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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Stout v. Stout CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B330984

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/10/26 Stout v. Stout CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ANDREW J. STOUT, B330984

Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BD579228)
v.

JULIE ANN STOUT,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Convey, Judge. Affirmed.
Galperin & Hensley, Yury Galperin, for Appellant.
Julie Ann Stout, in propria persona, for Respondent.

---

INTRODUCTION

Andrew Stout appeals from a family court order requiring
him to pay to Julie Ann Stout, his former spouse, $200,000 in
attorney fees pursuant to Family Code section 2030, and
additional attorney fees of $125,000 as a sanction pursuant to
section 271.1 Andrew contends the court abused its discretion
because the evidence and facts do not support these awards. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The record on appeal is voluminous, reflecting the granular
litigation of this case over more than a dozen years—more than
three times longer than the parties’ marriage. The clerk’s
transcript on appeal consists of 48 volumes, totaling
14,373 pages. The reporter’s transcript of the trial hearings
consists of 18 volumes, totaling 2,145 pages.2 We address only
those facts and proceedings relevant to the issues on appeal.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
We refer to Andrew and Julie by their first names to avoid
confusion.
2 Julie also requests that this court take judicial notice of
various exhibits and transcripts from the trial court proceedings,
many of which are already included in the record on appeal.
Because we find the record sufficient to affirm the family court’s
order, to the extent Julie requests judicial notice of items not
already included in the record on appeal, we deny her requests
for judicial notice as unnecessary.

2
A. Dissolution Proceedings and Borson Motion
Andrew and Julie were married in May 2009. Andrew is a
financial advisor providing wealth management services. During
Julie and Andrew’s marriage, Andrew was responsible for the
management of between $45 million and $77 million in client
assets. Julie was employed as a senior global director for an
electronics manufacturer at the beginning of their marriage, in
which role she ran a $600 million business unit. In 2011, Julie
began working solely with Andrew to support his wealth
management business, which she did until the end of their
marriage. She became disabled after a spinal injury in 2013 and
was ruled permanently disabled in December 2021. They have
no children.
In March 2013, Andrew filed a petition for dissolution of
the marriage. The parties thereafter engaged in extensive
pretrial proceedings from 2013 to 2021, including financial
discovery, litigation of temporary spousal support, litigation over
Julie’s occupancy of the marital residence, and allegations of
domestic violence by both parties.
In March 2014, the family court found that Andrew “does
not have the ability to pay all of the attorney’s fees for both
parties, but can pay a portion” under section 2030. The court
ordered Andrew to pay Julie’s counsel $47,000 for pretrial
attorney fees and expert accounting fees.
In January 2016, the family court granted Julie’s request
for an order to compel Andrew’s deposition testimony and to
produce responsive documents. The court found Andrew failed to
provide numerous responsive financial documents, despite
providing statements of compliance, and refused to answer
deposition questions about his book of business. The court also

3
awarded Julie $11,000 in attorney fees as a sanction for misuse of
the discovery process (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010, subd. (a);
2025.480, subd. (j)), payable by Andrew to Julie’s counsel.
In September 2016, Julie’s former counsel, the law firm
Freid & Goldsman, filed a motion for $413,788.69 in outstanding
attorney fees and costs pursuant to In re Marriage of Borson
(1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 632 (Borson).3 The family court granted the
Borson motion in October 2016, finding a disparity in assets and
ability to pay and that Andrew had reasonable ability to pay
some of Julie’s attorney fees, but it reserved determination of the
amount of fees until the time of trial.
In October 2016, the family court imposed issue and
evidentiary sanctions against Andrew for misuse of the discovery
process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subds. (b) & (c).) The court
also awarded Julie $20,000 in attorney fees as a further sanction,
payable by Andrew to Julie’s counsel. (Id., subd. (a).)
In March 2017, Julie filed a request through new counsel
for additional attorney fees and costs anticipated to be incurred
through trial. The family court found a “vast disparity” in access
to funds to pay legal and expert accounting fees, and it ordered
Andrew to pay Julie $165,000 in need-based attorney and

3 In a family law case, an attorney who expects to be
discharged by the client may file a motion pursuant to
section 2030 seeking attorney fees and costs on behalf of his or
her client directly from the opposing party. (Borson, supra,
37 Cal.App.3d at pp. 637-638). A “Borson motion” permits “a
discharged attorney to pursue a request for direct fee payment
from the former client’s spouse if the request is expressly or
impliedly authorized by the former client.” (In re Marriage of
Erickson & Simpson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 707, 709; see Borson,
at pp. 637-638.)

