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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Spector

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24CA0647

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.5K)

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Combined Opinion

24CA0647 Peo v Spector 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0647
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR5083
Honorable Karen L. Brody, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Joseph M. Spector,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Freyre and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Joseph M. Spector, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered in Denver District Court pursuant to a plea

agreement resolving cases against him in three separate counties.

Spector raises one issue on appeal: Did the district court err by

denying a motion to continue his sentencing hearing so that

appointed counsel could have additional time to investigate the

possibility of withdrawing his guilty plea based on ineffective

assistance of counsel? We conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion and therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In a global disposition of three cases in which he was charged

with sexual offenses against several children, Spector agreed to the

following:

• In Denver case number 22CR5083 — the case appealed

here — Spector pleaded guilty to one count of sexual

assault on a child and agreed to a stipulated sentence of

ten years to life on sex offender intensive supervision

probation (SOISP).

• In Douglas County case number 22CR1185, Spector

pleaded guilty to (1) one count of sexual exploitation of a

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child with a stipulated determinate ten-year prison

sentence and (2) one count of sexual assault on a child

with a stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.

• In Arapahoe County case number 22CR2122, Spector

pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on a child

with a stipulated sentence of ten years to life on SOISP.

Each agreement stipulated that the three SOISP sentences were to

be served consecutive to the prison sentence and concurrent with

each other.

¶3 After the district courts in all three counties accepted

Spector’s guilty pleas but before any sentencing hearings, Spector’s

private attorney, Colin Bresee, withdrew due to irreconcilable

differences. Public defender Sabrina Schmid entered her

appearance in Spector’s Denver case on November 16, 2023. The

sentencing hearing had been set for November 20, but the court

vacated that hearing and set a status conference for November 21.

¶4 At the status conference, Schmid asked the district court to

set sentencing for mid-January, and the court set the hearing for

January 25, 2024. An out-of-state victim’s representative told the

court that delays in the case had presented significant hardship to

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the family due to lack of closure and expenses associated with

last-minute travel cancellations. The family requested that the

rescheduled sentencing hearing proceed without further delay. To

avoid additional hardship to the victim’s family, the prosecutor

asked that any “motion to withdraw” be filed at least thirty days in

advance of the sentencing hearing. The court scheduled another

status conference to address any presentence legal arguments.

¶5 At the January 4, 2024, status conference, Schmid moved to

continue the sentencing hearing for several months, arguing that

she needed more time “to decide if it’s appropriate . . . to make a

claim to withdraw his plea.” The prosecutor objected, noting a

“long, tortured history” of plea negotiations and arguing that

Schmid’s motion was gamesmanship and that any claim of

ineffective assistance would be “laughable” because Bresee had

done “more than really any defense counsel [she’d] had on a case

like this.” The court agreed with the prosecutor’s characterization

of the circumstances. It denied the oral motion, pointing to the age

of the case, Bresee’s last-minute withdrawal, the fact that the

sentencing hearing had already been continued, the lack of concrete

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argument for a continuance, and the availability of postconviction

remedies.

¶6 At the sentencing hearing three weeks later, Schmid once

again moved for a continuance. The parties made nearly identical

arguments to those made on January 4, and the district court again

denied the motion. The court sentenced Spector in accordance with

his plea agreement.

II. Discussion

¶7 On appeal, Spector contends that the district court erred by

denying his motion to continue so that Schmid could adequately

advise him about whether to move to withdraw his guilty plea. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶8 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to continue for

abuse of discretion. People v. Ahuero, 2017 CO 90, ¶ 11. “There

are no ‘mechanical tests’ for determining whether a [district] court

abuses its discretion by denying a continuance.” People v. Brown,

2014 CO 25, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344, 1353

(Colo. 1988)).

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¶9 On review, we consider (1) the prejudice to the moving party if

the continuance was denied versus the prejudice to the opposing

party if a continuance was granted, see People v. Smith, 275 P.3d

715, 721-22 (Colo. App. 2011); (2) the circumstances confronting

the district court when the motion was made, see Ahuero, ¶ 11; and

(3) the reasons presented for the continuance, see id. Because a

request for a continuance requires the court to balance many

factors, “only an unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’ violates

the right to the assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Morris v.

Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)).

¶ 10 Crim. P. 32(d) permits a defendant to move to withdraw his

guilty plea before a sentence is imposed. See Crumb v. People, 230

P.3d 726, 730 (Colo. 2010). The rule “provides a vehicle” for a

defendant to present “a fair and just reason for discretionarily

permitting withdrawal” of the plea, People v. Figueroa-Lemus, 2020

CO 59, ¶ 12, but the defendant has the burden of demonstrating

that fair and just reason, People v. Chippewa, 751 P.2d 607, 609

(Colo. 1988), and whether the defendant met that burden is an

assessment within the sound discretion of the trial court, People v.

5
Lopez, 12 P.3d 869, 871 (Colo. App. 2000). One fair and just

reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d) is the

ineffective assistance of counsel. Lopez, 12 P.3d at 871.

B. Application

¶ 11 The record shows that the district court appropriately

considered the factors bearing on Spector’s request for continuance.

The prosecutor demonstrated prejudice if a continuance was

granted — prejudice to the out-of-state victim and victim’s family,

who wanted closure and had already suffered a financial loss due to

a prior sentencing delay. And the court reasonably perceived little

prejudice to Spector if a continuance was denied, because the

parties had stipulated to a ten-year SOISP sentence, Spector was

already serving a prison sentence for his Douglas County case, and

he could pursue relief for any ineffective assistance claim in a

postconviction motion.

¶ 12 Additional circumstances weighing in favor of denying

Spector’s motion include the sixteen-month age of the case, the

prior two-month sentencing continuance, the prosecutor’s robust

endorsement of Bresee’s performance and the absence of any

specific allegations to the contrary, and Spector’s arguable

6
gamesmanship in delaying his conviction. And as to the reasons

presented for a continuance, Spector’s counsel asserted only a

vague and speculative claim of ineffective assistance — she did not

attempt to allege a specific fair and just reason for withdrawing

Spector’s plea. Cf. Lopez, 12 P.3d at 871 (concluding that a Crim.

P. 32(d) motion may be denied if a claim of ineffective assistance is

conclusory or contradicted by the record).

¶ 13 For these reasons, we perceive nothing arbitrary or

unreasonable about the district court’s decision to deny Spector’s

motion to continue. We conclude that the court acted well within

its discretion.

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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