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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Sundwall

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 32

• Docket Number: Case No. 20251352-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (724)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 32

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
MEGGAN RANDALL SUNDWALL,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20251352-CA
Filed March 5, 2026

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Sean M. Petersen
No. 251401132

Emily Adams and Scott C. Williams,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Lindsay Combs,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Meggan Randall Sundwall is charged with aggravated
murder and obstruction of justice. The district court bound
Sundwall over for trial on those charges and denied her request
to be released pending trial, finding that substantial evidence
supported the charges and that clear and convincing evidence
supported that she was a flight risk. Sundwall appeals, asserting
that the court erred in determining that clear and convincing
evidence supported its finding that she poses a flight risk. We
disagree and affirm.
State v. Sundwall

BACKGROUND 1

Sundwall and Kimberly’s Relationship

¶2 Sundwall was working as a registered nurse when she met
a woman we refer to pseudonymously as Kimberly. Kimberly was
born without a kidney and suffered from chronic kidney disease,
endometriosis, hypertension, depression, and anxiety. Kimberly
told her family members and others, including Sundwall, that she
also had terminal cancer. Sundwall and Kimberly became friends,
and Kimberly lived with Sundwall and Sundwall’s husband for
about two years.

¶3 Over a nearly five-year span, Sundwall and Kimberly
texted each other frequently, sending a combined total of 28,880
texts. In 2020, Kimberly texted Sundwall that she was going to
name Sundwall as the beneficiary of her life insurance policy.
Kimberly explained that Sundwall had “been such a good friend”
and had “been taking care of” her and that she “was leaving over
a million dollars” to Sundwall.

1. This case comes to us on an interlocutory appeal—as authorized by statute, see Utah Code § 77-20-209—of the district court’s order that Sundwall be detained while she awaits trial or other resolution of the charges against her. “On interlocutory review, we recount the facts as alleged and in a light most favorable to the ruling below,” State v. Taylor, 2015 UT 42, ¶ 2 n.2, 349 P.3d 696, relying on the information available to the district court when it issued its ruling, including here the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and the evidence proffered at the detention hearing. Notwithstanding our recitation, however, the facts central to the charges have yet to be ultimately determined, and Sundwall “retains the presumption of innocence that attaches prior to conviction.” State v. Cordova, 2023 UT App 99, n.1, 536 P.3d 666.

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State v. Sundwall

¶4 After this communication, Kimberly’s death became a
frequent topic of discussion between Sundwall and Kimberly,
with Kimberly “repeatedly communicat[ing] a desire to die” and
Sundwall “suggest[ing] different ways for [Kimberly] to kill
herself.” Fairly early on, they discussed the possibility of using
insulin to cause Kimberly’s death. 2 Sundwall texted that if insulin
was used, someone “should stay with [Kimberly] and continue to
give [her] doses so . . . [she could] pass” and that the someone
“should probably be [Sundwall].” Sundwall also repeatedly sent
Kimberly texts like the following: “I’m convinced that you are not
going to pass until you actually want to completely. You’ve asked
for blessings, taken stuff, and say you want to, but I know you
don’t. You have to let go. It is past time.”

¶5 At some point, Kimberly told her sister that “she feared for
her life” “[b]ecause she wasn’t dying fast enough to make
[Sundwall] happy.” So on a weekend while Sundwall and her
husband were away camping, Kimberly’s sister and the sister’s
husband “went and got all of [Kimberly’s] stuff” and moved
Kimberly into their grandparents’ basement. Despite Kimberly’s
move, Sundwall and Kimberly maintained their friendship and
continued communicating.

¶6 In October 2023, Sundwall “and her husband began to have
financial problems.” Sundwall texted her husband that she would
have to keep working nights “unless [Kimberly] passe[d] and [left
her] money”; that she was counting “on the thing with [Kimberly]
being true to bail [them] out”; and that she was concerned
Kimberly was “going to outlive [them] and [they were] going to
be in [their] situation forever.” Sundwall also told Kimberly about
her financial difficulties and said, “If you dying would get me out
of this mess, I would take it.” Sometime later, Kimberly texted
Sundwall, “I would love to die in the next few days because it
would make it better for you.” Sundwall replied, “You are sweet.

