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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Malouf

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 437
• Docket Number: A183391
• Judges: Shorr

• Disposition: Affirmed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed.

Combined Opinion

No. 145 February 25, 2026 437

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOHN PHILLIP MALOUF,
Defendant-Appellant.
Deschutes County Circuit Court
19CR24889; A183391

Beth M. Bagley, Judge.
Submitted October 2, 2025.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Meredith Allen, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Affirmed.
438 State v. Malouf

SHORR, P. J.
Defendant appeals a judgment revoking probation
and imposing sentences of 120 days in jail on Counts 1, 2,
and 6, to be served concurrently, and imposing 36 months’
post-prison supervision (PPS) on Count 1 and 24 months’
PPS on Count 2. In a single assignment of error, defendant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the court to
find that defendant violated his probation. Specifically,
defendant argues that he did not have notice of the proba-
tion condition that required him to obtain permission before
leaving the state. The state argues in response that the trial
court at sentencing, and the judgment imposing probation
both stated that defendant was required to comply with the
general conditions of probation. The judgment specifically
references ORS 137.540(1), and a general condition of pro-
bation under ORS 137.540(1)(d) provides that a probationer
shall remain in the state unless they receive permission to
leave from the appropriate agency. Because the conditions
imposed in the judgment were readily ascertainable, defen-
dant had sufficient notice of the condition that he violated.
We affirm.
The state bears the burden of proving a probation
violation by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Martin,
370 Or 653, 668, 522 P3d 841 (2022). “Whether there is suf-
ficient evidence in the record to satisfy the state’s burden
is a legal question.” State v. Stroud, 293 Or App 314, 318,
428 P3d 949 (2018). Our task on appeal is to view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the state and determine
whether it was sufficient for the court to find a probation
violation. State v. Butler, 313 Or App 786, 788, 494 P3d 1031,
rev den, 368 Or 787 (2021). When the trial court finds a pro-
bation violation, it has discretion to revoke probation. State
v. Kelemen, 296 Or App 184, 192-93, 437 P3d 1225 (2019);
OAR 213-010-0001. We review predicate legal conclusions
for errors of law. Martin, 370 Or at 657-58. We also review
for legal error whether a defendant had adequate notice of
a probation condition. Cf. Stacey v. State of Oregon, 30 Or
App 1075, 1082, 569 P2d 640 (1977) (applying due process
requirements to the addition of a probation condition with-
out notice to the probationer, but expressly not considering
Cite as 347 Or App 437 (2026) 439

whether notice requirements applied to addition of general
terms of probation under ORS 137.540).
There was evidence presented at the probation
violation hearing that would allow the probation-violation
court to find the following facts. Defendant had been con-
victed of coercion constituting domestic violence (Count 1),
ORS 163.275; fourth-degree assault constituting domestic
violence (Count 2), ORS 163.160; and menacing constituting
domestic violence, ORS 163.190 (Count 6). He was initially
sentenced to 36 months’ probation on Count 1, and other
concurrent sentences on the other two counts.1 Defendant’s
criminal judgment cited ORS 137.540 and stated that
“Defendant is subject to all general conditions of probation
(ORS 137.540).”
Two days after sentencing, defendant reported to
probation, on June 3, 2021, and completed the intake pro-
cess. The next meeting with his probation officer was set for
June 18. At defendant’s request, because he had many ques-
tions, a meeting was set for June 7, to which defendant’s
probation officer directed him to report. After the intake
meeting, however, defendant called or emailed his probation
officer multiple times regarding rescheduling or not being
able to make it to scheduled meetings. Defendant was directly
ordered to report, but he never reported to the Deschutes
County probation office again.2 Defendant was arrested on
unrelated charges in Mississippi in February 2023.
In Oregon, the state filed allegations of probation
violations, and a warrant was issued for defendant’s arrest.
1
Defendant makes assertions of fact about what happened at his underlying
sentencing hearing, such as asserting that the sentencing court did not list the
general conditions of probation, and did not specifically notify him that he could
not leave the state. At the probation violation hearing, the court took judicial
notice of the trial court register. It was able to view the judgment containing the
conditions of probation. But it does not appear that the court took judicial notice
of the original sentencing proceedings. Defendant designated them as part of
the record on appeal and had them transcribed, but they were not before the
probation-revocation court. We take no notice of anything that occurred or did
not occur at defendant’s original sentencing hearing as it was not part of the
probation-violation court’s record.
2
On one of the dates in June 2021 that defendant’s Deschutes County proba-
tion officer set to meet with defendant, defendant went in person to the Wallowa
County probation office to try to report there, because he was a 6- to 7-hour drive
from the Deschutes office.
440 State v. Malouf

