Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Weatherill v. State Farm

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23CA1172

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
March 12, 2026

2026COA11

No. 23CA1172, Weatherill v. State Farm — Insurance —
Regulation of Insurance Companies — Required Disclosures;
Limitation of Actions — General Limitation of Actions Two
Years

Under section 10-3-1117(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025, a person who has

a potential automobile liability claim against an insured is entitled

to obtain relevant policy coverage information from the insured’s

insurance company. If the insurance company fails to respond to

the person’s request for information within thirty days, the insurer

is liable for damages in an amount of $100 for every day of

noncompliance. § 10-3-1117(3).

The questions presented on appeal are when a claim under

section 10-3-1117(3) accrues and which statute of limitations

applies. Declining to follow Reynolds v. Great Northern Insurance

Co., 2023 COA 77, a division of the court of appeals concludes that
section 10-3-1117 is not a penalty statute subject to a one-year

statute of limitations because the accrual provision for a cause of

action for penalties, section 13-80-108(9), C.R.S. 2025, does not

apply. Therefore, a section 10-3-1117 claim is subject to the two-

year catchall statute of limitations in section 13-80-102(1)(i), C.R.S.

2025, and accrues when the conduct giving rise to the cause of

action — i.e., the insurance company’s alleged noncompliance — is

discovered or should have been discovered.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA11

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1172
City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CV33310
Honorable Jill D. Dorancy, Judge

Joshua Weatherill and Wendy Weatherill,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Yun and Kuhn, JJ., concur

Announced March 12, 2026

Robinson & Henry P.C., Matthew W. Hamblin, Jon M. Topolewski, Denver,
Colorado; Singleton Shreiber P.C., Nelson Boyle, Denver, Colorado for
Plaintiffs-Appellants

Patterson Ripplinger, P.C, Franklin D. Patterson, Hillary D. Patterson,
Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

Ken Fiedler Injury Law, James R. Anderson, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus
Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association
¶1 Under section 10-3-1117(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025, a person who has

a potential automobile liability claim against an insured may

request relevant policy coverage information from the insured’s

insurance company. The insurer must respond within thirty days

by providing the claimant with all known insurance policies of the

insured, including any umbrella policies. Id. An insurer that

violates this obligation is liable to the requesting claimant for

damages in an amount of $100 for every day of noncompliance.

§ 10-3-1117(3).

¶2 In November 2022, plaintiffs, Joshua and Wendy Weatherill,

sued defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company, after they discovered that State Farm had provided them

with incomplete information in response to section 10-3-1117

requests they made on January 21, 2021, and February 16, 2021.

State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the

statute of limitations barred their claim. According to State Farm,

section 10-3-1117 imposes a penalty when an insurer fails to

comply with the statutory obligation, so the Weatherills’ claim was

subject to a one-year statute of limitations that began accruing

1
thirty-one days after State Farm received their requests. The

district court agreed with State Farm and dismissed the complaint.

¶3 Construing the relevant statutes and statutory scheme, we

conclude that section 10-3-1117 is not a penalty statute and,

therefore, is not subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Rather,

a claim against an insurer for violating section 10-3-1117 is subject

to the two-year catchall statute of limitations, § 13-80-102(1)(i),

C.R.S. 2025, and it accrues when the “conduct giving rise to the

cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered,” § 13-

80-108(8), C.R.S. 2025. In reaching this conclusion, we decline to

follow Reynolds v. Great Northern Insurance Co., 2023 COA 77.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand

the case with directions to reinstate the Weatherills’ complaint.

I. Background

¶4 The Weatherills were involved in a car accident with Keli

Ortega, who was insured by State Farm.1 On January 21, 2021,

the Weatherills’ counsel sent State Farm a request for information

on Ortega’s policy coverage under section 10-3-1117(2)(a). On

1 The facts are taken from the Weatherills’ amended complaint.

2
January 29, 2021, a State Farm claims specialist responded to the

request by email, attaching a copy of Ortega’s automobile liability

policy and declaration. That policy showed that Ortega had liability

coverage of $250,000. The response did not disclose an umbrella

policy for Ortega.

