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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Mancia

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 30

• Docket Number: Case No. 20230735-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (2)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (389)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 30

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
JOSE HUMBERTO MANCIA,
Appellant.

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ARGENIS DANIEL RAMIREZ SAEDT,
Appellant.

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ROSALIO ANDRES ALVAREZ,
Appellant.

Opinion
Nos. 20230735-CA, 20230760-CA, 20240282-CA
Filed March 5, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
Nos. 171910155, 171910158, 171910156

Erick Grange, Attorney for Jose Humberto Mancia

Dain E. Smoland and Staci A. Visser, Attorneys for
Argenis Daniel Ramirez Saedt

Darcy M. Goddard and S. Spencer Brown, Attorneys
for Rosalio Andres Alvarez
Derek E. Brown, Daniel L. Day, Terry M. Crist, and
David A. Simpson, Attorneys for the State
State v. Mancia

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Defendants Jose Humberto Mancia, Argenis Daniel
Ramirez Saedt, and Rosalio Andres Alvarez were each convicted
by a jury on two counts of murder for the deaths of Lloyd Pace
and Tami Woodward. While fleeing the scene of a drive-by
shooting in a stolen truck, Defendants collided with Pace and
Woodward’s car, killing them. Defendants now appeal, arguing
that their trial counsel were ineffective in a variety of ways. 1 We
reject their arguments and affirm their convictions.

BACKGROUND 2

The Conflict Between the Norteños and the Sureños

¶2 The Norteños and the Sureños are two rival street gangs
with a presence in Salt Lake County. Beginning in December 2016
and continuing into August 2017, several prominent Norteños
members were killed. The Norteños blamed the Sureños for these
killings. Specifically, they blamed a Sureños member named

1. Mancia, Saedt, and Alvarez were each represented by separate
   counsel at the joint trial.

2. “In an appeal from a jury trial, we review the record facts in a
   light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts
   accordingly, and we present conflicting evidence only as
   necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Kufrin,
   2024 UT App 86, n.1, 551 P.3d 416 (cleaned up).

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State v. Mancia

Manuel. 3 The Norteños were seeking “revenge” and Manuel and
his family, some of whom are also Sureños members, “were target
number one.”

¶3 Defendants are all Norteños members. On September 10,
2017, Saedt texted Mancia, “[Manuel] seen at the [gas station] in
R[ose] P[ark].” Several days later, Manuel posted a photo on
Facebook depicting him wearing Sureños paraphernalia with the
caption, “We running these streets [Sureños] gang NK,” which
stood for “Norteños Killers.” The purpose of the post was to
“mock[]” the Norteños and to “call[] them out.” Mancia saved
Manuel’s post on his phone a little over an hour after it was
posted.

The September 18 Shooting

¶4 On September 18, 2017, the owner (Truck Owner) of a blue
Ford Raptor (the Raptor) contacted police after discovering that
the Raptor was missing from the front of her house. She also
reported to police that several guns had been stolen from the
closet in the primary bedroom of her house, including a SIG Sauer
and a gold Desert Eagle.

¶5 Later that night, a police officer (Officer 1) responded to a
report of a shooting at the house Manuel shared with his family
(the Residence). As Officer 1 searched the area, he found shell
casings in the road and noticed damage to a silver Lexus parked
across the street from the Residence. A shell casing matched the
SIG Sauer that was reported stolen earlier that day. He also found
a handgun underneath the Lexus.

¶6 Officer 1 spoke with Manuel’s mother (Mother) that night.
Mother told him she was outside of the Residence when she saw

1. A pseudonym.

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State v. Mancia

the Raptor drive by the Residence three times. She told Officer 1
that on the third drive-by, she saw a hand come out of the truck
and, thinking she would be shot at, she ran into the Residence.
She heard four to five shots. A neighbor (Neighbor) corroborated
Mother’s account of the shooting, telling police she had woken up
to gunfire that night. Further, the Metro Gang Unit, a task force
comprised of various law enforcement agencies in Salt Lake
County with the goal of “quell[ing]. . . gang violence . . . and
crime,” had previously placed a pole camera at the Residence as
part of its gang interdiction efforts. The pole camera picked up
video of the drive-by shooting around 10:30 p.m.

The September 19 Shooting and Car Accident

¶7 The following evening, September 19, 2017, Neighbor was
working on her car in her driveway when she heard noises that
“sounded like . . . gunshots.” Neighbor stepped onto the sidewalk
and saw gunfire coming from the Raptor, which was driving
away from the Residence. The Raptor “fl[ew]” out of the
subdivision without braking. It hit a dip in the road and “caught
air” such that the bystanders “could see the undercarriage of the
[Raptor] and all the tires” before it came back down and landed
on top of a Toyota Yaris (the Yaris). After landing on the Yaris, the
Raptor “went upside down” and rolled through the intersection
before stopping with its roof on the ground. Neighbor, along with
a driver (Driver) and passenger (Passenger) in a car driving by,
witnessed the Raptor hit the Yaris. The Yaris ended up “pinned
between” a truck parked in a driveway and a garage. Pace and
Woodward, who were in the Yaris, did not survive.

¶8 Defendants were in the Raptor at the time of the accident.
After the crash, half of Saedt’s body was “hanging out of” the
Raptor. Mancia and Alvarez were able to exit the Raptor and flee
on foot before being apprehended in a neighbor’s backyard.

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State v. Mancia

Alvarez had a gunshot wound to his back, and he and Saedt were
taken to the hospital.

¶9 Defendants were each charged with two counts of felony
murder with gang enhancements, one count of felony discharge
of a firearm with a gang enhancement, and one count of theft by
receiving stolen property.