1. Kimberly did not have diabetes.

20251352-CA 3 2026 UT App 32
State v. Sundwall

I’d love that too.” Sometime in 2024, Sundwall “was fired from
her nursing position . . . for falsifying time cards and lying about
it.”

¶7 On August 12, 2024, Sundwall visited Kimberly at her
grandparents’ home, arriving at about 10:00 a.m. Sometime earlier
that morning, Sundwall had texted Kimberly, “Do you want to
take some Promethazine when I get there so that you are asleep
when this is happening?” At 1:59 p.m., Sundwall texted her
mother from Kimberly’s grandparents’ home, saying that she
could not get Kimberly to wake up. Later in the afternoon,
Sundwall contacted her parents again, this time asking her father
to come give Kimberly “a blessing of release” “to help her pass
peacefully and easier.” Sundwall’s parents arrived at 8:29 p.m.

¶8 At about 9:00 p.m., Kimberly’s uncle, who was also living
in Kimberly’s grandparents’ home, went into the basement to
check on Kimberly. He found Sundwall and Sundwall’s parents
gathered around Kimberly’s bed. Kimberly was lying on the bed
“making some funny noises” “like she was drowning,” and she
“wasn’t responding.” When the uncle asked Sundwall “how long
[Kimberly] had been like that,” Sundwall said, “[A] couple of
hours.” Sundwall told the uncle not to call an ambulance because
Kimberly had a “do not resuscitate” form (DNR) and did not want
to go to the hospital. Sundwall later told a detective that she “had
power of attorney over [Kimberly’s] medical decisions.”

¶9 Kimberly’s uncle called Kimberly’s sister, who urged him
to call 911, which he did. Sundwall and her parents left as
paramedics arrived. The paramedics found a “diabetic needle” in
Kimberly’s room near the chair where Sundwall had been sitting.
They took Kimberly to the hospital, where her blood sugar level
was measured at 14. A level under 40 can be life-threatening, and
when “someone who’s not a diabetic [has] a blood sugar [level] of
14,” “it’s probably [the result of] exogenous insulin,” meaning

20251352-CA 4 2026 UT App 32
State v. Sundwall

insulin administered from outside the body. Kimberly never
regained consciousness and died three days later.

¶10 Following Kimberly’s death, no DNR was ever found and
Sundwall never produced any document showing she had power
of attorney over Kimberly’s medical decisions. Law enforcement
officers learned and informed Sundwall that Kimberly had no life
insurance policy and that Kimberly never had cancer. Officers
asked Sundwall for consent to search her phone. Sundwall agreed
but did not immediately provide her phone. After Sundwall
provided her phone, officers compared the text messages on
Sundwall’s phone with those on Kimberly’s phone from a three-
week period and discovered that Sundwall had selectively
deleted from her phone 283 text messages from that period “that
talked about insulin, . . . finances, . . . life insurance and suicide.”

¶11 Sundwall was arrested, charged with aggravated murder
and obstruction of justice, and ordered to be held without bail. A
representative of the Division of Professional Licensing “came to
the jail and suspended [Sundwall’s] nursing license, cutting off
her career path and income.” Sundwall’s husband began
attempting to sell their home and car, and Sundwall’s parents
borrowed $30,000 against their home to retain private counsel to
represent Sundwall through her preliminary hearing. Sundwall
worked with a friend to “launch a GoFundMe campaign, despite
that platform having rules that explicitly bar fundraising for
violent crime defendants.” Sundwall “intend[ed] to ask [her
attorney] to rewrite the campaign to evade detection.”

¶12 Following a preliminary hearing, the district court found
probable cause to bind Sundwall over for trial on both the
aggravated murder charge and the obstruction of justice charge.
The State then filed notice that it did not intend to seek the death
penalty, thereby allowing the court to “address any requests for
bail.” See generally Utah Code § 77-20-201(1)(a), (3)(a) (providing
that a person charged with a capital felony is not entitled to bail

20251352-CA 5 2026 UT App 32
State v. Sundwall

but that if “the prosecuting attorney files a notice of intent to not
seek the death penalty,” a charge of aggravated murder is not a
capital felony). The court then set a detention hearing to
determine whether Sundwall should be granted pretrial release
or continue to be held without bail.