¶5 On February 16, 2021, the Weatherills’ counsel sent State

Farm’s registered agent a second, substantially identical section 10-

3-1117(2)(a) request. State Farm did not further respond.

¶6 Over a year after State Farm’s response, the Weatherills sued

Ortega. On October 31, 2022, and in connection with that

litigation, Ortega produced a confirmation of coverage document

from State Farm that showed she had an additional $1,000,000

umbrella policy at the time of the car accident.

¶7 In November 2022, the Weatherills filed this action against

State Farm. They asserted that State Farm had violated section 10-

3-1117 by failing to disclose Ortega’s umbrella policy in response to

their section 10-3-1117(2)(a) requests, and they sought damages of

$100 per day for each day that State Farm had not complied with

its obligation, plus attorney fees and costs.

3
¶8 State Farm moved to dismiss the Weatherills’ complaint under

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). It argued that section 10-3-1117 is a penalty

statute, and that a claim under the statute accrues at the time of

the violation, which, in this case, was March 19, 2021 — thirty-one

days after the Weatherills’ February 16, 2021, request to State

Farm’s registered agent. According to State Farm, because the

Weatherills sought a penalty, their claim was governed by a one-

year statute of limitations, and therefore the November 2022

complaint was barred because the statute of limitations had run.

The district court adopted State Farm’s argument and dismissed

the complaint.

II. Statute of Limitations for a Section 10-3-1117 Claim

¶9 To review the propriety of the district court’s ruling, we must

determine when a claim under section 10-3-1117 accrues and the

statute of limitations applicable to it. The parties’ initial briefing did

not address accrual, however. After oral argument, we granted the

parties’ request to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of

when a section 10-3-1117 claim accrues.

¶ 10 Considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the plain

language of the relevant statutes, we conclude that because the

4
accrual provision for a cause of action for penalties, § 13-80-108(9),

does not apply to a section 10-3-1117 claim, such a claim is not for

a penalty and therefore not subject to a one-year statute of

limitations. Consequently, a claim against an insurer for violating

section 10-3-1117 accrues under section 13-80-108(8) — when the

“conduct giving rise to the cause of action is discovered or should

have been discovered” — and is subject to a two-year statute of

limitations as set forth in section 13-80-102(1)(i).

¶ 11 The district court therefore erred by applying the one-year

statute of limitations to the Weatherills’ claim and dismissing their

November 2022 complaint.

A. Relevant Legal Principles

1. C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) Standards

¶ 12 A C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss tests the formal

sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint. Norton v. Rocky Mountain

Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2016 COA 3, ¶ 12, aff’d, 2018 CO 3.

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true

all factual allegations in the complaint and view the allegations in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Williams v. Rock-Tenn

Servs., Inc., 2016 COA 18, ¶ 11.

5
¶ 13 A court generally may not grant a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion

based on a statute of limitations defense unless the bare allegations

of the complaint reveal that the plaintiff filed the action after the

applicable statute of limitations had expired. Wagner v. Grange Ins.

Ass’n, 166 P.3d 304, 307 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 14 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim based

on a statute of limitations defense. Gomez v. Walker, 2023 COA 79,

¶ 7. When the court’s dismissal raises a question of statutory

interpretation, we review that issue de novo as well. See Rooftop

Restoration, Inc. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 CO 44, ¶ 5; see

also Gunderson v. Weidner Holdings, LLC, 2019 COA 186, ¶ 9

(determining the applicable statute of limitations presents a

question of law).

¶ 15 Our aim when interpreting a statute is to effectuate the

legislature’s intent. Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017 CO

13, ¶ 7. We begin with the statutory language itself, giving the text

its “ordinary and commonly accepted meaning.” Rooftop, ¶ 12. We

then consider the statutory framework as a whole, giving

“consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts and

avoiding constructions that would render any words or phrases

6
superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.” Pineda-Liberato

v. People, 2017 CO 95, ¶ 22. If the statutory language is “clear and

unambiguous,” the analysis ends. Hernandez v. Ray Domenico

Farms, Inc., 2018 CO 15, ¶ 6.