The Trial

¶10 At a joint jury trial, the State called seventeen witnesses, 4
including Neighbor, Passenger, Driver, a police investigator
(Investigator), Truck Owner, Officer 1, a police detective
(Detective), and a medical examiner (Medical Examiner), who
together testified to the above facts. The State also called Mother,
a forensic scientist (Forensic Scientist), the officer who
interviewed Mother after the September 19 shooting
(Interviewer), a firearms analyst (Firearms Expert), another police
officer (Officer 2), a gang expert (Gang Expert), and Pace’s sister
(Sister).

¶11 Neighbor testified that on September 19, she could not tell
if all the shots had come from the Raptor or if some had come from
the Residence as well. She testified that after the accident, she
witnessed a man run from the Raptor. She also testified that an
individual came from the Residence toward the scene of the
accident and yelled, “I’ll catch you on the rebound.”

¶12 Passenger testified that the Yaris was approximately four
and a half to five feet tall and the Raptor went high enough into

1. A fourth defendant in this case pled guilty and was therefore not tried with Defendants. We do not recount the testimony of the witnesses who spoke solely to that individual’s involvement, as it is not relevant to this appeal.

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State v. Mancia

the air to land on top of it. She stated that the Raptor rolled in the
air, “landed on one side,” and then “finished flipping” onto its
roof. She testified that after witnessing the accident, she
immediately got out of her car to help. When she got to the Yaris,
Woodward was already deceased, and Pace was still breathing,
but his pulse was “really weak.” She further indicated that as she
checked on Pace, she saw a male exit the Raptor and “t[ake] off
running.” She testified she saw a male in a white t-shirt “stuck” in
the Raptor and saw guns and magazines lying on the ground
around the Raptor.

¶13 Driver testified that he parked his car after witnessing the
accident and he followed Passenger on foot to the scene. He
testified that Passenger called 911 and that he spoke to the
dispatcher while Passenger checked the pulses of the individuals
in the Yaris. He stated he saw a male in front of the Raptor who
“hesitated a little bit” before “running into the neighborhood”
and saw guns on the ground near the Raptor. Driver also testified
he saw another truck drive to the end of the Residence’s street and
stop at the dip where the Raptor caught air. The driver of the truck
got out and ran across the road until he was ten to fifteen feet from
the scene of the accident before yelling, “[W]hat now, bitch?
What’s up bitch?” Driver testified the man then told the crowd
that had gathered at the scene of the accident that the individuals
in the Raptor had been shooting at “[his] house.”

¶14 After being granted immunity by the State, Mother agreed
to testify. Mother testified she could not remember anything
because she has “a sickness” and was “on a lot of different
kind[s]” of medications. She testified she could not remember
telling police the Raptor from the September 19 shooting was the
same vehicle involved in the September 18 shooting, though
Officer 1 later testified she had. She also did not recall telling
police that she assumed it was the same individuals involved in

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State v. Mancia

both shootings. Mother did not recall telling police that she was
outside on the driveway when the shots were fired on September
19, or that multiple gunshots were fired. Mother also did not recall
telling police that when the shooting happened, a male in the rear
passenger seat of the Raptor, who was wearing glasses, “pull[ed]
his arm out with the gun.” Nor did she recall telling police she
saw a male in a white shirt and a male in a red shirt inside the
Raptor. Finally, she did not recall telling police her husband got
into his truck after the accident.

¶15 Interviewer testified that Mother did not appear to be
impaired or in an altered mental state at the time he interviewed
her. Interviewer stated Mother recalled the incidents “very
clearly.”

¶16 Forensic Scientist testified that she tested evidence from
the accident for DNA. She said DNA found on the driver side
front airbag and the driver side door matched Alvarez’s profile
and DNA found on the passenger side front airbag and the driver
headrest matched Saedt’s profile. Forensic Scientist further
testified DNA found on the SIG Sauer matched Saedt’s profile,
while DNA found on a Taurus gun matched Alvarez’s profile.

¶17 Detective testified that the SIG Sauer, gold Desert Eagle,
and Taurus were all recovered in or around the Raptor. He
testified he reviewed pole camera footage and footage from a
neighbor’s doorbell camera following the accident, and he
confirmed the events captured on the pole camera were consistent
with what he observed at the scene.

¶18 Firearms Expert testified that three of the spent cartridges
found at the scene were fired from the Desert Eagle and one of the
two recovered bullets was fired from the same Desert Eagle. He
testified he was unable to match any casings or bullets to the
Taurus, and there was no evidence that the SIG Sauer was fired

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State v. Mancia

the night of the accident. He testified that the shell casing
recovered after the September 18 shooting matched the SIG Sauer
recovered at the scene of the accident.

¶19 Officer 2 testified that the Taurus was recovered with one
cartridge, and an “unspent shell casing.” He also testified the SIG
Sauer held a full eight-round magazine and a round in the
chamber. Finally, he testified the Desert Eagle was recovered with
a spent shell casing and a magazine with four rounds inside.

¶20 Medical Examiner testified that Pace died from blunt
injuries to his head, chest, and torso, and he testified Woodward
died from “blunt injuries [to] her head.” He further testified he
found nothing in either autopsy to suggest the cause of death for
either victim was anything other than the blunt force injuries.

¶21 Gang Expert testified to Defendants’ Norteños
involvement, pointing to their various tattoos, clothing, and social
media posts. Gang Expert also testified about a video taken on
Alvarez’s phone at 5:18 p.m. on September 19, 2017. In the video,
Alvarez is sitting in the passenger seat of the Raptor and wearing
a red T-shirt, and Saedt is driving and wearing a white T-shirt.
Gang Expert also testified about photographs depicting Mancia
wearing glasses. 5

¶22 Sister testified that Pace and Woodward were engaged. At
the beginning of her testimony, the State showed a picture of Pace,
and the following exchange then occurred:

Q: Tell me about [Pace].

