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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Dominguez-Olivia

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 754
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-21

• Judges: Tucker

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.6K)

• PDF

Syllabus

Neither appellant's statutory nor his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the delay between his criminal activity and the indictment. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Dominguez-Olivia, 2026-Ohio-754.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-21
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 0704
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
ALAN E. DOMINGUEZ-OLIVIA : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION

...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on March 6, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
GREENE C.A. No. 2025-CA-21

JOHNNA M. SHIA, Attorney for Appellant
MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

TUCKER, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Alan E. Dominguez-Oliva1 appeals from his convictions

after a jury found him guilty of one count of possession of a fentanyl-related compound and

one count of aggravated possession of drugs. Dominguez-Oliva claims the trial court erred

by failing to dismiss his charges on the grounds that he was not afforded his statutory and

constitutional rights to a speedy trial. He further claims he was denied due process of law.

Finally, he claims his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are otherwise

against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On May 18, 2022, multiple Ohio State Highway Patrol troopers were involved in

a prolonged high-speed chase with a vehicle that traveled on both the interstate and surface

streets. The troopers were eventually able to damage the vehicle’s tires by deploying spike

strips in its path of travel. Despite this, the pursuit continued until the troopers utilized their

cruisers to bump into, and ultimately box in, the vehicle.

{¶ 3} After the vehicle was stopped, the troopers approached the driver, later

identified as Dominguez-Oliva, and observed him attempting to swallow pills. Dominguez-

Oliva refused to comply with the troopers’ orders to exit the vehicle, and a struggle ensued

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The trial court, upon noting the record incorrectly identified the defendant-appellant as
Dominguez-Olivia rather than Dominguez-Oliva, filed an entry in January 2025 ordering
correction of the record. Despite the order, the pleadings subsequently filed by trial counsel
improperly identified him as “Dominguez,” while the pleadings filed by appellate counsel
incorrectly identified him as Dominguez-Olivia. Thus, the appellate caption is incorrect.

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before he was taken into custody. Dominguez-Oliva was transported to a local hospital for

medical treatment. Due to a mistake by hospital security, he was discharged without

notification to law enforcement.

{¶ 4} On May 31, 2022, Dominguez-Oliva was charged by indictment with assault,

failure to comply, and felonious assault on a peace officer. A warrant on indictment was

issued; however, Dominguez-Oliva remained at large until he was located and arrested in

Illinois on August 11, 2024. The charges in the 2022 indictment were tried on January 13,

2025, and are not part of the pending appeal.

{¶ 5} The indictment in the instant case was filed on December 20, 2024, after

Dominguez-Oliva was returned to the State of Ohio and prior to his jury trial on the first

indictment. The indictment charged him with aggravated possession of drugs and

possession of a fentanyl-related compound, with the drugs at issue being found on May 18,

2022 in Dominguez-Oliva’s vehicle. However, the seized items were not confirmed to be

illegal drugs until the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory issued a report on

November 9, 2022.

{¶ 6} Dominguez-Oliva filed a motion to dismiss in which he claimed the State

violated his right to a speedy trial and his right to due process. The motion was denied, and

the matter proceeded to a jury trial. After the jury found him guilty on all charges, the trial

court sentenced him appropriately.

{¶ 7} Dominguez-Oliva appeals.

II. Speedy Trial

{¶ 8} The first and second assignments of error state as follows:

DOMINGUEZ-OLIVIA’S [SIC] STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS WERE

VIOLATED.

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DOMINGUEZ-OLIVIA’S [SIC] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY

TRIAL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BY SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF

THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED.

{¶ 9} Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a speedy trial by both the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as by Article 1,

Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. State v. Knott, 2024-Ohio-2289, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), citing

State v. O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 8 (1987). “The constitutional right to a speedy trial is also

statutorily enforced in Ohio by the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 et seq.” Id., citing State v.

Adams, 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68 (1989). The rights under R.C. 2945.71 include a felony

defendant's right to be brought to trial within 270 days after being arrested.

R.C. 2945.71(C)(2).

{¶ 10} Dominguez-Oliva first claims his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated

because the State was required, but failed, to bring him to trial within 270 days of his May

2022 arrest. We disagree.

