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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Russell v. Dept of Local Affairs

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA0589

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8.8K)

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Combined Opinion

25CA0589 Russell v Dept of Local Affairs 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0589
State Personnel Board Case No. 2024G98

Ebony Russell,

Complainant-Appellant,

v.

Colorado Department of Local Affairs,

Respondent-Appellee.

and

State Personnel Board,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 12, 2026

Ebony Russell, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Eric W. Freund, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee

No Appearance for Appellee
¶1 Complainant, Ebony Russell, appeals the decision of the State

Personnel Board (Board) denying her petition for a discretionary

hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

¶2 The Colorado Department of Local Affairs (DOLA) works with

public and private housing developers, housing organizations, and

local governments to develop and finance affordable and safe

housing. Russell worked for DOLA’s Division of Housing on the

Housing Assistance Team as a Housing Asset Manager. In this

capacity, she managed a portfolio of projects receiving state and

federal funds, including funds from the federal Department of

Housing and Urban Development (HUD). She was responsible for

ensuring that the proper documents were completed and filed for

each project and that deadlines were being met. Russell also

maintained and managed record files for each project she oversaw.

All completed federal projects had to be “closed out.” Russell was

responsible for creating “closeout letters” — required, official

government documents sent to a loan grantee indicating the project

was completed and closed. Russell would prepare the closeout

1
letters for her projects and submit them to her supervisor for her

supervisor’s signature; the signed letters were then sent to the loan

grantee to notify them of the project’s status change.

1. Russell’s Emails with Bowman

¶3 In September 2023, Russell exchanged multiple emails with

Dave Bowman, Deputy Director for the Division of Local

Government at DOLA. Russell and Bowman discussed a guidance

memorandum they were drafting for the Impact Development Fund

(IDF). The IDF was providing financial assistance to homeowners

who were rebuilding their homes after the Marshall Fire. During

the email exchange, Russell told Bowman that federal regulations

required the IDF or the homeowners to maintain documentation

that general contractors were properly bonded and insured. Russell

was concerned that a failure to maintain the general contractors’

proof of insurance in the IDF files could damage the state’s

relationship with HUD in the event of an audit or that it could

expose homeowners to potential harm if a general contractor wasn’t

insured.

¶4 Bowman disagreed and told Russell that such documentation

wasn’t necessary because (1) the projects in question weren’t

2
federally funded; (2) the loans to the individual homeowners were

below the regulatory threshold; and (3) general contractors were

already required to be insured to obtain construction permits from

their local governments. Bowman also noted that adding an

additional requirement for the IDF and homeowners would be overly

burdensome.

1. Allegations of Russell’s Misconduct

¶5 In August 2023, DOLA conducted a routine review of the asset

managers’ federal projects to ensure that the required monitoring

was being conducted.1 During the review, DOLA discovered

multiple deficiencies and missing documents in project files for

projects managed by Russell. Specifically, one of Russell’s projects

(Project 17-056) had been closed out but didn’t have a closeout

letter and was missing other documentation. After being notified

about the deficiency, Russell drafted a closeout letter and copied

and pasted the signature of her former supervisor, Julia Zaffarano,

on the letter without Zaffarano’s authorization. Russell later

1 Once a federal project had been closed out by the asset manager,

the project was moved to the long-term monitoring team for the
ongoing monitoring required by federal programs.

3
admitted that she falsified the closeout letter and added it to the file

for Project 17-056.

¶6 Separately, around this time, DOLA discovered that Russell

had failed to report mileage tracking for the state-owned vehicle

that she was assigned to use and share with two other employees.2

Per DOLA’s policy and the Vehicle Use Agreement that Russell

signed, assigned drivers were required to report their odometer

readings monthly, which Russell failed to do from February 2023

through October 2023.

¶7 In October 2023, Alison George, the Director of the Division of

Housing, delegated authority to Maulid Miskell, the Deputy Division

Director, to contact Russell and schedule a “Rule 6-10 meeting.” A

Rule 6-10 meeting is held when an appointing authority finds

performance issues or conduct that may warrant a disciplinary

action; the meeting allows the employee an opportunity to respond

to the alleged performance or conduct concerns prior to a final

determination. Berumen v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., Wheat Ridge Reg’l

Ctr., 2012 COA 73, ¶ 20. Because DOLA’s Human Resources

2 Russell is Black.The other state employees who she shared the
vehicle with are White.

4
Department needed more time to gather relevant information and

investigate the allegations against Russell, the Rule 6-10 meeting

was postponed. Russell was placed on paid administrative leave on

November 1, 2023, pending investigation into the alleged

misconduct. Russell’s administrative leave was extended in

January 2024 and again in March 2024 to allow the investigation to

be completed.

