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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Karolina Richardson v. Mr. Pleasant Square Associates

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2022-001208

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.4K)

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Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Karolina Richardson and Krista Richardson,
Respondents,

v.

Mt. Pleasant Square Associates, II, LLC d/b/a Oyster
Park Apartments, Dewberry Capital Corporation, and
GREP Southeast, LLC, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001208

Appeal From Charleston County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-106
Heard October 6, 2025 – Filed March 4, 2026

AFFIRMED

Jeffrey A. Ross, of Ross & Cristaldi, LLC, of Mount
Pleasant; Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann Law
Firm, P.A., of Columbia; and Emily Christine Sheets, of
Copeland, Stair, Valz & Lovell, LLP, of Charleston, all
for Appellants.

Clayton B. McCullough, of McCullough Khan, LLC, of
Mount Pleasant, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Mt. Pleasant Square Associates, II, LLC d/b/a Oyster Park
Apartments (Mt. Pleasant Square), Dewberry Capital Corporation (Dewberry), and
GREP Southeast, LLC (GREP; collectively, the Appellants) appeal the judgment
and jury verdict against them as well as the trial court's orders (1) denying their
motions for directed verdict and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV); (2) granting Respondents Karolina Richardson and Krista Richardson's
motion for sanctions; and (3) denying Appellants' motion to alter or amend and/or
motion to reconsider. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Oyster Park Apartments (Oyster Park) is an apartment complex located in Mt.
Pleasant, South Carolina. Respondents moved into Oyster Park unit 104 in May
2017 and shortly after moved to unit 101 because the first unit flooded from rain.
After complaints to management about "black mold" in unit 101 and consequential
physical symptoms, Oyster Park management moved Respondents to unit 102.
Respondents moved out of Oyster Park in September 2017.

Respondents filed a complaint against Appellants, alleging Appellants breached
their duties under the South Carolina Residential Landlord Tenant Act (RLTA) by
representing the apartment was free of mold and failing to remediate the mold.
Respondents also filed a motion for sanctions and striking of Appellants' pleadings,
asserting Respondents received additional discovery just prior to trial. The trial
court declined to strike Appellants' pleadings but awarded sanctions in the form of
attorney's fees.

The parties proceeded to trial in July 2022. Appellants moved for a directed
verdict on their claims pursuant to the RLTA, and the trial court denied the
motions. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondents with a combined
award of $1 million.

Appellants filed a motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial, arguing that
Respondents presented no evidence to support their negligence claim. The trial
court denied the motion as well as Appellants' subsequent motion to alter or amend
and/or motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. This appeal followed.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the trial court err in denying Appellants' motions for a directed verdict and
JNOV on Respondents' negligence claim brought pursuant to the RLTA?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that Appellants committed a
discovery violation and in awarding sanctions?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried by a jury, [appellate courts] may only
correct errors of law." Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp., 387 S.C. 22, 36,
691 S.E.2d 135, 142 (2010). "The factual findings of the jury will not be disturbed
unless no evidence reasonably supports the jury's findings." Id. at 37, 691 S.E.2d
at 142.

"The imposition of sanctions is generally entrusted to the sound discretion of the
trial [court]." Barnette v. Adams Bros. Logging, 355 S.C. 588, 593, 586 S.E.2d
572, 575 (2003). "A trial [court]'s exercise of [this] discretionary power[] with
respect to sanctions imposed in discovery matters will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion." Id. "An abuse of discretion may be found by
[an appellate court] where the appellant shows that the decision of the trial [court]
was without reasonable factual support and resulted in prejudice to the appellant,
thereby amounting to an error of law." Halverson v. Yawn, 328 S.C. 618, 621, 493
S.E.2d 883, 884 (Ct. App. 1997). "The burden is on the party appealing from the
order to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion." Barnette, 355 S.C. at
593, 586 S.E.2d at 575.
LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Directed Verdict and JNOV

Appellants argue the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict
and JNOV because there is no evidence in the record to support the jury's finding
that Appellants violated the RLTA. We affirm.

