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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

COMMONWEALTH v. PHARREL P., a Juvenile.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-P-0837

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (260)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-837

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

PHARREL P., a juvenile.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury-waived trial, the juvenile was adjudicated

delinquent for carrying a firearm without a license in violation

of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and carrying a loaded firearm in

violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).1 As a result, the judge

committed the juvenile on both counts to the Department of Youth

Services until the age of eighteen. On appeal, he claims that

the motion judge made certain clearly erroneous findings of

1A third charge for possession of ammunition without a
firearm identification (FID) card was dismissed at the
Commonwealth's request.
fact, and that she erred in denying his motion to suppress.2 We

affirm.

1. Challenged findings of fact. The first factual finding

the juvenile claims to be clearly erroneous is the motion

judge's finding that the patfrisk of the vehicle began after the

exit order issued. We disagree.

When reviewing a motion to suppress, "we adopt the motion

judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error."

Commonwealth v. Catanzaro, 441 Mass. 46, 50 (2004). "We take

the facts from the judge's findings following a hearing on the

motion to suppress, adding those that are not in dispute, and

eliminating those that, from our reading of the transcript, are

clearly erroneous." Commonwealth v. Castillo, 89 Mass. App. Ct.

779, 781 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Wedderburn, 36 Mass.

App. Ct. 558, 558–559 (1994). "A finding is clearly erroneous

when 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Castillo,

supra, quoting Green v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc.,

47 Mass. App. Ct. 443, 446 (1999). "Our review of the

application of constitutional principles to those facts,

2 The motion judge was not the trial judge.

2
however, is plenary" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Cawthron, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 833 (2017), S.C., 479 Mass. 612

(2018).

Here, the motion judge found that the exit order was issued

to all occupants of the car, and that "they would be asked to

get out of the vehicle one by one and pat frisked." Prior to

this, as the motion judge found, Sergeant Detective Steven

Romano approached the driver and asked for her license and

registration, and the driver indicated it was in back of the

car. Romano asked her to retrieve it. The driver then got out

of the car, opened the trunk to retrieve a bag containing her

identification, and provided it to Romano. The body-worn camera

video footage (footage) also reflects that this occurred prior

to the exit order and patfrisk.

The footage also reflects that Officer Curtin, through the

open trunk, asked the occupants in the back seat of the car for

their identification. The trunk had been left open by the

driver when she retrieved her license and registration.

Although the footage shows Curtin's hand briefly skim or touch

two bags in the car's open storage area, we need not resolve

whether this constituted a patfrisk of the bags in any

constitutional sense of the term. At bottom, even if Curtin did

3
pat frisk the bags,3 the police gained no further information

from that conduct to bolster what we conclude below was the then

extant reasonable suspicion that an improperly stored firearm

was in the car.4

The juvenile also claims the motion judge's findings are

clearly erroneous as to the sequence of events leading to the

exit order. In particular, the juvenile claims that the

"officers were going to search the vehicle and its occupants

pursuant to a criminal investigation as soon as they pulled the

vehicle over."

The motion judge found that the exit order was based on the

"live" Snapchat photograph posted in a "story" that occurred

fewer than thirty minutes prior to the stop. That photograph

depicted a firearm with a magazine fully inserted that was

3 Curtin did testify that he conducted a "quick pat frisk"
by feeling "the outermost portion" of two bag or backpacks.
However, the motion judge did not make this legal conclusion.

4 The juvenile also challenges the finding of fact that the
exit order and patfrisk were due in part to officers' alarm at
the passengers' lack of response to Romano's questions. We
disagree. The motion judge did not rely on this finding to
explain the justification for the exit order and patfrisk of the
passengers. Regardless, this finding is not clearly erroneous
where there was testimony that Romano asked the passengers twice
if there were any weapons in the car, and the officers observed
no initial response from the passengers. In addition, the
footage supports that the exit order and patfrisks occurred
after Romano asked this question and also after the officers
received no initial response to the question.

4
improperly stored in a pocket or bag, without a safety device.

One minute prior to this live photograph, another live

photograph of D.C. was posted. Seven minutes after this live

photograph was posted, another live photograph was posted that

depicted the inside of a gym the police recognized. Within

approximately fifteen minutes, the police saw the car that

contained the juvenile (and eight others), leave the gym and

drive away. Before being stopped by the police, at an

intersection, the officers identified D.C. in the front seat of

the car.

The motion judge further found that after the car was

stopped, the officers realized that it was J.J.'s Snapchat

account on which the loaded, improperly stored firearm was

displayed, and he was also in the car. The juvenile was seated

in the rear of the vehicle, and he was identified from a "fresh"

post on the Snapchat account. It was all these facts, that

Officer Curtin testified to, expressly credited by the motion

judge, and not just the facts known prior to the stop, that gave

officers reasonable suspicion that the improperly stored firearm

was in the car, or on one of the occupants' persons.

1. Duration of stop. The juvenile also claims the motion

judge erred in denying the motion to suppress because the

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of establishing

5
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify prolonging

the stop after the motor vehicle violation investigation had

concluded. We disagree.

"A valid investigatory stop cannot last longer than

reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. The

scope of a stop may only extend beyond its initial purpose if

the officer is confronted with facts giving rise to a reasonable

suspicion that further criminal conduct is afoot" (quotations

and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694,

703 (2019). See Commonwealth v. Daveiga, 489 Mass. 342, 350-351

(2022). In circumstances where a police officer receives

information concerning an individual with a gun, the "test for

determining reasonable suspicion should include consideration of

the possibility of the possession of a gun, and the government's

need for prompt investigation." Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422

Mass. 782, 791 (1996), quoting United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d

99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994).