A: [He] was a big-hearted person. He loved his
family. He loved his friends. He was out to help

1. At trial, Mancia was not wearing glasses, but Alvarez was.

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State v. Mancia

everybody. Just a kind-hearted fellow. You can tell
by the smile on his face. That’s a really good picture.

He would help me decorate the yard during
the holidays, help me with Halloween. Halloween
was his favorite.

....

Q: Tell me about [Woodward].

A: [She] was really nice. [She] and my daughter
were really close friends. She had a couple
granddaughters that she worshipped, she loved to
be around, would go to their soccer games.

She would take [Pace] to work every day and
pick him up.

¶23 The State then asked Sister to speak about September 19,
2017. Sister testified she was hosting a family gathering that
evening and had planned to discuss a celebration of life that was
going to be held for her and Pace’s mother, who had recently
passed away. Sister testified Pace and Woodward “did not show
up.” She testified she had gone to bed, and her oldest daughter
woke her up after police rang the doorbell. The police informed
Sister that both Pace and Woodward had been killed in an
accident.

¶24 The State then asked Sister, “What was your reaction to
that news?” Sister responded, “I freaked out. I couldn’t stand it
because [Pace] is—was my rock, my person. And I had a heart
attack that night and then wound up in the hospital for a few days.
They said . . . my heart attack wasn’t caused from a broken heart,
but I think it was.” The State asked, “So how has your life been

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State v. Mancia

changed since [Pace’s] and [Woodward’s] death[s]?” Sister
answered, “I’m not the same person.” At this point, Alvarez’s
counsel objected. The State withdrew the question, and Sister’s
testimony concluded.

¶25 At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury.
Reflected in the instructions was the State’s party liability theory
of the case. Instructions 40 (Mancia), 44 (Saedt), and 48 (Alvarez)
identically stated that Defendants could not be convicted of felony
discharge of a firearm 6 unless the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that, as parties to the offense, they

a. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
discharged a firearm in the direction of any person
or persons knowing or having reason to believe that
any person may be endangered by the discharge of
a firearm;

OR

b. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
discharged a firearm in the direction of any person
or habitable structure with the intent to intimidate
or harass another;

OR

1. For felony murder to apply, Defendants needed to be convicted of felony discharge of a firearm. The felony murder instructions provided that the jury could not convict any defendant without finding that they “acted with the intent required as an element of Felony Discharge of a Firearm.”

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State v. Mancia

c. Acting with the mental state required to commit
the offense of Felony Discharge of a Firearm:

i. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
solicited, requested, commanded, or
encouraged another person to commit the
offense,

OR

ii. Intentionally aided another person to
commit the offense.

¶26 Instruction 34 stated the jury could find Defendants guilty
as a “party to the offense” only if it found “beyond a reasonable
doubt” that:

1. The person had the mental state required to
   commit the charged offense; AND

2. The person . . . [i]ntentionally, knowingly, or
   recklessly solicited, requested, commanded or
   encouraged another person to commit the charged
   offense; AND

3. The charged offense was committed either by that
   person or another person.

¶27 Instruction 35 stated,

Prior knowledge that a crime is about to be
committed or is being committed does not make a
person a party to the offense, and thereby subject
them to criminal prosecution[,] unless that person
has the mental state required to commit the crime,

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State v. Mancia

he solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids in the perpetration of the crime,
and the crime is committed.

¶28 The jury instructions also included a general unanimity
instruction, which stated, “This being a criminal case, your verdict
must be unanimous; all jurors must agree.”

¶29 In closing, the State argued the evidence showed that
Alvarez was driving the Raptor, Saedt was in the front passenger
seat, and Mancia was in the rear driver side seat and was the
shooter. Regarding mens rea, the State explained the meaning of
“[e]ncouraged or aided,” saying, “Encouraged by definition is to
support. To be there to allow whatever [is] supposed to happen,
to make sure it’s going to happen. And if the actual offense was
committed by someone, that there was actual felony discharge,
anyone who is a party to that is guilty.” The State then went on to
give a sports metaphor, explaining that a backup quarterback on
the winning Super Bowl team who merely stands on the sidelines
and helps with play calls “gets the ring” even if he “had never
thrown a play, had never thrown a pass, [and] all he did was put
on a uniform and show up.” The State then likened Defendants’
clothing, tattoos, and social media posts to being on the Norteños’
team.

¶30 The jury then retired to deliberate. During deliberations,
the jurors submitted a question to the court, asking, “How does a
party liability effect [sic] felony discharge of a firearm[?]” The
court and the parties agreed to direct the jurors to Instructions 34,
35, 40, 44, and 48. The jurors were told to “read these instructions
in conjunction with each other.”

¶31 The jury convicted Defendants as charged. They were each
sentenced to fifteen years to life to be served consecutively for

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State v. Mancia

both murder counts, and the State stipulated to the dismissal of
the other counts.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶32 Defendants each assert that their counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance in a variety of ways at trial.
“When an ineffective assistance claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, it presents a question of law.” State v. Cortez-Izarraraz,
2025 UT App 116, ¶ 22, 575 P.3d 1240 (cleaned up).

¶33 Defendants also argue the errors were cumulatively
prejudicial. When applying the doctrine of cumulative prejudice,
we consider “the standard of review applicable to each
underlying claim of error and reverse if the cumulative effect of
the several errors undermines our confidence that a fair trial was
had.” State v. King, 2017 UT App 43, ¶ 15, 392 P.3d 997 (cleaned
up).

