
on a murder. So it’s 25 to life no matter what on the underlying
murder. The only discretion the court will have is whether I
strike the additional 25-to-life [gun] allegation. I disagree
whether a bunch of factors — health related, or whatever factors
go into that.” Defense counsel requested additional time to
review defendant’s “post conviction behavior.” The court denied
the continuance. After confirming that defendant was a death
row inmate, the court stated, “I am not going to house a death
row inmate in county jail.” The court permitted defense counsel
15 minutes “to get ready” and defense counsel indicated she could
not be ready in 15 minutes. The court also reminded defense
counsel she did not file a written motion to continue, and defense
counsel responded the court previously had not required a
written motion.
Before starting the resentencing hearing, the court heard
defendant’s renewed Marsden motion. In the course of the
Marsden motion, defense counsel indicated she had requested
defendant’s records from the CDCR in May 2023 and did not
receive them until December 2023. In February 2023, counsel
requested additional records because the CDCR had not produced
all of defendant’s records. Counsel reported she consulted with

4
the Mexican counsel, the Mexican American Capitol Defense
Association, two capitol attorneys, appellate counsel on
defendant’s death penalty case, and defendant’s prior appellate
attorney. The court denied defendant’s Marsden motion.
Defendant stated, “If I decide to go pro per, I will need a little bit
extra time [sic]” and the court responded, “That will be denied.”
When the prosecutor returned to the courtroom, the
resentencing trial court explained: “This case is extremely
simple, as it appears to me. You got 51 to life. You got a first
degree murder with a [25]-to-life charge. And a stupid one-year
prior. And because of the stupid one-year prior . . . this whole
case is getting reopened, which is absolutely ridiculous to this
court. But that’s the case. There is nothing complicated about
it.” The court continued: “So what on earth is complicated? [¶] I
understand there may be post sentencing factors that can . . .
come into play. But even that is not complicated. This HIPAA
stuff after all could have been stuff that you told your attorney
for the last year and four months since she’s had the case. [¶]
She doesn’t need CDCR records for that. It’s all stuff that you
could have said . . . . [s]o at the last minute now getting these
records involved and HIPAA I find is disingenuous and is just
really not grounds for a continuance at this point in time.”
Defense counsel responded that CDCR records were important in
arguing for resentencing.
The prosecutor indicated defendant’s sentence was 52 years
to life, not 51 as represented but the court. The prosecutor
did not oppose the continuance request.
The court found defendant “understands aspects of his own
defense” and “he knows darn well what he should have told you
[defense counsel] and what he shouldn’t have.” The court

5
repeated, “I don’t think this is a complicated case,” and
continued, “I think it just needs to get done and then he can move
on with his death penalty case.”
Defense counsel reiterated that she was not prepared to
argue the resentencing and the court responded, “I am deeming
you prepared. So either answer up or say submitted, and then
that can go to the appellate court.” With respect to the merits,
the prosecutor advocated for imposing the 25 year to life gun
enhancement. The prosecutor argued the crime was a “vicious,
brutal killing.” The prosecutor argued, “[T]here is nothing before
this court to give consideration to reducing or striking” the gun
enhancement.
The court resentenced defendant to 50 years to life. The
court struck the section 12022, subdivision (b) enhancement and
the 667.5, subdivision (b) priors. The court did not state any
reasons for its choices. The court entered a new judgment
reflecting the 50-year-to-life sentence.

DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the resentencing trial court abused its
discretion in denying his counsel’s request for a continuance of
the March 12, 2024 resentencing hearing. Respondent argues the
court’s denial of a continuance was “reasonable . . . given that
counsel had ample time and opportunity to prepare for the
resentencing hearing.” We agree with defendant. Because we
reverse the judgment and order a new resentencing hearing, we
do not consider defendant’s remaining arguments.4

4 Defendant argues the trial court should have granted his
request to represent himself. Defendant also contends the trial

6
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides: “Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (Pen. Code,
§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) provides:
“The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” Where defendant’s original sentence included
a now-invalid sentencing enhancement the resentencing court
must provide a full resentencing hearing. (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
We review a trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118.)
“In reviewing the decision to deny a continuance, ‘[o]ne factor to
consider is whether a continuance would be useful. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Here, a continuance was merited because it
would have allowed defense counsel to obtain potential evidence
relevant to resentencing from the CDCR. The People did not
oppose the requested continuance. The burden of a continuance
was minimal because there would have been no need to

court abused its discretion in resentencing him to 25 years for the
firearm enhancement.