4
accountant fees pursuant to section 2030. The court determined,
among other things, that: Andrew’s income and expense
declaration was “filled with inconsistencies and omissions”;
Andrew failed to disclose the amount he had paid in attorney
fees; “[Andrew] makes a significant income [(over $32,000 per
month)] and [Julie] is unable to work and receives disability
payments” of $6,250 per month; and Andrew was “less than
forthcoming in his disclosures.” A previous panel of this court
upheld that award on appeal, noting that Andrew’s “bad faith
litigation conduct” and lack of transparency in his financial
disclosures could contribute to the amount of fees awarded by the
court. (Stout v. Stout (April 16, 2019, B281612 [nonpub. opn.].)4
A bifurcated judgment of dissolution as to status only was
entered on May 1, 2017. The case ultimately proceeded to trial
on several reserved issues in January 2021, and the trial
concluded in July 2022. Reserved issues determined at trial
included spousal support, confirmation of community and
separate property, and division of community property, including
the community property interest in the marital residence,
retirement accounts, and Andrew’s business.
Before the close of trial, Julie requested sanctions under
section 271 for dilatory litigation conduct by Andrew, including
failure to provide discovery, failure to pay court-ordered attorney
fees and costs, and failure to disclose assets.

4 Although Julie contends the present appeal seeks to renew
Andrew’s challenge to the March 2017 fee award, the fees at
issue here are not duplicative of that award.

5
B. Attorney Fees Awarded on the Borson Motion
The Borson motion, section 271 sanctions, and other
attorney fee issues were argued before the close of trial, on
July 12 and 13, 2022.
Freid & Goldsman’s September 2016 Borson motion
requested $413,788.69 in outstanding attorney fees and costs,
consisting of $412,187.55 in attorney fees and $1,601.34 in costs.
The motion was accompanied by the declaration of Julie’s
principal attorney, Melvin S. Goldsman, describing legal services
rendered on Julie’s behalf. Goldsman attested that Julie had
incurred a total of $479,093.75 in attorney fees and $16,394.94 in
costs, and the firm had received $18,000 from Julie, $30,000 from
Andrew pursuant to the March 2014 order, and $11,000 from
Andrew pursuant to the January 2016 order, as well as providing
Julie with $21,700 in “courtesy discounts.” Goldsman attached
as exhibits to his declaration the firm’s billing statements for
June 2013 through August 2016, as well as Andrew’s February
2016 income and expense declaration, stating Andrew’s income
for the most recent month as $42,004 in salary and commissions,
and his average monthly income in salary and commissions as
$33,048.
Goldsman further attested that the firm’s representation of
Julie included “[a]ddressing [Andrew]’s failure to disclose the
dissipation of community assets”; preparation of the motion to
compel; preparation of the request for discovery sanctions;
preparation of a contempt action due to Andrew’s non-payment of
court-ordered attorney fees and costs; and preparation of a wage
assignment due to Andrew’s failure to pay spousal support. At
trial, counsel for Freid & Goldsman argued Andrew was not a
credible witness and that Andrew’s actions “created unnecessary

