Jump To

Top Caption Syllabus Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 11, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Walker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 813
• Docket Number: C-250451

• Judges: Bock

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (18.3K)

• PDF

Syllabus

MOTION TO DISMISS — CREDIT-CARD APPLICATION — IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT — UNJUST ENRICHMENT — CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD — BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: Plaintiff's breach-of-implied-contract claim based on defendant bank's retention of plaintiff's personal information included in a denied credit-card application was properly dismissed where the processing of a credit-card application does not form a contract and plaintiff pleaded no facts supporting an inference that the bank agreed to enter into contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff's unjust-enrichment claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff alleged no facts supporting an inference that she conferred a benefit on defendant through the submission of a credit-card application that included her personal information and did not allege that her information had monetary value or that the bank sold the information for a profit. Plaintiff's conversion claim was properly dismissed where her complaint alleged that defendant came into possession of her property lawfully and did not allege that plaintiff demanded the return of the property and defendant refused to return the property. Plaintiff's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff's submission of a credit-card application to defendant bank did not establish a fiduciary relationship between the two. Plaintiff's constructive-fraud claim was properly dismissed where defendant bank owed no duty to disclose facts to plaintiff as it did not stand in any special relationship that would result in defendant owing plaintiff a duty to disclose. Plaintiff's challenge to the trial court's dismissal of her declaratory-judgment claim is overruled where plaintiff failed to comply with App.R. 16 by not citing to any relevant law.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as Walker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2026-Ohio-813.]

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
           FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
               HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

SHARNEE J. WALKER, : APPEAL NO. C-250451
TRIAL NO. A-2502150
Plaintiff-Appellant, :

vs. :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., :

    Defendant-Appellee.                    :

     This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
     For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 3/11/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as Walker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2026-Ohio-813.]

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
           FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
               HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

SHARNEE J. WALKER, : APPEAL NO. C-250451
TRIAL NO. A-2502150
Plaintiff-Appellant, :

vs. :
OPINION
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., :

    Defendant-Appellee.                    :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 11, 2026

Sharnee J. Walker, pro se,

Dickinson Wright PLLC and Manuel D. Cardona, for Defendant-Appellee.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

    {¶1}    After defendant-appellant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (“Chase”) denied

her credit-card application, plaintiff-appellant Sharnee Walker sued Chase. Her

complaint alleged several causes of action based on Chase retaining the personal

information Walker had provided with her application without any “reciprocal benefit

for the value received.” The trial court granted Chase’s motion to dismiss Walker’s

amended complaint. We affirm its judgment.

                      I. Factual and Procedural History

    {¶2}    Walker’s amended complaint against Chase asserted claims for breach

of implied contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, constructive fraud, breach of

fiduciary duty, an accounting, and a declaratory judgment. Some of the complaint’s

statements appear to be sovereign-citizen1-related assertions.

    {¶3}    Walker’s online credit application to Chase included her personal

information, such as her name, social security number, and signature. Walker alleged

that by processing her application, Chase created a “legally binding implied contract .

. . obligating [Chase] to consider [Walker’s] offer in good faith and to properly handle

the valuable information provided in a commercially reasonable manner, and . . . to

1 Sovereign citizens, sometimes known as tax protestors, Moorish-Americans, or American State

Nationals, often raise assertions that amount to pseudo law and have been described as “extremists
who wish to dissociate themselves from the social compact undergirding this nation's democratic
institutions, including the independent judicial branch of government.” United States v. Mitchell,
405 F.Supp.2d 602, 605 (D.Md. 2005). As one practitioner has explained, “Sovereign Citizens
believe that the United States Government has no inherent power over individual citizens of the
various states without individual consent.” Kalinowski: A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen
Movement, 80 Mont.L.Rev. 153, 157 (2019). Walker describes herself as both a “living woman” and
a “corporate entity.” The distinction between the two lies in the group’s belief “that our nation is
made up of two types of people: those who are sovereign citizens by virtue of Article IV of the
Constitution, and those who are ‘corporate’ or ‘14th Amendment’ citizens by virtue of the
ratification of the 14th Amendment.” Mitchell at 605. Courts across the country have rejected
sovereign citizenship pseudo-legal arguments as “meritless[,] patently frivolous, . . . nonsensical,
gibberish, and having no conceivable validity in American Law.” People of the Republic United
States ex rel. Goldsmith v. Schreier, D.S.D., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131987, *10 (S.D. S.D. Sept. 17,
2012).

                                             3
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

provide reciprocal benefit for the value received.”

