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March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Arlene Gariepy v. Midgard Self Storage Seneca SC, LLC

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2024-001841

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Arlene Gariepy, Lee Gariepy, Kimberlee Elliott and
Noah Gariepy, Respondents,

v.

Midgard Self Storage Seneca SC, LLC and Reliant Real
Estate Management, LLC, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2024-001841

Appeal From Oconee County
R. Scott Sprouse, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-111
Submitted February 3, 2026 – Filed March 11, 2026

AFFIRMED

Brett Harris Bayne and Samantha Ann Sanders Owen,
both of McAngus Goudelock & Courie, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Matthew Thomas Reitz, of Uricchio Howe Krell
Jacobson Toporek Theos & Keith, PA, of Charleston, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Midgard Self Storage Seneca SC, LLC, and Reliant Real Estate
Management, LLC (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order
denying their motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, Appellants argue the
circuit court erred in denying their motion because it improperly found Appellants
waived their right to arbitration. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the circuit court did not err in denying Appellants' motion to compel
arbitration because Appellants waived their right to arbitrate. In their answer,
Appellants initially requested a jury trial; over three hundred days elapsed between
when Respondents initiated litigation and when Appellants filed their motion to
compel arbitration; and Appellants participated in extensive written discovery and
depositions, which prejudiced Respondents. See Rhodes v. Benson
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 374 S.C. 122, 125-26, 647 S.E.2d 249, 250-51 (Ct. App.
2007) ("[D]etermining whether a party waived its right to arbitrate is a legal
conclusion subject to de novo review; nevertheless, the circuit [court]'s factual
findings underlying that conclusion will not be overruled if there is any evidence
reasonably supporting them." (first alteration in original) (quoting Liberty Builders,
Inc. v. Horton, 336 S.C. 658, 664-65, 521 S.E.2d 749, 753 (Ct. App. 1999))); id. at
126, 647 S.E.2d at 251 ("The right to enforce an arbitration clause . . . may be
waived."); id. ("In order to establish a waiver, a party must show prejudice through
an undue burden caused by delay in demanding arbitration." (quoting Liberty
Builders, 336 S.C. at 665, 521 S.E.2d at 753)); id. ("Generally, the factors our
courts consider to determine if a party waived its right to compel arbitration are:
(1) whether a substantial length of time transpired between the commencement of
the action and the commencement of the motion to compel arbitration; (2) whether
the party requesting arbitration engaged in extensive discovery before moving to
compel arbitration; and (3) whether the non-moving party was prejudiced by the
delay in seeking arbitration. These factors, of course, are not mutually exclusive,
as one factor may be inextricably connected to, and influenced by, the others."); id.
("What is 'a substantial length of time' . . . depend[s] on the extent of discovery
conducted and the corresponding presence or absence of prejudice to the party
opposing arbitration."); id. at 127, 647 S.E.2d at 251 ("[I]f the parties conduct little
or no discovery, then the party seeking arbitration has not taken 'advantage of the
judicial system,' prejudice will likely not exist, and the law would favor
arbitration[; however,] if the parties conduct significant discovery, then the party
seeking arbitration has taken 'advantage of the judicial system,' prejudice will
likely exist, and the law would disfavor arbitration."); id. at 128, 647 S.E.2d at 252
(finding "a direct nexus to the presence and degree of prejudice" was sustained by
the plaintiff because the parties exchanged written interrogatories and requests to
produce and took five depositions).

AFFIRMED.1

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.