6
attorney’s fees and costs rendered by Freid & Goldsman” when
the firm represented Julie.
Andrew’s counsel argued the 2016 finding that Andrew had
the ability to pay fees was contradicted by Andrew’s subsequent
income and expenses declarations and Julie’s current gross
income, and that the fees sought under the Borson motion were
“not reasonably related and they’re not reasonably necessary to
represent [Julie] . . . .”
The family court stated there was a finding of disparity in
access to resources to pay fees when the Borson motion was first
granted, requiring the court to “award reasonable and necessary
attorney’s fees on a contributed share basis.” Based on the
parties’ July 2022 income and expense declarations and other
evidence, the court found that Julie had $9,000 in monthly
income from private disability benefits income and Andrew had
$8,800 per month in salary and a housing benefit treated as
income. The court also found the marital residence was Andrew’s
separate property, subject to certain reimbursements to Julie and
that “Andrew did not present sufficient, credible, reliable
evidence to the court to solve [the] question” of the correct
valuation of his book of business.
In considering contributive share attorney fees, the family
court also considered the factors enumerated in section 4320 for
determining spousal support. On the section 4320 factors, the
court found Julie was “not in good health”, but had marketable
skills and would be able to work at the same level as when the
marriage started once her disability ends. The court also found
“the balance of hardships on a personal level balance in favor of
[Julie] and against [Andrew]. [Andrew] is healthy, wage earning,
is not in the same wage earning area that he was previously, but

7
he is able to continue in his career. [Julie] is still on disability, is
recovering, and it will be more difficult for her to get back into
the workforce full-time . . . .”
The court additionally found that, considering “the income
and expense declarations, schedule of assets and debts that
Andrew provided at this trial that Andrew does not have the
ability to pay for all of the attorney’s fees of both parties. He has
to pay his own attorney’s fees. And he then does not have enough
resources to pay all of Julie’s fees. Julie should also contribute to
her own attorney’s fees and costs since she does have income of
roughly 9,000 a month.” The court determined there was still “a
disparity in access to resources that favors [Andrew] and
disfavors [Julie] under Family Code §§ 2030 and 2032 so the
Court must award reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees on a
contributive share basis.” The court also determined that the
Freid & Goldsman firm had the expertise “to meet the needs of
this . . . case, and that they should be paid for their efforts” even
if those efforts did not result in prosecuting the case to
conclusion. The court ultimately found that reasonable and
necessary fees and costs under the Borson motion were $200,000
in attorney fees and $16,394.94 for court costs, payable by
Andrew to Freid & Goldsman.5

5 The family court separately ordered attorney fees of
$12,810 payable by Andrew to Julie pursuant to sections 2030
and 2032, for fees incurred by her trial counsel, Dieter Zacher.
Andrew does not argue on appeal that this award or amount
constituted an abuse of discretion.

8
C. Section 271 Sanction
The family court explained that its section 271 analysis, for
attorney fees as a sanction, was “based on litigation conduct that
caused the case to drag on; that caused the case to have increased
costs applied to it because of lack of cooperation; because of
litigation tactics that caused expenses and attorney’s fees to
increase and that the court should somehow tether or award
attorney’s fees to the aggrieved party based on that litigation
conduct. ¶ The court must also assess whether a 271 award
would cause an unreasonable or undue financial burden to the
person that has to pay it.”
The court found that both Andrew and Julie engaged in
sanctionable conduct during the dissolution proceedings. The
court determined that “fees and costs go both ways in this case”
for purposes of section 271, but that “the far greater attribution
of fees and costs under section 271 is for [Andrew’s] conduct.”
The court found that Julie engaged in “two major areas of
conduct” that delayed proceedings and increased fees and costs:
(1) remaining in the marital residence until a receiver for the
property was appointed and a court order was secured ordering
her to vacate; and (2) “litigat[ing] the issue of permanent spousal
support in the manner it was litigated, which was ‘all over the
place,’” even though it should “not [be] complicated in a short-
term marriage. . . . ” The court found that “the additional time
and costs . . . are sanctionable.” The court assessed $75,000 in
sanctions against Julie.
Andrew’s sanctionable conduct found by the court included:
“several instances” of Andrew’s “breaches of fiduciary dut[y]
where the court could not calculate damages”; Andrew “not
following court orders”; Andrew “not paying court-ordered

