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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. K. D. B.

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 509
• Docket Number: A184871
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Aoyagi

• Disposition: Jurisdictional judgment reversed as to Count 3; otherwise affirmed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Jurisdictional judgment reversed as to Count 3; otherwise affirmed.

Combined Opinion

No. 162 February 25, 2026 509

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of K. D. B.,
a Youth.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
K. D. B.,
Appellant.
Washington County Circuit Court
23JU02014; A184871

Michele C. Rini, Judge.
Argued and submitted January 20, 2026.
Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause for appellant.
Also on the briefs was Youth, Rights & Justice.
Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy
Attorney General.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Jurisdictional judgment reversed as to Count 3; other-
wise affirmed.
510 State v. K. D. B.

AOYAGI, P. J.
Youth appeals a juvenile court judgment asserting
delinquency jurisdiction over him for committing an act
that, if committed by an adult, would constitute second-
degree sexual abuse. He raises two assignments of error.
First, youth contends that the court erred in denying his
motion for a judgment of dismissal, because the evidence
was legally insufficient to prove second-degree sexual
abuse. Second, alternatively, youth posits that the court
erred in denying his request for a jury trial, arguing that
existing case law denying a jury right in juvenile proceed-
ings should be revisited in light of changes to Oregon’s juve-
nile justice system over time, including regarding juvenile
sex-offender registration, as well as shifts in constitutional
legal analysis. As explained below, we agree with youth that
the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the mental-
state element of second-degree sexual abuse and reverse the
jurisdictional judgment on that basis. We need not reach the
second assignment of error given our disposition.
The delinquency petition alleged that youth com-
mitted three counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Counts 1
and 2 were ultimately dismissed, so we limit our discussion
to Count 3. Count 3 alleged that, on or about July 12, 2021,
youth “did unlawfully and knowingly subject [J] to an act of
sexual intercourse, the said [J] not consenting thereto.” At
the contested jurisdictional hearing, youth moved for a judg-
ment of acquittal, which is more properly termed a motion
for a judgment of dismissal. See State v. J. D. B., 326 Or App
237, 239 n 1, 532 P3d 99 (2023) (a motion for a judgment of
dismissal is “the proper mechanism for challenging the suffi-
ciency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding” and is akin to
a motion for a judgment of acquittal in adult court). The juve-
nile court denied the motion. That is the ruling that youth
challenges on appeal, so we state the facts in accordance with
the standard of review for that ruling. That is, we describe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, includ-
ing allowing for reasonable inferences. State v. B. I. Z. V.,
332 Or App 726, 732, 734, 550 P3d 985 (2024). Ultimately,
we must decide whether, so viewing the evidence, a rational
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 509 (2026) 511

trier of fact could find the elements of second-degree sexual
abuse proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 732.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the
evidence was as follows. Youth and J were students at the
same high school. On July 11 or 12, they started spending
time together and texting each other. Youth was 15 years
old; J was one grade above him. On July 12, J invited youth
to her house, and they had sex in her bedroom. J could not
remember exactly how it started, but her recollection was
that they were “kind of flirty with each other, and then
eventually started kissing, and then it kind of just went on
from there.” With J’s consent, they took off their clothes and
began having sexual intercourse. At some point “in the mid-
dle of it,” J said, “Wait, it hurts.” Youth responded, “Hold on,
I’m almost finished.” J did not say anything further, and
they “just kind of went on till he was done,” which took “a
couple more minutes.” J later described herself as having
“just kind of [gone] into the fawn response and just kind of
[taking] it and [being], like, okay, this is happening now.”
Once they finished having sex, they sat on the bed and hung
out for a while. At the time, J “didn’t really process that it
was a bad thing that had just happened.” She was friendly
with youth afterwards and continued to hang out with him,
including developing a romantic interest in him and having
consensual sex with him on other occasions.
In December 2021, a school resource officer at the
high school was investigating some rumors and interviewed
J as part of that investigation. The officer discussed the
concept of consent with J, including characterizing it as a
“bright, shiny line.” According to J, it was her interview
with the school resource officer that caused her to realize
that a portion of the intercourse with youth on July 12 was
nonconsensual.1
1
Specifically, the prosecutor asked, “So, once this was all done, what hap-
pened next?” J answered, “I think we just kind of sat on my bed after that. I
didn’t really process that it was a bad thing that had just happened, so I was
still friendly and we were still hanging out after that.” The prosecutor followed
up, “What do you mean you did not process that it was a bad thing that had hap-
pened?” J answered, “It took me until I was in the interview with Officer Wolfer
to realize that was not consensual.” The prosecutor clarified, “[I]s that because
you had a specific conversation with Officer Wolfer regarding what constituted
consent?” J answered, “Yes.”
512 State v. K. D. B.

