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March 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Wells Fargo v. Bennett, T.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 322 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: McLaughlin

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by McLaughlin

J-A28024-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

WELLS FARGO BANK, NOT IN ITS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
INDIVIDUAL OR BANKING : PENNSYLVANIA
CAPACITY, LAKE COUNTRY :
MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, NEWREZ :
LLC, D/B/A, SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE :
SERVICING :
:
:
v. : No. 322 MDA 2025
:
:
TINA BENNETT, GARY L. BENNETT, :
JERRY AND CRYSTAL TUTTLE :
:
:
APPEAL OF: JERRY AND CRYSTAL :
TUTTLE

Appeal from the Order Entered February 6, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Civil Division at
No(s): 2020-840

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: MARCH 10, 2026

Jerry and Crystal Tuttle (collectively, “the Tuttles”) appeal from the

entry of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, Not in Its Individual

or Banking Capacity, Lake Country Mortgage Loan Trust, Newrez LLC, d/b/a/,

Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (“Wells Fargo”) in this mortgage foreclosure

action. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history as follows:

In July 1998, Gary L. Bennett, who is now deceased, and
defendant Tina Bennett entered into a loan agreement
(note) with Green Tree Consumer Discount Company in the
amount of $128,250. The loan was secured by a mortgage
J-A28024-25

on real property located at 32 North Street, Forest City,
Pennsylvania. On July 29, 1998, the mortgage was recorded
in the Susquehanna County Recorder’s Office. The mortgage
was thereafter assigned to [Wells Fargo].

In October 2017, Gary L. Bennett died. Thereafter, Tina
Bennett failed to make the payments required under the
note and mortgage. No payments have been made on the
note since April 2018. In July 2019, Act 91 notice was
provided to defendant Tina Bennett as required by law.
Defendant Tina Bennett failed to cure the default. On
September 24, 2020, [Wells Fargo] filed this foreclosure
action. Defendant Tina Bennett has never appeared or
answered [Wells Fargo’s] complaint, and [Wells Fargo]
obtained a default judgment, sought a writ of execution, and
the real property was sold at a sheriff’s sale wherein [Wells
Fargo] was the successful bidder. A sheriff’s deed was
executed conveying the subject real property to [Wells
Fargo].

After obtaining the sheriff’s deed and filing an ejectment
action to recover possession of the subject real property,
[Wells Fargo] discovered that [the Tuttles] had obtained a
fifty (50%) interest in the subject real property by virtue of
a court decision in 2018.1 On May 25, 2023, [Wells Fargo]
then filed a motion to set aside the sheriff[’s] sale, strike
the sheriff’s deed, vacate the judgment and reaffirm the
mortgage. On May 26, 2023, the court granted [Wells
Fargo’s] motion. [Wells Fargo] then sought to amend the
pleadings to include the Tuttles as defendants, and the court
granted the motion.
1 Thus, the Tuttles were aware of the subject mortgage
at least as early as 2018.

[Wells Fargo] filed an amended complaint on January 19,
2024. The Tuttles filed an answer and new matter.
Thereafter, on November 21, 2024, [Wells Fargo] filed the
present summary judgment motion together with a
supporting brief. By order dated November 25, 2024, the
court scheduled oral argument for January 30, 2025, and
directed the Tuttles to file an opposition brief no later than
five (5) days prior to the oral argument date. The Tuttles
filed their responsive pleading and opposition brief to [Wells

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J-A28024-25

Fargo’s] motion for summary judgment on January 29,
2025. Oral argument occurred on January 30, 2025.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/6/25, at 1-2 (citations omitted).

On February 6, 2025, the court granted Wells Fargo’s motion for

summary judgment.1 This appeal followed.

The Tuttles raise the following issue: “Whether the trial court abused its

discretion in granting the entirety of [Wells Fargo’s] summary judgment

motion where there existed issues of material fact that necessarily prevented

the entry of summary judgment on all matters before the trial court?” Tuttles’s

Br. at 5.

The Tuttles argue that the court erred in granting Wells Fargo’s motion

for summary judgment because there existed an issue of material fact as to

Wells Fargo’s timeliness in bringing the mortgage foreclosure action against

---

1 The trial court correctly points out that the Tuttles’s response to Wells Fargo’s

motion for summary judgment was untimely. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.3(a), an “adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings but must
file a response within [30] days after service of the motion[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P.
1035.3(a). Wells Fargo filed its motion for summary judgment on November
21, 2024. The Tuttles had 30 days after the date of service of the motion to
file a response. The Tuttles’s response filed on January 29, 2025 was untimely.