9
attorney’s fees so that [Julie] could have resources to fund her
litigation and present more credible complete evidence on
financial matters”; and “not paying the mortgage on the [marital]
residence causing it to go [into] foreclosure, in part, and
ultimately to a forced sale.” The court also found Andrew
engaged in discovery conduct “that held back documents [such]
that even though sanctions were awarded for discovery motions
those discovery efforts had to be followed through.” The court
explained: “Documents were not produced. Complete analysis
was not provided. The parties are required to open the books to
each other in a divorce case, and on balance it was Andrew who
was more resourced, rich[er] than Julie[,] who failed to do this.
This caused Julie to expend more fees and costs in this
litigation.”
The court made an express finding that Andrew’s “actions
were taken to delay this case” and, “tethering this to the
$200,000 Freid & Goldsman [Borson] Motion order,” it imposed
“section 271 sanctions against [Andrew] of $200,000 payable to
[Julie].” Having assessed $75,000 against Julie, and $200,000
against Andrew, the court ordered Andrew to pay “net section
271 monetary sanctions as and for attorney’s fees to [Julie] in the
amount of $125,000, upon entry of the judgment.”
The court also stated that both parties had exhibited
qualities reflecting poorly on their credibility. The court stated:
“Andrew as the petitioner presented himself as a witness who
was very guarded and very restrictive in what he revealed. He
seemed put upon by the court process. That is, resentful of the
intrusion into his life and these financial matters. To the extent
that he prevented and precluded inquiry into those matters by
stonewalling discovery, by not cooperating with discovery, by not

10
completing discovery, by not providing full complete responses
and document production[,] there’s a remedy for that in these
proceedings. [¶] To the extent that that behavior was
demonstrated to the court on the witness stand or in the
courtroom, the court takes that into account as a negative factor
against his [sic] creditability.” “And Andrew to many degrees
reflected negatively, contradictory statements, intransigen[ce],
and to Andrew many degrees he did these things during his
testimony. This reflects adversely on his [sic] creditability.” The
court noted it could draw a negative inference against Andrew for
giving inconsistent statements or failing to provide evidence. As
for Julie, the court found she “presented herself as not directly
answering questions by giving answers that were much longer
and nonresponsive,” and “constantly refer[red] back to a negative
statement against Andrew or this happened in this case solely
because Andrew did it, or Andrew’s responsible for it.”
Final judgment on the reserved issues was entered on
May 10, 2023. Andrew timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“The purpose of an attorney fees award in a marital
dissolution proceeding is to provide, as necessary, one of the
parties with funds adequate to properly litigate the matter.” (In
re Marriage of Bendetti (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 863, 868
(Bendetti); accord, In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 964, 974-975 (Falcone).) Sections 2030 and 2032
govern an award of need-based attorney fees and costs.
Section 2030, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “In a proceeding for

11
dissolution of marriage . . . the court shall ensure that each party
has access to legal representation . . . to preserve each party’s
rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs
assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party, or to the
other party’s attorney, whatever amount is reasonably necessary
for attorney’s fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending
the proceeding during the pendency of the proceeding.”
Section 2030, subdivision (a)(2), states, “When a request for
attorney’s fees and costs is made, the court shall make findings
on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under this
section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to
funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for
legal representation of both parties. If the findings demonstrate
disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an
order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” “The court must make
explicit findings on the issues listed in section 2030,
subdivision (a)(2).” (In re Marriage of Hearn (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 380, 393 (Hearn); accord, In re Marriage of
Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050.)
Section 2032, subdivision (a), further requires the family
court to consider whether the award is “ ‘just and reasonable
under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.’ ” (See
Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 393-394; In re Marriage of
Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 867 (Keech).) This
determination includes consideration of “the need for the award
to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient
financial resources to present the party’s case adequately.”
(§ 2032, subd. (b); accord, Bendetti, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at
p. 868.) The determination also includes, “to the extent relevant,”
consideration of the factors enumerated in section 4320 for