"In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, a court must view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."
Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 476, 514 S.E.2d
126, 130 (1999). "When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict
in favor of the moving party is proper." Id. "The trial court can only be reversed
by [an appellate court] when there is not evidence to support the ruling below." Id.
at 476–77, 514 S.E.2d at 130. "A motion for JNOV may be granted only if no
reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict." Welch v. Epstein, 342
S.C. 279, 300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 419 (Ct. App. 2000). "The jury's verdict will not be
overturned if any evidence exists that sustains the factual findings implicit in its
decision." Id. "When considering directed verdict and JNOV motions, neither the
trial court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to
resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence." Id.

"The principal statute which creates a cause of action [under the RLTA] is
[s]ection 27-40-440 . . . ." Watson v. Sellers, 299 S.C. 426, 435, 385 S.E.2d 369,
374 (Ct. App. 1989). This statute "is in derogation of common law and,
therefore, . . . should be strictly construed . . . ." Id. at 433, 385 S.E.2d at 373.
Section 27-40-440 of the South Carolina Code (2007) provides:

(a) A landlord shall: (1) comply with the requirements of
applicable building and housing codes materially
affecting health and safety; (2) make all repairs and do
whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition; (3) keep all
common areas of the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, and, for premises containing more than four
dwelling units, keep in a reasonably safe condition; (4)
make available running water and reasonable amounts of
hot water at all times and reasonable heat . . . (5)
maintain in reasonably good and safe working order and
condition all electrical, gas, plumbing, sanitary, heating,
ventilating, air conditioning, and other facilities and
appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be
supplied by him. . . . (b) If any duty imposed by
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) is greater than any duty
imposed by any other paragraph of that subsection, the
landlord's duty must be determined by reference to
paragraph (1) of subsection (a).
In negligence actions pursuant to the RLTA, a "plaintiff must establish (1) a duty
of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a
negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting from the breach."
Pryor v. Nw. Apartments, Ltd., 321 S.C. 524, 528, 469 S.E.2d 630, 632–33 (Ct.
App. 1996).
We hold there is evidence in the record to support the jury's finding that Appellants
breached the RLTA.1 Appellants had duties pursuant to the RLTA to maintain the
premises and make repairs. See § 27-40-440(a)(1)–(5) (stating various duties owed
by landlords to tenants). While the evidence indicates Appellants worked to
remediate Respondents' mold issue, there was some conflict and lack of clarity in
trial testimony regarding how long management was aware of leaks at Oyster Park
and their effect on Respondents' unit. See Welch, 342 S.C. at 300, 536 S.E.2d at
419 ("When considering directed verdict and JNOV motions, neither the trial court
nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve
conflicts in the testimony or evidence."). Further, we find the evidence lends itself
to an inference that, at face value, Appellants failed to keep the premises in a fit
and habitable condition based on the mold in Respondents' unit. See
§ 27-40-440(a)(2) (requiring the landlord to "make all repairs and do whatever is
reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable
condition"). As such, we hold the trial court did not err by denying Appellants'
motions for a directed verdict and JNOV. See Swinton Creek Nursery, 334 S.C. at
476, 514 S.E.2d at 130 ("In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, a court must
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party."); id. at 476–77, 514 S.E.2d at 130 ("The trial court can only be
reversed by [an appellate court] when there is not evidence to support the ruling
below."); Welch, 342 S.C. at 300, 536 S.E.2d at 419 ("A motion for JNOV may be
granted only if no reasonable jury could have reached the challenged verdict."); id.

1
We acknowledge Appellants' argument that the trial court erred in failing to direct
a verdict on subsections (1) and (4) of section 27-40-440(a); however, we find
Appellants' arguments in this regard are not preserved for our review as they were
either not ruled on by the trial court or were raised for the first time in Appellants'
motion for JNOV. See RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P., 399 S.C. 322,
331, 732 S.E.2d 166, 170–71 (2012) ("[O]nly the grounds raised in the directed
verdict motion may properly be reasserted in a JNOV motion."); Wilder Corp. v.
Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("[I]t is axiomatic that an issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.").
("The jury's verdict will not be overturned if any evidence exists that sustains the
factual findings implicit in its decision.").2,3

II. Discovery Violation and Sanctions
Appellants argue the trial court abused its discretion in finding they committed a
discovery violation and in awarding sanctions. They contend Respondents
presented no evidence to support their argument that the information produced just
before trial included additional evidence not previously produced. Appellants
further assert the trial court failed to properly weigh or make specific findings on
the factors applicable to its sanctions award. Finally, they argue the trial court
erred by factoring in paralegal fees in its sanctions award. We affirm.

