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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

J.R., Etc. v. Township of Long Hill Board of Education

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1491-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (26.2K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1491-24

J.R.,1 on behalf of minor child, T.R.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF LONG HILL
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
MORRIS COUNTY, and
MICHAEL VITURELLO,
Principal,

Respondents-Respondents.

---

Submitted February 25, 2026 – Decided March 13, 2026

Before Judges Currier and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of
Education, Docket No. 78-4/22.

Oleske & Oleske, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Kristen
D. Oleske, on the briefs).

1
We use initials to protect the privacy interests of petitioner, the parent of a
student enrolled in a New Jersey public school. See N.J.A.C. 6A:32-7.5(a); New
Jersey Pupil Records Act, N.J.S.A. 18A:36-19; see also R. 1:38-3(a)(1).
The Busch Law Group, LLC, attorneys for respondents
Long Hill Board of Education and Michael Viturello
(Douglas M. Silvestro, on the brief).

Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Commissioner of Education (Luke D.
Hertzel-Lagonikos, Deputy Attorney General, on the
statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

Petitioner J.R., on behalf of her minor child, T.R., appeals from the final

agency decision of the Commissioner of Education (Commissioner), which

upheld the determination of the Township of Long Hill Board of Education (the

Board) finding T.R. committed an act of harassment, intimidation, or bullying

(HIB) based on messages he sent to a Snapchat group containing demeaning

comments about a fellow student. The Commissioner adopted the

Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision, which found the conduct satisfied

the statutory definition of HIB pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.

We affirm the Commissioner's decision. The record contains substantial

and credible evidence supporting the determination T.R.'s conduct met the

statutory criteria for HIB.

I.

During the relevant period, T.R. was an eighth-grade student at Central

Middle School (CMS) in the Long Hill Township School District (the District).

A-1491-24
2
Michael Viturello had served as CMS principal for seven years. Melissa Backer,

an assistant principal with the District since 2016, also served as the anti -

bullying specialist for all three District schools, including CMS.

On November 10, 2021, a CMS student, Jane, 2 shared a Snapchat thread

with Viturello after first reporting the matter to the school counselor. The thread

included multiple CMS students, including T.R., making demeaning comments

about another CMS student, Susan.

The comments, including those made by T.R., were vulgar and targeted

Susan's appearance, weight, and sexual orientation. Viturello testified Jane was

concerned about the comments that were being made about Susan. The

comments made by T.R., with some minor exceptions, were generally directed

at Susan, and he was aware the other participants were referring to her. Susan

was not included in the November 9, 2021 Snapchat thread. The thread included

CMS students as well as students from middle schools in nearby towns outside

the District.

On the afternoon of November 10, 2021, Viturello contacted Susan's

parents to make them aware. He spoke with Susan's mother, who already knew

2
Fictitious names are used to identify the student reporter (Jane) and the victim
(Susan).
A-1491-24
3
comments had been made about her daughter and was "very concerned[.]" She

reported Susan was "self-conscious" and "anxious" about the comments.

Jane, who initially reported the incident to CMS staff, expressed fear of

retaliation from classmates for informing school staff about the Snapchat thread.

The day after making her report, Jane's parents signed her out of school, and she

was homeschooled for the remainder of the school year. Viturello also spoke

with Jane's mother, who indicated her intent to withdraw Jane from school as a

result of the Snapchat incident.

On November 11, 2021, Viturello met with all CMS students, including

T.R., who had made negative comments about Susan. During the meeting, T.R.

admitted making the statements attributed to him, though he indicated he did not

remember some of them.

The CMS Student Manual and Code of Conduct set forth in detail the

behavior expected of CMS students. After an initial review, Viturello

determined T.R. had, at a minimum, violated Section 2 (Behavior) by failing to:

(a) "[m]ake appropriate decisions" and (b) "[c]ommunicate with others in a

positive manner without teasing, name calling, or profanity." He also

determined T.R. violated Section 3 (Respect) by failing to "[b]e respectful of

different cultures, religions, ethnic and racial groups, gender identities and

A-1491-24
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sexual orientations, and physical and mental differences." As a result, Viturello

imposed a six-day out-of-school suspension (OSS) on T.R. and other students

involved in the Snapchat thread and initiated an HIB investigation.