1. Statutes of Limitation

¶ 16 Statutes of limitation prescribe the time during which a party

may assert a cause of action. Gunderson, ¶ 9. Their purpose is to

promote justice, discourage unnecessary delay, and prevent the

pursuit of stale claims. Hickerson v. Vessels, 2014 CO 2, ¶ 13.

¶ 17 In title 13, article 80, of the Colorado Revised Statutes, the

General Assembly established the statutes of limitation for personal

actions. See §§ 13-80-101 to -119, C.R.S. 2025. As relevant here,

there is a one-year statute of limitations applicable to “[a]ll actions

for any penalty or forfeiture of any penal statutes,” § 13-80-

103(1)(d), C.R.S. 2025, and a two-year catchall statute of limitations

applicable to “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no other

period of limitation is provided,” § 13-80-102(1)(i).

¶ 18 “Integral to any statute of limitations is the time of accrual: the

time when the proverbial clock starts ticking and the statute of

limitations begins to run.” Rooftop, ¶ 13. The legislature has

7
established “a handful of separate dates of accrual which apply in

particular circumstances.” Id. A cause of action for penalties

accrues “when the determination of overpayment or delinquency for

which such penalties are assessed is no longer subject to appeal.”

§ 13-80-108(9). An action for losses or damages not otherwise

addressed in section 13-80-108 accrues “when the injury, loss,

damage, or conduct giving rise to the cause of action is discovered

or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable

diligence.” § 13-80-108(8).

1. Section 10-3-1117

¶ 19 Section 10-3-1117(2)(a) requires that when a prospective

claimant sends a request for policy information to a personal

automobile insurer, the insurer must respond within thirty days.

And the insurer’s response must include

the following information with regard to each
known policy of insurance of the named
insured, including excess or umbrella
insurance, that is or may be relevant to the
claim:

(I) The name of the insurer;

(II) The name of each insured party, as the
name appears on the declarations page of
the policy;

8
(III) The limits of the liability coverage; and

(IV) A copy of the policy.

Id.

¶ 20 An insurer that “violates this section is liable to the requesting

claimant for damages in an amount of one hundred dollars per day,

beginning on and including the thirty-first day following the receipt

of the claimant’s written request.” § 10-3-1117(3). “The penalty

accrues until the insurer provides the information required by this

section.” Id.

¶ 21 When enacting section 10-3-1117, the legislature also

amended its legislative declaration regarding insurance companies’

trade practices to clarify the statute’s purpose — to increase

“transparency in the insurance claims process to further the public

policy of encouraging settlement and preventing unnecessary

litigation” and to provide a claimant with “accurate and reliable

information about the amount of legal liability coverage available for

a claim.” Ch. 250, secs. 1, 2, §§ 10-3-1101, 10-3-1117, 2019 Colo.

Sess. Laws 2426 -28.

9
B. Application

¶ 22 We turn first to the plain statutory text to determine whether

the legislature intended section 10-3-1117 to be a statutory

penalty. See Rooftop, ¶¶ 9, 14. Section 10-3-1117(3) states that a

claimant may recover “damages” for an insurer’s violation. And

“damages” generally means “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be

paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury.” Black’s Law

Dictionary 488 (12th ed. 2024). But section 10-3-1117(3) also

refers to the damages as a “penalty.” The word “penalty,” as

commonly used, means “[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer,

usu[ally] in the form of imprisonment or fine; esp[ecially] a sum of

money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a

civil wrong (as distinguished from compensation for the injured

party’s loss).” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1365. A penalty is “often

something imposed by the state.” Rooftop, ¶ 14. Section 10-3-1117

damages are not a fine imposed by the state, suggesting that the

provision does not amount to a penalty.