ANALYSIS

I. Ineffective Assistance

¶34 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show (1) “counsel’s performance was deficient”
and (2) counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “A defendant’s
inability to establish either element defeats a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel.” State v. Miller, 2023 UT App 85, ¶ 25, 535
P.3d 390 (cleaned up). “Because failure to establish either prong
of the test is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we
are free to address [an appellant’s] claims under either prong.” See
State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 25, 453 P.3d 657 (cleaned up).

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State v. Mancia

¶35 To establish deficient performance, a defendant “must
demonstrate counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. The deficient performance inquiry
should focus on whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances, and it must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” State v. Sandoval, 2024 UT
App 186, ¶ 19, 562 P.3d 731 (cleaned up).

¶36 To establish prejudice, a defendant “must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
State v. Forbush, 2024 UT App 11, ¶ 25, 544 P.3d 1. “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). “When evaluating a prejudice
claim in the ineffective assistance context, we assess
counterfactual scenarios—that is, what would have happened but
for the ineffective assistance, and we may do so with the evidence
available to us, even when not part of the original record.” Id.
(cleaned up).

¶37 Here, Defendants each assert multiple instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Some of their arguments are
shared, while others are unique to an individual defendant. We
address each argument in turn, indicating below who argues in
each instance.

A. Mens Rea Jury Instructions

1. Definitions of Mens Rea

¶38 Defendants each argue that his respective counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction defining the
mens rea of “recklessly” as that term is used in the context of
accomplice liability. Specifically, Defendants argue the

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State v. Mancia

instructions created the possibility that they were convicted based
on a layperson’s likely understanding of what it means to
recklessly solicit, request, command, or encourage the discharge
of a firearm rather than the legal definition. We disagree based on
a lack of prejudice.

¶39 “When applying Strickland’s prejudice analysis in the
context of erroneous jury instructions, we must determine
whether there is a reasonable probability the jury would not have
convicted the defendant if the jury instructions had been correct.”
State v. Grunwald, 2020 UT 40, ¶ 22, 478 P.3d 1. In determining
whether such a probability exists, we consider two questions: (1)
“did the error in the jury instructions create the possibility that the
jury convicted the defendant based on factual findings that would
not have led to conviction had the instructions been correct?” and
(2) “if so, is there a reasonable probability that at least one juror
based its verdict on those factual findings?” Id.

¶40 The first step in our analysis requires us to “identify the
theoretical factual scenarios in which the error in the jury
instructions permitted the jury to wrongfully convict”
Defendants. State v. Lolani, 2025 UT App 138, ¶ 18, 581 P.3d 1024
(cleaned up). In the second step, “we determine whether there is
a reasonable probability that, based on the totality of the evidence,
a juror convicted the defendant based on one of those
impermissible scenarios.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶41 On the first step, Defendants argue that the jury could have
convicted them not based on criminal recklessness—which
requires the actor’s conduct to be a “gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint,” Utah
Code § 76-2-103(3)—but based on the lay notion that simply being
armed and in a car amounts to reckless behavior. This court has

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State v. Mancia

previously identified a scenario where the lack of a definition of
“recklessly” prejudiced a defendant. See State v. Liti, 2015 UT App
186, ¶¶ 22–23, 355 P.3d 1078. There, our court considered a
reckless manslaughter case where the defendant claimed he shot
and killed his friend by accident. We concluded that the omission
of the “gross-deviation requirement” in the definition of
recklessness prejudiced the defendant because while his conduct
of “drawing a gun, arming it, and exercising poor trigger
discipline created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to
another,” it was not necessarily “a ‘gross deviation’ from what a
reasonable person may have done under the [threatening]
circumstances” the defendant found himself in. Id. But there is no
such scenario here.

¶42 On the record before us, the lack of a legal definition of
recklessly “simply did not create a possibility that the jury
convicted [Defendants] based on factual findings that would not
have led to conviction” had the definition been included. Lolani,
2025 UT App 138, ¶ 21. As applicable here, a person acts
“[r]ecklessly with respect to . . . the result of his conduct when he
is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that” his conduct will encourage another to
unlawfully discharge a firearm. Utah Code § 76-2-103(3); see also
id. § 76-10-508.1. “The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” Id. § 76-2-
103(3). Instructions 40, 44, and 48 provided that Defendants could
be convicted of felony discharge of a firearm via party liability if
the jury found that any of them, “[a]cting with the mental state
required to commit the offense of Felony Discharge of a Firearm,”
“[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly solicited, requested,
commanded, or encouraged another person to commit the

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State v. Mancia

offense” or “[i]ntentionally aided another person to commit the
offense.”

¶43 A jury would easily understand that riding with fellow
gang members while armed to the house of a targeted member of
a rival gang in the midst of ongoing retaliatory violence presented
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that one’s fellow gang member
would feel encouraged by such conduct to commit felony
discharge of a firearm. Likewise, there is no reasonable
probability that the jury convicted Defendants based on the
notion that riding with fellow gang members while armed is
reckless in the colloquial sense and that if the jury had been told
it had to find that Defendants’ conduct constituted a gross
deviation from what an ordinary person would do in the same
circumstances the verdict would have been different.