12
determining spousal support. (§ 2032, subd. (b); Falcone, supra,
203 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.) “[T]he record must reflect that the
trial court considered the factors set forth in sections 2030
and 2032.” (In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039,
1056; accord, Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 238, 242.) “Financial resources,” however, “are
only one factor for the court to consider.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).) “[I]n
determining whether to award attorney fees to one party, the
family court may consider the other party’s trial tactics.” (In re
Marriage of Sorge (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 626, 662.)
Section 271, subdivision (a), provides, “Notwithstanding
any other provision of this code, the court may base an award of
attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which [the] conduct of
each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law
to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce
the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the
parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs
pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction.” (See
Boblitt v. Boblitt (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 603, 612 [“[t]he duty
imposed by . . . section 271 requires a party to a dissolution action
to be cooperative and work toward settlement of the litigation on
pain of being required to share the party’s adversary’s litigation
costs”].) The family court has “broad discretionary authority” to
impose section 271 sanctions (In re Marriage of Eben-King &
King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 1220 (Eben-King)), and an award
of fees as a sanction under this section does not require any
showing of need or actual injury (§ 271, subd. (a); see In re
Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478-1479).
But the court must “take into consideration all evidence
concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities,” and is

13
prohibited from making an award that “imposes an unreasonable
financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is
imposed.” (§ 271, subd. (a); see In re Marriage of Pearson (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 218, 233 (Pearson).)
“ ‘ “On appeal, we review an attorney fee award under
section 2030 for an abuse of discretion.” ’ ” (Hearn, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 394; accord, Bendetti, supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.) We also review the award of
sanctions under section 271 for an abuse of discretion. (Menezes
v. McDaniel (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 340, 347; In re E.M. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 828, 850.) The court’s factual findings in
support of its determination are reviewed for substantial
evidence. (In re Marriage of Knox (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 15, 25;
Menezes, at p. 347.) An attorney fees order “ ‘ “will be overturned
only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in
support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order
made.” ’ ” (Hearn, at p. 394; accord, In re Marriage of Smith
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532; see In re E.M., at p. 850
[imposition of section 271 sanctions will be upheld on appeal
unless, “ ‘considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in
its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no
judge could reasonably make the order’ ”]; accord, Menezes, at
p. 347.)

B. The Family Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Awarding $200,000 in Fees on the Borson Motion
Andrew raises two challenges to the family court’s Borson
fee award: (1) that the award was “excessive” and (2) that Julie
was “equally guilty” of dilatory conduct. Neither contention
warrants reversal.

14
Andrew argues that although the $200,000 in attorney fees
awarded on the Borson motion was half the amount requested by
Julie’s former attorneys, “it was still excessive.”6 Andrew makes
no argument that any particular hours or fees billed by the firm
were unreasonable for the services rendered, and does not
identify any factors the court failed to properly consider. Rather,
Andrew argues the case was “‘overlitigated’” by Julie, and the
parties each had the resources to pay their own attorney fees,
thus the fees were not reasonably necessary. (See In re Marriage
of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 112 (Ciprari)
[“Notwithstanding the parties’ relative economic circumstances,
an award under section 2030 et seq. is properly denied if a case
has been overlitigated or if the fees otherwise were not
‘reasonably necessary.’ ”].)
Andrew relies on Keech, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pages 870
to 871, which held “[i]t was an abuse of discretion to order
husband to pay wife’s attorney fees without making any inquiry
into the reasonableness of those fees,” where “[t]he record on
appeal does not itself justify fees of this magnitude during the
time frame in question.” Keech stated that “[a]pproval of claims
of this type, without prior judicial scrutiny followed by
appropriate findings,” was an “abdication of the judicial
function.” (Ibid.)
But Andrew concedes that here, unlike Keech, the trial
court performed a reasonableness inquiry, and he argues that
“despite the examination by [the] trial court as to the
‘reasonableness’ of [the] fee,” the award punishes Andrew for the

6 Andrew does not argue on appeal that the family court’s
award of $16,394.94 for court costs on the Borson motion was an
abuse of discretion.

