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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

M.A. v. T.D.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0559

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-559

M.A.

vs.

T.D.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant appeals from the extension of an abuse

prevention order issued by a Boston Municipal Court judge

pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 3 (209A order). He argues that the

judge erred in extending the 209A order because the plaintiff

failed to establish that she was in imminent danger of abuse.

We affirm.

Background. We draw the following facts from the record,

reserving some for later discussion. The plaintiff and the

defendant dated briefly in 2024 but broke up after three months.

Following their breakup, the defendant began to try to contact

the plaintiff. The defendant used Instagram, Facebook,

WhatsApp, Facetime, and various phone numbers and identities to
attempt to contact the defendant. He also sent messages to the

plaintiff's friends and family to coerce the plaintiff into

calling him. He posted pictures of the plaintiff on a Facebook

group calling her an illegal immigrant and threatened to call

immigration if she did not call him back. The defendant sent

messages pretending to be the company that owned the apartment

where she lived to "get [her] to meet up" and "sen[t]

intimidating messages saying [the plaintiff] scammed him and got

free meals out of him." Further, he "pretended to be someone

named Tyler to get [her] to meet up with him on three different

dates."

On January 21, 2025, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte

209A order against the defendant. On February 4, 2025,

following a two-party hearing wherein the defendant was

represented by counsel, the judge extended the 209A order for

one year. The defendant timely appealed therefrom.

Discussion. The defendant solely argues that the plaintiff

did not prove that she was in imminent danger of abuse, and thus

the judge erred in issuing the one-year 209A order. We

disagree. "We review . . . for an abuse of discretion or other

error of law" (citation omitted). Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97

Mass. App. Ct. 660, 664 (2020). Whether seeking the issuance of

an initial protective order or a later extension of that order,

2
"[t]he burden is on the complainant to establish facts

justifying [its] issuance and continuance." Iamele v. Asselin,

444 Mass. 734, 736 (2005), quoting Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass.

592, 596 (1995). "The plaintiff must meet that burden by a

preponderance of the evidence." Iamele, supra.

1. Abuse. We discern no error in the issuance of the 209A

order because sufficient evidence of abuse was presented at the

two-party hearing. "Abuse" is defined as, inter alia, "placing

another in fear of imminent serious physical harm." G. L.

c. 209A, § 1. "When a person seeks to prove abuse by fear of

imminent serious physical harm, our cases have required in

addition that the fear be reasonable" (quotation omitted).

Iamele, 444 Mass. at 737. "In determining whether an

apprehension of anticipated physical force is reasonable, a

court will look to the actions and words of the defendant in

light of the attendant circumstances" (citation omitted).

Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 143 (2006).

However, "for the plaintiff's fear of imminent serious physical

harm to be reasonable, it is not necessary that there be a

history -- or even a specific incident of physical violence."

Noelle N., 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 665. "[A] judge must consider

the totality of the circumstances of the parties' relationship."

Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740.

3
Here, the record is replete with instances wherein the

plaintiff expressed fear, stated that she was "afraid," and

testified that she was "afraid that he's going to come after me

in my home and my work, and I'm afraid that he will harm himself

and also harm me." She provided detail and context to her

reasons for being in fear of imminent serious physical harm, and

there was a clear nexus between the defendant's actions --

including but not limited to his stalking-like behavior -- and

that fear. Thus, we discern no error in the judge's conclusion.

See Iamele, 444 Mass. at 741. See also G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass.

App. Ct. 389, 396 (2018) ("where we are able to discern a

reasonable basis for the order in the judge's rulings and order,

no specific findings are required").

1. Coercive control. The plaintiff also argues, as an

additional ground in support of the issuance of the 209A order,

that she met her burden to establish coercive control.1 On

September 18, 2024, four months before the plaintiff filed for

the original 209A order, the abuse prevention statute was

amended to include "coercive control," defined as "a pattern of

behavior intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate,

1 We note that the coercive control theory was at issue
during the two-party hearing. Indeed, the judge recognized as
much and stated on the record that the 209A order "could be seen
as" and "based on" coercive control.

4
control, coerce or compel compliance." G. L. c. 209A, § 1, as

amended through St. 2024, c. 118, § 4. "To demonstrate a

pattern of behavior, the plaintiff must make a showing of three

or more acts," and "each act must be intended to threaten,

intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel

compliance of a family or household member." See Guidelines for

Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings § 1:00A

commentary (Oct. 2025). Given our conclusion that there was

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the plaintiff was in

fear of imminent serious physical harm, and that such fear was

reasonable, we need not rely on that additional basis.2

Order entered February 4,
2025, extending abuse
prevention order, affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Neyman &
Sacks, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: March 10, 2026.

2 We note, however, that there is a measure of
persuasiveness to the plaintiff's argument, as there was
evidence that the defendant performed at a minimum three or more
acts intended to "threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate,
control, coerce or compel compliance" of the plaintiff. See
Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings
§ 1:00A commentary (Oct. 2025).

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

5