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March 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Commonwealth v. Scott K. Tavares.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0454

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.1K)

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Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-454

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

SCOTT K. TAVARES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Scott K. Tavares, appeals from an order of a

Boston Municipal Court judge revoking his probation based on a

finding that he committed new criminal offenses. The defendant

now appeals, asserting that (1) he received ineffective

assistance of counsel and (2) his right to due process was

violated. We affirm.

Background. In 2021, the defendant pleaded guilty to

possession with intent to distribute a class A controlled

substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a), and possession with intent to

distribute a class B controlled substance, G. L. c. 94C,

§ 32A (a). He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of two

years in the house of correction, with ninety days deemed served
and the balance suspended for two years, during which he was

placed on probation.

The probation department alleged that on April 15, 2023,

the defendant violated his probation by committing larceny over

$1,200 and conspiracy to commit larceny related to shoplifting

at an Ulta Beauty store in Taunton (Taunton incident). Ulta

Beauty is a chain of cosmetic stores. The probation department

alleged that the defendant and another man "essentially created

a diversion" by starting a fight while a woman stole items from

the store.

The probation violation hearing was held on November 7,

1. The police detective who investigated the Taunton

incident was not available to testify. Ulta Beauty did not send

anyone from its store to testify. The only witness called by

the probation department was a police detective from Stoughton.

At the outset, the defendant objected to the Stoughton

detective's testimony because he had earlier investigated a

similar incident allegedly involving the defendant at an Ulta

Beauty store in Stoughton (Stoughton incident). According to

defense counsel, the probation department charged the defendant

with a probation violation based on the Stoughton incident, but

ultimately, no violation was found. In response, the

prosecutor, who was assisting the probation department at the

hearing, stated that the Stoughton detective would testify that

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he had watched surveillance video recordings of both the

Stoughton incident and the Taunton incident and determined that

the same three individuals were involved in each, thus showing

an ongoing pattern or conspiracy. The judge ruled that the

Stoughton detective could "testify to what he did himself." He

also admitted in evidence surveillance video recordings of the

Taunton incident without objection, but excluded surveillance

video recordings of the Stoughton incident because they had been

produced to defense counsel only that morning.

The Stoughton detective testified that he reviewed

surveillance video recordings that Ulta Beauty made available to

him through an Internet based software program. He was able to

identify from the video recordings of the Taunton incident a

woman whom he "previously charged . . . with shoplifting at the

Ulta Beauty in Stoughton." Those recordings showed the woman

entering the store, two men entering who later got into a

"scuffle," and then the woman leaving. The detective testified

that he notified the Taunton police department "of the two

identifications that I was aware of," whom he described as "the

female and the black male in the blue polo shirt," and that

"Taunton ended up charging" the woman and the defendant.

During cross-examination, defense counsel sought to

establish that the woman and the two men shown in the Taunton

3
video recordings had not acted in close coordination. She

began,

Q.: "So, Detective O'Connor, you mentioned that you saw a
female enter the store and you were familiar with her
because you charged her before?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "And those were also larcen[ies] from Ulta Beauty,
correct?"

A.: "Yes."

Q.: "And in those instances, there weren't two men with
her; she was just -- she was by herself, basically?
There weren't the men that you saw in the video with
her?"

A.: "In one there was and one there was not. So, yes."

Defense counsel then elicited from the detective that the two

men entered the Taunton store about five to six minutes after

the woman entered, they did not enter or leave the store

together, and the detective did not know what they argued about

or exactly when the defendant left the store in relation to the

woman.

On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked the detective

to describe the Stoughton incident, and the judge overruled the

defendant's objection because "the door was opened." The

detective testified that the Stoughton incident occurred on

April 14, 2023 (the day before the Taunton incident), and that

the defendant wore the same blue polo shirt during both

incidents. In addition, again because "the defense opened that

4
door," the judge reconsidered his earlier ruling excluding the

surveillance video recordings of the Stoughton incident. The

recordings were admitted, and the detective provided additional

testimony regarding the Stoughton incident and the defendant's

involvement in it.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge determined

"that the defendant did conspire with [the woman] and a third

party to commit a larceny" and "that [the defendant] has

violated his probation."

Discussion. 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel. The

defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel at the probation violation hearing because, during her

cross-examination of the Stoughton detective, his attorney

"needlessly" opened the door to the admission of previously

excluded evidence regarding the Stoughton incident. The

defendant did not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of

counsel in any posthearing motion, but does so now on direct

appeal. As "our courts strongly disfavor raising claims of

ineffective assistance on direct appeal," Commonwealth v.

Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 811 (2006), such claims "should only be

brought on direct appeal when the factual basis of the claim

appears indisputably on the trial record," Commonwealth v.

Keon K., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 568, 573-574 (2007).

5
"To sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the defendant must show that [1] the behavior of counsel fell

below that of an 'ordinary fallible lawyer' and [2] that such

failing 'likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise

available, substantial ground of defence.'" Commonwealth v.

