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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: The Estate of Charles E. Milner, by and through its Administrator, Mary E. Milner v. Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation, LLC d/b/a Grandview Medical Center

Supreme Court of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: SC-2025-0632

• Judges: Cook, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (25)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (176)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Ralph D. Cook](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/3617/ralph-d-cook/)

Rel: March 6, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

SC-2025-0632

---

Ex parte Affinity Hospital, LLC d/b/a Grandview Medical Center

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: The Estate of Charles E. Milner, by and through its
Administrator, Mary E. Milner

v.

Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation,
LLC d/b/a Grandview Medical Center)

(Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-24-901348)

COOK, Justice.
SC-2025-0632

This mandamus petition arises from a wrongful-death action in

which the original complaint named the wrong defendant and the

plaintiff failed to substitute the proper defendant in place of a fictitiously

named defendant before the two-year period for bringing the action

expired. On April 1, 2024, Mary E. Milner, the administrator of the estate

of her deceased husband, Charles E. Milner, commenced in the Jefferson

Circuit Court a wrongful-death action against "Community Health

Systems Professional Services Corporation, d/b/a Grandview Medical

Center" and three fictitiously named defendants, including one that she

alleged "owned or operated the hospitals or clinics" named in her

complaint. Mary alleged that Charles died as a result of their negligence.

In its answer to Mary's complaint, the named defendant identified

its correct legal name as CHSPSC, LLC ("CHSPSC"), and expressly

denied that it "does business as" Grandview Medical Center. It also

pointed out that, "upon information and publicly available records,

Affinity Hospital, LLC is the licensee for [Grandview Medical Center]."

Later, at a status conference, CHSPSC again advised the trial court

and Mary that it "does not do business as" Grandview Medical Center.

Despite that information, Mary persisted in her belief that CHSPSC was

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the proper entity, claiming her own research supported that conclusion.

More than four months after CHSPSC filed its initial answer and

approximately five months after she filed her original complaint, Mary

amended her complaint. In the amended complaint, Mary kept the initial

parties, including all fictitiously named defendants, but added CHSPSC,

identifying it by its correct legal name, and Grandview Medical Center

as separate defendants to the action.

About a month later, Mary filed her second amended complaint in

which she made "Affinity Hospital, LLC d/b/a Grandview Medical

Center" ("Affinity") a defendant to her wrongful-death lawsuit. Affinity

moved to dismiss Mary's action against it, arguing, among other things,

that her wrongful-death claim was time-barred under Alabama's

Wrongful Death Act, § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975. It also argued that her

second amended complaint could not relate back to the date she filed her

original complaint under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P.,

because, it asserted, she had not exercised due diligence in her attempts

to ascertain its identity.

In response, Mary argued that, because she had exercised due

diligence in discovering Affinity's legal identity as the licensee of

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Grandview Medical Center, under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), her second

amended complaint related back to the date of her original complaint.

The trial court denied Affinity's motion after concluding that Mary

had exercised due diligence in ascertaining Affinity's legal identity.

Affinity thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing

the trial court to vacate its order denying its motion to dismiss and to

instead enter an order dismissing Mary's wrongful-death claim against

it for the reasons set forth in its motion. For the reasons explained below,

we grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

I. Charles's Death and Mary's Attempted Settlement

In January 2022, Mary's husband, Charles, was admitted to

Grandview Medical Center. While there, Charles allegedly developed

pressure ulcers and associated illnesses. He was eventually discharged

to a rehabilitation facility but was later admitted to UAB Hospital.

While Charles was at UAB Hospital, medical staff discovered

another large pressure ulcer on Charles's body. Despite attempts to treat

it, the wound did not heal. Charles passed away on April 3, 2022.

After Charles passed away, Mary hired a lawyer who sent a

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settlement demand to (1) "Risk Management" at Grandview Medical

Center's mailing address, (2) "Community Health Systems" located at

4000 Meridian Boulevard in Franklin, Tennessee, and (3) the lawyers

representing CHSPSC. Although the parties agreed to attend mediation,

one week before that mediation was scheduled to take place, CHSPSC's

counsel canceled it.