¶44 In other words, “the asserted errors in the jury instruction
simply didn’t drive the outcome here.” Lolani, 2025 UT App 138,
¶ 25. Had the jury been given the legal definition of recklessly, it
would not have changed the verdict because the evidence
supporting party liability was overwhelming. At trial, the jury
heard testimony that Defendants were Norteños members and
that the Norteños blamed the Sureños—in particular, Manuel—
for the deaths of several of their prominent members. The jury
heard testimony that because the Norteños blamed Manuel, the
Norteños sought “revenge” against him, such that the Norteños
considered Manuel’s family “target number one.” The jury heard
testimony suggesting Defendants were keeping tabs on Manuel,
as evidenced by Saedt’s text to Mancia prior to the shootings,
“[Manuel] seen at the [gas station] in R[ose] P[ark].” The jury
heard testimony Manuel had mocked the Norteños by posting a
photo on Facebook of himself wearing Sureños paraphernalia
with a caption that included the abbreviation “NK” or “Norteños
Killers” and Mancia later saved this post to his phone.

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State v. Mancia

¶45 Further, the jury heard testimony that Defendants engaged
in a drive-by shooting at the Residence the prior evening after
circling it three times in the Raptor. The jury heard testimony that
the Raptor returned the following evening to the Residence and a
male inside the Raptor wearing glasses, like Mancia, fired shots.
Two of the other individuals in the Raptor were wearing a white
shirt and a red shirt, like Saedt and Alvarez were wearing at the
time of the accident. The jury heard testimony that DNA found on
the driver side front airbag and the driver side door matched
Alvarez and DNA found on the passenger side front airbag and
the driver headrest matched Saedt. The jury also heard testimony
that the Desert Eagle had been fired, and DNA found on the SIG
Sauer and the Taurus—which were both loaded—matched
Saedt’s and Alvarez’s respective DNA profiles. The jury also
learned that after the accident, Mancia and Alvarez were
apprehended in a neighbor’s backyard and Alvarez had a gunshot
wound, while Saedt was found with half of his body “hanging out
of” the Raptor.

¶46 Based on the “totality of the evidence” presented to the
jury, there is no “reasonable probability” that if the jury had been
instructed it had to find that Defendants’ conduct constituted a
gross deviation from what an ordinary person would do in the
same circumstances, the verdict would have been different. State
v. Lolani, 2025 UT App 138, ¶ 18, 581 P.3d 1024 (cleaned up).
Indeed, the evidence painted a clear picture for the jury that
Defendants’ conduct constituted a gross deviation from what an
ordinary person would do in the same circumstance. Specifically,
there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have
determined that an ordinary person—even one in the gang
scenario in which Defendants were operating—would obtain a
weapon and join an excursion that by every indication was aimed
at inflicting extrajudicial violence as retaliation for the crimes of
others. Nor is it reasonably likely that a jury would determine that

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State v. Mancia

riding with fellow gang members while armed to the residence of
a targeted rival in the midst of ongoing retaliatory violence did
not present a substantial and unjustifiable risk that one’s fellow
gang member would feel encouraged by such conduct to commit
felony discharge of a firearm.

¶47 To resist the conclusion that including the definition of
recklessness would not change the jury’s verdict, Mancia and
Saedt direct us to State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7, 345 P.3d 1141. There, the
appellant was charged with failure to respond to an officer’s
signal to stop under Utah Code section 41-6a-210(1)(a), which
provides that “an operator who receives a visual or audible signal
from a peace officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not: . . .
attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means.”
At the close of trial, defense counsel objected to the elements
instruction for the failure-to-respond charge because “it did not
outline the mental state required for the offense” and “the
requisite mental state needed to be defined for the jury.” Id. ¶ 4
(cleaned up). The district court overruled the objection. Id. On
appeal, the defendant argued the elements instruction needed to
identify “the requisite mental state for the jury because the mens
rea implications of the terms ‘receive’ and ‘attempt’ [were]
unclear.” Id. ¶ 8. Our supreme court agreed with the defendant,
reasoning that “a juror would likely have perceived that the
‘receives a visual or audible signal from a peace officer’ element
of the offense require[d] knowledge of the peace officer’s signal”
but that it could not be assumed “that a juror would recognize the
significance of this knowledge requirement as an essential mens
rea element.” Id. ¶ 20.

¶48 The jury instructions in the case before us, however, are
different from those in Bird. There, the jury instructions did not
include the required mental state of “knowingly” and left it to the
jury to deduce what mental state was required. See id. ¶¶ 4, 20.

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State v. Mancia

Here, unlike in Bird, the required mental states were clearly
provided to the jury in the text of Instructions 40, 44, and 48. See
supra ¶¶ 25–27. Thus, Bird does not dictate the outcome in the
instant case.

¶49 In sum, we see no theoretical factual scenario in which the
failure to include the legal definition of recklessly in the jury
instructions “permitted the jury to wrongfully convict”
Defendants. Lolani, 2025 UT App 138, ¶ 18 (cleaned up).
Accordingly, Defendants were not prejudiced by counsel’s failure
to object to the jury instructions.

1. Formatting of Instructions

¶50 Saedt and Alvarez also argue party liability involves a
layered mens rea that, in this case, was “confusing” for the jury to
understand in light of the instructions it was given. Although they
essentially concede that the relevant jury instructions were correct
statements of the law, they take issue with the format of
Instructions 44 and 48 respectively. As written, Instructions 44
and 48 outlined liability for both felony discharge of a firearm and
accomplice liability for felony discharge of a firearm. Saedt and
Alvarez assert that it was improper to include both instructions
together and, therefore, that counsel was ineffective by not
objecting to the instructions and requesting they be separated. We
disagree because counsel’s performance was not deficient.