The following day, T.R.'s mother notified school staff she was afraid to

leave T.R. alone that morning as he had exhibited suicidal ideation in prior

years. In response, Backer, the school counselor, and the school social worker

made a home visit. They conducted a risk assessment and wellness visit of T.R.,

and he was cleared to return to school after the evaluation.

The HIB investigation was conducted by Viturello and Backer. Backer

interviewed Susan the day after the incident was reported. Susan was aware of

the Snapchat thread's substance and indicated a friend informed her of its

contents. Backer testified Susan was "clearly very upset, she was crying, she

expressed concern about going to the high school because these students had

been previously making fun of her from our District and another district and she

was embarrassed." Susan also stated "she avoids going to certain areas because

she doesn't want to be around" those students. Susan received counseling from

the District for the remainder of the year. Following the interview with Susan,

Backer and Viturello interviewed witnesses and alleged offenders.

A-1491-24
5
The HIB investigation was completed on November 19, 2021. Backer

concluded T.R.'s conduct constituted HIB under Board policy and state law. She

completed an investigation report form in which she checked the boxes finding

T.R.'s behavior met the listed HIB criteria. As Viturello had already imposed a

six-day OSS on T.R. for the Code of Conduct violations, Backer recommended

additional remedial measures, including meeting with a school counselor, a

reflective writing assignment, and an in-home risk assessment supplemented by

an additional parent meeting. Viturello approved the HIB investigation report

without modification and forwarded it to the then-Superintendent of Schools,

who approved the report without modification. Petitioner requested a Board

hearing. At the Board hearing, the Board agreed with the recommendation of

the Superintendent and upheld the determination T.R. had committed an act of

HIB.

Petitioner then filed a petition of appeal with the Commissioner. The

matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, where it was filed

for determination as a contested case. After two days of hearings, the ALJ issued

an initial decision on October 28, 2024, upholding the HIB finding and

suspension, which the Commissioner adopted as the final agency decision on

December 9, 2024. This appeal followed.

A-1491-24
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II.

"[A]n appellate court reviews agency decisions under an arbitrary and

capricious standard." Zimmerman v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237

N.J. 465, 475 (2019). "An agency's determination on the merits 'will be

sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone v. Bd. of Trs.,

Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of

Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)). To determine

whether an agency's action meets this standard, appellate courts consider the

following:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which
the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Allstars Auto. Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).]

The framework for adjudicating HIB allegations is set forth in the Anti -

Bullying Bill of Rights Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 18A:37-13.1 to -32 and

administrative code promulgated by the Commissioner of Education as

A-1491-24
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authorized by the State Board of Education. The Legislature promulgated these

laws "to strengthen the standards and procedures for preventing, reporting,

investigating, and responding to incidents of harassment, intimidation, and

bullying of students that occur in school and off school premises[.]" N.J.S.A.

18A:37-13.1(f).

As defined by the Act:

"Harassment, intimidation or bullying" means any
gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or any
electronic communication, whether it be a single
incident or a series of incidents, that is reasonably
perceived as being motivated either by any actual or
perceived characteristic, such as race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, or a mental, physical or
sensory disability, or by any other distinguishing
characteristic, that takes place on school property, at
any school-sponsored function, on a school bus, or off
school grounds as provided for in section 16 of
P.L.2010, c. 122 (C.18A:37-15.3), that substantially
disrupts or interferes with the orderly operation of the
school or the rights of other students and that:

a. a reasonable person should know, under the
circumstances, will have the effect of physically or
emotionally harming a student or damaging the
student's property, or placing a student in reasonable
fear of physical or emotional harm to his person or
damage to his property;

b. has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student
or group of students; or

A-1491-24
8
c. creates a hostile educational environment for the
student by interfering with a student's education or by
severely or pervasively causing physical or emotional
harm to the student.

[N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14.]

The Board adopted a policy that largely models the language of N.J.S.A.

18A:37-14. Petitioner challenges this policy as an impermissible alteration of

the statute. Specifically, after the semicolon following subsection (a), which

separates it from subsection (b), the Board's policy includes the word "or."