II. Mary's Wrongful-Death Action and CHSPSC's Answer

As a result, on April 1, 2024, Mary commenced the present action

against "Community Health Systems Professional Services Corporation,

d/b/a Grandview Medical Center"; "Fictitious Defendant A," whom Mary

alleged "owned or operated the hospitals and clinics" named in her

complaint; and "Fictitious Defendants B and C." According to Mary, after

she filed suit, she conducted two searches on the Alabama Secretary of

State's website to determine who owned Grandview Medical Center. She

first searched for "Grandview Medical Center," which led her to

"Grandview Medical Group Research LLC," with a principal address of

4000 Meridian Boulevard in Franklin, Tennessee. She also searched for

"Community Health Systems," which revealed that "CHS Professional

Services Corporation" was located at the same Franklin, Tennessee,

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address. Mary then searched Grandview Medical Center's website for

additional information about its legal name, but, according to Mary, that

search yielded no meaningful results.

She also conducted some basic internet searches, which led her to

three news articles that further led her to believe that Grandview

Medical Center is owned and controlled by "Community Health

Systems." Those articles included (1) a 2021 news article that stated that

Grandview Medical Center is a "subsidiary of Community Health

Systems"; (2) a 2013 news article stating that "Trinity Medical Center"

will be rebranded as "Grandview Medical Center" and that contained a

quote from the "CEO of Trinity's parent company, Community Health

Systems"; and (3) a news article noting that Grandview Medical Center's

facility "was sold to Community Health Systems in 2013."

On May 6, 2024, CHSPSC filed its answer to Mary's complaint in

which it asserted that it had been erroneously named as "Community

Health Services Professional Services Corporation, LLC d/b/a Grandview

Medical Center" in Mary's original complaint and that its true legal name

is "CHSPSC, LLC." CHSPSC further asserted that "it does not do

business as Grandview Medical Center, and is not the [owner] for that

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hospital," but that "publicly available records" showed that "Affinity

Hospital, LLC is the licensee for the hospital." (Emphasis added.)

After CHSPSC filed its answer, no further developments occurred

in the case for four months.

III. The September 2024 Status Conference and Mary's First
Amended Complaint

On September 16, 2024, the trial court held a status conference

during which, it is undisputed, CHSPSC again advised Mary that it was

not the owner of Grandview Medical Center. While the transcript of that

status conference was not included in the materials before us, Affinity

alleges that CHSPSC also reiterated that "Affinity owned and operated

the hospital."

Although Mary claims that after the status conference she

performed additional research that, she said, showed that "[CHSPSC],

LLC and/or Community Health Systems Professional Services

Corporation, LLC were the owners" of Grandview Medical Center,

Answer at 7, she has not provided this Court with any documentation

supporting that assertion.

On September 23, 2024, over four and a half months after CHSPSC

filed its answer and seven days after she was told again that CHSPSC
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did not own Grandview Medical Center, Mary amended her complaint.

In her first amended complaint, Mary kept "Community Health Systems

Professional Services Corporation, d/b/a Grandview Medical Center" and

the fictitiously named defendants as defendants to the action but added

"CHSPSC, LLC" and "Grandview Medical Center" as defendants. No

other defendant was substituted for a fictitiously named defendant or

added to the first amended complaint.

That same day, Mary, for the first time, sent interrogatories and

requests for production to CHSPSC and Grandview Medical Center in

which she asked for more information about the legal name and business

relationships of Grandview Medical Center. It does not appear from the

materials before us that those defendants responded to those discovery

requests or that Mary otherwise attempted to ascertain the identity of

Grandview Medical Center's true owner at that time.

On October 16, 2024, CHSPSC moved to dismiss Mary's amended

complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of its motion,

CHSPSC attached an affidavit of Russell Baldwin, the Vice President

and Chief Litigation Counsel for CHSPSC. Baldwin stated in his affidavit

that CHSPSC does not own or operate any hospitals, including

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SC-2025-0632

Grandview Medical Center, and does not manage, control, or direct the

operations of Grandview Medical Center.