¶51 Saedt and Alvarez argue that the jury instructions were
confusing because they addressed the mental state for both the
felony discharge of a firearm and party liability in the same
instruction. While they assert that the jury instructions could have
been clearer, they do not assert that these jury instructions
misstated the law. And where the jury instructions were legally
correct, there can be no deficient performance by counsel in failing
to object to the instructions. See State v. Seach, 2021 UT App 22,

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State v. Mancia

¶ 16, 483 P.3d 1265 (holding that the “failure to object to jury
instructions that correctly state the law is not deficient
performance, and cannot, by definition, lead to prejudice.”
(cleaned up)). Accordingly, Saedt’s and Alvarez’s counsel did not
perform deficiently in failing to object to legally correct jury
instructions.

B. Character and Victim Impact Testimony

¶52 Defendants each argue their respective counsel provided
ineffective assistance by not objecting to the admission of Sister’s
testimony, which they assert amounted to character and victim
impact testimony. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume,
without deciding, that Defendants’ counsel performed deficiently
by failing to object to Sister’s testimony.7 We therefore turn to
whether that failure “prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

¶53 We envision a counterfactual scenario where Sister
testified only that Pace and Woodward were engaged and on their
way to Sister’s house at the time they were killed. In this version
of events, Sister would not testify about Pace’s or Woodward’s
character or about the impact their deaths had on her life. In that
scenario, there is still no reasonable likelihood that the jury would
have done anything other than convict Defendants. The jury
heard overwhelming evidence supporting the State’s theory of
the case—namely, that Defendants engaged in a drive-by
shooting at the Residence in retaliation for Manuel’s alleged
involvement in the deaths of several Norteños members and that
when fleeing the scene of the shooting, the Raptor they were
driving collided with the Yaris, killing Pace and Woodward.

1. While Alvarez’s counsel did eventually object to Sister’s testimony, Alvarez asserts that his counsel objected too late.

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¶54 We believe there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have acquitted Defendants if it had not heard Sister’s
testimony that humanized Pace and Woodward or shared the
impact they had on Sister’s life. That the loss of her brother would
have had an impact on Sister would have been obvious to the jury,
regardless of Sister’s testimony. And we are not persuaded that
the tipping point for the jury’s decision was hearing a family
member talk positively about her lost loved ones. Therefore,
Defendants were not prejudiced by their counsel’s failure to object
to Sister’s testimony and they received effective assistance. 8

C. Unanimity Instruction

¶55 Mancia and Alvarez argue that their counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to request a specific unanimity
instruction. They argue they could have been convicted of felony
discharge of a firearm in four ways: (1) intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly shooting at Mother; (2) intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly shooting at the Residence; (3) intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly soliciting, requesting, commanding, or encouraging
the shooting; or (4) intentionally aiding the shooting. And because
the felony murder charges depended on the intent underlying the
felony discharge, they argue “the jury could have been divided
four different ways when it found” Mancia and Alvarez “guilty
of felony discharge of a firearm and felony murder.” They

1. Saedt alone argues in the alternative that the district court plainly erred by allowing the admission of Sister’s testimony. Because “the prejudice test is the same whether under the claim of ineffective assistance or plain error,” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 40, 453 P.3d 657 (cleaned up), Saedt’s plain error argument fails for the same reasons his ineffective assistance argument does.

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therefore assert it was ineffective assistance for counsel to not
request a specific unanimity instruction.

¶56 The Unanimous Verdict Clause of the Utah
Constitution requires the verdict in criminal cases to be
unanimous. Utah Const. art. 1, § 10. Unanimity is not met “if a
jury unanimously finds only that a defendant is guilty of a crime.”
State v. Hummel, 2017 UT 19, ¶ 26, 393 P.3d 314 (cleaned up).
Rather, it “requires unanimity as to each count of each distinct
crime charged by the prosecution and submitted to the jury for
decision.” Id. (cleaned up). Furthermore, “a jury must be
unanimous on all elements of a criminal charge for a conviction to
stand.” Id. ¶ 29 (cleaned up).

¶57 Mancia and Alvarez’s argument is akin to the arguments
made by the appellant in State v. Hummel, 2017 UT 19, 393 P.3d
314. There, the appellant argued there were “multiple ‘theories’
behind the charges of theft against him,” including, (1) “extortion
by threatening to subject someone to criminal confinement,” (2)
“extortion by threatening to take or withhold official action,” (3)
“extortion by threatening to cause a public official to take or
withhold official action,” (4) “deception by a false impression of
law or fact,” and (5) “deception by preventing another from
acquiring information likely to affect his judgment.” Id. ¶ 58.
Hummel argued that the Utah Constitution required the jury to
be unanimous as to the theory of theft under which it convicted
him. Id. ¶ 18. But the supreme court clarified that “those ‘theories’
do not represent distinct criminal offenses with different elements
in our substantive criminal law. Instead, they are definitional
examples—and non-exhaustive ones—of the various means by
which someone may commit the single offense of theft.” Id. The
court explained,

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State v. Mancia

The relevant parallel here would be to . . . a murder
case with evidence of two alternative means by
which it was committed—by poison and by
suffocation. There is no distinct crime of murder by
poison or murder by suffocation. And for that
reason it cannot be said that these distinct theories
or means of committing the murder are legally
distinct, or more importantly, that they are legal
elements that must be found unanimously by the
jury to have a valid conviction under the
Unanimous Verdict Clause.

Id. ¶ 62.

¶58 The same is true here. Mancia and Alvarez conflate the
theories or means of committing felony discharge with the legal
elements of the crime. The statute provided, in relevant part;

[A]n individual who discharges a firearm is guilty
of a third degree felony . . . if:

(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of
one or more individuals, knowing or having reason
to believe that any individual may be endangered
by the discharge of the firearm; [or]

(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass
another or with intent to damage a habitable
structure . . . , discharges a firearm in the direction
of any individual or habitable structure.

