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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kevin C. Loudon v. Victoria County

Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 13-24-00205-CV
• Nature of Suit: Tax

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.4K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00205-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

KEVIN C. LOUDON, ET AL., Appellants,

v.

VICTORIA COUNTY, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 24TH DISTRICT COURT
OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Victoria County

(County) and awarded sums associated with appellants’ 1 (Loudon) 2023 delinquent

1 The appellants in this case are Kevin C. Loudon, if living, and if deceased, his unknown heirs; the

unknown owner or owners of CHATELET SUBD LOT 27 BLOCK 1 in the City of Victoria, Victoria County,
Texas; the executors, administrators, guardians, legal representatives, devisees of Kevin C. Loudon; and
any and all other persons, including adverse claimants, owning or having any legal or equitable interest in
or lien upon CHATELET SUBD LOT 27 BLOCK 1 in the City of Victoria, Victoria County, Texas.
taxes, penalties and interest, and section 33.48 attorney’s fees. See TEX. TAX CODE

§§ 33.01, 33.48(a)(5). Loudon argues by three multifarious issues, which we construe as

two, that (1) the County was not entitled to collect both section 33.48 attorney’s fees and

section 33.01 penalties and interest on his delinquent taxes, and (2) the County could not

collect section 33.48 attorney’s fees on his 2023 delinquent taxes because those taxes

became delinquent after the underlying suit was filed in 2017. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Loudon failed to pay property taxes for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016. In March

2017, the County initiated the instant delinquent tax suit under Chapter 33, Subchapter C

of the Texas Tax Code. See id. §§ 33.41–33.57. In July of that year, Loudon and the

County entered an official payment agreement to pay off the foregoing three years of

unpaid taxes and the resulting fees. See id. § 33.02 (statute governing installment

agreements for delinquent taxes). Pursuant to the agreement, “counsel for the

parties . . . will sign and enter a Joint Motion for Dismissal With Prejudice and Agreed

Order of Dismissal With Prejudice regarding all claims advanced in the Lawsuit.”

Loudon was responsible for paying all the district clerk fees associated with the

lawsuit as part of the agreement. 2 Loudon did not pay the court costs. In 2022, the County

sent a notice to Loudon requesting that he remit payment to the district clerk, so the

parties could dismiss the lawsuit. However, Loudon did not respond, and the lawsuit was

never dismissed.

Loudon paid the final payment related to the payment agreement on January 31,

2020, including some newly accrued fees for missed payments and for paying his 2019

2 While absent from the record, both parties conceded this fact.

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property taxes late. Loudon paid his property taxes for 2020, 2021, and 2022 without

issue. However, Loudon’s 2023 taxes became delinquent on February 1, 2024. Loudon

made two late payments, and according to his delinquent tax records, a remaining

balance of $521.24 remained if paid in March, or $530.80 if paid in April.

Shortly thereafter, Loudon filed a motion to dismiss the suit with prejudice, and on

February 9, 2024, paid the remaining court costs. In response, on March 21, 2024, the

County filed a motion for summary judgment to obtain the “outstanding balance of [the

2023] delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and attorney’s fees owed.”

In April 2024, the trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment

and awarded it $530.80. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“We review grants of summary judgment de novo.” First United Pentecostal

Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017). In de novo review, we

exercise our own discretion and grant no deference to the trial court’s decision. Vaughn

v. Vaughan, 710 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (citing Quick

v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998)). A claimant is entitled to summary

judgment if it has proved “that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fortitude Energy, LLC v. Sooner Pipe LLC, 564 S.W.3d

167, 179 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

B. Applicable Law

Texas property taxes “are delinquent if not paid before February 1 of the year

following the year in which imposed.” TEX. TAX CODE § 31.02(a). Under section 33.01,

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delinquent property taxes incur automatic (1) penalties of six percent for the first month

the tax is delinquent plus one percent for each additional month or portion thereof that the

tax remains unpaid until July 1 3 and (2) interest of one percent for each month or portion

thereof that the tax remains unpaid. Id. § 33.01(a), (c). The foregoing penalties and

interest are incurred automatically “as long as the taxes remain unpaid, regardless of

whether a judgment for the delinquent taxes has been rendered.” City of Bellaire v.

Sewell, 426 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

A taxing unit, such as the County in this case, may initiate a suit to recover

delinquent taxes. See TEX. TAX CODE § 33.41(a). If “the person sued owned the property

on January 1 of the year for which the taxes were imposed,” the taxing unit shall include

a prayer “for personal judgment for all taxes, penalties, interest, and costs that are due or

will become due on the property.” Id. § 33.43(b) (emphasis added). Further, the “taxing

unit is entitled to recover” various enumerated costs and fees including “attorney’s fees

in the amount of 15 percent of the total amount of taxes, penalties, and interest due the

unit.” See id. § 33.48(a)(5) (referred herein as section 33.48 attorney’s fees). Taxes that

become delinquent after the taxing unit files its tax delinquency suit but before a judgment

is entered are merged into the suit. See id. § 33.42(b) (providing that “[i]f a taxing unit’s

tax on real property becomes delinquent after the unit files suit to foreclose a tax lien on

the property but before entry of judgment, the court shall include the amount of the tax

and any penalty and interest in its judgment”); see, e.g., Hydrogeo, LLC v. Quitman Indep.

Sch. Dist., 483 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (providing that even

3 Other automatic penalties are imposed for a tax that remains delinquent beyond July 1. See TEX.

TAX CODE § 31.01(a).
4
where the taxing unit did not provide the most recent tax statement in discovery, it was

entitled to all taxes that became delinquent during the pendency of the tax delinquency

suit); Williams v. County of Dallas, 194 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet.

denied) (same).