The question on appeal is whether the evidence was
sufficient to prove second-degree sexual abuse. As relevant
here, a person commits second-degree sexual abuse when a
person “subjects another person to sexual intercourse * * *
and the victim does not consent thereto.” ORS 163.425(1)(a).
Second-degree sexual abuse is a serious offense—a Class
C felony. ORS 163.425(2). It is also an offense within the
Criminal Code, so a culpable mental state is required for
“each material element of the offense that necessarily
requires a culpable mental state.” ORS 161.095(2). Youth was
charged with “knowingly” subjecting J to sexual intercourse
without her consent, which was the minimum culpable men-
tal state for the nonconsent element of second-degree sex-
ual abuse in July 2021. State v. Haltom, 366 Or 791, 824,
472 P3d 246 (2020) (holding “that the requirement in ORS
163.425(1)(a) that the victim ‘does not consent’ is an integral
part of the conduct that the statute proscribes, and that proof
of a minimum mental state of ‘knowingly,’ as defined in ORS
161.085(8), is required with respect to that element”).2 A per-
son acts “knowingly” when a person “acts with an awareness
that the conduct of the person is of a nature so described.”
ORS 161.085(8).
The state therefore was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that youth knew that J did not consent to
sexual intercourse on July 12—or, more precisely, because it
is undisputed that she initially consented, that youth knew
that J ceased consenting “in the middle.” Youth argues that
the evidence was legally insufficient to prove knowledge.
The state’s response is straightforward—it argues that, by
saying, “hold on, I’m almost finished,” youth acknowledged
hearing J say “wait, it hurts,” which is enough to prove that
he knew that she no longer consented to sexual intercourse.
We are unpersuaded by the state’s argument. Viewed
in the light most favorable to the state, J made an ambig-
uous statement in the midst of consensual sexual inter-
course between two teenagers. The evidence adduced at the

2
The legislature amended ORS 163.325 in response to Haltom, adding an
affirmative defense relating to nonconsent, but those amendments did not go into
effect until January 1, 2022, so they are not at issue here. Or Laws 2021, ch 410,
§ 1.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 509 (2026) 513

delinquency hearing allows a reasonable inference that J sub-
jectively wanted youth to stop what he was doing, including
perhaps stopping intercourse altogether. However, J’s inter-
nal thought processes have limited relevance to whether the
evidence was sufficient to prove that youth knowingly sub-
jected J to nonconsensual sex. The state had to put forward
direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that youth knew that J had withdrawn
her prior consent and thus knew that he was subjecting J to
nonconsensual sexual intercourse from that point forward.
We conclude that the state failed to meet that bur-
den. We disagree with the state that J saying “wait, it hurts,”
in the middle of consensual intercourse was an unambiguous
withdrawal of consent to any continued intercourse, such that
the state could meet its burden of proof by simply showing
(as it did) that youth heard her say it. Rather, the statement
was ambiguous in nature, in that those words could reason-
ably be understood in any number of ways, depending on con-
text, including, for example, as a request that youth adjust
his physical position, slow down, or pause without actually
ceasing intercourse. The record is silent as to whether youth
physically did anything that might evince how he person-
ally interpreted J’s statement. And even if one might reason-
ably infer that he did nothing but tell J that he was nearly
done, it does not follow that youth understood J’s statement
to mean that she was no longer consenting to intercourse
and was telling him to stop immediately. Doing nothing in
response to such a statement may have been an immature or
inconsiderate way to handle it, but it is not enough to prove
a crime (or an act that would be a crime if committed by an
adult). Without evidence of something that would clarify the
ambiguity in J’s statement—some other statement or action
or larger contextual fact—the record is simply insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that youth knew that he
was having sexual intercourse with J without her consent. It
follows that the juvenile court erred in denying the motion
for a judgment of dismissal on Count 3.
Accordingly, we reverse the jurisdictional judgment
as to Count 3. We otherwise affirm, insofar as the juvenile
514 State v. K. D. B.

court itself dismissed Counts 1 and 2, and those counts are
not at issue on appeal.
Jurisdictional judgment reversed as to Count 3;
otherwise affirmed.