Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Lead Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Scott Mitchell Obeginski v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 09-26-00057-CV
• Nature of Suit: Mandamus

• Disposition: Motion or Writ Denied

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7)

• PDF

Disposition

Motion or Writ Denied

Lead Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

---

NO. 09-26-00057-CV

---

IN RE SCOTT MITCHELL OBEGINSKI

---

Original Proceeding
284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24-11-18234

---

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In an order imposing sanctions on Scott Mitchell Obeginski for citing fictional

authority in Trial Court Cause Number 24-11-18234, the trial court ordered

Obeginski, when making “any filing of any plea, pleading, motion, brief, or similar”

in any capacity to “include with each filing with any and all Court(s) or Clerk(s) as

attachments a copy of any and all legal authorities cited in the filing highlighting the

portion of the legal authority attached which supports the proposition for which he

cites the legal authority.”1 In a mandamus petition, Obeginski contends the trial

1
The Order made additional rulings and imposed additional sanctions, but
only the order to provide copies of cited case authority is at issue in this mandamus
proceeding. Obeginski has perfected an appeal from the trial court’s final judgment
1
court’s directive is “an act far exceeding its jurisdiction” and argues that the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to exercise its ministerial duty to vacate the

order after “the loss of plenary power.” 2 Obeginski argues mandamus relief is

appropriate to alleviate harm from “an unconstitutional restriction on court access.”

Real Party in Interest Joshua Want Real Estate Group, LLC filed a response at the

request of the Court. We deny mandamus relief.

“The judicial power is divided among these various named courts by means

of express grants of ‘jurisdiction’ contained in the constitution and statutes. The

‘jurisdiction’ of a particular court is that portion of the judicial power which it has

been expressly authorized to exercise by the constitution or statutes.” Eichelberger

v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979) (citation omitted). Additionally,

in Trial Court Cause Number 24-11-18234. The appeal, which is docketed as Appeal
Number 09-25-00487-CV, remains pending in this Court.

2
The trial court signed the Modified Final Judgment on October 17, 2025. The
first weekday after the 30th day thereafter is Monday, November 17, 2025. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 4. Obeginski filed a Motion for New Trial on November 17, 2025. Joshua
Want Real Estate Group LLC filed a motion for sanctions on November 17, 2025.
Both of these motions were timely filed. See id. 329b(a). With the Modified Final
Judgment signed on October 17, 2025, the 75th day thereafter is December 31, 2025.
Assuming the post-judgment motions were overruled by operation of law 75 days
after the date of judgment, the trial court retained plenary power over its judgment
for another 30 days, which was January 30, 2026. See id. 329b(c), (e). The trial court
signed the sanctions order on January 9, 2026, which was timely. Obeginski filed a
Motion to Vacate Void Portion of Sanctions Order on January 30, 2026.

2
courts have inherent powers that arise “from the very fact that the court has been

created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities.” Id.

“The inherent powers of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the

exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of

its independence and integrity.” Id. Additionally, courts have powers “implied from

an express grant of power.” Id. at 399. A court has no inherent power to take

jurisdiction of a case when that jurisdiction has been expressly or impliedly granted

to another Texas court. Id. at 399-400.

While the constitution or a statute confers subject matter jurisdiction on a

court, it is the filing of a pleading that invokes that jurisdiction and gives a particular

court and the judge presiding in that court the authority to adjudicate a case. “‘The

right of a plaintiff to maintain a suit, while frequently treated as going to the question

of jurisdiction, has been said to go in reality to the right of the plaintiff to relief rather

than to the jurisdiction of the court to afford it.’” Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12

S.W.3d 71, 76-77 (Tex. 2000) (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 16, at 23 (1990)).

Generally, “[a] judgment is void only when it is shown that the court had no

jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no

jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.” Mapco,

Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (citing

Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding)) (other

3
citation omitted). A court may have jurisdiction over a case but should not exercise

it in deference to another court with concurrent jurisdiction. See Kelley v.

Homminga, 706 S.W.3d 829, 833 (Tex. 2025). “In general, as long as the court

entering a judgment has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter and does

not act outside its capacity as a court, the judgment is not void.” Reiss v. Reiss, 118

S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003) (citation omitted).

Obeginski entered an appearance in Trial Court Cause Number 24-11-18234.

The trial court had personal jurisdiction over Obeginski and the inherent power to

sanction him for his improper conduct in the 284th District Court. Thus, the trial

court possessed the authority to sanction Obeginski for citing fictitious legal

authority in his filings in Trial Court Cause Number 24-11-18234. The larger

question is whether the trial court possessed the authority to require Obeginski to

attach a copy of the legal authorities cited in a filing Obeginski makes with any court,

not just the 284th District Court.

Generally, for a sanction to be just a direct relationship must exist between

the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and it must not be excessive.

TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (orig.

proceeding). Here, the offensive conduct was repeatedly citing fictious cases.

Ordering the person who cited fictitious cases to attach highlighted copies of the

cited cases to his filings relates directly to the abuse found. Under appropriate

4
circumstances, “just sanctions” includes “the authority to issue injunctions to control

a party’s actions in another court.” Miller v. Armogida, 877 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (district court could enjoin plaintiff

from re-filing frivolous case in county court).

Obeginski argues the trial court has placed an unconstitutional restriction on

his access to courts. He does not explain how the trial court’s command that he attach

his supporting authority when he cites a case in a court proceeding encumbers his

right to access courts. He has identified no language in the trial court’s order that

prevents him from petitioning any court at any time, and he describes no technical

burden that makes including copies of cited case authority an impediment to his

access to courts.

Obeginski has identified no court proceeding that the challenged Order

adversely affects. A trial court’s order directing a party to file supporting authority

in a higher court could potentially interfere with the appellate court’s jurisdiction,

but in this case, we have appellate jurisdiction not only over the trial court’s

judgment, but also over the sanctions order. Nothing prevents this Court from

reviewing the sanctions order on appeal and deciding then whether Obeginski must

file copies of his cited case authorities with the appellate court.

“A trial court’s power to decide a motion for sanctions pertaining to matters

occurring before judgment is no different than its power to decide any other motion

5
during its plenary jurisdiction.” Scott & White Mem’l Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940

S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. 1996) (op. on reh’g). “Thus, the time during which the trial

court has authority to impose sanctions on such a motion is limited to when it retains

plenary jurisdiction[.]” Id. We conclude the trial court retained plenary power over

the case when it signed the Order. We hold that the order is not void.3

We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). We

conclude the Relator has not shown that he is entitled to mandamus relief.

Accordingly, we deny Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App.

P. 52.8(a). Any pending motions are denied as moot.

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on March 11, 2026
Opinion Delivered March 12, 2026

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

3
The trial court loses its authority to award sanctions after its plenary power
expires. Scott & White Mem’l Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. 1996)
(op. on reh’g). Thereafter, the trial court’s authority is restricted to enforcing its
judgment. The issue of whether the trial court may enforce the “supporting
authorities” provision of the Sanctions Order in a post-judgment enforcement
proceeding is not before us at this time.
6