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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

ANGELIKI PAPADOPOULOS v. DANIEL J. DUNN & Others; JAMIE McGUINNESS AND SONS INC. & Another, Third-Party

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0532

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-532

ANGELIKI PAPADOPOULOS

vs.

DANIEL J. DUNN1 & others;2 JAMIE McGUINNESS AND SONS INC. &
another,3 third-party defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Angeliki Papadopoulos, appeals from the

entry in the Superior Court of a separate and final judgment in

favor of defendants George Drizos, as trustee of GND Realty

Trust (GND), and the Nicholas & George Delegas Trust

(collectively, the trust defendants); the entry of a separate

and final judgment in favor of defendant town of Weymouth

1 Doing business as Adam Builders.

2Town of Weymouth; George Drizos, as trustee of GND Realty
Trust; Nicholas & George Delegas Trust; and Stephen A. McDonald.
As is our custom, we spell the parties' names as they appear in
the complaint. This court granted leave to any misnamed parties
to seek a correction to the trial court docket. It appears that
no motion seeking such a correction was filed below.

3 Envirobusiness, Inc., doing business as EBI Consulting.
(town); and from the denial of the plaintiff's motion for relief

from final judgment. The plaintiff asserts that the judge erred

in concluding that the record did not support the elements of

duty and causation. Finding that the plaintiff presented no

evidence of causation on the record before us, we affirm.

Background. We consider the undisputed material facts "in

the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]," reserving some

facts for later discussion. Doe v. Massachusetts Trial Court,

494 Mass. 408, 409 (2024).

The plaintiff owns 1-3 Commercial Street in Braintree (the

property). Prior to February 2017, the property abutted 4

Commercial Street, owned by defendant GND. Between February 13,

2017, and February 23, 2017, defendant Daniel Dunn, through his

subcontractors and at the behest of GND, conducted and completed

the demolition of 4 Commercial Street (the project). The

project was permitted by the town, which did not perform,

oversee, or supervise the project. As a result of the project,

a wall between the property and 4 Commercial Street became an

exterior wall; at the project's conclusion, this wall "was

partly demolished, leaving part of the exterior of the wall

incomplete, not protected as required by the building code from

water and water vapor intrusion."

2
In April 2017, approximately two months after the project,

the plaintiff inspected the property and found no damage to the

interior. In January 2018, approximately 11 months after the

project, the plaintiff again visited the property and noticed

for the first time "that the building suffered substantial water

damage."

The plaintiff hired an engineer over a year later in August

1. The engineer inspected "what was remaining" of the

exterior wall, as well as "the interior of [the property] and

the damage caused by water infiltrating the existing remains" of

the wall. His report notes the presence of that damage, opines

that the work involving the exterior wall had not been carried

out in accordance with the applicable building code, and

concludes that the project "was in violation of 780 CMR and was

producing extensive damage to the interior of the remaining

building." The report does not specify the nature or location

of the interior damage or provide any explanation as to how the

alleged code violations caused damage, and the record presents

no other description of water infiltrating through the exterior

wall. Between August 2018 and March 2019, the town

"substantially improved" the wall.

The plaintiff also hired a roofer to repair part of the

property's roof in September 2019, almost two years after the

3
project. The roofer saw water leaking into the property at

several locations due to flashing not adhering to the roof.

Additionally, the roofer noted that the entire roof had been

repaired within the past year, but the "work wasn't done

properly, [t]here was a lot of debris on the roof," and "the

whole roof was in need of replacement."

Summary judgment. The plaintiff claims several errors in

the motion judge's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

We review the judge's decision de novo, affirming "where there

is no material issue of fact in dispute and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (citation omitted).

Doe, 494 Mass. at 411. Because we agree with the judge's

dispositive determination that the plaintiff presented no

evidence on the causation element, we affirm and do not address

other determinations within his decision.

"It is a bedrock principle of negligence law that a

defendant cannot and should not be held liable for a harm unless

the defendant caused the harm." Doull v. Foster, 487 Mass. 1,

6-7 (2021), citing Wainwright v. Jackson, 291 Mass. 100, 102

(1935) ("The general rule is that one cannot be held liable for

negligent conduct unless it is causally related to injury of the

plaintiff"). And while it is true that a plaintiff need not

"exclude all other possible causes" for the injury, "[s]he must

4
show that there is a greater probability than not that the

accident resulted from the defendant's negligence." Enrich v.