Mary's counsel thereafter "began asking other colleagues whether

they knew the legal name for Grandview Medical Center and eventually

came to learn that [it] may now be owned by Affinity Hospital." Answer

at 7. Mary's counsel then searched the Alabama Secretary of State's

website for Affinity and noted that it shared the same Franklin,

Tennessee, address as "Grandview Medical Group Research LLC" and

"CHSPSC, LLC."

IV. Mary's Second Amended Complaint Adding Affinity and
Affinity's Motion to Dismiss

Mary then filed a second amended complaint1 on October 27, 2024,

in which she finally made Affinity a defendant to her wrongful-death

action, but she did not substitute it for "Fictitious Defendant A," which

she had alleged "owned and operated the hospitals and clinics" named in

her complaint. According to the materials before us, Affinity was

represented by the same law firm as CHSPSC. She also kept "Grandview

1Mary mistakenly titled this second amended complaint as
"Plaintiff's 3rd Amended Complaint."

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SC-2025-0632

Medical Center" and "Fictitious Defendants A, B and C" as defendants.

However, she removed "Community Health Systems Professional

Services Corporation, d/b/a Grandview Medical Center" and "CHSPSC,

LLC" from her action.2

Following additional proceedings not pertinent to the present

mandamus petition, on April 10, 2025, Affinity moved to dismiss Mary's

wrongful-death claim against it. Affinity argued, among other things,

that Mary's wrongful-death claim against it was time-barred by § 6-5-

410(d) and that her second amended complaint could not relate back to

the date of her original complaint under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4)

because, it said, Mary "did not exercise the mandatory due diligence [in]

determin[ing] [Affinity's] identity prior to the filing of the complaint, or

seek to timely amend [her complaint] after irrefutably being made aware

of [Affinity's] identity." In support of its motion to dismiss, Affinity

attached a series of public records that, it said, clearly showed that it

2The materials before us indicate that, around that time, the trial

court granted CHSPSC's motion to dismiss and, thus, that it was
officially removed as a defendant to the action at that time.

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SC-2025-0632

operates Grandview Medical Center.3

In her response in opposition to Affinity's motion, Mary argued that

her second amended complaint related back to her original complaint

under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4) because, she said, she had exercised

due diligence in her attempts to ascertain the true legal name of

Grandview Medical Center's owner before adding Affinity to her second

amended complaint. In particular, Mary alleged that she had exercised

due diligence (1) by engaging in presuit correspondence with CHSPSC's

counsel who did not, at that time, deny that CHSPSC was affiliated with

Grandview Medical Center, (2) by searching for Grandview Medical

Center's owner on the Alabama Secretary of State's website, (3) by

reviewing news and website articles about Grandview Medical Center

and who owned it, and (4) by engaging in discovery in an attempt to

3Those documents included: (1) a copy of a 2022 license from the

Alabama State Board of Health permitting "Affinity Hospital, LLC to
operate Grandview Medical Center"; (2) a screenshot of the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services Provider Registry website listing "Affinity
Hospital, LLC" as "d/b/a Grandview Medical Center"; (3) a screenshot of
the Jefferson County Real Property Ownership Records database
showing Affinity as the "owner" of Grandview Medical Center; and (4) a
screenshot of the Jefferson County Department of Health's website
listing "Affinity Hospital, LLC" as "d/b/a Grandview Medical Center."

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SC-2025-0632

further ascertain the legal identity of Grandview Medical Center's true

owner.

In support of her response, Mary attached copies of various

documents that, she said, demonstrated her efforts.4 According to Mary,

despite her best efforts, she "was not provided with obvious information

that identified Grandview Medical Center as Affinity Hospital, LLC," and

"[n]one of the medical records, correspondences nor internet research

revealed Affinity Hospital as the [licensee] of Grandview." Answer at 13.