¶8 The investigation focused on four allegations against Russell:

(1) the unauthorized use of Zaffarano’s signature in the Project 17-

056 closeout letter; (2) incomplete letters and project files; (3)

communication issues related to the emails with Bowman; and (4)

not reporting mileage tracking for the assigned state vehicle. The

investigation report was completed in March 2024. Although the

investigator couldn’t confirm or rule out the second or third

allegations, he was able to substantiate the first and fourth

allegations — that Russell falsified Zaffarano’s signature and failed

to report mileage for her state-assigned vehicle.

¶9 While the investigation was ongoing, Zaffarano discovered a

second falsified document in another of Russell’s project files.

Specifically, Zaffarano found that the Contract Monitoring Letter in

5
the file for Project 18-009 contained an unauthorized signature and

was backdated. The document bore Kim Snetzinger’s signature and

was dated October 15, 2020, on the first page and October 15,

2019, on the second page. A review of the electronic file revealed

that Russell created the document for the letter on April 20, 2021,

and uploaded it to the electronic file on August 1, 2023. However,

Snetzinger’s last day of employment with DOLA was March 27,

2020.

¶ 10 Based on the investigation and discovery of the second

falsified document, in early April 2024, Miskell contacted Russell to

schedule the Rule 6-10 meeting. After exchanging several emails,

the Rule 6-10 meeting was scheduled for May 3, 2024. On April 23,

2024, George notified Russell that she was rescinding Miskell’s

delegation authority and that George would be conducting the Rule

6-10 meeting instead of Miskell. The meeting was held on May 3,

2024, and June 25, 2024. George terminated Russell’s employment

in July 2024.

B. Procedural History

¶ 11 On April 23, 2024, Russell filed a consolidated appeal and

dispute with the Board alleging retaliation (based on her

6
disagreement with Bowman) in violation of the State Employee

Protection Act (Whistleblower Act), , §§ 24-50.5-101 to -108, C.R.S.

2025, and racial discrimination in violation of the Colorado Anti-

Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-400.2 to -408, C.R.S. 2025.3

She also asserted that Miskell should have been precluded from

conducting the Rule 6-10 meeting based on a conflict of interest —

namely, that Bowman complained to Miskell about Russell’s

performance.

¶ 12 Russell and DOLA submitted information sheets outlining

information and evidence regarding their appeal allegations,

defenses, underlying facts, and arguments. See Dep’t of Pers. &

Admin. Rule 8-35, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. Russell sought

reinstatement, back pay, compensation for emotional distress,

punitive damages, and an investigation into DOLA’s bad faith

actions. DOLA asked the Board to deny Russell’s petition for a

3 Russell initially filed a whistleblower complaint form.At the
Board’s direction, she later filed her consolidated appeal and
dispute form on May 8, 2024, to comply with the State Personnel
Board Rules and Personnel Director’s Administrative Procedures.
See Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-21(A), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1
(“Employees shall file both the [appeal form] and the Whistleblower
Complaint Form.”).

7
hearing and to dismiss her appeal because the Board lacked

jurisdiction and Russell failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation or discrimination.

¶ 13 The ALJ issued a preliminary recommendation that first

concluded that Russell had abandoned her CADA retaliation claim

and her claim that DOLA violated the Board’s grievance procedures

by failing to present any evidence to support these claims in her

information sheet. Next, the ALJ concluded that Russell’s

whistleblower and discrimination claims were filed more than ten

days after the alleged discriminatory practices; therefore, the Board

lacked jurisdiction to hear them. Even if the Board had jurisdiction

to hear the claims, however, the ALJ concluded that Russell failed

to establish prima facie claims of whistleblower retaliation and

racial discrimination.

¶ 14 At a public meeting on March 18, 2025, the Board reviewed

the ALJ’s preliminary recommendation. It found sufficient basis to

adopt the preliminary recommendation and denied Russell’s

petition for a hearing.