Petitioner argues this changes the meaning of the statute by making subsection

(a) a "disjunctive" element rather than a "conjunctive" element. Put differently,

petitioner contends this change erroneously renders subsection (a) only one of

the three possible elements necessary for a finding of HIB, rather than a required

element. Accordingly, petitioner maintains the Board's HIB determination,

which relied on the policy, and the subsequent upholding of that determination

by the Commissioner were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

When interpreting statutory language, we "aim[] to effectuate the

Legislature's intent." W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518 (2023). The "'best

indicator' of legislative intent 'is the statutory language.'" Ibid. (quoting State

v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 94 (2022)). We "ascribe to the statutory words their

ordinary meaning and significance and read them in context with related

A-1491-24
9
provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole." DiProspero v. Penn,

183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citation omitted). "Punctuation is part of an act and

may be considered in its interpretation." Commerce Bancorp, Inc. v. InterArch,

Inc., 417 N.J. Super. 329, 336 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Moore v. Magor Car

Corp., 27 N.J. 82, 87 (1958)). "If the Legislature's intent is clear from the

statutory language and its context with related provisions, we apply the law as

written." Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 429 (2013). "'[O]nly

when the statute is ambiguous, the plain language leads to a result inconsistent

with any legitimate public policy objective, or is at odds with the general

statutory scheme,' will we turn to extrinsic tools to determine legislative intent."

In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor Station (CS327), 258 N.J. 312, 325 (2024)

(alteration in original) (quoting Shelton, 214 N.J. at 429). Moreover, when a

statute is silent as to a particular issue, we must interpret that issue in light of

the Legislature's intent. See Ogborne v. Mercer Cemetery Corp., 197 N.J. 448,

459 (2009) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 171 (2006)).

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14, a finding of HIB does not require

subsection (a) to be satisfied in every instance. The statutory language and the

placement of the word "or" between subsections (b) and (c) indicate that the

three subsections—(a), (b), and (c)—are to be read disjunctively. See State v.

A-1491-24
10
Smith, 262 N.J. Super. 487, 506 (App. Div. 1993) ("When items in a list are

joined by a comma or semicolon, with an 'or' preceding the last item, the items

are disjunctive."); In re Est. of Fisher, 443 N.J. Super. 180, 192 (App. Div. 2015)

(finding "the three clauses in N.J.S.A. 3B:5-14.1(b)(1) are distinct and separate

from each other" because "the word 'or' in a statute is to be considered a

disjunctive particle indicating an alternative." (quoting State v. Kress, 105 N.J.

Super. 514, 520 (Law Div. 1969))). This is supported by the Commissioner's

decision in Wehbeh v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Verona, Essex Cnty.,

Commissioner Decision No. 51-20 (Feb. 4, 2020),

nj.gov/education/legal/commissioner/2020/51-20.pdf, which held:

The Initial Decision incorrectly views subsection (a),
that a reasonable person should know the act will have
a harmful effect, as the third requirement, with an
additional fourth requirement being a choice between
subsections (b) and (c). As a matter of standard
statutory construction, the term "or" between
subsections (b) and (c) also applies to subsection (a),
such that a demonstration of any of these three criteria
can support a finding of HIB.

Accordingly, satisfying any one of the three subsections is sufficient to establish

a finding of HIB.

Notwithstanding, the Commissioner's finding T.R.'s conduct satisfies

N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14(a) is supported by the record. Petitioner argues the school

A-1491-24
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administration's own factual findings required dismissal of the HIB charge as a

matter of law. What petitioner is referring to is a box Melissa Backer checked

on the HIB investigation form, which read, "Intentional, but not designed to

harass, intimidate or bully[:] The student knowingly engaged in harassing,

intimidating, or bullying behavior but was not aware of the potential negative

impact on the target." However, this speaks to T.R.'s subjective intent, which is

not included in the statutory language. Indeed, the governing standard is what

"a reasonable person should know[] under the circumstances," not what T.R.

knew. N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14(a). Furthermore, we agree with the ALJ's well-

reasoned analysis as to why a reasonable eighth grade student should know his

messages would have the effect of emotionally harming Susan:

[A] reasonable 8th grade student would be aware of the
ability to screenshot texts or pictures and, thus, should
know, under the circumstances, that the posted insults
may not remain confined to the Snapchat participants
and might be revealed to Susan even if the Snapchat
posts later disappeared. Given the ease under which
electronic communications may be copied or shown to
other persons, it is certainly reasonable to expect a
thirteen-year-old student to understand that someone
could disseminate his comments regardless of the
forum in which they were posted. In this regard,
Viturello testified that although it was Snapchat, there
were over two dozen students on it, and "knowing
middle school students, it's very reasonable to
understand that someone's going to share a
conversation that was more than one comment." He