V. The Trial Court's Judgment

Following a hearing, on July 29, 2025, the trial court denied

Affinity's motion to dismiss. In support of its decision, the trial court

4Those documents included: (1) documents reflecting two searches

on the Alabama Secretary of State's website for "Grandview Medical
Group Research LLC" with a principal address of 4000 Meridian
Boulevard in Franklin, Tennessee, and for "CHS Professional Services
Corporation," located at the same Franklin, Tennessee, address; (2)
various pages of Grandview Medical Center's website without
information pertaining to its legal name; (3) a 2021 news article that
stated that Grandview Medical Center is a "subsidiary of Community
Health Systems"; (4) a 2013 news article stating that "Trinity Medical
Center" will be rebranded as "Grandview Medical Center," which
contained a quote from the "CEO of Trinity's parent company,
Community Health Systems"; and (5) an undated news article noting
that Grandview Medical Center's facility "was sold to Community Health
Systems in 2013."
12
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reasoned that Mary "acted with due diligence to ascertain the true legal

name of Defendant Affinity Hospital, LLC," and, thus, that her "[Second]

Amended Complaint related back to the original complaint pursuant to

Rule 15(c) and Rule 9(h) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure."

On August 14, 2025, Affinity filed a motion to alter, amend, or

vacate the trial court's order. That same day, the trial court denied the

postjudgment motion. This petition for a writ of mandamus followed, and

we subsequently ordered answers and briefs.

Standard of Review

" ' " 'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and it "will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right
in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty
upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court." ' " Ex parte Monsanto Co.,
862 So. 2d 595, 604 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Ex parte United
Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)).' "

Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., Inc., 254 So. 3d 862, 866 (Ala. 2017) (quoting

Ex parte Novus Utils,, Inc., 85 So. 3d 988, 995 (Ala. 2011)). "The question

whether a plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in identifying a

fictitiously named defendant as the party the plaintiff intended to sue is

reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Bowman, 986

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So. 2d 1152, 1156 (Ala. 2007) (citing Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531 (Ala.

1999)).

Discussion

The key issue in this case is whether Mary's second amended

complaint, filed on October 27, 2024, nearly seven months after the

expiration of the two-year period for bringing a wrongful-death action,

see § 6-5-410(d), related back to the filing of her original complaint on

April 1, 2024. Among other things, Affinity argues that Mary's second

amended complaint cannot relate back to the date she filed her original

complaint under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4) because, it says, she did not

exercise "due diligence" in determining Affinity's identity as the

fictitiously named defendant that owns Grandview Medical Center both

before and after the filing of her original complaint. It is for this reason

that Affinity contends that it is entitled to a writ of mandamus directing

the trial court to dismiss her wrongful-death claim against it.

As an initial matter, we note that Alabama's Wrongful Death Act

provides that a wrongful-death action "must be commenced within two

years from and after the death of the testator or intestate." § 6-5-410(d).

Our Court has explained that " '[t]his two year period is part of the

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substantive cause of action and is not to be treated as a statute of

limitations.' " Pollard v. H.C. P'ship, 309 So. 3d 1189, 1194 (Ala. 2020)

(quoting Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala.

1979)). Rather, it is to be treated as being " ' "of the essence of the cause

of action, to be disclosed by averment and proof." ' " Id. at 1194

(quoting Wood v. Wayman, 47 So. 3d 1212, 1218 (Ala. 2010), quoting in

turn Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, 350, 10 So. 2d 13, 15 (1942)

(overruled on other grounds by King v. National Spa & Pool Inst., Inc.,

607 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1992))).

Our Court has recognized that the relation-back doctrine applies to

wrongful-death claims. This is so because "the relation-back doctrine

'simply recognizes and clarifies what has already occurred' in that

application of the doctrine does not extend the limitations period but

merely allows substitution of a party in a suit otherwise timely filed."

Pollard, 309 So. 3d at 1194. Consistent with this principle, " 'Rule 9(h)

and Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., allow a plaintiff to avoid the bar of a

statute of limitations by fictitiously naming defendants for which actual

parties can be later substituted.' " Ex parte Chemical Lime of Alabama,

Inc., 916 So. 2d 594, 597 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Fulmer v. Clark Equip. Co.,

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654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995)).

Fictitious-party practice is governed by Rule 9(h), which provides:

"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party
and so alleges in the party's pleading, the opposing party may
be designated by any name, and when that party's true name
is discovered, the process and all pleadings and proceedings
in the action may be amended by substituting the true name."