   {¶4}   Walker further alleged that though it denied her application, Chase

retained her personal information, which it used for its own benefit by “feeding the

data into propriety risk models, storing it for credit risk aggregation, leveraging it to

raise reserves or securitize internal receivables, and using it to meet compliance

benchmarks (e.g., Basel III, CECL under GAAP), all without providing any reciprocal

benefit to Plaintiff.” Walker demanded a “full accounting and disclosure” from Chase

involving “the handling and monetization of her financial instrument and associated

data.” Chase refused to do so, citing its lack of obligation to provide Walker any

documentation.

   {¶5}   Chase moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

After both parties filed their briefs, the trial court granted Chase’s motion to dismiss.

Walker has appealed.

                                 II. Analysis

   {¶6}   Walker raises seven assignments of error, which collectively argue that

the trial court erred in granting Chase’s motion to dismiss Walker’s complaint.

Walker’s first assignment of error argues, globally, that the trial court erred in

dismissing her complaint and the other six assignments relate to her individual claims.

We begin with her second assignment of error and proceed through her various claims.

A. Standard of review

   {¶7}   This court reviews a trial court’s judgment granting a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim de novo. Twang, LLC v. City of Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-6077,

¶ 87 (1st Dist.). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Brendamour v. City of the

Village of Indian Hill, 2022-Ohio-4724, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). Civ.R. 8(A) sets the standard

                                       4
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

for determining whether a complaint’s allegations are sufficient. Vandemark v. Reder,

2026-Ohio-50, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). A complaint must “contain (1) a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for

judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.” Civ.R. 8(A).

   {¶8}   A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal is appropriate where, accepting the factual

allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from those

facts in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines that “it appears ‘beyond doubt from

the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling [the plaintiff] to

recovery.’” Brendamour at ¶ 17, quoting O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union,

Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus. Without sufficient factual support, conclusory

statements involving elements of a claim cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.

Olthaus v. Niesen, 2023-Ohio-4710, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). But Ohio is a notice-pleading

jurisdiction, and plaintiffs are not required to prove their cases at the pleading stage.

Maternal Grandmother, ADMR v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2021-

Ohio-4096, ¶ 7, 16.

B. Second Assignment of Error: Implied-in-fact contract

   {¶9}   Walker argues that the trial court erroneously dismissed her claim for

breach of an implied-in-fact contract. She maintains that the trial court (1) used an

incorrect legal standard, and (2) resolved factual disputes against her involving

whether mutual assent existed.

   1. Implied-in-fact contracts

   {¶10} To state a claim for breach of contract, a party must plead facts showing

“(1) the existence of a valid contract between the parties, (2) the other party’s failure

to perform where performance is due, and (3) damages.” Nationstar Mtge., LLC v.

Krehnbrink, 2025-Ohio-4445, ¶ 50 (1st Dist.). Walker challenges the trial court’s

                                       5
            OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

determination that no contract existed between her and Chase.

   {¶11} A contract is one or more promises, which, upon breach, give rise to a

cause of action. Deffren v. Johnson, 2021-Ohio-817, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). Under Ohio law,

contracts may be express, implied in fact, or implied in law (quasi-contract). Linder v.

Am. Natl. Ins. Co., 2003-Ohio-5394, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.), citing Legros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio

St.3d 1, 6 (1989). Express contracts involve the parties mutually assenting to the

contract’s terms through an explicitly stated offer and acceptance. Legros at 6. An

implied-in-fact contract also requires mutual assent, but no express offer and

acceptance are necessary; instead, the existence of the contract and its terms are

determined by viewing the “surrounding circumstances which made it inferable that

the contract exists as a matter of tacit understanding.” Legros at 6-7.

   {¶12} The party claiming the existence of an implied-in-fact contract bears a

“heavy burden” to “‘“demonstrate the existence of each element necessary to the

formation of a contract including, inter alia, the exchange of bilateral promises,

consideration and mutual assent.”’” Deffren at ¶ 19, quoting Sagonowski v. The

Andersons, Inc., 2005-Ohio-326, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), quoting Bowes v. Toledo Collision—

Toledo Mechanical, Inc., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3727, *9 (6th Dist. Aug. 18, 2000).

While the parties’ mutual assent to enter an implied-in-fact contract is inferred from

the circumstances, the facts must show that the parties actually intended to enter a

contract. Id.