8
II. Analysis

¶ 15 On appeal, Russell contends that the Board erred by adopting

the ALJ’s determination that (1) the Board lacked jurisdiction to

hear her whistleblower and discrimination claims; (2) she failed to

establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation and racial

discrimination; and (3) she abandoned her CADA retaliation claim

and her claim that DOLA violated the Board’s grievance procedures.

We address and reject each contention in turn.

A. Appellate Rules

¶ 16 As an initial matter, Russell’s opening brief does not comply

with several of the appellate rules for briefing. See C.A.R. 28. For

instance, for each issue Russell raises, the brief lacks a statement

of the applicable standard of review and a statement of

preservation, and it infrequently cites the record. See C.A.R.

28(a)(7)(B) (The appellant must provide reasoning, “with citations to

the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

relies. . . .”).

¶ 17 The appellate rules are not technicalities; they are designed to

enable appellate review. Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10.

A party’s pro se status doesn’t excuse the failure to comply with the

9
appellate rules. See Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners

Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (noting that while courts may

consider a party’s pro se status, pro se parties are still bound by

the rules). Nevertheless, we recognize that it’s challenging for a

person who isn’t a lawyer to represent themselves in legal

proceedings. Taking that into account, see id., we elect to address

Russell’s arguments as best we understand them.

B. Russell’s Whistleblower and Discrimination Claims Were Not
Filed Within the Jurisdictional Filing Period

¶ 18 Russell argues that the Board erred by concluding that it

lacked jurisdiction to review her claims for whistleblower retaliation

and racial discrimination. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 We review the Board’s final orders under Colorado’s

Administrative Procedure Act (APA). § 12-20-408(1), C.R.S. 2025

(providing that judicial review shall be conducted in accordance

with section 24-4-106(11), C.R.S. 2025). Under the APA, we may

overturn the Board’s decision only if it was arbitrary or capricious,

was unsupported by the record, was contrary to law, or exceeded

the Board’s authority. See § 24-4-106(7)(b); Lawley v. Dep’t of

10
Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239, 1247 (Colo. 2001); see also § 24-4-

106(11)(e) (directing the reviewing court to apply the standard of

review set forth in section 24-4-106(7)). “Where the challenge is to

the Board’s resolution of an ultimate conclusion of fact, a reviewing

court must determine whether the record contains sufficient

evidence showing a reasonable basis in law for the Board’s

conclusion.” Colo. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Maggard, 248 P.3d 708,

712 (Colo. 2011). The correctness of a legal conclusion drawn by

the Board from undisputed facts is a matter for the appellate court,

and when the Board’s decision is based on an improper application

of the law, we may set the decision aside. See Coates, Reid &

Waldron v. Vigil, 856 P.2d 850, 856 (Colo. 1993).

¶ 20 “Any employee in the state personnel system may file a written

complaint with the [Board] within ten days after the employee knew

or should have known of a disciplinary action . . . .” § 24-50.5-

104(1), C.R.S. 2025; see also Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-7, 4

Code Colo. Regs. 801-1 (“Appeals or petitions for hearing are timely

if received by the Board or postmarked no later than ten (10) days

after receipt of the written notice of the action, or if no notice was

required, no later than ten (10) days after the employee knew or

11
should have known of the alleged improper action.”). The Board

does not have jurisdiction to review an action that is not timely

appealed. State Pers. Bd. v. Gigax, 659 P.2d 693, 694 (Colo. 1983).

1. Analysis

¶ 21 Russell was first notified of a disciplinary action on October

16, 2023, when she was told of the initial Rule 6-10 meeting.

Miskell reissued the notice on October 25, 2023, and Russell was

placed on paid administrative leave on November 1, 2023.

Following the investigative report, Miskell contacted Russell on April

4, 2024to schedule the Rule 6-10 meeting. Russell responded the

next day, acknowledging that she had received the April 4 email.

Russell also responded to a separate email on April 4 and 5, 2024,

objecting to Miskell’s role in the hearing. Using April 5, 2024, as

the calculation date for when Russell “knew . . . of a disciplinary

action,” § 24-50.5-104(1), Russell should have filed her complaint

and appeal by April 15, 2024. Because Russell didn’t file the

complaint and appeal until April 23, 2024, her whistleblower claim

was untimely.