Further, as previously noted, on November 25, 2024, the court issued an order
scheduling oral argument on the motion for summary judgment for January
30, 2025. The order set forth a briefing schedule stating, “Brief of the moving
party is due no later than ten (10) days prior to the date set for argument.
Brief of responding party is due no later than five (5) days prior to date set
for argument[.]” Order, filed 11/26/24. The Tuttles filed their response one
day prior to oral argument in contravention of the court’s order. Nevertheless,
the court entertained argument from both parties on the motion and
addressed the merits of the Tuttles’s response. We thus decline to base our
decision on the untimeliness of the response. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 126.

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J-A28024-25

them. Id. at 9. The Tuttles assert that since they have had an interest in the

subject property since 2018, Wells Fargo should have added them as

defendants in the initial action, “which would have resulted in a mitigation of

damages considering [they] would have had opportunity to remedy the

deficient payments of Appellee Bennett.” Id. They point out that they

addressed the issue regarding calculation of damages in both their new matter

to the amended complaint and response to the motion for summary judgment.

Id. at 13. In the Tuttles’s view, Wells Fargo’s “lack of haste” in bringing this

action against them “directly resulted in them incurring additional damages

by the accruing of penalties and interest on top of the principal of the

mortgage.” Id. at 14.

“[S]ummary judgment is only appropriate in cases where there are no

genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880, 891 (Pa. 2018) (citing

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2(1)). “When considering a motion for summary judgment,

the trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences

therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve

all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the

moving party.” Id. We “reverse a grant of summary judgment if there has

been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 892. Our standard of

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id.

The holder of a mortgage has the right, upon default, to bring a

foreclosure action. Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1056–57

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J-A28024-25

(Pa.Super. 1998). Summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action is

subject to the same rules as other civil actions. CitiMortgage, Inc. v.

Barbezat, 131 A.3d 65, 67 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1141(b)). In

a mortgage foreclosure action, summary judgment is appropriate “if the

mortgagor admits that the mortgage is in default, the mortgagor has failed to

pay on the obligation, and the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount.”

Gerber v. Piergrossi, 142 A.3d 854, 859 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

Further, “general denials by mortgagors that they are without

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of averments as to the

principal and interest owing [on the mortgage] must be considered an

admission of those facts.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 467

(Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted, alteration in Gibson). Additionally, to

defeat a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party cannot rest

upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 464 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3).

Here, to successfully defend against Wells Fargo’s summary judgment

motion, the Tuttles were obligated to identify “one or more issues of fact

arising from evidence in the record controverting the evidence cited in support

of the motion[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3(a)(1). The Tuttles’s purported issue of

fact is their claim that Wells Fargo delayed in adding them to the lawsuit

because Wells Fargo sought to enlarge the amount due under the mortgage.

However, the Tuttles point to no evidence in the record to support this bald

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J-A28024-25

assertion. They have not shown any evidence that Wells Fargo knew of their

interest in the property prior to the ejectment action, purposely delayed

notifying them for financial gain, or engaged in any deceitful practices. As the

trial court aptly pointed out, “[a]t best, the Tuttles contend that if [Wells

Fargo] had included the Tuttles as defendants in this litigation from its

inception, or at some earlier point thereafter, then presumably the Tuttles

would have taken steps to correct the delinquent payments;” however, “[t]he

record has no evidence to support the Tuttles assertion that the costs of this

matter would have been mitigated if [Wells Fargo] had added the Tuttles to

the litigation sooner.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6 & 6 n.4 (emphasis removed).

Moreover, the Tuttles’s answer to the amended complaint and response

to the motion for summary judgment contain only general denials and claims

of lack of knowledge in response to Wells Fargo’s assertions of default and

amount due under the loan. These general denials and claims of lack of

knowledge constitute admissions. Gibson, 102 A.3d at 467. The Tuttles have

presented no facts to contest that the mortgage is in default, the mortgagors

have failed to pay on the obligation, or the recorded mortgage is in a specific

amount. Gerber, 142 A.3d at 859. The trial court thus acted correctly in

granting summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo since no material fact

remains at issue as to any element in the mortgage foreclosure action.

Order affirmed.

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J-A28024-25

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/10/2026

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