Under Rule 15(c)(4), an amendment of a pleading relates back "to the

date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by

principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h)."

Our Court has explained that, for an amended complaint that

identifies a fictitiously named defendant to relate back to the date of the

original complaint, the plaintiff must establish:

"(1) that it stated a cause of action against the defendant in
the body of the original complaint, albeit identifying the party
only as a fictitiously named party; (2) that it was ignorant of
the defendant's identity at the time the original complaint
was filed; (3) that it exercised due diligence to identify the
fictitiously named party; and (4) that it promptly amended its
complaint once it knew the identity of the fictitiously named
party. [Ex parte Griffin, 4 So. 3d 430, 436 (Ala. 2008).] The
absence of evidence establishing any one of these factors is
sufficient to support a trial court's judgment disallowing the
outside-the-limitations-period substitution."

Patterson v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 101 So. 3d 743, 747 (Ala.

2012).

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Here, the parties specifically dispute whether Mary exercised due

diligence in ascertaining the true identity of Affinity, which appeared to

be named in each of Mary's complaints as a fictitiously named defendant

that owns Grandview Medical Center. If we determine that Mary did not

exercise due diligence in ascertaining Affinity's identity in this case, we

need not address whether the other factors listed above are met. See

generally Patterson, 101 So. 3d at 747 ("The absence of evidence

establishing any one of the[] factors [pertaining to relation-back

principles] is sufficient to support a trial court's judgment disallowing the

outside-the-limitations-period substitution.").

Our Court has previously stated that, "to invoke the relation-back

principle of Rule 15(c), a plaintiff, after filing suit, must proceed in a

reasonably diligent manner to determine the true identity of a fictitiously

named defendant and to amend his complaint accordingly." Ex parte

FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 593-94 (Ala. 1992). The test for determining

whether a party exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain the

identities of the fictitiously named defendants is " 'whether the plaintiff

knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted

defendants were in fact the parties described fictitiously.' " Ex parte

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Griffin, 4 So. 3d 430, 436 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Davis v. Mims, 510 So. 2d

227, 229 (Ala. 1987)). "It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to exercise due

diligence both before and after the filing of the complaint." Ex parte

Nicholson Mfg. Ltd., 182 So. 3d 510, 514 (Ala. 2015) (emphasis omitted).

" 'Diligence' is a relative term, and what is due diligence must be

determined by the circumstances of each case." Brown & Flowers v.

Central of Georgia Ry., 197 Ala. 71, 75, 72 So. 366, 367 (1916). Our Court

has previously explained that " ' "[d]ue diligence means ordinary, rather

than extraordinary, diligence …." ' " Ex parte Thompson, [Ms. SC-2025-

0127, Sep. 26, 2025] ___ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2025) (citations omitted).

In Crowl v. Kayo Oil Co., 848 So. 2d 930, 939-41 (Ala. 2002), our

Court addressed what constituted insufficient due diligence in

circumstances similar to those presented in the present case. In Crowl,

the plaintiff sued Conoco, Inc., and fictitiously named defendants after

suffering an injury at a gas station with Conoco signage, but he made no

meaningful effort to determine who owned or operated the station.

Although the plaintiff served interrogatories on Conoco

contemporaneously with his complaint, which were never answered, he

did nothing else to identify the proper defendant. Id. at 939-40. Our Court

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held that this did not constitute due diligence, because the plaintiff could

have learned the identity of the owner of the station -- Kayo Oil Co. --

"from public records or simply by going to the service station where he

was injured and asking the manager who owned or leased the property"

rather than just relying on the gas station's signage. Crowl, 848 So. 2d at

940.

By contrast, in Oliver v. Woodward, 824 So. 2d 693 (Ala. 2001), the

plaintiff, at the time of filing suit, knew from her medical records that a

specific doctor was one of several doctors present when the treatment

that injured her was authorized. Id. at 698. However, she did not know

which doctor had authorized the treatment until after the limitations

period had expired. Id. at 699. At the outset, the plaintiff undertook a

series of depositions, including that of the doctor at issue, who denied

responsibility. Id. She did not learn that he had authorized the treatment

until she deposed a radiologist identifying him as the doctor in charge.