A-1491-24
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further noted that participants can screenshot . . . the
information posted on Snapchat "so the information
travels." Backer explained, "[m]aking fun of someone's
appearance, [and] their sexuality, . . . a normal person
would understand that . . . would be hurtful to that
person and could cause emotional harm." Backer
believed that a reasonable 8th grader would know under
the circumstances that the conduct that T.R. admitted to
would have the effect of physically or emotionally
harming a student. She testified that "a reasonable 8th
grade student would be aware that there are negative
implications associated with that kind of language," and
a "reasonable person would think that using that
language with a group of [twenty-five] plus students
would get back to that student." Simply put, the
evidence fails to establish that the Board's conclusion
that "a reasonable person should know, under the
circumstances, [that T.R.'s comments] will have the
effect of physically or emotionally harming" Susan was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Because T.R.'s conduct falls within subsection (a), even if subsections (b) and

(c) were resolved in petitioner's favor, the outcome would not change.

As to the main text of the statute, petitioner does not dispute T.R.'s

comments are "reasonably perceived as being motivated either by any actual or

perceived characteristic." See Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J.

Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021) ("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed

waived." (quoting Woodlands Cmty. Ass'n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 319

(App. Div. 2017))), aff'd as modified, 252 N.J. 265 (2022). The comments were

clearly motivated by Susan's weight and sexual orientation. Instead, petitioner

A-1491-24
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argues T.R.'s actions did not substantially disrupt or interfere with the orderly

operation of the school or the rights of other students, emphasizing Susan would

not have been aware of the Snapchat comments had the school administrators

not informed her.

Petitioner's argument is belied by the record, which reflects Susan was

first made aware of the contents of the group chat when a friend told her. Even

if petitioner had first been notified by school administrators, it is unreasonable

to suggest inflammatory messages targeted at Susan in a group chat involving

more than twenty-five middle school students would not have otherwise reached

her. Moreover, it was another student, Jane, who took screenshots of the chat

and brought them to school officials. The school administrators were statutorily

required to investigate the allegations and to "inform the parents or guardians of

all students involved in the alleged incident." N.J.S.A. 18A:37-15(b)(5). If we

were to accept petitioner's argument, we would deem it permissible for school

administrators to disregard their statutorily mandated duty.

The ALJ correctly found T.R.'s actions substantially disrupted or

interfered with the orderly operation of the school or the rights of other students:

Viturello testified that the victim, Susan, "was very
anxious about the situation, was very impacted, [and]
needed multiple counseling sessions[.]" She also
expressed fear of going to the high school because the

A-1491-24
14
incident involved not only Long Hill students but
students in surrounding towns. Similarly, Backer
testified that Susan "was visually very upset" about the
comments said about her, she was crying and
embarrassed, and she expressed concern about going to
the high school. In addition, Viturello testified that the
student who reported the information, Jane, was "very
concerned about retribution" from the students
involved in the conduct. Indeed, Jane's parents signed
her out of the school after she reported the incident and
Jane [remained] homeschooled for the remainder of the
2021–2022 school year. Viturello testified that he
spoke with T.R.'s mother, who was concerned about
T.R.'s mental health based on his involvement in the
incident. This resulted in school staff conducting a risk
assessment at T.R.'s home. Backer further testified that
there was an interference with operation of the school
as a whole and the incident "had a substantial
interference with the school day." She described that
"there were about [twenty-five] students that were
involved on the Snapchat, so clearly it was spoken
about within the middle school halls"; "[t]here were a
lot of students that were interviewed"; and "there were
a lot of staff members that were involved in the
interview process and the HIB investigation[.]"

Finally, petitioner argues the HIB finding violated T.R.'s First

Amendment right to freedom of speech. Petitioner concedes T.R.'s Snapchat

comments would not constitute protected speech "if T.R. knew or should have

known that the words would reach and harm the student who was the subject of

the comments" but argues "T.R. was not aware that his words would cause

harm." This argument likewise lacks merit. As discussed, a reasonable eighth

A-1491-24
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grade student should have known his comments would reach and harm Susan.

Because T.R.'s conduct constitutes HIB pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:37-14,

accepting petitioner's argument would require striking down the HIB statute as

violative of the First Amendment. Petitioner does not raise such a challenge,

and even if she had, it is unlikely it would succeed. Cf. Mahanoy Area Sch.

Dist. v. B.L., 594 U.S. 180, 192-93 (2021).

The Commissioner's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable.

Affirmed.

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