{¶ 11} In State v. Taylor, 2021-Ohio-2701 (2d Dist.), we addressed this identical issue

and fact pattern. In Taylor, the defendant was initially charged with two misdemeanor drug

offenses following a traffic accident. Id. at ¶ 2. After a lab analysis of the suspected drugs,

he was subsequently indicted on a separate felony cocaine possession charge. Id. at ¶ 3.

Taylor filed a motion to dismiss asserting a statutory speedy trial violation. Id. The trial

court denied the motion, and we affirmed. In doing so, we stated:

Under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), a defendant facing a felony charge must be

brought to trial within 270 days of the commencement of the case, subject to

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any tolling provisions set forth in R.C. 2945.72. A criminal case is commenced

on the date an indictment is returned, a bill of information is filed, a warrantless

arrest is made, or a warrant, summons, or citation is issued, whichever first

occurs. R.C. 2901.13(E). Thus, the dispositive issue is when the case for

possession of cocaine commenced – on March 1, 2019 (the date the

misdemeanor citations were issued) or on January 17, 2020 (the date of the

indictment for cocaine possession). We conclude that the cocaine possession

case commenced, and thus the speedy trial count began, on January 17, 2020.

Given this, Taylor's statutory speedy trial rights were not violated.

In State v. Adams, [43 Ohio St.3d 67 (1989)], the Ohio Supreme Court

concluded that, when one case is commenced and thereafter a second case

is commenced, the second case is subject to the statutory speedy trial

limitation of the first case when the cases “arise from the same facts * * * and

the state knows of such facts at the time of the initial [commencement] * * *.”

Adams at 68. In State v. Baker, 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 676 N.E.2d 883, the

Supreme Court again reviewed the statutory speedy trial implications of

separately-commenced cases arising from the same event. This review

resulted in the conclusion that when a second case arises from the same

events as the initial case, there are two scenarios that exempt the State from

the statutory speedy trial limit of the first case. The two situations are (1) the

second case, though having the same genesis as the first case, “arise[s] from

facts different from the original charge[s],” or (2) “the state did not know of

these facts at the time of the [commencement] of the initial [case.]” Id. at

5
syllabus. Under either circumstance, the speedy trial time begins to run upon

commencement (by indictment or otherwise) of the second case. Id. at 112.

In State v. Dalton, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2003-CA-96, 2004-Ohio-3575,

we applied Baker to facts relevant to the pending analysis. Dalton was arrested

for rape. A bag containing a white powder was discovered on Dalton's person

upon his arrest. Several hours after the arrest, the police searched Dalton's

vehicle pursuant to a search warrant. The search resulted in the discovery of

“several pills, glassware, and chemicals that [the police] believed were

contraband.” Id. at ¶ 5. The collected items were sent to a lab for analysis. The

analysis later revealed that the white powder was methamphetamine, that one

of the pills was hydrocodone, and that the chemicals were used in the

manufacture of methamphetamine.

While the lab results were pending, Dalton was indicted for rape and

related charges. Over six months later, Dalton was indicted on three drug

counts: two counts of aggravated possession of drugs (the methamphetamine

and the hydrocodone) and one count of illegal possession of chemicals for the

manufacture of drugs. Dalton moved to dismiss the drug offenses, asserting

that the speedy trial calculation on these counts “should run from the date of

the rape indictment because [the drug counts] arose from the same factual

circumstances as the charges filed in the original indictment.” Id. at ¶ 10. We

disagreed, explaining that the facts (the lab results) supporting the drug counts

“were not known to the State until after the initial indictment * * * [thus] * * *

pursuant to Baker, the speedy trial timetable [did] not run from the [rape]

indictment date.” Id. at ¶ 13. We further explained that, although the drug-

6
related indictment occurred approximately five months after the State received

the lab results, this, under Baker, was “irrelevant” to the beginning date of the

speedy trial count because, under R.C. 2901.13(E), the drug counts were

commenced on the date these counts were indicted. Id. at ¶ 14. We have

similarly held that when a person is initially charged with a driving under the

influence offense (OVI), and, after the State's receipt of a lab result reflecting

a prohibited concentration of alcohol, the person is then charged with a

prohibited concentration OVI, the second charge is subject to a new speedy

trial clock. See State v. Lekan, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16108, 1997 WL

351287 (June 27, 2997); State v. Cantrell, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2000-CA-95,

2001 WL 1018234 (Sept. 7, 2001). The rationale for these decisions was that,

since the prohibited concentration offenses were dependent upon lab results,

the State did not know the facts of the offenses until the lab results became

available. Lekan; Cantrell.