Windmere Corp., 416 Mass. 83, 87 (1993). In the absence of

"specific facts establishing a genuine, triable issue, summary

judgment should be granted." Cullen Enters. v. Massachusetts

Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 399 Mass. 886, 890 (1987).

The plaintiff points to water damage in the interior and

the roof of her property as having been caused by the

defendants' negligence, but the record does not contain facts

necessary to substantiate this claim.4 The plaintiff's claim of

damage related to the exterior wall is based on an expert report

which noted "damage that was produced by water infiltrating the

exposed existing remains of the fire/party wall." The report,

however, provided no further description of the damage nor any

description linking it to the defendants beyond the conclusory

assessment that "the [project] carried out was in violation of

780 CMR and was producing extensive damage to the interior of

the remaining building." Without more, this report cannot

substantiate the claim that the project caused damage to the

4 To the extent the plaintiff also asserts liability for
damage to the exterior wall itself, the plaintiff admits "the
Town began making repairs to the façade of the [plaintiff's]
building," and the town's interrogatory response details the
repair work it completed to restore the wall, none of which the
plaintiff has contested in the record.

5
plaintiff's property via the exterior wall. See Cullen Enters.,

399 Mass. at 890 ("Conclusory statements . . . [are]

insufficient to avoid summary judgment" [citation omitted]).

Furthermore, the plaintiff herself only alleged water

damage as having occurred through the roof, a contention

similarly unsubstantiated in the record. The plaintiff did not

notice water damage until nearly a year after the project, and

only after the entire roof was replaced -- and nineteen months

after the project's completion -- did she engage a roofer who

opined that multiple flashings on the roof were causing leaks

into the property. Even viewed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, this cannot substantiate a finding that "there is

a greater probability than not that the accident resulted from

the defendant's negligence." Enrich, 416 Mass. at 87. We agree

with the judge's finding that the plaintiff cannot prove her

negligence claim on this record.5

Motion for relief from final judgment. The plaintiff also

alleges error in the same judge's denial of her motion for

relief from final judgment. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (1).

5 To the extent the plaintiff relies on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to substantiate her negligence claim, that
principle is inapplicable unless "other responsible causes
including conduct of the plaintiff are sufficiently eliminated
by the evidence." Enrich, 416 Mass. at 88. As detailed, the
record supports the motion judge's finding that other
responsible causes have not been so eliminated.

6
The judge applied the Berube factors, which "may inform the

court's decision concerning whether the [plaintiff] has met

[her] burden under this rule." Hermanson v. Szafarowicz, 457

Mass. 39, 46-47 (2010). See Berube v. McKesson Wine & Spirits

Co., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 430-431 (1979). Reviewing for abuse

of discretion, we find none and affirm. See Hermanson, supra at

47-48.

The judge noted that the plaintiff's claims of negligence

would have no greater merit even had the omitted materials been

submitted, pointing out that he had already credited "[the

plaintiff's] claim that trash/building debris was observed on

[the] roof roughly one year after the [project]," that the

omitted photographs actually established that the debris was

located "on the opposite side of [the] roof" from where the leak

was alleged, and that the evidence further suggested that "other

parties [had] work[ed] on the roof." Furthermore, the judge

"was not bound to accept the [plaintiff]'s self-serving

statement" that she instructed counsel to use the omitted

evidence. See Hermanson, 457 Mass. at 47. We cannot say that

the judge "made a clear error of judgment in weighing the

[relevant] factors" or that his decision "falls outside the

range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and citation

7
omitted), L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014),

and we therefore affirm.

Conclusion. We affirm the separate and final judgment

entered in favor of the trust defendants; the separate and final

judgment entered in favor of the town; and the order denying the

plaintiff's motion for relief from final judgment.

So ordered.

By the Court (Desmond,
D'Angelo & Smyth, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: March 6, 2026.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

8