¶ 23 Section 10-3-1117 has other features consistent with a

penalty, though. In particular, the statute punishes an insurer for

not complying with its statutory obligation, and the punishment is

10
based on the number of days it takes the insurer to comply, not the

claimant’s actual damages. See Kruse v. McKenna, 178 P.3d 1198,

1201 (Colo. 2008) (a statute is penal if “the statute asserted a new

and distinct cause of action,” the claim allows recovery without

proof of actual damages, and the claim allows an award in excess of

actual damages), overruled on other grounds by, Guarantee Tr. Life

Ins. Co. v. Est. of Casper, 2018 CO 43. But even if these features

suggest that the statute is penal, “that result would be meaningless

if the legislature explicitly determined that the statute was not

penal for the purposes of applying the appropriate statute of

limitations.” Rooftop, ¶ 9.

¶ 24 Therefore, we focus instead on section 10-3-1117 in the

context of “the interplay between the one-year statute of limitations,

section 13-80-103(1)(d), and the accrual statute, section 13-80-

108.” Id. at ¶ 15. In Rooftop, the supreme court conducted this

analysis in relation to section 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. 2025, which

governs claims for unreasonable delay or denial of insurance

11
benefits.2 Rooftop, ¶ 1. To determine whether the statute was

penal and subject to a one-year statute of limitations, the court first

looked to the accrual provision for penalties, which, as noted,

provides that the cause of action accrues when the determination of

overpayment or delinquency for which such penalties are assessed

is no longer subject to appeal, § 13-80-108(9). Based on the

accrual provision, the court determined that “the legislature

considered a defining feature of a cause of action for penalties to be

a determination of either overpayment or delinquency.” Rooftop,

¶ 15. The court explained that this defining feature was absent

from a cause of action under section 10-3-1116(1), where a

claimant “must only file a complaint” to support its claim against

the insurer. Rooftop, ¶ 15. And because a claim under the statute

“never leads to a determination of overpayment or delinquency[,]

. . . the claim would never accrue, and the statute of limitations

would be rendered meaningless.” Id. Accordingly, the supreme

2 If an insurer “unreasonably delay[s] or denie[s]” a claim for

payment of benefits, the claimant may bring an action “to recover
reasonable attorney fees and court costs and two times the covered
benefit.” § 10-3-1116(1), C.R.S. 2025.

12
court held that a section 10-3-1116(1) claim is not a cause of action

for penalties subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Id. at ¶ 16.

¶ 25 In our view, the Rooftop analysis controls here. The “defining

feature” of a claim for penalties is likewise absent from a cause of

action under section 10-3-1117. A claimant asserting a section 10-

3-1117 cause of action need only file a complaint to support a claim

against the insurer. See § 10-3-1117(3). And there is no

determination of overpayment or delinquency before the cause of

action is filed, nor does the claim lead to a determination of

overpayment or delinquency that is “no longer subject to appeal.”

§ 13-80-108(9).

¶ 26 This is where we part ways with Reynolds. See In re Marriage

of Aragon, 2019 COA 76, ¶ 13 (acknowledging that a division of this

court is not bound by another division’s decision). In Reynolds,

another division of this court considered the statute of limitations

applicable to a section 10-3-1117 cause of action. In that case, the

claimant asserted a claim against the insurer because, for over

seventeen months, the insurer did not provide a response to a

section 10-3-1117(2)(a) request. Reynolds, ¶ 2. Relying on the

reference to a “penalty” in section 10-3-1117(3), the Reynolds

13
division determined that section 10-3-1117 imposes a statutory

penalty, and that, as a penalty, the cause of action was subject to a

one-year statute of limitations under section 13-80-103(1)(d).

Reynolds, ¶¶ 13-14. The division then determined that (1) section

13-80-108(9) governs the accrual of a cause of action for penalties;

(2) “[t]he determination of delinquency” — i.e., “not providing the

insurance policy” — is “statutorily established as the thirty-first day

after the written request is received by the insurer’s registered

agent”; and (3) “a cause of action requesting the penalty imposed by

section 10-3-1117(3) accrues on the thirty-first day after the insurer

receives the written request for information.” Id. at ¶ 16.