   2. Walker’s complaint contains no facts that could show an
   implied-in-fact contract

   {¶13} Initially, Walker argues the trial court applied the incorrect legal

standard when it found that Walker’s complaint lacked any factual allegations

suggesting that Chase “promised [Walker] access to credit in exchange for personally

                                       6
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

identifiable information.” She claims this conflated the requirements for an express

contract with an implied-in-fact contract. She is incorrect. Walker’s pleading an

implied-in-fact contract claim does not relieve her from the obligation to plead facts

showing that Chase agreed to enter into a contract with her. As explained, while an

implied-in-fact contract does not include an express offer and acceptance, Walker had

to allege facts demonstrating the formation of a contract, including mutual assent,

consideration, and bilateral promises. Deffren at ¶ 19, quoting Sagonowski at ¶ 14,

quoting Bowes at *9. In other words, to survive a Civ.R. 12(B) motion, Walker’s

complaint had to allege facts that, if believed, showed that Chase promised to provide

Walker with something of value.

   {¶14} But Walker’s complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that her

submission of a credit-card application and Chase’s processing of the application,

along with its retention of her identifying information, created an implied-in-fact

contract.

   {¶15} A consumer’s submitting a credit-card application and a bank’s

processing that application does not form a contract entitling the applicant to a line of

credit. See Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Palmer, 63 Ohio App.3d 491, 493-494 (10th

Dist. 1989) (credit-card applicant submitted an application, which was denied, and

“therefore, no cardholder contract could have existed between her and the bank.”); see

also Guridy v. Am. Express Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105671, *6 (N.D.Ohio June 4,

2025) (“[T]he only clear facts Guridy alleges on the face of her complaint are that she

submitted an online application to Amex for a platinum credit card, which Amex

denied . . . Such facts are insufficient to state any plausible claim against Amex under

federal or state law.”); Discover Bank v. Wyley, 2025-Ohio-104, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.)

(“Credit card agreements are contracts whereby the issuance and use of a credit card

                                       7
              OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

creates a legally binding agreement.” (Emphasis added.)).

   {¶16} Walker argues that her claim “concerns the use of Appellant’s data, not

a promise of credit. The denial is a separate event and is not relevant to the existence

of the contract regarding the commercial data.” But Walker’s amended complaint

alleged that Chase retained her personal information without providing “any

reciprocal benefit.” And under these facts, the only plausible “reciprocal benefit”

would be the credit for which she applied. Accordingly, her complaint did claim that

Chase should have issued her credit in exchange for Walker submitting an application

containing personal information, which Chase retained.

   {¶17} Walker’s application containing her personal information did not create

a contract requiring Chase to provide her a line of credit. That Chase may have

obtained some residual benefit from retaining her personal information does not, on

its own, establish that a contract was formed. See Legros, 44 Ohio St.3d at 7

(distinguishing between implied-in-fact contracts and implied-in-law (quasi-

contracts) where, while there is no meeting of the minds, “civil liability arises out of

the obligation cast by law upon a person in receipt of benefits which he is not justly

entitled to retain.”).

   {¶18} Moreover, the amended complaint includes no allegations supporting

an inference that Chase promised Walker it would do anything in exchange for her

submitting a credit-card application. Walker alleged nothing that would support an

inference that Chase agreed not to retain her data unless it issued her credit. The facts,

viewed in the light most favorable to Walker, do not establish a mutual assent to the

contract terms Walker argues exist.

   {¶19} We overrule Walker’s second assignment of error.

                                        8
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

C. Third Assignment of Error: Unjust enrichment

   {¶20} Walker asserts that the trial court erroneously dismissed her unjust-

enrichment claim because it deemed her allegation that she conferred a benefit on

Chase to be conclusory, and it improperly resolved factual issues regarding the benefit

she provided Chase against Walker.

   {¶21} The equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment allows a party to “recover

the reasonable value of services rendered in the absence of an express contract if

denying such recovery would unjustly enrich the opposing party.” Deffren, 2021-Ohio-

817, at ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). To state a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must plead facts

showing “(1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff upon a defendant, (2) knowledge by the

defendant of the benefit, and (3) retention of a benefit by the defendant under

circumstances where it would be unjust to do so without payment of its value.” Id.,

quoting Estate of Neal v. White, 2019-Ohio-4280, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). Generally, a party

cannot maintain an unjust-enrichment claim where the subject of the claim is

governed by an enforceable express or implied-in-fact contract. Id., citing Ryan v.

Rival Mfg. Co., 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 14729, *3 (1st Dist. Dec. 16, 1981).