¶13 After receiving evidentiary proffers and arguments at the
detention hearing, the court issued an order denying Sundwall
pretrial release. The court found that there was substantial
evidence to support the charges, and it found “by clear and
convincing evidence that [Sundwall was] likely to flee the
jurisdiction of the court if [she was] released on bail.” In support
of this latter finding, the court explained as follows:

[T]he [c]ourt viewed texts as to [Sundwall’s] many
concerns about her current financial situation and
mental state and the need for a payout to get out of
her current financial situation.

Of great concern to the [c]ourt is evidence
that [Sundwall’s] current financial situation has not
surprisingly improved, but actually worsened,
including a loss of a job, the sale of or potential need
to sell her home, along with concerns of . . . an
ongoing ability to pay retained counsel.

The [c]ourt is aware of a large amount of
support for [Sundwall] from her friends and
family. . . .

The [c]ourt also notes [defense counsel’s]
argument that this case presents, in his words,
remarkable circumstances where release could be
appropriate. . . .

Notwithstanding this support and argument,
the [c]ourt likens [Sundwall’s] current situation to

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State v. Sundwall

being backed into a corner more or less with nothing
to lose based upon her current status.

When someone has nothing to lose, it
oftentimes results in drastic decisions being made.
And that is a foremost concern of the [c]ourt.

Potential life in prison, along with the
[c]ourt’s understanding and consideration of
[Sundwall’s] current financial situation, mental
state, and facts showing a years-long relationship
that ended in the death of someone, give the [c]ourt
extreme pause when considering [Sundwall’s]
likelihood of showing up to court.

¶14 Having found substantial evidence to support the charges
and clear and convincing evidence that Sundwall posed a flight
risk, the court denied Sundwall’s request for pretrial release.
Sundwall now appeals that ruling.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 Sundwall asserts that the district court’s finding by clear
and convincing evidence that she was a flight risk is clearly
erroneous. “A district court’s determination that there is clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant is . . . likely to flee if
released is a fact-intensive, credibility-assessment-dependent
inquiry that deserves deference. We reverse that determination
only if it is clearly erroneous.” Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 49,
515 P.3d 444; accord State v. Cordova, 2023 UT App 99, ¶ 6, 536 P.3d
666. Under the clearly erroneous standard, “we must sustain the
[district] court’s judgment unless it is against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Briggs, 2008 UT
75, ¶ 10, 197 P.3d 628 (cleaned up). “Additionally, in those
instances in which the [district] court’s findings include inferences

20251352-CA 7 2026 UT App 32
State v. Sundwall

drawn from the evidence, we will not take issue with those
inferences unless the logic upon which their extrapolation from
the evidence is based is so flawed as to render the inference clearly
erroneous.” Id. ¶ 11 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶16 Under the Utah Constitution, criminal defendants are
generally entitled to pretrial release. See Utah Const. art. 1, § 8.
One exception to that general rule is where (1) the defendant is
charged with a felony, (2) “there is substantial evidence to support
the charge,” and (3) “the court finds, by clear and convincing
evidence, that . . . the individual is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if the individual is released on bail.” Utah Code § 77-20-
201(c)(ii).

¶17 When “making a determination about pretrial release,” the
district court may “rely upon information contained in” any of the
following:

(i) the indictment or information; (ii) any sworn or
probable cause statement or other information
provided by law enforcement; (iii) a pretrial risk
assessment; (iv) an affidavit of indigency described
in Section 78B-22-201.5; (v) witness statements or
testimony; (vi) the results of a lethality assessment
completed in accordance with Section 77-36-2.1; or
(vii) any other reliable record or source, including
proffered evidence.

Id. § 77-20-205(8)(a). Additionally, the court may consider, among
other things, “the nature and circumstances of the offense, or
offenses, that the individual was arrested for, or charged with”;
the individual’s “character,” “physical and mental health,”
“employment status or history,” “financial resources,” and “past
criminal conduct”; and any “other evidence relevant to the

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State v. Sundwall

individual’s likelihood of fleeing . . . if released.” Id. § 77-20-
205(8)(b). If the court determines that pretrial release should not
be granted, the court must “make sufficiently detailed findings of
fact on the risk of . . . flight from the court’s jurisdiction to enable
a reviewing court to ensure that the [court’s] determination
reasonably considered all of the evidence presented to the court.”
Id. § 77-20-205(10). The court “may not base a determination about
pretrial release solely . . . on the seriousness or type of offense that
the individual is arrested for or charged with, unless the
individual is arrested for or charged with a capital felony.” Id.
§ 77-20-205(9). “[A]ny arrest or charge for . . . aggravated murder[]
is a capital felony unless . . . the prosecuting attorney files a notice
of intent to not seek the death penalty.” Id. § 77-20-201(3)(a). 3 Here
the State filed such a notice, making the aggravated murder
charge against Sundwall a non-capital felony for purposes of
pretrial release.