¶ 22 Russell’s assertion that these actions constituted “continuing

violations” is unavailing. Each alleged violation — the issuance of a

12
disciplinary notice, the placement on administrative leave, and the

notice of who would conduct the hearing — occurred on discrete,

identifiable dates. The harm, if any, arose from the notifications

themselves and was complete when the notices were sent,

regardless of the duration of any resulting leave. Because these

were not continuing violations, Russell’s whistleblower claim is time

barred. See Subryan v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 789 P.2d 472,

475 (Colo. App. 1989) (“A completed act, such as termination, is not

a continuing violation.”).

¶ 23 Russell’s discrimination claim, which alleged disparate

treatment because other White coworkers weren’t disciplined for

also failing to report mileage for a state-owned vehicle, similarly

fails. Under section 24-50-125.3, C.R.S. 2025, Russell was

required to file her discrimination claim within ten days of the

alleged discriminatory practice. Again, even using April 5, 2024, as

the notice date, Russell didn’t file her discrimination claim until

April 23, 2024.

¶ 24 Because Russell’s whistleblower and discrimination claims

were untimely, the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear them. We

13
therefore discern no error with the Board’s decision to dismiss those

claims on that basis.

C. Russell Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case for Her
Whistleblower and Discrimination Claims

¶ 25 While we conclude that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear

Russell’s whistleblower and discrimination claims, because of her

pro se status, we elect to address their merits.

1. Russell’s Whistleblower Claims

¶ 26 Russell contends that the Board incorrectly concluded that

she failed to establish a prima facie case for whistleblower

retaliation. We disagree.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 27 We affirm the Board’s decision to adopt the ALJ’s

determinations if the ultimate conclusion is supported by the

evidentiary record and has a reasonable basis in the law.

Velasquez v. Dep’t of Higher Educ., 93 P.3d 540, 542 (Colo. App.

2003).

¶ 28 The Whistleblower Act protects state employees from

retaliation by an appointing authority or supervisor when an

employee discloses “information on actions of state agencies that

14
are not in the public interest.” § 24-50.5-101(1); see § 24-50.5-103,

C.R.S. 2025. To establish a prima facie case of whistleblower

retaliation, an employee must establish that (1) they disclosed

information pertaining to a matter of public interest; (2) they were

disciplined as defined by the Whistleblower Act; and (3) the

disciplinary action occurred because of the disclosure of

information. See Ward v. Indus. Comm’n, 699 P.2d 960, 966-68

(Colo. 1985); § 24-50.5-103(1).

b. Analysis

¶ 29 To establish the first element of a prima facie case of

whistleblower retaliation, Russell had to disclose a matter of public

interest. Matters of public interest are those “regarding any action,

policy, regulation, practice, or procedure, including, but not limited

to, the waste of public funds, abuse of authority, or

mismanagement of any state agency.” § 24-50.5-102(2), C.R.S.

2025; accord Ward, 699 P.2d at 967. Disclosures that “do not

concern matters in the public interest, or are not of ‘public

concern,’ do not invoke [the Whistleblower Act].” Ferrel v. Colo.

Dep’t of Corr., 179 P.3d 178, 186 (Colo. App. 2007).

15
¶ 30 Russell’s disclosures didn’t relate to a matter of public

concern. Rather, they involved an internal disagreement she and

Bowman had over regulatory interpretation. In Russell’s view, the

IDF or the homeowners should have maintained documents

demonstrating that their general contractors were properly bonded

and insured. But in Bowman’s opinion, such documentation was

unnecessary because the projects weren’t federally funded; the

loans to the individual homeowners were below the regulatory

threshold level; and in order to obtain construction permits from

local governments, general contractors were already insured. Such

a dispute doesn’t implicate an abuse of authority, unethical

conduct, or a waste of public funds and therefore does not

constitute a matter of public concern. § 24-50.5-102(2); see Ward,

699 P.2d at 967. Although Russell asserted that Bowman’s actions

could harm homeowners and damage the state’s relationship with

HUD, her concerns were speculative. As a result, Russell failed to

establish that her disclosure addressed a matter of public concern

and, consequently, failed to satisfy the first element of a prima facie

case of whistleblower retaliation.