15
expenses of overlitigation when Julie is “equally guilty.” As
Andrew notes, “[t]he court must take into account the relative
circumstances of the parties including their respective needs,
income, and assets. In determining whether the fees incurred
were reasonable, the court may consider various factors including
the nature of the litigation, its complexity, the amount involved,
the financial circumstances of the parties, the legal skill involved,
and whether counsel’s skill and effort were wisely devoted to the
expeditious disposition of the case.” (In re Marriage of Kelso
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 374, 385.)
Our review of the record demonstrates the court performed
a thorough assessment of the parties’ relative circumstances,
including their respective incomes and needs. Based on the facts
before it, the family law court expressly found that there was a
disparity in access to funds to retain counsel affecting Julie, that
the “balance of hardships” favored Julie, and that Andrew had
the ability to pay for some (although not all) of Julie’s legal
representation. Substantial evidence supports these findings:
Although the parties’ monthly income was relatively close at the
time of trial ($9,000 in disability benefits for Julie and $8,800 in
salary and housing for Andrew, down from $33,038 average for
Andrew in 2016), the evidence was that Andrew was “healthy,
wage earning, is not in the same wage earning area that he was
previously, but he is able to continue in his career. [Julie] is still
on disability, is recovering, and it will be more difficult for her to
get back into the workforce full-time . . . .” The court also noted
Andrew’s history of withholding financial discovery, including
that “Andrew did not present sufficient, credible, reliable
evidence to the court to solve [the] question” of the correct

16
valuation of his book of business, which supports an inference
against Andrew on the valuation of his assets.
Although Andrew argues Julie had the resources to pay her
own fees, “[t]he fact that the party requesting an award of
attorney’s fees and costs has resources from which the party
could pay the party’s own attorney’s fees and costs is not itself a
bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees and
costs requested.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).) Further, the relevant
inquiry is the parties’ relative circumstances, and a need-based
fees award may be proper even if the party requesting fees can
pay her own attorney fees. (See Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
p. 111 [“By mandatory consideration of the parties’ relative
circumstances, section 2032 authorizes a need-based fee award
even if [the party requesting the award] could pay her own
attorneys’ fees”].)
The family court’s finding that the fee award and amount
to be paid by Andrew were reasonable is also supported by
substantial evidence. Although the family court noted “there is
not an itemized statement accompanying the [Borson] Motion as
to whether each entry was reasonable or necessary,” the motion
attached detailed itemized billing records from June 2013
through August 2016, as well as Goldsman’s declaration
describing in detail his qualifications and the specific legal
services performed during the firm’s representation of Julie. This
was sufficient evidence for the court to conclude “Fr[ei]d &
Goldsman had the commencement, experience, education,
training and status in the community to meet the needs of this
case and that they should be paid for their efforts even if those
efforts were not entirely or even remotely successful in
prosecuting this case to its conclusion . . . .”

17
The family court also considered, as it was authorized to do,
evidence of Andrew’s bad faith litigation tactics during the period
Julie was represented by Freid & Goldsman, resulting in a
greater responsibility for the ballooning litigation expenses at
that time. (See In re Marriage of Dick (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 144,
166-168 [affirming award of $750,000 attorney fees to the wife
because the record “reveals a case of stunning complexity,
occasioned, for the most part, by husband’s intransigence”]; In re
Marriage of Kozen (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1258, 1264 [affirming
$300,000 fee award to wife even though amount was “obscene”
relative to community assets, where husband’s “stonewalling”
and lack of cooperation in discovery, as well as wife’s reasonable
mistrust of husband’s representations regarding his assets,
contributed to the amount of accountant and attorney fees
incurred].) Goldsman declared the firm’s representation of Julie
included “[a]ddressing [Andrew]’s failure to disclose the
dissipation of community assets”; preparation of the motion to
compel; preparation of the request for discovery sanctions;
preparation of a contempt action due to Andrew’s non-payment of
court-ordered attorney fees and costs; and preparation of a wage
assignment due to Andrew’s failure to pay spousal support.
This litigation history from 2013 to 2016 is also reflected in
the record, and Andrew’s intransigence and dilatory tactics were
noted by the family court, which found that Andrew “prevented
and precluded inquiry” into financial matters “by stonewalling
discovery, by not cooperating with discovery, by not completing
discovery, by not providing full complete responses and document
production.” (See Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 112 [“The
trial judge was in a position to assess whether or not the case was
overlitigated and the fees reasonably incurred.”].) If one party’s