Id. Our Court held that the plaintiff's amended complaint related back

because she had diligently attempted to verify which doctor had

authorized the harmful treatment and could not have substituted the

doctor at issue earlier without a reasonable factual basis. Id.

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In sum, "[i]n a case involving fictitiously named defendants, the

answer to [the] question [whether an amendment relates back to the

filing of the original complaint as permitted by Rules 9(h) and 15(c)(4),

Ala. R. Civ. P.,] depends upon the plaintiff's conduct." Ex parte Mobile

Infirmary Ass'n, 74 So. 3d 424, 428 (Ala. 2011). Once the identity of the

fictitiously named defendant has been verified, "the plaintiff must

substitute the named defendant for the fictitious party within a

reasonable time after determining the defendant's true identity."

Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Ala. 1996).

Turning to the case now before us, Charles passed away on April 3,

1. Because Mary's wrongful-death claim is subject to the two-year

period set forth in § 6-5-410(d), Mary's second amended complaint

naming Affinity as a defendant, filed on October 27, 2024, must relate

back to her original complaint filed on April 1, 2024, for her wrongful-

death claim against it to survive. As the legal principles above make

clear, for her second amended complaint to relate back to her original

complaint under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), there must be evidence

indicating that Mary exercised due diligence in ascertaining Affinity's

identity as the fictitiously named defendant that owns Grandview

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Medical Center before and after the filing of her original complaint.

Here, the materials before us indicate that, after Charles died,

Mary's counsel engaged in settlement negotiations with CHSPSC's

counsel that ultimately went nowhere. According to Mary, at no point

during those discussions did CHSPSC's counsel deny that it owned

Grandview Medical Center or inform her that Affinity was the owner.

However, when CHSPSC filed its answer to Mary's original

complaint on May 6, 2024, it explicitly stated that "it does not do business

as Grandview Medical Center, and is not the [owner] for that hospital."

It also stated that, "upon information and publicly available records,

Affinity Hospital, LLC is the licensee for the hospital." (Emphasis added.)

Mary does not refute that CHSPSC provided this information in its

answer to her original complaint.

Our Court has previously recognized that a plaintiff's failure to take

action in ascertaining the true identity of a defendant once he or she has

been put on notice that the wrong defendant has been named constitutes

a lack of due diligence. See Jones v. Resorcon, Inc., 604 So. 2d 370, 373

(Ala. 1992) (explaining that plaintiff's counsel was on notice that the

defendant was not the proper party, in part because the defendant filed

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an answer stating it was not the manufacturer of the product at issue);

see also Ex parte Tate & Lyle Sucralose, Inc., 81 So. 3d 1217, 1222 (Ala.

2011) (holding that a plaintiff's failure to act upon a motion to dismiss --

which stated that the named defendant was not the proper party --

constituted a lack of due diligence because the "attorney was in fact privy

to information at that point that put him on notice that [the named

defendant] might not be the [proper defendant]"). Here, the undisputed

evidence shows that Mary was put "on notice" of Affinity's identity as

early as May 2024 -- nearly six months before she filed her second

amended complaint making Affinity a defendant to her wrongful-death

action.

Despite that notice, Mary took no action to amend her complaint to

make Affinity a defendant at that time. In fact, nothing was done in the

case for over four months after CHSPSC filed its answer.

Additionally, when the trial court held a status conference for the

case in September 2024, during which it is undisputed that CHSPSC

again advised Mary that it was not the owner of Grandview Medical

Center, Mary still did not amend her complaint to substitute Affinity for

the fictitiously named defendant that owns Grandview Medical Center.

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Instead, she amended her complaint to add only CHSPSC and

"Grandview Medical Center" as defendants to the action.

Although she apparently sent interrogatories and requests for

production to CHSPSC and Grandview Medical Center that same day

inquiring about the legal name and business relationships of Grandview

Medical Center, there is no indication that she received responses to

those discovery requests. There is also no indication that she attempted

to follow up with those defendants regarding their discovery responses.