¶ 27 We cannot agree with the Reynolds division’s conclusion that,

under section 10-3-1117, a “determination of delinquency” is

“statutorily established” as the thirty-first day after the insurer

receives the claimant’s request. Id. The plain language of section

10-3-1117 does not mention a determination of delinquency; rather,

it provides that “damages” begin to accrue thirty-one days after the

insurer receives the request. § 10-3-1117(3). Equating this date

with the accrual date for the statute of limitations conflates the

penalty and damages accrual standards in a way that is

14
inconsistent with the supreme court’s analysis in Rooftop. Cf. King

Soopers Inc. v. Indus. Claims Appeals Off., 2023 COA 73, ¶ 34 (“We

are bound to follow Colorado Supreme Court precedent.”). Indeed,

Rooftop rejected the proposition that a cause of action could

simultaneously be “a cause of action ‘for penalty or forfeiture of any

penal statute’ (under section 13-80-103(1)(d)) and a ‘cause of action

for losses or damages’ (under section 13-80-108(8)).” Rooftop, ¶ 16.

¶ 28 Moreover, nothing in section 10-3-1117 identifies who would

make the determination of delinquency and start the clock on the

statute of limitations. Reynolds, ¶ 16, suggests that the claimant

makes that determination when the insurer fails to respond within

the thirty-day deadline. But the claimant does not make a

determination of delinquency; the claimant discovers the “conduct

giving rise to the cause of action.” § 13-80-108(8).

¶ 29 In Reynolds, the claimant could readily ascertain within thirty

days that the insurer violated section 10-3-1117 because the

insurer did not respond to the claimant’s request. But the

conclusion that section 10-3-1117 is a penalty becomes problematic

when, as alleged here, the insurer responds to a section 10-3-

1117(2)(a) request within thirty days but fails to provide the

15
claimant with all the statutorily required information. In that

circumstance, the claimant may have no knowledge that the

insurer’s response violated section 10-3-1117 within the thirty-day

deadline. The claimant therefore cannot determine a deficiency in

the insurer’s response until the claimant “discover[s]” the violation.

§ 13-80-108(8). Under Reynolds’ holding, though, the statute of

limitations would nonetheless begin to accrue thirty-one days after

the claimant’s section 10-3-1117(2)(a) request. See id.

Consequently, a claimant’s section 10-3-1117 cause of action could

be barred by the one-year statute of limitations even though the

claimant did not know, and could not reasonably discover, that an

insurer had violated its obligation under the statute. Such an

interpretation appears incongruous with the legislature’s purpose

when enacting section 10-3-1117. See § 10-3-1101(2), C.R.S. 2025;

Pineda-Liberato, ¶ 22; cf. Owens v. Brochner, 474 P.2d 603, 606

(Colo. 1970) (“To say that a cause of action accrues to a person

when she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time,

that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be expected to

have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon her is patently

inconsistent and unrealistic. . . . To say to one who has been

16
wronged, ‘You had a remedy, but before the wrong was

ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,’ makes a

mockery of the law.” (citation omitted)).

¶ 30 Even if, in light of Reynolds, section 10-3-1117 could be

considered ambiguous, we think the legislative history supports our

interpretation. See Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 13 (if a

statute is ambiguous, reviewing courts turn to “other interpretive

aids to discern the legislature’s intent,” including “any relevant

legislative history”). In 1986, the legislature enacted the current

scheme on the statutes of limitation and accompanying accrual

provisions. Ch. 114, sec. 1, §§ 13-80-101 to -118, 1986 Colo. Sess.

Laws 695 -701. During a hearing before the House Judiciary

Committee, a committee member asked for an example of what

causes of action would constitute a penalty subject to the one-year

statute of limitations. Hearing on S.B. 69 before the H. Judiciary

Comm., 55th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mar. 13, 1986). In

response, an attorney who assisted in drafting the bill testified that

it could refer to taxes: “if somebody failed to pay their taxes within a

certain time and the penalty is assessed.” Id. (statement of Richard

W. Laugesen). He further explained that additional examples were

17
provided in the bill through the “cross-references” to section 13-80-

1. Id. The titles of these cross-referenced statutes identify them

as penalties, and the assessment of a penalty in those statutes

includes, as mentioned by section 13-80-108(9), a predicate

regulatory or adjudicative finding of delinquency or overpayment.