16
¶ 31 To establish the second element of a prima facie case of

whistleblower retaliation, Russell had to show that she was

disciplined. A “disciplinary action” as defined in the Whistleblower

Act is “any direct or indirect form of discipline or penalty, including,

but not limited to, . . . suspension . . . or withholding of work, or the

threat of any such discipline or penalty.” § 24-50.5-102(1). Russell

was issued multiple Rule 6-10 meeting notices, which, when viewed

collectively, could reasonably be perceived as threatening

disciplinary action. And Russell was placed on administrative

leave, which effectively suspended her employment and removed

her from the workplace. Accordingly, Russell satisfied the second

element of a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, but only

as to the issuance of multiple Rule 6-10 meeting notices and her

placement on administrative leave.

¶ 32 To establish the third element of whistleblower retaliation,

Russell had to show that the protected disclosure was a substantial

or motivating factor in her adverse action. Ward, 699 P.2d at 968.

We have already concluded that there was no protected disclosure

here. But even if Russell’s communication with Bowman was

protected, the record doesn’t support a finding that it was the

17
motivating factor behind the Rule 6-10 meeting notices or her

placement on administrative leave. While the email prompted

concerns about the appropriateness of Russell’s tone, our review of

the record reflects that DOLA’s actions were driven by independent

and serious allegations, including that Russell forged her

supervisor’s signature — an allegation that, on its own, warranted

investigation — and Russell’s failure to report mileage on the

shared vehicle. These matters presented legitimate operational and

compliance concerns separate from any protected communication.

While the timing of the notices and administrative leave coincided

with Russell’s disclosure, they were also directly linked to the

discovery of Russell’s other alleged misconduct. Under these

circumstances, the temporal proximity appears coincidental rather

than causal, and the record does not suggest that Russell’s

communication was the determinative or motivating factor in the

adverse action.

¶ 33 Because Russell failed to establish the first and third elements

of a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, her claim

necessarily fails, and the Board did not err by adopting the ALJ’s

recommendation to deny a hearing.

18
2. Russell’s Racial Discrimination Claim

¶ 34 Russell also argues that the Board erred by concluding that

she failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

We disagree.

a. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 35 As discussed above, we will affirm the Board’s decision to

adopt the ALJ’s recommendation if it has a reasonable basis in law

and is supported by the evidentiary record. Velasquez, 93 P.3d at

542.

¶ 36 CADA prohibits an employer from taking any adverse action

against an employee based on race, national origin, or ancestry.

§ 24-34-402, C.R.S. 2025. To establish a prima facie case of

discrimination, an employee must show that (1) they belong to a

protected class; (2) they were qualified for the job at issue; (3) they

suffered an adverse employment decision despite their

qualifications; and (4) all the evidence in the record supports or

permits an inference of unlawful discrimination. Bodaghi v. Dep’t of

Nat. Res., 995 P.2d 288, 297 (Colo. 2000).

19
b. Analysis

¶ 37 Russell contends that similarly situated White coworkers

weren’t threatened with discipline for failing to track mileage on a

shared vehicle. This argument, however, overlooks several material

facts. First, Russell had signed an acknowledgment expressly

assigning her the responsibility for reporting vehicle mileage, yet

she failed to do so for several months. Russell also failed to track

the vehicle’s mileage well before she started sharing it with her

coworkers. Moreover, as discussed above, the October 16 and

October 23, 2023, Rule 6-10 meeting notices didn’t rest on the

mileage issue alone; they also cited the allegation that Russell

forged her former supervisor’s signature on a closeout letter. That

allegation, standing alone, provided an independent and sufficient

basis for the issuance of the Rule 6-10 meeting notices and

Russell’s placement on administrative leave. The missing mileage

issue was added later, after Russell was already aware of the Rule

6-10 meeting. Notably, Russell was never formally disciplined for

the mileage tracking issue itself.

¶ 38 Russell also points to a White employee who was not

disciplined after missing a contract renewal deadline. We agree

20
with the ALJ’s conclusion that this comparison is inapt. While the

cited conduct may have constituted negligence, it isn’t comparable

to Russell’s alleged conduct of intentionally forging her supervisor’s

signature.

