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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Kynard

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 758
• Docket Number: L-25-00038

• Judges: Osowik

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12.4K)

• PDF

Syllabus

Per Osowik, J., trial court judgment is reversed on the imposition of a consecutive sentence to another unsentenced case in another court. Remanded for the limited purpose of post release control notification.

Combined Opinion

                        by [Thomas J. Osowik](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8121/thomas-j-osowik/)

[Cite as State v. Kynard, 2026-Ohio-758.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. {48}L-25-00038

Appellee/Cross Appellant Trial Court No. CR0202201569

v.

William Kynard, IV DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant/Cross Appellee Decided: March 6, 2026

---

Julia R. Bates, Esq., Prosecutor and
Lorrie J. Rendle, Assistant Prosecutor for appellee.

Patricia Horner, for appellant.

---

OSOWIK, J.,
Procedural History

{¶ 1} On August 15, 2022, appellant entered a plea of Guilty and was found Guilty

by the court of the offense of Possession of Cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11 (A) &

(C) (4)(a), a Felony of the 5th degree. The plea form/judgment entry executed by Kynard
on August 15, 2022, clearly indicates that he was advised of post-release control

conditions pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C).

{¶ 2} On August 25, 2022 appellant was sentenced to serve a period of 3 years of

community control with numerous conditions that were to be monitored by the Lucas

County Adult Probation Department. The judgment entry of sentencing also indicates that

appellant was notified that a violation of the terms of community control or violation of

any law would lead to longer or more restrictive sanction, including a prison term of 12

months. Kynard did not appeal his original sentencing.

{¶ 3} On December 7, 2023, Kynard admitted to a community control violation.

The court then continued Kynard on community control with additional admonitions

concerning drug screens.

{¶ 4} On January 30, 2025 (journalized on February 3, 2025) the trial court

ordered Kynard to serve a “term of 12 months to be served consecutively to sentence

served CR24-1777.” The judgment entry also contains the following language:

Defendant notified of post-release control as follows: Felony
Sex Offense: 5 years mandatory; F-1: 2-5 years mandatory; F-2: 18
months-3 years mandatory; F-3 (offense of violence, R.C.
2901.01(A)(9)): 1-3 years mandatory; F-3 (other): up to 2 years
discretionary; F4: up to 2 years discretionary; F-5: up to 2 years
discretionary. Defendant further notified that if post-release control
conditions are violated, the adult parole authority or parole board
may impose a more restrictive or longer control sanction or return
Defendant to prison for up to nine months for each violation, up to a
maximum of 50% of the minimum stated term originally imposed.
Defendant further notified that if the violation is a new felony
conviction, Defendant may be both returned to prison for the greater

2.
of one year or the time remaining on post-release control, plus
receive a prison term for the new felony (-ies).

{¶ 5} Kynard appeals from this February 3, 2025 judgment of the trial

court and presents two assignments of error for our review.

Assignments of Error

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT
CONSECUTIVELY TO A SENTENCE IN THE FUTURE.

{¶ 6} In this assignment, Kynard asserts the trial court erred in imposing his 12

month prison sentence consecutively to CR24-1777. It is undisputed that Case CR24-

1777 was a case before another court for which Kynard had not yet been sentenced.

{¶ 7} Appellee concedes this error by the trial court and rightfully so since a trial

court may not order a sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence that is to be

imposed in the future. State v. Fizer, 2016-Ohio-8384, ¶10 (6th Dist.), citing State v.

White, 18 Ohio St.3d 340, 342-43 (1985). Therefore, we find appellant’s first assignment

of error well-taken.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO
SERVE A MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR A FIFTH DEGREE
FELONY.

{¶ 8} In this assignment, Kynard argues that his 12-month sentence is not

supported by the evidence as required by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) but rather appellant’s

statement in the sentencing report that “one extra year ain’t nothing.” Even though the

trial court “summarily referenced” Kynard’s prior criminal history of convictions, he

3.
asserts that his maximum 12-month sentence is contrary to the felony sentencing statutes

in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

{¶ 9} In response, the State points out that we are precluded by State v. Jones,

2020-Ohio-6729, from reviewing the trial court's consideration of the sentencing factors

enumerated in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

{¶ 10} Generally, we review sentencing challenges under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

The statute allows us to increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate the

sentence and remand the matter for resentencing only if we clearly and convincingly

find either (1) the record does not support the trial court's findings under specified

Revised Code sections not at issue here, or (2) the sentence is otherwise contrary to

law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)-(b).

{¶ 11} However, since the Ohio Supreme Court decided Jones, the law governing

appellate review of a trial court's consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in imposing

a sentence is clear: R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to

independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12. State v. Bowles, 2021-Ohio-4401, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), quoting Jones at ¶ 42.

{¶ 12} Moreover, we may summarily dispose of an assignment of error that is

based only on the trial court's consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

See State v. Coon, 2025-Ohio-1849 ¶ 23 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Eames, 2024-Ohio-

183 ¶ 10 (6th Dist.). Accordingly, we find Kynard’s second assignment of error not well-

4.
taken and it is denied.