See § 8-72-107(1), (3), C.R.S. 1990 (allowing the division of

insurance to fine or imprison employers for each failure to provide

tax records);3 § 8-79-104(1)(a)(II)(A), (1)(d), C.R.S. 2025 (allowing the

division of insurance to fine employers for their failure to comply

with reporting requirements); § 8-81-101, C.R.S. 2025 (setting out

fines and other consequences for entities making false

representations or willfully failing to disclose material facts to the

division of unemployment insurance).

¶ 31 Construing the plain language of section 10-3-1117 and the

relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that section 10-3-1117 is

not an action for a penalty or forfeiture for purposes of determining

the statute of limitations. See Rooftop, ¶ 9 (“[I]f the legislature even

3 The cross-reference to section 13-80-108(9) was later removed

from this statute in 1991. Ch. 226, sec. 2, § 8-72-107(3), 1991
Colo. Sess. Laws 1360.

18
implicitly indicates that a statute is not penal for the purposes of

identifying the correct statute of limitations, then [the court] must

yield to the intent of the legislature.”). A cause of action brought

under section 10-3-1117, therefore, is not subject to a one-year

statute of limitations.

¶ 32 Then, because a section 10-3-1117 claim is not otherwise

enumerated in another statute of limitations, we conclude that such

a claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations under the

catchall provision for “[a]ll other actions of every kind for which no

other period of limitation is provided.” § 13-80-102(1)(i). And

because the claim must accrue under some provision of section 13-

80-108, see Rooftop, ¶ 13 (The statute of limitations is “necessarily

connect[ed]” to “one of the dates of accrual laid out in section 13-

80-108.”), we further conclude that this cause of action “shall be

deemed to accrue when the . . . conduct giving rise to the cause of

action is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise

of reasonable diligence.” § 13-80-108(8).

¶ 33 Having determined the applicable statute of limitations and

accrual period, we conclude that the district court erred by granting

19
State Farm’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion and dismissing the

Weatherills’ section 10-3-1117 claim.

¶ 34 As alleged in the complaint, the Weatherills sent requests to

State Farm on January 21, 2021, and February 16, 2021, for

insurance coverage information on Ortega under section 10-3-

1117(2)(a). On January 29, 2021, State Farm responded to the

Weatherills’ January request, and it did not provide any further

response to the February request. In its response, State Farm

provided Ortega’s automobile liability policy and declaration,

showing liability coverage of $250,000, but it did not disclose

Ortega’s $1,000,000 umbrella policy. The Weatherills did not

discover State Farm’s failure to disclose the umbrella policy until

October 31, 2022.

¶ 35 Accepting these factual allegations as true, see Williams, ¶ 11,

the bare allegations of the complaint do not reveal that the statute

of limitations had run before the Weatherills filed their complaint,

see Wagner, 166 P.3d at 307. Regardless of whether we view the

Weatherills’ two section 10-3-1117(2)(a) requests in isolation

(because, as State Farm alleged, only the February 16, 2021,

request was sent to the registered agent as directed by section 10-3-

20
1117) or if we consider them together, the two-year statute of

limitations had not run before the Weatherills filed their November

2022 complaint. See § 13-80-102(1)(i); § 13-80-108(8). The

Weatherills alleged that they did not learn that State Farm’s

response to the January 21, 2021, request failed to disclose the

umbrella policy until October 31, 2022. The Weatherills filed their

complaint within two years of this discovery, and they filed their

complaint within two years of State Farm’s alleged failure to

respond to the February 16, 2021, request within thirty days.

¶ 36 The Weatherills therefore were not barred from bringing their

section 10-3-1117 claim against State Farm.

III. Disposition

¶ 37 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the

district court with directions to reinstate the complaint.

JUDGE YUN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

21