Here, as the motion judge found, the stop of the car was

lawful after police witnessed the traffic infraction.5 After the

driver provided her license and registration, further inquiry

was justified because, as outlined above, the police had a

5 The juvenile does not dispute that the police were
authorized to stop the car.

6
reasonable suspicion that one of the occupants of the car was

carrying an improperly stored firearm. Each step taken by the

police was proportional to the degree of suspicion they

possessed. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 672

(2001), overruled in part on other grounds, Commonwealth v.

Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 38 (2020). See also Commonwealth v.

Sinforoso, 434 Mass. 320, 323 (2001) (officers' actions

"proportional to the escalating suspicion that emerged over the

course of the stop"). Finally, as the motion judge properly

determined, in light of how recently the Snapchat postings had

occurred, the danger presented to public safety by a concealed

firearm, and the officers' collective experience, the police

were entitled to expand the scope of their investigation without

running afoul of rights of the occupants of the car.

1. Exit order. The juvenile further claims that the

motion judge erred by concluding that the police were justified

in issuing an exit order based on a concern of officer safety.6

We disagree.

6 The juvenile also claims that the judge erred in finding
the exit order was justified based on reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity apart from the offense of the driver. Given
our resolution of the legality of the exit order on other
grounds, we do not address this argument.

7
The reasonableness of the particular conduct at issue here

is controlled by Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658

(1999), where the Supreme Judicial Court determined that

"art. 14 requires that a police officer, in a routine traffic

stop, must have a reasonable belief that the officer's safety,

or the safety of others, is in danger before ordering a driver

out of a motor vehicle." Id. at 662–663. Stressing the

leniency of this test, the court emphasized that "it does not

take much for a police officer to establish a reasonable basis

to justify an exit order or search based on safety concerns."

Id. at 664. See Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. at 38. "A police

officer need point only to some fact or facts in the totality of

the circumstances that would . . . warrant an objectively

reasonable officer in securing the scene in a more effective

manner." Commonwealth v. Rosado, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 212

(2013).

Here, as the motion judge properly determined, based on the

information discussed above, the police had reasonable suspicion

that the improperly stored firearm depicted on the Snapchat

story was in the possession of one of the occupants of the car.

See Commonwealth v. Stampley, 437 Mass. 323, 328 (2002) ("The

justification for an exit order does not depend on the presence

of an 'immediate threat' at the precise moment of the order, but

8
rather on the safety concerns raised by the entire circumstances

of the encounter"). Given the totality of circumstances that

had been uncovered in the short time frame from the initial

Snapchat post to the stop of the car, a reasonable prudent

person in the officers' position would be concerned for his or

another officer's safety. Accordingly, the exit order was

justified.7 See Commonwealth v. San, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 189, 193

(2005). See also Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 794

(2003) ("The Constitution does not require officers to gamble

with their personal safety" [quotation and citation omitted]).

1. Patfrisk. Finally, the juvenile claims that the motion

judge erred by concluding that there existed reasonable

suspicion that the juvenile was armed to justify his patfrisk.

We disagree.8

7 Relying on an unpublished decision by a panel of this
court, the juvenile claims that any delayed or lack of response
to Romano's question regarding the presence of a gun does not
add to a safety concern because the occupants were not required
to respond. However, as noted above, the motion judge did not
rely on that silence in her analysis, and properly found the
exit order was justified apart from it.

8 For the first time on appeal, the juvenile also challenges
the patfrisk of the other occupants of the car. He did not
raise this issue in his motions to suppress, or in his
supporting affidavits, and the matter was not addressed in the
motion judge's decision. In this posture, the juvenile has
waived this claim. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as
appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004). Also, the record here is
not adequate to resolve the issue. See Commonwealth v. Santos,
95 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 797-798 (2019). At the very least, the

9
Once a suspect has been lawfully seized, "a patfrisk is

permissible only where an officer has reasonable suspicion that

the suspect is armed and dangerous." Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. at

36, citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-327 (2009).

"[The officer] must have a reasonable suspicion, based on

specific articulable facts, that the suspect is armed and

dangerous." Torres-Pagan, supra at 38-39.

Here, as the motion judge found, when the exit order was

issued, the juvenile stood up from his seat, and Romano saw, in

plain view, the dark brown handle of a firearm sticking out of

his waistband. See Commonwealth v. Little, 16 Mass. App. Ct.

959, 959-960 (1983). Based on this observation, Romano had far

more than reasonable suspicion that the juvenile was in

possession of an improperly stored firearm and a reasonable

juvenile did not establish, or even allege, that he had -- or
how he had -- a reasonable expectation of privacy in what, if
anything, was obtained as a result of the other patfrisks. See
Commonwealth v. Delgado-Rivera, 487 Mass. 551, 554-555 (2021),
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 908 (2022). See also Commonwealth v.
DeJesus, 489 Mass. 292, 298 (2022) (juvenile "bears the burden
of demonstrating that he or she personally has an expectation of
privacy in the place searched, and that this expectation is
reasonable" [citation omitted]).

10
apprehension of danger based on his observation of that firearm.

See Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 578 (2011), cert.

denied, 565 U.S. 1262 (2012). The patfrisk was proper.

Adjudications of delinquency
affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
Massing & Brennan, JJ.9),

Clerk

Entered: March 6, 2026.

9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

11