Later, in 2023, the state amended its allegations and moved to
revoke probation, alleging that defendant had failed to report
to the probation office as directed; failed to remain in the
State of Oregon until receiving permission to leave; failed to
undergo a mental health evaluation within 60 days and begin
treatment within 90 days; failed to schedule a substance
abuse evaluation and complete any recommended treatment;
and failed to obtain a domestic violence intervention evalu-
ation and complete any recommended treatment. At a con-
tested probation violation hearing, the court found that defen-
dant violated his probation by failing to report as directed,
failing to complete a domestic violence evaluation, and leaving
Oregon without permission. The court revoked his probation
and sentenced him to jail time and PPS as specified above,
and entered a judgment reflecting that sentence. Defendant
appealed.
As an initial matter, we assume without deciding
that defendant sufficiently preserved this claim of error.
He argued at the probation violation hearing that the court
could not find that he violated probation because he did not
have sufficient notice of the condition that he could not leave
the state without permission.
One of the general terms of probation, ORS 137.540
(1)(d), provides that a “probationer shall” “[r]emain in the State
of Oregon until written permission to leave is granted by the
Department of Corrections or a county community corrections
agency.” One of the terms in the underlying judgment impos-
ing probation on defendant was that he abide by the general
terms of probation. As noted, that term cited the statute, ORS
137.540, that lists the general terms of probation. The court
found that defendant’s probation officer had never given him
permission to leave the state. Defendant left the state and was
arrested in Mississippi in 2023. We conclude that those facts
are sufficient for a court to find a probation violation of the
general probation term listed at ORS 137.540(1)(d).
Defendant argues that, to find the probation viola-
tion, the state had to prove that defendant had sufficient
notice of the condition he violated. Citing State v. Berglund,
311 Or App 424, 431, 491 P3d 820 (2021), defendant begins
by arguing that a defendant has a right to notice of the
Cite as 347 Or App 437 (2026) 441

specific probation violations alleged. Defendant received
that notice here in the motion to revoke probation, which
alleged specific violations.
He next argues, citing State v. Priester, 325 Or App
574, 530 P3d 118, rev den, 371 Or 332 (2023), that “[t]he trial
court must state all the terms of a defendant’s sentence,
including all the conditions of probation, on the record at
the time it sentences the defendant.” Priester has no applica-
tion here. The issue in Priester was not, as here, whether the
defendant had sufficient notice of his probation conditions to
be found to have violated them. Rather, the issue was whether
the trial court had entered a judgment containing sentencing
provisions that had not been announced at sentencing. Id.
at 581. That is, in Priester, the error was that the court had
imposed specific conditions in the judgment that had not been
stated individually on the record in the defendant’s presence.
That raised a question of whether the court could use a short-
hand reference, such as “DV package” when imposing proba-
tion terms. We held that it could not, absent evidence that the
specific terms were known to the parties. Id. at 583-84.
Defendant’s assignment of error does not fit the
Priester scenario. Defendant’s assignment of error is not that
the trial court functionally resentenced him outside of his
presence, as in Priester; rather, his assignment of error is
that he lacked notice of a condition of probation, namely that
he not leave the state without permission. But, here, the gen-
eral conditions of probation were referenced in the judgment
imposing defendant’s probation. The judgment cited ORS
137.540 when expressly stating that “Defendant is subject to
all general conditions of probation (ORS 137.540).” Although
it could have been even clearer and better practice for the
judgment itself to list out each of the conditions, the refer-
ence to all of the general conditions listed in the statute was
sufficient notice for defendant to be required to comply with
those conditions. The probation-revocation court did not err
by finding defendant to have violated the probation condition
prohibiting him from leaving the state without permission.
For those reasons, we affirm the judgment revoking
defendant’s probation.
Affirmed.