C. Analysis

Loudon first argues the County was not entitled to section 33.48 attorney’s fees

because the County levied section 33.01 penalties and interest. See TEX. TAX CODE

§§ 33.01(a), 33.01(c), 33.48(a)(5). We note that it is unclear from the record what

proportion of the final award was attributed to section 33.48 attorney’s fees. Regardless,

for the reasons below, we disagree with Loudon’s argument.

Loudon relies entirely on Spring Branch Independent School District v. Siebert

which held that when “a penalty has been assessed under sections 33.01 or 33.07, the

Tax Code prohibits a taxing unit from recovering attorney’s fees under section 33.48.”

100 S.W.3d 520, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In Siebert, the taxing

unit assessed both section 33.01 penalties and interest and section 33.07 penalties. Id.

at 526. It then sought section 33.48 attorney’s fees. Id. The court found that the taxing

unit was not entitled to section 33.48 attorney’s fees. Id. at 527.

While section 33.07 and 33.08 are not relevant to this appeal, we agree with

Siebert’s holding that penalties assessed under those sections prohibit a taxing unit from

recovering attorney’s fees. 4 However, we disagree with Siebert to the extent it holds that

4 Loudon argues extensively in his appellate brief that the County could not have awarded section

33.07 or section 33.08 additional penalties and section 33.48 attorney’s fees. See TEX. TAX CODE
§§ 33.07(a), 33.08(b). However, the County did not impose (nor was it granted) section 33.07 or section
33.08 penalties. Instead, the record indicates that the final award was some proportion of section 33.01
penalties and interest and section 33.48 attorney’s fees. See id. §§ 33.01, 33.48. Thus, we do not address
this issue.
5
penalties assessed solely under section 33.01, as in this case, preclude an award of

attorney’s fees under section 33.48. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 33.01, 33.48. First, such

would render an award of attorney’s fees under section 33.48 impossible for a taxing unit

to obtain because section 33.01 fees are incurred automatically by statute when taxes

become delinquent, requiring no lawsuit or judgment. See id. § 33.01(a); Sewell, 426

S.W.3d at 119. Second, in contrast to section 33.07—which expressly provides that if its

penalties are imposed, then attorney’s fees are not recoverable in a tax delinquency

lawsuit—section 33.01 contains no such prohibition on attorney’s fees. See TEX. TAX

CODE §§ 33.01, 33.07; Harris Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 99 v. Duke,

59 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (providing that section

33.07(a)’s penalty to defray the costs of collection is merely an alternative remedy to

attorney’s fees available to a taxing unit under 33.48(a)(5)). Third, Texas courts have

consistently awarded both section 33.01 automatic penalties and interest and section

33.48 attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Willie v. Harris County, 499 S.W.3d 907, 911 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (finding the taxing unit was entitled to an

award for section 33.48 attorney’s fees despite having already collected section 33.01

penalties and interest); Duke, 59 S.W.3d at 340 (providing that the taxing unit was entitled

to section 33.48 attorney’s fees and section 33.01 penalties and interest under section

33.01); Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lamountt, 726 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (holding the taxing unit was entitled to section 33.01 penalties

and interest and section 33.48 attorney’s fees).

6
Thus, we hold the County was not precluded from obtaining section 33.48

attorney’s fees on the basis that it also obtained section 33.01 penalties and interest. See

TEX. TAX CODE §§ 33.01, 33.48. We overrule Loudon’s first issue.

Loudon lastly argues that the County was not entitled to section 33.48 attorney’s

fees because, he contends, such remedy was unavailable for his 2023 taxes. He

contends sections 33.42 and 33.43 allow a taxing unit to recover remedies related only

to taxes that were delinquent when it filed suit. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 33.42, 33.43.

Because his 2023 taxes were not yet delinquent when the County filed suit in 2017, he

argues the County could not obtain section 33.48 attorney’s fees for that year. Again, we

disagree.

Under section 33.43(b), a taxing unit “shall” include a prayer “for personal judgment

for all taxes, penalties, interest, and costs that are due or will become due on the

property.” Id. § 33.43(b) (emphasis added). Here, the County’s 2017 original petition

prayed for the “total amount of all delinquent taxes, penalties and interest, including taxes,

penalties and interest becoming delinquent during the pendency of this suit, costs of

court, attorney’s fees, abstract fees, and expenses of foreclosure sale.” See id. While the

current suit was pending, Loudon’s 2023 delinquent taxes were merged into this suit when

they became delinquent on February 1, 2024. See id. §§ 33.42(b), 33.43(b); see also

Hydrogeo, 483 S.W.3d at 57; Williams, 194 S.W.3d at 33. At that time, the County was

entitled to seek section 33.48 attorney’s fees related to such taxes. See TEX. TAX CODE

§ 33.48(a)(5). Despite Loudon’s argument, we find nothing in the language of sections

33.42 or 33.43 which prohibits the County from collecting section 33.48 attorney’s fees

7
when it filed its motion for summary judgment related to his 2023 delinquent taxes. See

id. §§ 33.42, 33.43(b). Thus, we overrule Loudon’s second issue. 5

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JON WEST
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
5th day of March, 2026.

5 Loudon also extensively argues in his appellate brief that the County improperly charged him in

2014, 2015, 2016, and 2019, including attorney’s fees for his 2019 taxes. However, the trial court merely
granted summary judgment related to 2023’s taxes. Moreover, no causes of action exist in the underlying
suit for the recovery of funds from the County. Thus, these issues are not before us.
8