¶ 39 Accordingly, Russell failed to identify a similarly situated

employee who engaged in comparable misconduct and was treated

more favorably. She therefore did not establish a prima facie case

of racial discrimination.

D. Russell Abandoned Her CADA Claim

¶ 40 Russell also argues that the Board erred by concluding that

she abandoned her CADA retaliation claim and her claim that

DOLA violated the Board’s grievance procedures. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 41 Again, where the Board adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, we

affirm the Board’s decision if it is supported by the evidentiary

record and has a reasonable basis in law. Velasquez, 93 P.3d at

542.

¶ 42 An applicant or employee who alleges discriminatory or unfair

employment practices in the state personnel system may appeal by

filing a complaint in writing with the Board. § 24-50-125.3. That

21
complaint is then referred to an ALJ, who reviews the information

presented by both parties. Dep’t of Pers. & Admin. Rule 8-26(A), 4

Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. The complainant “has the burden to

persuade the Board that it appears the employment action violate[d]

[their] rights,” id. at Rule 8-25(D). The ALJ then makes “a

[p]reliminary [r]ecommendation” to the Board as to whether a

hearing should be granted or denied. Id. at Rule 8-26(B). From

there, the Board considers the preliminary recommendation and

renders its decision to grant or deny a hearing. Id. at Rule 8-27(A).

¶ 43 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under CADA, a

complainant must either provide direct evidence of retaliation or

show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an

adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed

between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action.

22
Smith v. Bd. of Educ., 83 P.3d 1157, 1162 (Colo. App. 2003); see

Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1227 (10th Cir. 2008).4

1. Analysis

¶ 44 We conclude that Russell failed to establish a prima facie case

of unlawful retaliation under the CADA. Russell provided no direct

evidence of retaliation. Therefore, her claim rested on her ability to

demonstrate each element of the prima facie case. To satisfy the

first element of such a claim, Russell was required to demonstrate

that she engaged in activity protected by CADA prior to the alleged

adverse action. Bodaghi, 995 P.2d at 297; see Dep’t of Pers. &

Admin. Rule 8-25(D), 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. The record

contains no such evidence. Russell’s information sheet and reply

don’t address this claim or present argument or evidence showing

that she engaged in any CADA-protected activity before filing her

4 These cases concern retaliation claims under Title VII. However,
we may rely on federal law when it is helpful in construing Colorado
law. Because the applicable language in CADA is substantially
similar to Title VII language that prohibits retaliation, we rely on
cases interpreting Title VII. Colo. C.R. Comm’n v. Big O Tires, Inc.,
940 P.2d 397, 399 (Colo. 1997); see also Dep’t of Pers. and Admin.
Rule 9-4, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1 (noting that state and federal
case law should be referenced in determining whether
discrimination occurred).

23
appeal. Apart from checking the box for CADA retaliation on the

Board’s standard appeal form, Russell took no action to pursue or

develop a CADA claim. Russell therefore failed to establish any of

the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation. Under these

circumstances, Russell failed to meet her burden, and the Board

correctly concluded that her claim was abandoned.

¶ 45 Russell likewise failed to establish any violation of the

grievance procedures. To prevail on such a claim, she was required

to show both that she invoked the grievance process and that DOLA

failed to comply with the required procedures. See Dep’t of Pers. &

Admin. Rule 8-23, 4 Code Colo. Regs. 801-1. The grievance process

requires an employee to submit a grievance to their supervisor,

meet with the supervisor, and receive a written “Step One Decision.”

Id. at Rule 8-13(A). If no Step One Decision is issued, or if the

employee is dissatisfied, the employee must submit a written “Step

Two” grievance to the appointing authority and receive a written

“Step Two Decision.” Id. at Rule 8-13(B). Only after completion of

these steps, or a failure to issue a Step Two Decision, may the

employee appeal to the Board. Id. at Rule 8-14. The record

contains no evidence that Russell initiated or participated in the

24
grievance process at any stage. As with her CADA claim, Russell’s

information sheet and reply do not address the grievance claim and

present no evidence that DOLA failed to act or otherwise violated

the grievance procedures. Russell’s sole action was checking the

box for a grievance claim on the Board’s standard appeal form,

which is insufficient to preserve or develop the claim. We agree that

Russell abandoned her grievance claim.

III. Disposition

¶ 46 We affirm.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

25