Cross appeal

{¶ 13} The State brings its own cross appeal of the February 3, 2025 judgment of

the trial court. It asserts that at the at the January 30, 2025 community control violation

sentencing hearing, the trial court held no discussion of post-release control (“PRC”), and

the sentencing entry only listed the range of possible PRC terms associated with the

various felony degree levels. As such, the State would submit that the trial court did not

properly notify Kynard of the term and nature of PRC in this case. The State also

claims that Kynard was never properly notified of any potential post-release conditions as

required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and 2929.15(B) and this case should be remanded for re-

sentencing. Appellant has not responded.

Initial sentencing entry of August 29, 2022

{¶ 14} Our examination of the record establishes that Kynard was initially

sentenced to community control on August 25, 2022. In that judgment entry that was

journalized on August 29, 2022, there is no notification to Kynard of any post-release

control conditions.

{¶ 15} Further, the record before us does not include a transcript of that initial

sentencing proceeding that would enable us to make a determination that the trial court

orally informed Kynard of any potential post-release control conditions at sentencing.

We will note that although the plea form/judgment entry establishes notifications of post-

5.
release control conditions, these advisements must occur at the sentencing hearing

pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(1).

{¶ 16} In this case, Kynard was found in violation of the conditions of his

community control and the reserved sentence of 12 months imprisonment was imposed

on January 30, 2025 (journalized on February 3, 2025).

The February 3, 2025 Community Control Violation Sentencing Judgment Entry

{¶ 17} The State argues that the trial court completely failed to provide post-

release control notifications to Kynard both in its discussion at the community control

violation hearing and the by the terms of the sentencing judgment entry.

{¶ 18} The language in the sentencing judgment entry of February 3, 2025,

concerning post-release notification is as follows:

Defendant notified of post-release control as follows: Felony Sex
Offense: 5 years mandatory; F-1: 2-5 years mandatory; F-2: 18 months-3
years mandatory; F-3 (offense of violence, R.C. 2901.01(A)(9)): 1-3 years
mandatory; F-3 (other): up to 2 years discretionary; F- 4: up to 2 years
discretionary; F-5: up to 2 years discretionary. Defendant further notified
that if post-release control conditions are violated, the adult parole authority
or parole board may impose a more restrictive or longer control sanction or
return Defendant to prison for up to nine months for each violation, up to a
maximum of 50% of the minimum stated term originally imposed.
Defendant further notified that if the violation is a new felony conviction,
Defendant may be both returned to prison for the greater of one year or the
time remaining on post-release control, plus receive a prison term for the
new felony (-ies).

{¶ 19} The State contends that the sentencing entry did not explicitly provide

whether post-release control is discretionary or mandatory, nor does it identify the

potential length of the post-release control term.

6.
{¶ 20} Recently, the State asserted this identical argument in another cross-appeal

to this court that involved this same trial court and a judgment entry utilizing the identical

post-release control notification language. In State v. Whitney, 2025-Ohio-4978, ¶ 20

(6th Dist.), we held:

In this case, the trial court—in an apparent scrivener's error in the drafting
of the sentencing entry—included all potential terms of postrelease control
instead of selecting the one(s) imposed at the sentencing hearing and
applicable to Whitney. This is an obvious error that renders the trial court's
imposition of postrelease control clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

{¶ 21} In this case, the entry reflects that Kynard pled guilty to and was found

guilty by the court to the offense of POSSESSION OF COCAINE a violation of R. C.

2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(a) a Felony of the 5th degree. In this instance, a felony of the fifth

degree was one of multiple ranges listed in the sentencing entry and indicated as

discretionary up to 2 years. Needless to say, the entry is inartfully crafted and it is not

specific to Kynard’s conviction. Like we found in Whitney, in this case we find the

sentencing entry concerning post-release notifications to be contrary to law.

{¶ 22} Additionally, the community control violation hearing of January 30, 2025

shows no discussion or oral advisement by the trial court of the terms of post-release

control conditions.

The Community Control Violation Sentencing Hearing

{¶ 23} R.C. 2967.28(B) requires the trial court to orally advise the offender of

notice of post-release control conditions at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing

judgment entry. State v. Sprouse, (6th Dist.), 2023-Ohio-2983, ¶ 24. See State v. Grimes,

7.
2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 1. The transcript of the January 30, 2025 community control

violation hearing is void of any notification to Kynard of post-release control.

{¶ 24} If a court improperly imposes post-release control, it may correct the

sentence in accordance with the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191, which provides

that a court must hold a hearing before issuing the correction. Id., citing State v.

Schleiger, 2014-Ohio-3970 ¶ 15.

{¶ 25} The imposition of an incorrect post-release control term renders that

portion of appellant’s sentence voidable, not void; thus, the State’s cross-assignment of

error is well-taken.

Conclusion

{¶ 26} The trial court’s judgment is reversed with respect to the imposition of

consecutive sentences and is further vacated, in part, and the matter is remanded for

resentencing consistent with this opinion regarding notification to Kynard of post-release

control, including terms and consequences for violations. The State is ordered to pay the

costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment reversed
and remanded.

8.
State of Ohio v. William Kynard, IV
Appeals Case No.: L-25-00038
Trial Court Case No.: CR0202201569

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. [[Applied Signature]]
JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. [[Applied Signature 2]]
JUDGE

Charles E. Sulek, J. [[Applied Signature 3]]
CONCUR. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

9.