Based upon Baker, and our case law applying Baker in analogous

circumstances, the speedy trial time in Taylor's cocaine possession case

began on January 17, 2020, the date of the cocaine possession indictment.

Id. at ¶ 7-11.

{¶ 12} In this case, Dominguez-Oliva was originally indicted for failure to comply,

assault, and felonious assault. At that time, the lab analysis of the drugs found in

Dominguez-Oliva’s vehicle had not been completed, and he was not indicted on the felony

drug charges until after the lab analysis confirmed the illegal nature of the drugs. Under

our analysis in Taylor, the speedy trial time did not begin to run until the filing of that

indictment on December 20, 2024. The matter was tried to a jury on May 5, 2025.

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{¶ 13} There was no statutory speedy trial violation on this record. Further,

Dominguez-Oliva has not demonstrated a constitutional speedy trial violation because he

has not claimed, or demonstrated, that the four-month period between indictment and trial

was unreasonable or that he suffered any prejudice therefrom.

{¶ 14} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

III. Due Process

{¶ 15} The third assignment of error is as follows:

DOMINGUEZ-OLIVIA’S [SIC] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS OF LAW UNDER SECTION 16, ARTICLE I, OF THE OHIO

CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED.

{¶ 16} Dominguez-Oliva contends that he was denied due process of law because of

the “State’s two-year delay in bringing these additional drug offenses.”

{¶ 17} Delay between a defendant's involvement in alleged criminal conduct and an

indictment involving such conduct may deprive a defendant of his constitutionally protected

due process rights. State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150 (1984), paragraph two of the syllabus.

However, “preindictment delay violates due process only when it is unjustifiable and causes

actual prejudice.” State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, ¶ 12. A defendant has the initial

burden to present evidence of actual prejudice in order to demonstrate that he was deprived

of his due process rights. Id. at ¶ 13, citing State v. Whiting, 84 Ohio St.3d 215, 217 (1998).

{¶ 18} Determining “‘actual prejudice’ involves ‘a delicate judgment based on the

circumstances of each case.’” State v. Walls, 2002-Ohio-5059, ¶ 52, quoting United States

v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971). “In making this assessment, courts are to consider

the evidence as it exists when the indictment is filed and the prejudice the defendant will

8
suffer at trial due to the delay.” Id., citing State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150, 154 (1984),

citing Marion at 326. “‘Actual prejudice exists when missing evidence or unavailable

testimony, identified by the defendant and relevant to the defense, would minimize or

eliminate the impact of the state's evidence and bolster the defense.’” State v. Bourn, 2022-

Ohio-4321, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-5105, ¶ 28.

{¶ 19} We conclude that Dominguez-Oliva has failed to establish any “actual

prejudice” resulting from the delay between his arrest and subsequent indictment. Simply

put, he has failed to suggest any evidence of prejudice such as the death of a key witness,

lost evidence, or faded memories resulting from the State's delay in indicting him.

{¶ 20} The third assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight

{¶ 21} The fourth assignment of error states as follows:

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT AND

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT TO SUSTAIN DOMINGUEZ-OLIVIA’S

[SIC] CONVICTIONS.

{¶ 22} Dominguez-Oliva claims the State failed to present evidence sufficient to

support his convictions and that the convictions are otherwise against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

{¶ 23} “An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine

whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Marshall, 2010-Ohio-5160, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.),

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. The

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

9
any rational trier of fact could have found the crime's essential elements proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id.

{¶ 24} When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and determines whether in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172,

175 (1st Dist.1983). A case should not be reversed as being against the manifest weight

of the evidence except “‘in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against

the conviction.’” Id.

{¶ 25} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,

manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that a

conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding

of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. McCrary, 2011-Ohio-3161 ¶ 11 (10th Dist.).