18
actions are the catalyst for excessive litigation, it is improper for
a court to deny a fee award based on “overlitigation.” (See id. at
p. 113 [abuse of discretion for trial court to deny wife’s fees
request as unreasonable due to “overlitigation,” where husband’s
comingling of assets inflated litigation costs; “a much more
nuanced and granular inquiry is required when assessing
reasonableness in this context”].)
Although there was also evidence that Julie’s conduct
contributed to the costs of litigation, we defer to the trial court’s
balancing of the evidence in finding Andrew bore greater
culpability. In determining whether the family court’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, we “ ‘ “consider all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving
conflicts in support of the [findings]. [Citations.]” [Citation.] We
may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court’s
credibility determinations.’ ” (Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
p. 94.)
Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude the family
court abused its discretion. (See Hearn, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p.394 [under the abuse of discretion standard, “ ‘ “[t]he trial
court’s order will be overturned only if, considering all the
evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge
could reasonably make the order made” ’ ”]; In re Marriage of
Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 406.)

C. The Section 271 Sanction Award Was Within the Family
Court’s Broad Discretion
Andrew argues the section 271 sanctions awards of
$200,000 against Andrew and $75,000 against Julie were an

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abuse of discretion because Julie’s conduct frustrated speedy
resolution and the parties were equally at fault. He argues that
“[i]f [Andrew] was equally at fault, then the attorney’s fees as a
sanction should have been zero,” rather than net $125,000
against Andrew, “as the equal conduct on the part of the parties
would have created an equivalence in culpability.”7
As stated, the family court found that Andrew’s conduct
was more sanctionable than Julie’s conduct. Although the court
determined that “fees and costs go both ways in this case” for
purposes of section 271, it concluded “the far greater attribution
of fees and costs under section 271 is for [Andrew’s] conduct.”
Substantial evidence supports this determination,
including that Andrew: did not pay court-ordered attorney fees;
did not pay the mortgage on the marital residence; and engaged
in discovery misconduct resulting in discovery sanctions for
failing to produce documents and provide accurate financial
information. The family court weighed the evidence of Andrew’s
conduct and the evidence of Julie’s conduct, and it found that “on
balance it was Andrew who was more resourced, rich[er] than
Julie[,] who failed to [open the books],” and “caused Julie to have
to expend more fees and costs in this litigation” through his
dilatory tactics.
Andrew does not dispute the findings of the family court
regarding his conduct or the court’s determination that his
conduct justified sanctions under section 271. Instead, he only
argues the net award should be zero because Julie was equally at
fault. But, as stated, the family court determined that Andrew

7 Andrew does not argue the award “imposes an
unreasonable financial burden” on him. (§ 271, subd. (a); see
Pearson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 233.)

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bore greater culpability than Julie for conduct that drove up fees
and costs in their divorce case, and that he was, on balance,
better resourced and richer than Julie. We defer to the trial
court’s findings because they are supported by substantial
evidence and do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. (See
Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 94; Vasquez v. LBS Financial
Credit Union (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 97, 109.) Accordingly, “[t]he
trial court’s award of attorney fees to [Julie] was within its broad
discretionary authority to do so under Family Code section 271.”
(Eben-King, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 122.)

D. Julie’s Request for Sanctions on Appeal
Julie requests that we impose appellate sanctions on
Andrew for filing a frivolous appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
8.276(a)(1) [Court of Appeal may impose sanctions for “[t]aking a
frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay”]; Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 128.5, 907.) “[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous
only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive—to harass the
respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment—or when
it indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable attorney
would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without
merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.)
Although “ ‘the borderline between a frivolous appeal and one
which simply has no merit is vague indeed[,’] . . . [sanctions]
should be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious
conduct.” (Flaherty, at pp. 650-651.) We decline to impose
sanctions under the circumstances presented here. “An appeal
that is simply without merit is not by definition frivolous” (id. at
p. 650), and despite Andrew’s documented history of dilatory

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tactics, we cannot say his appeal was without merit or solely to
cause delay.

DISPOSITION

The family court’s order is affirmed. Julie may recover her
costs on appeal. Julie’s request for appellate sanctions is denied.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.

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