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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Keith R. Byrd v. Rebecca M. Byrd

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2023-000594

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Keith Renado Byrd, Appellant,

v.

Rebecca Mitchell Byrd, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000594

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Michelle M. Hurley, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-113
Submitted February 18, 2026 – Filed March 11, 2026

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Glenn Walters, Sr., of Glenn Walters & Associates, PA,
of Orangeburg; and Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville,
both for Appellant.

Charles Thomas Brooks, III, of Law Office of Charles T.
Brooks, III, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Keith Renado Byrd (Husband) appeals the family court's final
order in a divorce action he filed against Rebecca Mitchell Byrd (Wife) seeking
additional relief, including equitable distribution of marital property. On appeal,
Husband argues the family court erred in its determination of equitable distribution
by failing to (1) identify marital and separate property and (2) assign values to the
assets and debts of the marital estate. Consequently, he contends the family court
erred in failing to recognize the marital residence was his separate property and
awarding it to Wife. Additionally, Husband avers the family court erred in
awarding Wife attorney's fees when he was "falsely accused" of being
uncooperative during litigation, and the award of attorney's fees to Wife was only
justified by the erroneous award of the marital residence to Wife. We reverse and
remand this matter to the family court for further proceedings pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR.

As to whether the family court erred in its equitable distribution award, we hold the
family court failed to make requisite findings distinguishing marital property from
nonmarital property and identifying the fair market value of the marital property.
See Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate
courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and
procedural rulings."); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-620 (B) (2019) (requiring the family
court to "give weight in such proportion as it finds appropriate" to fifteen factors in
apportioning marital property, including "the value of the marital property," "the
nonmarital property of each spouse," and "liens and any other encumbrances upon
the marital property, which themselves must be equitably divided . . . and any other
existing debts incurred by the parties or either of them during the course of the
marriage"); Buist v. Buist, 399 S.C. 110, 118, 730 S.E.2d 879, 883 (Ct. App. 2012)
("Utilizing [the] fifteen factors [set forth in § 20-3-620(B)], the family court must:
(1) identify the marital property to be divided between the parties; (2) determine
the fair market value of the property; (3) apportion the marital estate according to
the contributions, both direct and indirect, of each party to the acquisition of the
property during the marriage, their respective assets and incomes, and any special
equities they may have in marital assets; and (4) provide for an equitable division
of the marital estate, including the manner in which the distribution is to take
place."), aff'd as modified, 410 S.C. 569, 766 S.E.2d 381 (2014); Wooten v.
Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 546, 615 S.E.2d 98, 105 (2005) ("Marital debt, like marital
property, must be specifically identified and apportioned in equitable
distribution."); Buist, 399 S.C. at 118, 730 S.E.2d at 883 (reversing the family
court's distribution of marital property and remanding the issue when the family
court "did not identify all the parties' marital property, but instead selectively
divided certain real and personal property without determining the fair market
value of all the property"). Here, in our review of the family court's order and the
record on appeal, we find the family court failed to make appropriate findings as to
whether the marital residence was marital property, whether several loans acquired
during the marriage constituted marital debt, the fair market value of all marital
property, and the parties' contributions to the acquisition of the marital property.
Because the family court's order and the record on appeal do not identify the value
of the marital estate, this court is unable to determine the fairness of the overall
equitable distribution of the marital estate on appeal. See Smith v. Smith, 425 S.C.
119, 139, 819 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Ct. App. 2018) ("The ultimate goal of [equitable]
apportionment is to divide the marital estate, as a whole, in a manner that fairly
reflects each spouse's contribution to the economic partnership and also the effect
on each of the parties of ending that partnership." (alteration in original) (quoting
King v. King, 384 S.C. 134, 143, 681 S.E.2d 609, 614 (Ct. App. 2009))).
Therefore, we reverse the family court's order regarding equitable distribution of
the marital estate and remand to the family court to (1) determine whether the
marital residence was marital property, whether the loans acquired during the
marriage constituted marital debt, the fair market value of all marital property, and
the parties' contributions to the acquisition of the marital property; and (2) fairly
apportion the marital estate.

We remand the issue of attorney's fees to the family court, as we are constrained to
do based upon our reversal of the equitable distribution award. See Crossland v.
Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 460, 759 S.E.2d 419, 428 (2014) ("Where beneficial
results in a divorce action are reversed on appeal, the case should be remanded for
reconsideration of attorney's fees awarded.").

REVERSED AND REMANDED.1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.