As a result, a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will

also be dispositive of sufficiency. State v. Farra, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 26} Dominguez-Oliva first challenges his convictions by arguing that the State

failed to prove that he was the driver of the vehicle during the high-speed pursuit. We

disagree.

{¶ 27} The record reflects there was only one occupant, the driver, in the vehicle at

the time of the pursuit and stop. The troopers confirmed that the vehicle was registered to

Dominguez-Oliva. The troopers also reviewed a picture of the Illinois driver’s license for

Dominguez-Oliva and determined that it matched the driver of the vehicle. A search of the

10
vehicle revealed a brown paper bag that contained both methamphetamine as well as a

debit card with the name “Alan Dominguez.” Finally, the two troopers who testified at trial

identified Dominguez-Oliva as the person in the vehicle. We find nothing in this record to

rebut the above evidence and conclude that it was sufficient to prove identity.

{¶ 28} Dominguez-Oliva next claims that the State failed to prove that he had

possession of any of the drugs found in the vehicle. Specifically, he contends the State's

evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he knowingly possessed the drugs because

no DNA or fingerprint evidence tied him to the drugs and no one saw him place the drugs in

the vehicle.

{¶ 29} Possession of a drug may be either actual physical possession or constructive

possession. State v. Mabry, 2007-Ohio-1895, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’

means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere

access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon

which the thing or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). “A person has constructive

possession of an item when he is conscious of the presence of the object and able to

exercise dominion and control over that item, even if it is not within his immediate physical

possession.” (Citations omitted.) Mabry at ¶ 18. “Establishment of ownership is not

required.” State v. Rastbichler, 2014-Ohio-628, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.). In determining whether an

individual possessed an item, it is necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances

surrounding the incident. Mabry at ¶ 20.

{¶ 30} Again, the record shows that Dominguez-Oliva was the registered owner and

sole occupant of the involved vehicle. The methamphetamine was located in a brown bag

that also contained a debit card with the name Alan Dominguez on it. The evidence

demonstrates that the troopers found and retrieved 451 blue pills that were scattered

11
throughout the vehicle and later determined to be contraband. The troopers observed

Dominguez-Oliva shoving a portion of those pills into his mouth so fast that they were

“cascading” out of the corners of his mouth. Based upon this evidence, we conclude that a

reasonable juror could find that Dominguez-Oliva possessed the drugs found in his vehicle.

{¶ 31} Finally, Dominguez-Oliva claims the State failed to prove that the pills were

fentanyl “with a weight equaling or exceeding 20 grams.” In support, he notes that only a

small number of the seized pills were tested in a laboratory.

{¶ 32} The record demonstrates that the troopers sent the pills to the Ohio State

Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory for testing. Emily Hartsell, a criminalist in the drug

chemistry section of the Crime Laboratory, testified at trial that she received 451 round blue

pills. She testified that each pill had the imprint “M30.” She further testified that she tested

four of the pills and determined they were fentanyl and that the total weight of the fentanyl

pills was over 20 grams.

{¶ 33} The record supports Dominguez-Oliva’s claim that only a few of the pills

recovered from his vehicle were subjected to laboratory testing. However, this “random-

sampling” method of testing drugs has been upheld by Ohio courts. State v. Samatar,

2003-Ohio-1639, ¶ 81 (10th Dist.); State v. Mattox, 13 Ohio App.3d 52, 53 (2d Dist. 1983).

“These cases hold that the random-sampling method of testing creates a reasonable

inference that all similar contraband contains the same controlled substance as that tested,

at least when the contraband is recovered together and similarly packaged. Accordingly,

evidence of the random-sampling method is sufficient as a matter of law to support a

determination that the entire substance recovered together and similarly packaged is the

same controlled substance as that tested.” Id.

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{¶ 34} We conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient for a reasonable

juror to find that Dominguez-Oliva possessed fentanyl in an amount commensurate with a

first-degree felony.

{¶ 35} Based upon the record before us, we conclude that the State presented

evidence sufficient to support the convictions for drug possession and that those convictions

are not otherwise against the weight of the evidence.

{¶ 36} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

V. Conclusion

{¶ 37} All of the assignments of error asserted by Dominguez-Oliva being overruled,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

.............

EPLEY, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.

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