Bowen, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 798 (2018), quoting Commonwealth

v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). "Where, as here, the

defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on

a tactical or strategic decision, the test is whether the

decision was manifestly unreasonable when made" (quotation and

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664,

674 (2015). "The inquiry involves both temporal and substantive

considerations. The temporal consideration limits the effect of

hindsight by requiring a focus on the point in time when counsel

made the challenged strategic decision" (citation omitted). Id.

"Substantively, '[o]nly "strategy and tactics which lawyers of

ordinary training and skill in the criminal law would not

consider competent"' are manifestly unreasonable." Id., quoting

Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 186-187 (2005).

The defendant contends that defense counsel provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by choosing to cross-examine

the Stoughton detective at all. Had counsel instead waived

cross-examination, the defendant argues, the probation

department would not have been able to prove by a preponderance

6
of the evidence that the defendant engaged in a larceny as a

joint venturer and conspiracy to commit larceny. See

Commonwealth v. Sargent, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 29 (2020) ("we

uphold a judge's finding of a probation violation if it is

supported by a preponderance of the evidence"). We are not

persuaded.

We cannot say that it was manifestly unreasonable for

defense counsel to fail to anticipate that her questions would

"open the door" to admission of the Stoughton video recordings.

Although the judge initially ruled that the probation department

could not present the Stoughton recordings because they had not

been produced to defense counsel until the morning of the

hearing, the judge effectively allowed the Stoughton detective

to testify about the Stoughton incident by stating that he could

"testify to what he did himself." The detective proceeded to do

so by testifying that he could identify the woman involved in

the Taunton incident because he had "previously charged her with

shoplifting at the Ulta Beauty in Stoughton," and by effectively

testifying that he also identified "the black male in the blue

polo shirt" in the Taunton recordings as the defendant. Based

on those rulings and earlier testimony by the detective, it was

not unreasonable for defense counsel to think that she too could

ask him about the Stoughton incident without "opening the door"

to the admission of the Stoughton recordings.

7
Nor can we say that the questions actually asked by defense

counsel during cross-examination of the Stoughton detective fell

below the performance of an "ordinary fallible lawyer."

Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96. Through those questions, defense

counsel attempted to cast doubt on the notion that the woman and

man alleged to be the defendant in the Taunton surveillance

videos were coconspirators. She did so by inquiring about other

incidents in which the detective was aware that the woman had

shoplifted and the two men were not present. She succeeded in

eliciting from the detective that in one video (or perhaps one

prior incident) the men were not with the woman. She also

sought to undermine the probation department's contention that

the three people were acting in a conspiracy because they

entered and left the Taunton store at different times. Without

resorting to speculation, we cannot say on this record whether

counsel would have taken a different approach to cross-

examination had she been able to review the Stoughton video

recordings before the hearing, or had she anticipated that the

judge might reverse course on his ruling excluding the Stoughton

video recordings from evidence. In assessing the reasonableness

of counsel's tactical decision, however, we are required to

focus on "the point in time when counsel made the challenged

strategic decision." Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 674. Based on the

limited record before us, in the absence of a motion for a new

8
hearing supported by affidavits and evidence, we cannot say that

the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel under

the appropriate standards.

1. Due process. The defendant also claims that the

revocation of his probation was improper because he did not

receive adequate notice of the evidence used against him at the

hearing, specifically, the surveillance video recordings of the

Stoughton incident. Due process entitles a defendant to written

notice of the alleged violation of probation and disclosure of

the evidence against him. See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass.

61, 66 (2006); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 113

(1990). At the same time, "[d]ue process, by its nature, is a

flexible concept." Durling, supra. To obtain relief, a

defendant must "demonstrate prejudice resulting from any lack of

notice, and . . . failure to show prejudice is fatal to his

claim of error." Commonwealth v. Simon, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 80,

86 (2003).

The defendant has shown no such prejudice here. As

discussed, the judge initially excluded the Stoughton

surveillance video recordings after defense counsel objected to

their late production,1 but reversed course after finding that

1 At the hearing, defense counsel stated that she had been
provided with a compact disc containing the video recordings
that morning and had "only viewed the video from Taunton," not
the Stoughton recordings. The record does not clearly indicate

9
her cross-examination of the Stoughton detective "opened the

door" to that evidence. After making that decision, the judge

announced a recess of the proceeding so that "defense counsel

[could] view those videos and then resume the hearing." The

judge directed counsel to "[t]ake some time to watch the

video[s] and let me know when you're done." The judge further

advised that if counsel needed additional time to review the

recordings, the hearing would be continued to another date.

Following the recess, the defendant did not request additional

review time, request a continuance, or object to the hearing's

resumption. Because the defendant was allowed a meaningful

opportunity to review and respond to the evidence after the

judge ruled on its admission, we cannot conclude that any lack

of notice was prejudicial.

Order revoking probation
affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks,
Hodgens & Toone, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: March 9, 2026.

what other information defense counsel had with regard to the
Stoughton recordings prior to the hearing.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

10