¶18 As noted, the district court found that there was clear and
convincing evidence that Sundwall was a flight risk, and it denied

1. By its terms, the provision in Utah Code subsection 77-20- 201(3)(a), regarding when a charge of aggravated murder qualifies as a capital offense, applies specifically to subsection 77- 20-201(1)(a), which states, “An individual charged with, or arrested for, a criminal offense shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, except if the individual is charged with . . . a capital felony when there is substantial evidence to support the charge . . . .” As a corollary, subsection 77-20-205(9)(a) states, “The [court] may not base a determination about pretrial release solely . . . on the seriousness or type of offense that the individual is arrested for or charged with, unless the individual is arrested for or charged with a capital felony . . . .” Because of the plain relationship between subsection 77-20-201(1)(a) and subsection 77-20-205(9)(a), we conclude that subsection 77-20-201(3)(a)’s provision regarding when aggravated murder qualifies as a capital offense applies to subsection 77-20-205(9)(a) and subsection 77-20-201(1)(a).

20251352-CA 9 2026 UT App 32
State v. Sundwall

her pretrial release on that basis. “The clear and convincing
standard implies something more than the preponderance, or
greater weight, of the evidence[] and something less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. It demands the introduction of
evidence that makes the existence of the disputed facts very
highly probable.” Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 84, 515 P.3d 444
(cleaned up). “Though we are not unmindful of the ‘clear and
convincing’ burden of proof below, that burden does not alter, nor
is it inconsistent with, the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review
on appeal.” In re R.R.D., 791 P.2d 206, 208 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

¶19 The district court “liken[ed] [Sundwall’s] current situation
to being backed into a corner more or less with nothing to lose.”
It stated that its “foremost concern” was that “[w]hen someone
has nothing to lose, it oftentimes results in drastic decisions being
made.” On this basis, the court found “by clear and convincing
evidence that [Sundwall was] likely to flee the jurisdiction of the
court if [she was] released on bail.”

¶20 The district court made that finding based on the totality of
the evidence and information presented in the moving papers, the
preliminary hearing, and the detention hearing. That evidence
and information—when viewed in the light most favorable to the
court’s ultimate finding—demonstrated the following:

• After Sundwall and her husband began experiencing
financial problems, she falsified time cards at her place of
employment and lied about it.

• Substantial evidence suggests that when Sundwall
continued to experience financial difficulties, she killed
Kimberly, hoping to receive life insurance proceeds.

• When Kimberly’s uncle suggested emergency medical help
for Kimberly, Sundwall lied about Kimberly having a
DNR.

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State v. Sundwall

• Later, as officers began to investigate Kimberly’s death,
Sundwall lied about having a power of attorney over
Kimberly’s medical decisions.

• Substantial evidence suggests that as officers began
focusing their investigation on Sundwall, she illegally
deleted at least 283 incriminating text messages from her
phone.

• And when the cost of private counsel became apparent,
Sundwall sought to circumvent crowdfunding rules, with
an intent to involve her attorney in that wrongdoing.

In sum, the evidence and information before the district court
demonstrated a repeated pattern of Sundwall resorting to
unlawful or otherwise impermissible behavior when backed into
a corner.

¶21 The evidence and information before the court also showed
that Sundwall was again in desperate straits due to financial strain
beyond what she experienced previously and the prospect of
receiving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. Given Sundwall’s demonstrated pattern of unlawful and
impermissible behavior when she is backed into a corner and the
fact that she was now backed into a more desperate corner than
ever before, the district court could reasonably infer that
Sundwall was likely to engage in the unlawful behavior of fleeing
the jurisdiction of the court if she was released on bail.
Accordingly, the court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence
that Sundwall was a flight risk is not clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION

¶22 The district court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence that Sundwall was a flight risk is not clearly erroneous.

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State v. Sundwall

We therefore affirm the court’s decision to deny Sundwall’s
request for pretrial release.

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