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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Jones

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 852
• Docket Number: C-250308

• Judges: Nestor

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.2K)

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Syllabus

IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT – OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS – PLAIN ERROR – RESISTING ARREST – R.C. 1.51 – R.C. 2921.31 – R.C. 2921.33: The trial court did not commit plain error in convicting defendant of obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31, because R.C. 2921.31 is not in irreconcilable conflict with R.C. 2921.33, the resisting arrest statute, and the State had discretion in determining under which statute to charge defendant.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-852.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250308
TRIAL NO. 25/CRB/5571
Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
KIANTE JONES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 3/13/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-852.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250308
TRIAL NO. 25/CRB/5571
Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. :
OPINION
KIANTE JONES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 13, 2026

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Robert S. Hendricks, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David H. Hoffmann,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

NESTOR, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Kiante Jones appeals his conviction for

obstructing official business. Because the obstructing official business statute is not

in irreconcilable conflict with the resisting arrest statute, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} In April 2025, Cincinnati police officers arrested Jones for domestic

violence. After performing a search incident to a lawful arrest, an officer attempted to

place Jones inside the police car. Jones refused to put his feet in the car. A second

officer intervened to attempt to force Jones’s feet inside the car. When officers tried

to shut the car door, Jones kicked the car door back into the officers. After Jones

kicked the door open, an officer maced him.

{¶3} Jones was charged with one count of obstructing official business in

violation of R.C. 2921.31, a second-degree misdemeanor. After a bench trial, the trial

court found Jones guilty. The court imposed a sentence of 27 days in jail, and awarded

him a time served credit equal to his sentence.

II. Analysis

{¶4} Jones appeals his conviction. In one assignment of error, he argues that

the trial court erred by convicting him of obstructing official business. In his view,

R.C. 1.51 required the State to prosecute him under R.C. 2921.33, the resisting arrest

statute, instead of R.C. 2921.31, the obstructing official business statute.1

A. Standard of Review

{¶5} To properly preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a

1 Jones’s briefing suggests that he was charged with both offenses. A review of the record shows
that this is factually incorrect.

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

timely objection. State ex rel. Holwadel v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2015-Ohio-

5306, ¶ 50. “To be timely, the objection must be raised ‘at a time when such error

could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.’” Id., quoting State v. Childs,

14 Ohio St.2d 56 (1968), paragraph three of the syllabus. If a party raises an objection

for the first time during closing arguments, the objection is untimely. Edelstein v.

Edelstein, 2025-Ohio-1514, ¶ 54 (1st Dist.), citing Holwadel at ¶ 50. And, “[t]he failure

to timely object waives all but plain-error review on appeal.” Kelley v. Horton, 2025-

Ohio-5252, ¶ 22 (1st Dist.), citing Anders v. Seitz, 2023-Ohio-668, ¶ 15, fn. 3 (12th

Dist.).

{¶6} Jones argues that the State should have prosecuted him for resisting

arrest, instead of obstructing official business. But Jones failed to raise this argument

before trial. The first time Jones raised this argument was in closing arguments.

Because Jones’s objection was raised for the first time during closing arguments, it

was not timely and not properly preserved. Edelstein at ¶ 54. We therefore review his

appeal for plain error.

B. R.C. 2921.31 & R.C. 2921.33

{¶7} Jones claims R.C. 1.51 is applicable to his case. This statute provides:

If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision,

they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the

conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local

provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the

general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that

the general provision prevail.

R.C. 1.51.

{¶8} In Jones’s view, R.C. 2921.31 (obstruction) and R.C. 2921.33 (resisting)

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

are in irreconcilable conflict. Thus, he argues, resisting arrest is the special provision

which prevails over obstructing official business, the general provision. The Third

District considered this argument in State v. Swift, 2023-Ohio-1435 (3d Dist.).

{¶9} The facts in Swift are similar to the facts here. In Swift, police officers

came to Swift’s home to arrest him in connection with a domestic dispute. Id. at ¶ 2.

When Swift refused to comply with the officers, they tased him and took him into

custody. Id.

{¶10} A grand jury indicted Swift on one count of obstructing official business.

Id. at ¶ 3. During trial, Swift moved to dismiss the indictment. Id. at ¶ 4. He argued

that “if his conduct constituted . . . obstructing official business, then it also constituted

the offense of resisting arrest . . . and that the existence of the resisting arrest statute—

the specific statute—precluded his prosecution under the obstructing official business

statute—the general statute.” Id. The trial court denied his motion and found him

guilty of obstructing official business. Id.

{¶11} Swift appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. Swift,

2023-Ohio-1435, at ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). The Third District affirmed the trial court’s

judgment, reasoning that the resisting arrest and obstructing official business statutes

did not irreconcilably conflict because they require two different culpable mental

states. Id. at ¶ 12, 14. A conviction for obstructing official business requires “purpose.”

Id. at ¶ 12. Resisting arrest, on the other hand, prohibits resisting or interfering with

a lawful arrest “recklessly or by force.” Id.

{¶12} The Third District reasoned that because “a person can commit the

offense of resisting arrest even when they do not act with the purpose of preventing,

obstructing, or delaying their arrest[,]” resisting arrest does not necessarily result in a

violation of the obstruction statute. Id. at ¶ 13. And, because the conduct proscribed

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

under each statute is different, the statutes are not in irreconcilable conflict. Id.

{¶13} Therefore, “it was well within the State’s authority to prosecute Swift

under the obstructing official business statute in preference to the resisting arrest

statute.” Id. at ¶ 14.

{¶14} Jones asks us to part ways with the Third District, and hold that under

the facts of this case, there is an irreconcilable conflict between R.C. 2921.31 and

2921.33. We see no reason to do so. The Third District’s reasoning is sound, and we

adopt it today.

{¶15} Because the statutes are not irreconcilable, prosecutorial discretion

allows the State to proceed under the charge that it deems best fits the conduct. Swift,

2023-Ohio-1435, at ¶ 14 (3d Dist.), quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,

123-124 (1979) (“[W]hen an act violates more than one criminal statute, the

Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against

any class of defendants. Whether to prosecute and what charge to file . . . are decisions

that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).

{¶16} The State’s decision to charge Jones with obstructing official business

under R.C. 2921.31, rather than resisting arrest under R.C. 2921.33, fell squarely

within its prosecutorial discretion.

{¶17} Jones’s briefing focuses on the argument that he was improperly

charged. He does not specifically assert that his conduct was insufficient to support

an obstruction charge under R.C. 2921.31. But to be thorough, we note that Jones’s

conduct did constitute obstruction of official business. See, e.g., State v. Terry, 2025-

Ohio-1195 (1st Dist.) (where defendant’s physical actions of providing false

information and resisting an officer’s attempts to restrain her hampered the officer’s

duties, defendant’s conduct was sufficient to support an obstruction charge).

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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

III. Conclusion

{¶18} The trial court did not commit plain error when it convicted Jones of

obstructing official business. We overrule Jones’s assignment of error and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and MOORE, J., concur.

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