Utah Code § 76-10-508.1(1). Discharging a firearm was the
element that the jury must have agreed upon. Subsections (a) and
(b) provided the theories or means of discharging a firearm and
thus committing felony discharge. The jury did not need to agree

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State v. Mancia

on whether Mancia or Alvarez discharged the firearm in
accordance with subsection (a) or subsection (b) because they
were different ways to commit the same crime.

¶59 And because party liability is not a separate charge from
discharge of a firearm and is merely an additional way of being
held liable for felony discharge, the jury did not need to agree on
which person solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided another person to commit the felony discharge
and which person actually discharged the gun. See State v.
Fitzwater, 2026 UT App 10, ¶ 52 (holding that “the jury was not
required to be unanimous as to whether [the defendant] was
guilty as a principal or instead as an accomplice” because
“murder as a principal and murder as an accomplice are not
‘separate crimes’ but are different ways of committing the ‘single
offense’ of murder”). The jury only needed to have been
unanimous that someone in the Raptor discharged a firearm and
that each person in the Raptor knew, intended, or recklessly
disregarded a substantial likelihood that the discharge would
occur in order to find Mancia and Alvarez guilty. This is because,
under the party liability theory the State presented at trial, even if
neither Mancia nor Alvarez was the individual who actually
discharged the firearm, they would still be liable as accomplices.
See Utah Code § 76-2-202 (“Every person, acting with the mental
state required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as
a party for such conduct.”).

¶60 Further, because the felony murder charges were reliant on
the felony discharge charge, unanimity on the act of discharging
the firearm or party liability was sufficient to convict Mancia and
Alvarez of felony murder. The State presented significant

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State v. Mancia

evidence that Defendants wanted to get even with Manuel and
the Sureños. The evidence demonstrated that no one in the Raptor
was unaware that they were in the Raptor to engage in a drive-by
shooting on September 19. Evidence at trial showed Defendants
sought “revenge” for the deaths of their fellow gang members,
they were keeping tabs on Manuel’s location, and Manuel mocked
the Norteños on Facebook. Evidence showed Mancia saved this
Facebook post to his phone and several days later, Defendants
engaged in not one drive-by-shooting, but two, on back-to-back
nights, with each defendant armed with a loaded firearm.

¶61 For these reasons, Mancia’s and Alvarez’s counsel did not
perform deficiently by failing to object to the jury instructions for
lack of a specific unanimity instruction. Therefore, Mancia and
Alvarez did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

D. Prosecution of a Minor

¶62 As Mancia was the only defendant who was a minor at the
time he was charged, he alone argues his counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecution of a
minor under the theory of party liability. When Mancia was
charged in 2017, Utah law granted the district court “exclusive
original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older
charged with an offense that would be murder or aggravated
murder if committed by an adult.” Utah Code § 78A-6-701(1)
(2017). However, prior to trial, the statute was amended such that
the district court had jurisdiction over a minor charged with
murder or aggravated murder only if the minor “was a principal
actor in an offense” (the Amended Statute). Id. § 80-6-502(1)

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(2022). 9 Thus, Mancia argues his counsel should have “objected to
party liability applying to a minor for felony murder” once the
Amended Statute went into effect.

¶63 “The courts of this state operate under a statutory bar
against the retroactive application of newly codified laws.” State
v. Alvarado, 2023 UT App 123, ¶ 19, 538 P.3d 633 (cleaned up). The
one exception to this statutory bar is if the new statute is declared
to apply retroactively. See id.; see also Utah Code § 68-3-3 (“A
provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision
is expressly declared to be retroactive.”). Absent this exception,
Utah courts “apply the law as it exists at the time of the event
regulated by the law in question.” Alvarado, 2023 UT App 123,
¶ 19 (cleaned up). Thus, we must determine “what event is
regulated” by the Amended Statute. Id. “The event regulated
differs, however, based on whether the law is substantive or
procedural.” Id. The difference between whether a law is
substantive or procedural “is in the nature of the underlying
occurrence at issue.” State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 14, 251 P.3d 829.
“On matters of substance the parties’ primary rights and duties are
dictated by the law in effect at the time of their underlying
primary conduct (e.g., the conduct giving rise to a criminal charge
. . . ).” Id. “When it comes to the parties’ procedural rights and
responsibilities, however, the relevant underlying conduct is
different: the relevant occurrence for such purposes is the
underlying procedural act (e.g., filing a motion or seeking an
appeal).” Id. Thus, the law governing a procedural act is “the law
in effect at the time of the procedural act, not the law in place at

1. The legislature has since renumbered the Amended Statute. As there are no material changes relevant to this appeal, we cite the current version of the statute for convenience.

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the time of the occurrence giving rise to the parties’ substantive
claims.” 10 Id.

¶64 Mancia argues the Amended Statute is procedural because
it “controls the mode and form of procedure for enforcing the
underlying substantive rights and merely affects the judicial
machinery available for determining substantive rights.”
(Quoting State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68, ¶ 12, 290 P.3d 21 (cleaned
up).) The State argues the Amended Statute “fundamentally alters
the scope of criminal liability−a quintessentially substantive
change.” Because substantive laws affect a party’s primary rights
and duties at the time of the underlying conduct, the State argues
“restricting the available theories of prosecution for juvenile
defendants . . . directly impacts the elements the State must prove
to establish criminal liability.” We agree with the State.

