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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re Isabella L. CA2/7

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B345314

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/10/26 In re Isabella L. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ISABELLA L., A Person B345314
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law. (Los Angeles County
________________________________ Super. Ct. No.
25CCJP00023A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FERNANDO L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Dismissed.
Mary Manuel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melineh Hatamian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

INTRODUCTION

Fernando L. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings that his infant daughter, Isabella L., is a person
described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivision (b)(1).1 Fernando argues substantial evidence did not
support the court’s finding his substance abuse placed his
newborn daughter, Isabella L., at risk of serious physical harm or
illness. Fernando does not challenge other jurisdiction findings
based on substance abuse by Melissa U., Isabella’s mother, and
Melissa did not appeal from the jurisdiction findings. In the
meantime, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction, leaving Isabella in the custody of
Fernando and Melissa, and Fernando did not appeal from the
order terminating jurisdiction. Because we cannot provide
Fernando any effective relief, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2025 the juvenile court sustained a petition filed
by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services under section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court found
true allegations that Melissa’s substance abuse placed Isabella at

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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risk of serious physical harm or illness; that Fernando failed to
protect Isabella from Melissa’s substance abuse; and that
Fernando’s substance abuse placed Isabella at risk of serious
physical harm or illness.
The court released Isabella to her parents and ordered
Isabella to live with Melissa in the home of Isabella’s maternal
grandmother or other housing approved by the Department. The
court ordered Melissa and Fernando to complete drug and alcohol
programs, parenting classes, and individual counseling.
Fernando timely appealed from the court’s jurisdiction findings.
At the section 364 judicial review hearing in
September 2025 the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction
over Isabella.2 Fernando did not appeal from the order
terminating jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law
“Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness
concerns because the parties have multiple opportunities to
appeal orders even as the proceedings in the juvenile court
proceed.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59.) The
“‘critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is
moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective
relief if it finds reversible error.’” (In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163 (Rashad D.); accord, In re S.R. (2025)
18 Cal.5th 1042, 1051 (S.R.); In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 275

2 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of the
juvenile court’s September 18, 2025 order. (See Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

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(D.P.).) An “appeal may become moot where subsequent events,
including orders by the juvenile court, render it impossible for the
reviewing court to grant effective relief.” (In re E.T. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436; see S.R., at p. 1051.) “‘For relief to be
“effective,” two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff
must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
plaintiff seeks.’” (S.R., at p. 1051; see D.P., at p. 276.) ““‘When
no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be
dismissed.’”” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1050-1051.)
In addition, the “principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction
attaches to a child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that
‘“[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is
immaterial that another might be inappropriate”’ [citation].
Thus, where jurisdictional findings have been made as to both
parents but only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may
be rendered moot.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283-284; see
In re Jayden A. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1343.)
Even where a case is moot, however, the reviewing court
has ‘“inherent discretion”’ to reach the merits of an appeal. (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282; see S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at
p. 1052.) In deciding whether discretionary review of a moot case
is appropriate, the reviewing court may consider, among other
factors, “whether the challenged jurisdictional finding ‘could be
prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the
current or future dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other
consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.”’” (D.P., at
p. 285.)

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B. Fernando’s Appeal Is Moot, and Discretionary Review
Is Not Warranted
Fernando argues substantial evidence did not support the
juvenile court’s finding his substance abuse endangered Isabella.
Fernando’s appeal, however, is moot for two reasons.
First, because neither Fernando nor Melissa appealed from
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings based on Melissa’s
substance abuse, even if we reversed the finding based on
Fernando’s substance abuse, the juvenile court would still have
jurisdiction over Isabella. Therefore, we cannot provide
Fernando effective relief, and his appeal is moot. (See D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see, e.g., In re M.C. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 137, 150-151 [“‘Because the juvenile court
assumes jurisdiction of the child, not the parents, jurisdiction
may exist based on the conduct of one parent only.’”]; In re
Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329 [appeal from a
jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (b), was
nonjusticiable where the mother did not challenge a finding
under section 300, subdivision (j)].)
Second, while this appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction over Isabella. To reverse the
jurisdiction findings, as Fernando requests, we would also have
to reverse the subsequent order terminating jurisdiction.
Because Fernando did not appeal from the order terminating
jurisdiction, that order is “not now before us or otherwise subject
to appellate review.” (In re Gael C. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 220,
223-224; see Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) We do
not have jurisdiction to review the order terminating jurisdiction,
and “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further
hearings in the now-closed case.” (Rashad D., at p. 164.)

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Fernando argues we should exercise our discretion to reach
the merits of his (moot) appeal because the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction finding “could be used against [him] in future
dependency proceedings and could affect his rights
(including . . . placement, reunification services, or parental
rights).” The possibility the jurisdiction finding could be used
against Fernando in possible future proceedings is too speculative
to justify discretionary review of his moot appeal. (See D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278 [speculative future harm is
insufficient to avoid mootness]; Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th
at p. 164, fn. 5 [argument “the jurisdiction finding might
influence the [child protective agency’s] decision to file a new
dependency petition at some point in the future . . . is too
speculative to justify appellate review of an otherwise moot
case”]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1495 [the
possibility jurisdiction findings would affect future dependency
proceedings was “speculative” because future orders “would
require evidence of present detriment, based on the then
prevailing circumstances of parent and child”]; see also In re
Miguel J. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 635, 649 [father’s argument
“the jurisdictional findings in this case might be misinterpreted
in a hypothetical future case is purely speculative”].)

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DISPOSITION

The Department’s request for judicial notice is granted.
The appeal is dismissed as moot.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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