7
reschedule witnesses or consider juror inconvenience. (People v.
Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 829, 839–840.) We do not agree
with respondent that counsel had “ample time and opportunity to
prepare for the resentencing hearing.” Counsel had not received
the requested documents relevant to postconviction factors set
forth in section 1172.75, subdivision (d). Although a trial court
would have been required only to consider this evidence in
exercising its discretion whether to strike or reduce the firearm
enhancement,5 the evidence was still relevant to the court‘s
consideration of whether to strike or reduce the enhancement.
We also do not agree with respondent that defense counsel
had to explain with more specificity why she needed more time in
light of her request for additional documents from CDCR that she
had not yet received. Contrary to respondent’s suggestion,
defense counsel could not be expected to vouch for the relevancy
of documents she had not yet received from the CDCR. There
was nothing speculative about counsel’s request for a
continuance.
Defendant cites People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 in
support of arguments that defendant’s reasons for the
continuance request were speculative and any error in the
denying the request was harmless. In Doolin, the defendant
requested a continuance of the penalty phase in a death case,
inter alia, to retest DNA evidence and interview potential
character witnesses. (Id. at p. 450.) The high court concluded

5 As noted earlier in this Discussion, section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(3) provides that a court “may” consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated.” (Italics added.)

8
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a
continuance to retest the DNA evidence “because the remaining
evidence pointed convincingly to defendant’s guilt” and
defendant’s request for a continuance was untimely and “unlikely
to affect the outcome of the proceedings.” (Id. at p. 451.) As to
the potential character witnesses, the high court observed,
inter alia, the defendant failed to explain why counsel could not
interview these witnesses during the six days leading up to the
penalty phase trial and his defense team was “aware” of these
witnesses and whether they would have been a source for
potential information on child abuse mitigating circumstances.
(Ibid.) Under these circumstances, “defendant’s vague and
speculative reasons for the continuance failed to support a
showing of good cause.” (Ibid.) For the reasons set forth above,
the facts before us are a far cry from those in Doolin and do not
support that defendant’s expressed need for the continuance was
speculative.
We also do not agree that the denial of a continuance was
harmless. The record does not indicate the court understood the
extent of its discretion when it denied the continuance. For
example, the court incorrectly stated, “The only discretion the
court will have is whether I strike the additional 25-to-life [gun]
allegation” when the court had discretion to reduce the 25-year-
term to impose a lesser included enhancement. (People v.
McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020–1021, 1030 [trial court
has discretion to strike enhancement and impose lesser included
§ 12022.53 enhancement or other lesser included enhancement].)
As further indication of prejudice, we note the prosecutor
capitalized on the CDCR’s delay in providing documents by
arguing, “[T]here is nothing before this court to give

9
consideration to reducing or striking” the enhancement.
Although respondent asserts the trial court could have relied on
the “extreme violence of appellant’s crime and the way he used
the firearm to commit murder,” the record does not contain a
recitation of facts of the offense, and the trial court did not rely on
any fact related to the offense, even though the prosecutor
emphasized the brutality of defendant’s crime. Instead, the court
recited defendant should “move on” with his death penalty case.
We recognize that section 1050, subdivision (b) generally
requires a written motion to request a continuance and that
section 1050, subdivision (c) states, “Notwithstanding
subdivision (b), a party may make a motion for a continuance
without complying with the requirements of that subdivision”
albeit absent a showing good cause, sanctions may be imposed.
No party relies on section 1050 on appeal and we therefore do not
consider it further.
Finally, defendant requests this court remand the case to a
different judge. According to him, the court exercised its
sentencing discretion “based on its view that it shouldn’t have
been asked to do [a full resentencing] when all it should have to
do is strike the now-unlawful one-year enhancement.” Although
we conclude that the trial court was not fond of the resentencing
statute, the record does not support defendant’s view that the
court was unwilling to apply the law. We, however, caution trial
courts from making intemperate remarks that could be
misunderstood. We express no opinion on how the trial court
should exercise its discretion upon remand.

10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for a new
resentencing hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.

11