¶65 In State v. Johnson, the defendant sought to reduce the
degree of his convictions when the relevant statute was amended
after his plea was entered and accepted by the district court. See
2012 UT 68, ¶ 4, 290 P.3d 21. The supreme court concluded the
relevant statute was substantive “with respect to [the defendant’s]
eligibility for reducing his convictions” because the statute
“prescribe[d] the class of defendants who [were] eligible to seek
reductions in convictions.” Id. ¶ 13. The court reasoned that
“changes in the class of eligible defendants would not merely

1. The State argued at trial that Mancia was the “principal actor to the offense.” But given the jury was not required to determine who the principal actor was under the State’s party liability theory, we take Mancia’s argument that he was not the principal actor at face value. We thus evaluate what event is regulated by the Amended Statute, looking to whether the Amended Statute is substantive or procedural to guide us.

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affect the judicial machinery available for determining
substantive rights but would instead affect the scope of the
substantive right.” Id. (cleaned up). Applying Johnson here, the
Amended Statute does not merely “control the mode and form of
procedure for enforcing the underlying substantive rights;” it also
“eliminates the substantive rights of a class of defendants.” Id.
¶ 14 (cleaned up). If the Amended Statute applied, then Mancia
could not be held criminally liable for the adult crime of murder
or felony discharge and would instead face adjudication in
juvenile court and be subject to different consequences. Therefore,
the impact would not just be on the judicial machinery available
for determining substantive rights but on the scope of the
substantive right itself, making the Amended Statute substantive
and not procedural.

¶66 Because the Amended Statute was substantive, Mancia’s
counsel’s objection would not have succeeded. Accordingly, it
was not deficient performance for counsel to forgo such an
objection. See State v. Soto, 2022 UT App 107, ¶ 31, 518 P.3d 157
(“Where counsel could have reasonably believed that an objection
was futile, counsel has not performed deficiently.” (cleaned up)).
And because counsel did not perform deficiently, Mancia fails to
demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

II. Cumulative Prejudice

¶67 Finally, Defendants each argue that the multiple errors of
their respective counsel were cumulatively prejudicial. We
identified two issues above—the lack of a mens rea definition and
the failure to object to Sister’s testimony—where we assumed
counsel’s performance was deficient. See supra sections I.A.1 and
I.B. “We now consider whether these two instances of [counsel’s
presumably] deficient performance prejudiced” Defendants. State

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State v. Mancia

v. Haynes, 2025 UT App 75, ¶ 72, 571 P.3d 1197, cert. denied, 578
P.3d 749 (Utah 2025).

¶68 “To reverse under the cumulative error doctrine, this court
must determine that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error, standing
alone, has a conceivable potential for harm, and (3) the cumulative
effect of all the potentially harmful errors undermines its
confidence in the outcome.” Id. ¶ 73 (cleaned up). “For purposes
of this analysis, we assume that each of these errors, standing
alone, had a conceivable potential for harm.” Id. (cleaned up). So,
we consider “whether the cumulative effect of” the lack of mens
rea definitions and the failure to object to Sister’s testimony
prejudiced Defendants. Id.

¶69 As explained above, when evaluating prejudice under
Strickland, “we assess counterfactual scenarios.” State v. Forbush,
2024 UT App 11, ¶ 25, 544 P.3d 1 (cleaned up). “Applying this
analysis here, we are not convinced that there is a reasonable
probability the result would have been better for [Defendants] if
the trial proceeded” without the presumed error in the jury
instructions and without Sister’s presumably improper
testimony. Haynes, 2025 UT App 75, ¶ 74 (cleaned up).

¶70 At trial, the jury heard testimony that Defendants were all
Norteños members and that the Norteños blamed Manuel for the
killings of several prominent Norteños members. The jury heard
testimony that Manuel and his family “were target number one”
for the Norteños and that the Norteños were seeking “revenge.”
The jury heard testimony that, days before the two shootings,
Saedt texted Mancia that Manuel was seen at a gas station. The
jury also heard testimony that Manuel posted a photo on
Facebook with the caption “NK”—short for “Norteños Killers”—
and that Mancia saved this Facebook post to his phone shortly
after it was posted.

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¶71 The jury heard testimony that the Raptor drove by the
Residence on September 18 and fired multiple shots. The jury also
heard expert testimony that the shell casing recovered from the
September 18 shooting matched the SIG Sauer recovered after the
shooting on September 19. It further heard evidence that on
September 19, Defendants fired shots at the Residence or those
standing outside of it and then fled, which led to the car accident.
The jury heard still more evidence that Defendants were in the
Raptor at the time of the accident, that guns were found in and
around the Raptor, and that the shooter on September 19 was in
the rear seat of the Raptor and was wearing glasses. The jury also
heard testimony supporting that all three defendants had
firearms: the Desert Eagle had been fired, DNA found on the SIG
Sauer matched Saedt’s profile, and DNA found on the Taurus
matched Alvarez’s profile. Finally, the jury heard that a man who
lived in the Residence ran to the scene of the accident and yelled,
“[W]hat now, bitch? What’s up, bitch?” and “I’ll catch you on the
rebound,” suggesting he felt the Defendants got what they
deserved for shooting at the Residence.

¶72 In short, the evidence heard by the jury overwhelmingly
supports that Defendants intended to go to the Residence to
engage in a drive-by shooting. In the face of this evidence,
including mens rea definitions and removing Sister’s testimony
about Pace’s and Woodward’s character and the impact their
deaths had on her does not change the overwhelming evidence of
Defendants’ guilt. For this reason, the cumulative effect of the
assumed errors does not undermine our confidence in the
outcome, as there is not a reasonable probability that the results
would have been better for Defendants had the presumed errors
not occurred. Accordingly, there was no cumulative prejudice.

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CONCLUSION

¶73 Defendants’ multiple ineffective assistance of counsel
claims and their cumulative error argument fail. Accordingly, we
affirm each of their convictions.

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