   {¶22} The trial court found that Walker failed to alleged facts supporting an

inference that Chase benefited from retaining Walker’s personal information. Walker

argues that her complaint sufficiently alleged a conferred benefit by stating that Chase

used her information “for monetization purposes.” On appeal, Walker asserts that it is

a “well-known fact in the financial industry, that a bank’s ability to use customer data

for regulatory calculations provides a substantial, monetizable benefit. This benefit

includes, but is not limited to, optimizing capital reserves, managing risk exposure,

and avoiding regulatory penalties.”

   {¶23} The trial court correctly determined that Walker’s assertion that she

                                        9
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

conferred a benefit upon Chase was conclusory. She did not allege that her personal

information itself had intrinsic monetary value or that Chase sold her information for

a profit. See Brooks v. Peoples Bank, 732 F.Supp.3d 765, 782 (S.D.Ohio 2024)

(“Plaintiffs cannot recover the ‘value’ of their [personal information] because they fail

to allege Limestone benefited in that amount, for example by selling or profiting off of

their [personal information] in any way, or, frankly, that Plaintiffs were deprived of

the value of their [personal information] when they gave it to Limestone.”). Absent any

facts—other than banking jargon—that support a reasonable inference that Chase

received any benefit from Walker’s personal information, her unjust-enrichment

claim cannot succeed. We overrule Walker’s third assignment of error.

D. Fourth Assignment of Error: Conversion

   {¶24} Walker argues that the trial court “misapplied the concept of

‘dispossession of ownership’ in the context of data.”

   {¶25} “Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the

exclusion of the rights of the owner or the withholding of the property from the owner’s

possession under a claim inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” Bunta v. Superior

VacuPress, L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-4363, ¶ 20. If the defendant lawfully obtained

possession of the plaintiff’s property, then the plaintiff must also establish (1) the

plaintiff demanded the return of the property, and (2) the defendant refused to return

the property. Alexander v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2012-Ohio-3911, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.).

   {¶26} Walker’s complaint established that Chase lawfully gained possession of

Walker’s personal information because she voluntarily submitted a credit application.

But Walker did not assert she demanded Chase return her information or that Chase

refused to do so. Her appellant brief concedes this point stating that the “[a]mended

complaint may have omitted the specific allegation of a demand and refusal.”

                                       10
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

   {¶27} The trial court properly dismissed Walker’s conversion claim, so we

overrule Walker’s fourth assignment of error.

E. Fifth Assignment of Error: Breach of Fiduciary Duty

   {¶28} Walker argues that the trial court erred by dismissing this claim because

“special circumstances” existed giving rise to a fiduciary duty.

   {¶29} Walker’s fiduciary-duty claim required factual allegations showing (1)

existence of a duty created through a fiduciary relationship, (2) Chase’s failure to

observe the duty, and (3) an injury proximately caused by that failure. Mills Fence Co.,

LLC v. Kinne, 2025-Ohio-2247, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). “‘A fiduciary relationship is one in

which special confidence and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another

and there is a resulting position of superiority or influence, acquired by virtue of this

special trust.’” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Massien, 2010-Ohio-1864, ¶ 35. “‘A

“fiduciary” is “a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for

the benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking.”’” Branson v. Fifth

Third Bank, 2025-Ohio-4396, ¶ 71 (1st Dist.), quoting Health Alliance of Greater

Cincinnati v. Christ Hosp., 2008-Ohio-4981, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.), quoting Groob v.

KeyBank, 2006-Ohio-1189, ¶ 16.

   {¶30} Walker alleged no facts establishing that Chase owed her a fiduciary

duty. Chase and Walker’s only interaction, according to the complaint, involved

Walker’s request for a line of credit and Chase’s processing her application, denying

her application, and retaining her information. Walker, however, argues that the trial

court ignored the “special circumstances” present in this case that should give rise to

a fiduciary duty, including (1) her providing her personal information to Chase, (2)

Chase’s position as a sophisticated financial institution with “superior knowledge

regarding the use and value of this data,” (3) Chase’s having “operationalized” her

                                       11
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

personal information to “meet its binding regulatory obligations,” and (4) Chase’s

nondisclosure of its intent to use her data to do so. These allegations do not establish

that Chase owed Walker a fiduciary duty. Instead, they suggest that Chase had a motive

at the outset of the relationship to use Walker’s data to determine whether to enter

into a contractual business relationship.

   {¶31} Chase and Walker’s interactions did not create even a debtor-creditor

relationship, which would itself be insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship. See

Mills at ¶ 19; Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St.2d 282, 286 (1979). Walker

alleged no facts suggesting that Chase engaged in any undertaking on her behalf that

might have required it to act primarily for her benefit.