Our Court has previously recognized that the conducting of formal

or informal discovery can be evidence of a plaintiff's due diligence in

attempting to ascertain the correct identity of a defendant; however, we

have also held that it may not "necessarily prove due diligence." Ex parte

Tate & Lyle Sucralose, 81 So. 3d at 1221. For example, in Ex parte Mobile

Infirmary Ass'n, supra, our Court found that the plaintiff did not exercise

due diligence despite the plaintiff's use of both formal and informal

discovery to ascertain the identity of the defendants. There, the plaintiff's

attorney searched the Alabama Secretary of State's website, informally

contacted the parent company's attorney, and served unspecific

interrogatories in an effort to ascertain the hospital owner's proper

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identity, but the plaintiff did not amend the complaint until after the

period for bringing the action had expired. 74 So. 3d at 430-32. Our Court

concluded, among other things, that those steps were insufficient to

establish due diligence. Id.

By contrast, in Ex parte Russell, 314 So. 3d 192, 202-04 (Ala. 2020),

our Court held that the plaintiff exercised due diligence when she

pursued both formal and informal discovery aimed at identifying the

proper defendants. There were two examples involving two different

substituted defendants. First, this Court held that the trial court could

have reasonably concluded that the plaintiff "had diligently pursued

discovery targeted toward identifying [a nurse] but had been hindered by

[the hospital]'s failure to timely disclose a requested record that would

have clearly revealed a connection …." Id. at 202-03. Second, this Court

noted that, "[d]espite th[e plaintiff's] interrogatories and repeated

informal requests by [the plaintiff]'s counsel for more specific

information," an emergency-room secretary's interaction with the

decedent was not revealed until after the period for bringing the action

had expired. Id. at 204.

Here, there is no indication that, when she did not obtain any

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responses to her discovery requests inquiring about Grandview Medical

Center's affiliations and business relationships, Mary took any

additional steps to ascertain the true identity of Grandview Medical

Center's owner. See Crowl, 848 So. 2d at 940 (explaining that a plaintiff

cannot rely on a defendant's failure to answer interrogatories to justify

lack of knowledge of the identity of the proper defendant, because "Rule

9(h) places the duty upon the plaintiff to exercise 'due diligence' to

identify a fictitiously named defendant"). Thus, we do not believe that

her attempt to conduct formal discovery to ascertain the identity of

Grandview Medical Center's owner constituted due diligence,

particularly when considered in conjunction with the information that

she had already received from CHSPSC in its answer to her original

complaint indicating that publicly available records showed that Affinity

was the actual licensee of Grandview Medical Center.

Finally, although Mary eventually filed her second amended

complaint and made Affinity a defendant to her action, this occurred

nearly six months after CHSPSC first put her on notice that it was not

the owner of Grandview Medical Center and that public records indicated

that Affinity was Grandview Medical Center's licensee. It was also over

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a month after CHSPSC again told her it was not the owner of Grandview

Medical Center during a status conference in the case. Thus, despite

being "on notice" that Affinity is the licensee of Grandview Medical

Center for nearly six months after she filed her original complaint, Mary

did not attempt to make Affinity a defendant to her action "within a

reasonable time after determining [its] true identity." Crawford, 678 So.

2d at 1060. The materials before us also indicate that she did not actually

substitute Affinity for "Fictitious Defendant A," the fictitiously named

defendant that Mary had alleged "owned and operated the hospitals and

clinics" -- i.e., Grandview Medical Center -- and had named in her original

complaint as required by Rule 9(h).

Mary attempts to get around this by asserting in her answer to

Affinity's petition that she "was not provided with obvious information

that identified Grandview Medical Center as Affinity Hospital, LLC," and

that "[n]one of the medical records, correspondences nor internet

research revealed Affinity Hospital as the [licensee] of Grandview."

Answer at 13. Mary further contends that she conducted additional

research to determine the owners of Grandview Medical Center and had

confirmed "that [CHSPSC,] and/or Community Health Systems

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Professional Corporation, LLC were the owners." Id. at 7. However, the

only evidence she presents in support of her alleged due diligence consists

of presuit emails with counsel for CHSPSC, search results from the

Alabama Secretary of State's website, various pages from Grandview

Medical Center's website that do not list ownership information, and

three news articles of questionable relevance -- one undated, one from

over 4 years ago, and one from over 12 years ago -- that suggest that

Grandview Medical Center was a subsidiary of CHSPSC.