"Under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), SCRCP, when a party fails to comply with a discovery
order, the trial court has the discretion to impose a sanction it deems just . . . ."
McNair v. Fairfield County, 379 S.C. 462, 465, 665 S.E.2d 830, 832 (Ct. App.
2008). "In determining the appropriateness of a sanction, the court should consider
such factors as the precise nature of the discovery and the discovery posture of the
case, willfulness, and degree of prejudice." Id. at 467, 665 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting
Griffin Grading & Clearing, Inc. v Tire Serv. Equip. Mfg. Co., 334 S.C. 193, 199,
511 S.E.2d 716, 719 (Ct. App. 1999)).

2
We acknowledge the following arguments from Appellants: (1) the RLTA
requires written notice to a landlord; (2) Appellants properly remediated
Respondents' mold problem in compliance with the RLTA; (3) the trial court erred
in considering testimony from another Oyster Park tenant; and (4) much of the
evidence presented at trial was unrelated to the negligence claim under the RLTA.
However, these arguments have either been raised for the first time on appeal or
have not been ruled on by the trial court. Therefore, we find they are unpreserved
for our review. See Wilder Corp., 330 S.C. at 76, 497 S.E.2d at 733 ("[I]t is
axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate
review.").
3
To the extent Appellants argue the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the
entirety of section 27-40-440(a), we note that neither party objected to the jury
charge at trial; therefore, we find any argument in this regard is not preserved. See
Rule 51, SCRCP ("No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction [to the jury] unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider
its verdict . . . .").
We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing sanctions based on
Appellants' failure to produce discoverable information until the eve of trial. See
Barnette, 355 S.C. at 593, 586 S.E.2d at 575 ("A trial [court]'s exercise of [this]
discretionary power[] with respect to sanctions imposed in discovery matters will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion."). Appellants did not
dispute that they produced notebooks containing discoverable information on the
eve of trial. Regardless of whether these notebooks contained completely new
information, we find this violated the trial court's order compelling Appellants to
produce discovery.
We acknowledge Appellants' argument that the trial court failed to exercise
discretion because it did not make specific findings of fact on the factors applicable
to a sanctions award. However, we hold the trial court clearly exercised its
discretion in determining whether to award sanctions, specifically citing the
applicable factors. See McNair, 379 S.C. at 465, 665 S.E.2d at 832 (stating factors
a court should consider in determining the appropriateness of a sanction (quoting
Griffin Grading & Clearing, Inc., 334 S.C. at 199, 511 S.E.2d at 719)).
Finally, we hold the trial court did not err by including paralegal fees in its
sanctions award. Brawley v. Richland County, 445 S.C. 80, 99, 911 S.E.2d 156,
166 (Ct. App. 2025). This court recently held that "a circuit court may include
paralegal and support-staff fees in a computation of reasonable fees and costs so
long as they are billed at appropriate and reasonable rates and that the tasks
involved contribute[d] to the litigation." Brawley v. Richland County, 445 S.C. 80,
100, 911 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ct. App. 2025). In so doing, this court noted "several
South Carolina cases upholding the inclusion of paralegal fees within reasonable
fee awards" as early as 1995. Id. at 99, 911 S.E.2d at 166. We find no error in the
trial court's inclusion of paralegal fees in the sanctions award. 4

4
We acknowledge Appellants' argument that the affidavit of Clayton McCullough
and supporting exhibits were not part of the trial record and therefore improperly
considered by the court. However, the trial court indicated the affidavit was before
the lower court because it expressly referenced it in ruling on the motion for
sanctions. Additionally, Appellants raise the specific argument that the absence of
McCullough's affidavit indicates there was no evidentiary basis for the trial court's
award for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we find this argument is not
preserved for our review. See Wilder Corp., 330 S.C. at 76, 497 S.E.2d at 733
("[I]t is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but
must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for
appellate review.").
Based on the foregoing, the orders of the circuit court are

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.