   {¶32} We overrule Walker’s fifth assignment of error.

F. Sixth Assignment of Error: Constructive Fraud

   {¶33} Walker argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her constructive-

fraud claim because it applied the standard for “actual fraud” to her constructive-fraud

claim, improperly requiring her to plead “a false representation, knowledge of falsity .

. . and intent to mislead.”

   {¶34} Constructive fraud is the “‘breach of a legal or equitable duty, which,

irrespective of moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent, because of

its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure

public interests.’” Cohen v. Estate of Cohen, 23 Ohio St.3d 90, 91 (1986), quoting

Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 169 W.Va. 72, 76 (1981). Constructive fraud typically occurs

where parties to a contract have a fiduciary or confidential relationship, due to a

party’s failure to disclose material facts where the party is under a duty to speak.

Downing v. Downing, 2023-Ohio-2673, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.), quoting Cohen at 92, citing

Carmen v. Carmen, 2012-Ohio-3255, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting Layman v. Binns, 35

                                        12
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Ohio St.3d 176, 178 (1988). The duty to disclose material facts applies only to facts that

the other party did not and reasonably could not have known. See Saxe v. Dlusky,

2010-Ohio-5323, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.). A duty to provide information may arise from a

fiduciary relationship or in situations “‘where one party imposes confidence in the

other because of that person’s position, and the other party knows of this confidence.’”

Schmitz v. NCAA, 2016-Ohio-8041, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.), quoting Cent. States Stamping

Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405, 1409 (6th Cir. 1984).

   {¶35} Constructive fraud does not require fraudulent intent. Cohen at 92. But

a constructive-fraud claim, like an actual-fraud claim, must be pled with particularity

under Civ.R. 9(B). Id. at ¶ 66; see Kobal v. Edward Jones Secs., 2021-Ohio-1088, ¶ 20

(8th Dist.). Moreover, parties asserting constructive fraud must allege detrimental

reliance. Oak Hill Invest. Co. v. Jablonski, 605 N.E.2d 998 (6th Dist. 1992).

   {¶36} The trial court incorrectly cited actual-fraud elements. But its decision

rested on Walker’s failure to allege facts supporting an inference that Chase owed

Walker a duty to disclose information, a requirement common to both actual- and

constructive-fraud claims.

   {¶37} At most, the trial court’s reciting actual-fraud elements was harmless

error because the trial court’s finding that Chase did not owe Walker a duty to disclose

was correct. Chase and Walker were not in a fiduciary relationship. They were not

parties to a contract. This was not a situation where Walker might have “impose[d]

confidence” in Chase because of Chase’s position, or that Chase would have any reason

to know about that confidence. Walker did not allege detrimental reliance—nothing in

her complaint suggested that had she known Chase would use her personal

information for internal uses, she would not have submitted her credit application.

And as Walker asserts that Chase’s use of her personal information is “a well-known

                                       13
             OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

fact,” Chase had no duty to disclose information because Walker already knew that

Chase would use her personal information.

   {¶38} The trial court properly dismissed Walker’s constructive-fraud claim, so

we overrule her sixth assignment of error.

G. Seventh Assignment of Error: Declaratory Judgment/Accounting

   {¶39} Walker challenges the trial court’s dismissing her declaratory-judgment

action and request for an accounting.

   1. Declaratory judgment

   {¶40} Walker asserts the trial court’s finding that “no real controversy exists”

was “a fundamental misapplication of the law.” Yet, Walker cites no law involving

declaratory actions. Walker fails to provide our standard of review and does not cite

law involving when a trial court may dismiss a declaratory-judgment action. She also

fails to define “actual controversy” for declaratory-judgment purposes.

   {¶41} But even if Walker had provided authority and developed a cognizable

argument, no genuine controversy existed between Walker and Chase. There was no

contract, no relationship, no promises, and no representations. Nothing amounts to

an actual controversy.

   2. Accounting

   {¶42} Walker’s request for an accounting is a remedy, not a cause of action,

and cannot exist on its own without a viable claim. See Meehan v. Mardis, 2019-Ohio-

4075, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). Here, no viable claims exist.

   {¶43} We overrule Walker’s seventh assignment of error.

H. First Assignment of Error: Complaint as a whole

   {¶44} Because we hold that the trial court properly dismissed all of Walker’s

claims, we overrule Walker’s first assignment of error, which challenges the trial

                                        14
           OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

court’s dismissing her amended complaint as a whole.

                            III. Conclusion

  {¶45} We overrule Walker’s assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                          Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.

                                    15