Much of this evidence was directly refuted by the evidence that

Affinity submitted in support of its motion to dismiss, including (1) a copy

of a 2022 license from the Alabama State Board of Health5 permitting

"Affinity Hospital, LLC to operate Grandview Medical Center"; (2) a

screenshot of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Provider

Registry website listing "Affinity Hospital, LLC" as "d/b/a Grandview

Medical Center"; (3) a screenshot of the Jefferson County Real Property

Ownership Records database showing Affinity as the "licensee" of

5The Alabama State Board of Health was the licensing agency for

hospitals at the time this action was commenced. See § 22-2-1, Ala. Code
1975.

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Grandview Medical Center; and (4) a screenshot of the Jefferson County

Department of Health's website listing "Affinity Hospital, LLC" as "d/b/a

Grandview Medical Center."6 Moreover, Affinity provided evidence

indicating "that the identity of [Affinity] could have been ascertained by

requesting and reviewing the publicly available property-tax records."

This further refutes Mary's argument that she exercised due diligence.

See Ex parte Lucas, 212 So. 3d 921, 930 (Ala. 2016) (citing Crowl, 848 So.

2d at 937).

Based on the materials before this Court, Affinity has

demonstrated that Mary failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining

Affinity's identity both before and after the filing of her original

complaint. See Patterson, 101 So. 3d at 747 ("The absence of evidence

6Practically speaking, one would also imagine that a large hospital

like Grandview Medical Center would have been involved in previous
litigation. Indeed, a search of the name "Grandview Medical Center" on
a legal-research platform yields pertinent results that would have been
discoverable during the due-diligence period (cases decided before May 6,
2024). For instance, our Court previously decided Ex parte Affinity
Hospital, LLC, 373 So. 3d 180, 181 (Ala. 2022), in which the first words
of the opinion state: "Affinity Hospital, LLC ('Affinity'), d/b/a Grandview
Medical Center …." See also Ex parte Johnson & Johnson, 330 So. 3d
480, 485 n.2 (Ala. 2020) (noting in a footnote that a respondent/plaintiff
in that suit was "Affinity Hospital, LLC, doing business as Grandview
Medical Center in Jefferson County").
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establishing any one of the[] factors [pertaining to relation-back

principles] is sufficient to support a trial court's judgment disallowing the

outside-the-limitations-period substitution."). As a result, Mary's second

amended complaint cannot relate back to the date of the filing of her

original complaint under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), and Affinity is,

therefore, entitled to mandamus relief.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Affinity has demonstrated a clear

legal right to the relief it is seeking. Accordingly, we grant the petition

for a writ of mandamus and issue the writ directing the trial court to

vacate its order denying Affinity's motion to dismiss and to, instead, enter

an order granting that motion.7

7Because the resolution of this issue is dispositive, we pretermit

discussion of any other issues raised by the parties. See Ex parte Board
of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of City of Mobile, 272 So. 3d 635, 638 (Ala.
2018) (finding petitioner's second argument to be dispositive, thus
pretermitting discussion of the petitioner's first argument). See also
Jackson Hosp. & Clinic, Inc. v. Murphy, 343 So. 3d 490, 498 n.3 (Ala.
2021) (stating that the Court would pretermit discussion of remaining
issues in light of the dispositive nature of another issue). However, we
emphasize that the parties in the present case rested their arguments
here on the application of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P. Our
decision today should not be understood as suggesting that a more
persuasive argument could not have been made under the provisions of
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PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, McCool,

and Parker, JJ., concur.

Rule 15(c)(3), which excludes fictitious-party pleading and, instead,
applies the relation-back doctrine to "a plaintiff's attempt to amend in
order to correctly identify a defendant included in or contemplated by the
plaintiffs' original complaint." Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., Inc., 254 So.
3d 862, 870 (Ala. 2017).
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