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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Doctor Bradley

District Court of Appeal of Florida

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 5D2026-0128

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.3K)

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Combined Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2026-0128
LT Case No. 2025-014323-CICI

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NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,

Appellant,

v.

DOCTOR BRADLEY,

Appellee.

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Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Dennis P. Craig, Judge.

James A. McKee, of Foley & Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, and
Kevin Fowler, of Foley & Lardner LLP, Orlando, for Appellant.

Carol A. Yoon, of Doran, Foxman, Sims, Wolfe & Yoon, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.

March 6, 2026

MAKAR, J.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”)
appeals the trial court’s issuance of a temporary injunction
granting Doctor Bradley a waiver to compete in the 2025−2026
men’s basketball season for Bethune-Cookman University
(“BCU”). At the heart of this appeal is the NCAA’s “Five-Year
Rule,” which requires college athletes to complete their four
seasons of eligibility within a five-year period. Because the trial
court’s order is facially deficient and is not supported by competent
substantial evidence, we quash the temporary injunction and
reverse.

I.

Over the six prior college basketball seasons, Bradley was
rostered on the following schools’ teams: California State
Fullerton, where he redshirted1 during the 2019−20 season and
received a Covid-19 waiver for the 2020−21 season; Salt Lake City
Community College, where he played during the 2021−22 season;
New Mexico State University (“NMSU”), where he played during
the 2022−23 season until NMSU canceled the school’s season mid-
year after teammates reported hazing to the police2; Nicholls State
University (“Nicholls State”), where he transferred during the
2023−24 season until Bradley left the team due to complications
stemming from the hazing incident at NMSU; and the University
of Arkansas at Pine Bluff (“UAPB”), where he played during the
2024−25 season.

After his season at UAPB, Bradley transferred to BCU,
hoping to be eligible for the 2025−26 basketball season. On May
27, 2025, BCU applied, on Bradley’s behalf, to the NCAA for a

1 A “redshirt” is “a college athlete who is kept out of varsity

competition for a year in order to extend eligibility.” See Redshirt,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
redshirt (last visited Feb. 23, 2026).

2 Bradley was indicted on thirteen felony counts for his role in

the hazing incident at NMSU; he eventually pled guilty to two
counts of disorderly conduct in exchange for testifying against his
former-teammate codefendants.

2
waiver3 of the Five-Year Rule4 relating to his 2023−24 season at
Nicholls State. The waiver request asserted that Bradley met the
criteria for an extension of eligibility waiver because (1) California
State Fullerton redshirted him during the 2019−20 season, and (2)
Bradley was denied an opportunity to participate in the 2023−24
season at Nicholls State because of circumstances beyond his
control, citing his withdrawal from the basketball team relating to
the NMSU hazing allegations.

3 The NCAA waiver bylaw states:

A waiver of the five-year period of eligibility is designed
to provide a student athlete with the opportunity to
participate in four seasons of intercollegiate competition
within a five-year period. This waiver may be granted,
based upon objective evidence under the following
circumstances:

(a) [1] The student-athlete did not use a
season of competition due to an institutional
decision to redshirt the student-athlete; [2] the
student-athlete was listed on the institution’s
squad list and was eligible for competition
during the segment of the season that ends with
the NCAA championship; and [3] the student-
athlete was deprived of the opportunity to
participate in intercollegiate competition in one
other season due to circumstances beyond the
control of the student-athlete or the institution.
(The use of this provision is limited to one time
in a student-athlete’s period of eligibility)

NCAA Bylaw 12.8.1.7.1.

4 The Five-Year Rule states that “[a] student-athlete shall
complete the student-athlete’s [four] seasons of participation
within five calendar years from beginning of the semester or
quarter in which the student-athlete first registered for a
minimum fulltime program of studies in a collegiate institution . .
. .” NCAA Bylaw 12.8.1.

3
On August 12, 2025, the NCAA denied Bradley’s waiver
request, determining that it: (1) did not “provide objective
documentation [that Bradley] was unable to compete for a reason
outside his or an institution’s control” for the 2023 season at
Nicholls State, and (2) did not “demonstrate extraordinary
circumstances existed to warrant approving the waiver.”

On August 26, 2025, BCU requested that the NCAA
reconsider its denial of Bradley’s waiver, providing additional
statements from his lawyer, mental health counselor, and deacon.
On November 14, 2025, the NCAA again denied the waiver
request, determining that Bradley’s “2023 fall semester [at
Nicholls State] is not considered a denied participation
opportunity given [Bradley] decided not to participate at an
institution that sponsored his sport, in part due to pending legal
matters, which is a legislated circumstance within his control.”
BCU did not appeal that determination, which NCAA rules would
have allowed. As a result, the 2025−2026 season began without
Bradley on BCU’s roster.

On November 24, 2025, Bradley filed a one count complaint,
claiming that the NCAA had violated the Florida Antitrust Act; it
also sought to “enjoin[] the NCAA from continuing to violate the
Florida Antitrust Act and an order declaring that he is entitled to
play Division I college basketball for the 2025−2026 season.”
Bradley alleged that “the NCAA ha[d] arbitrarily and capriciously
refused to waive its Five-Year Rule (under NCAA Bylaw 12.8.1) as
it related to [Bradley’s] participation in the Fall 2023 semester at
Nicholls State, despite the extraordinary circumstances beyond his
control.” The complaint further alleged that, without relief,
Bradley would be deprived of $192,000 in Name, Image, and
Likeness (“NIL”) compensation from BCU and would “suffer
irreparable harm to his competitive development and prospects to
play professional basketball following the 2025−2026 season.”

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court on January 9,
2026, granted Bradley’s temporary injunction, ordering the NCAA
to grant Bradley’s waiver, allowing him to compete for BCU in
what remained of the 2025−26 basketball season. In its order, the
trial court presented a brief two-paragraph analysis, stating,

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Competition in a sport cannot be supplanted by any
legal remedy. This Court lacks the ability to adequately
evaluate [Bradley’s] contribution to the team or the
effects of inactivity on his NBA recruitment
opportunities. The Court therefore finds that there is no
adequate remedy at law and that the injury to [Bradley]
outweighs any possible harm to [the NCAA].

Additionally, the Court finds that [Bradley] has a
likelihood of success on the merits of his antitrust
complaint in that [the NCAA] is the sole arbiter of who is
eligible to compete in college sports, for which, as [the
NCAA] contends, athletes have no other recourse.

The NCAA appealed the trial court’s ruling. It simultaneously
moved to expedite this appeal and to stay the trial court’s order,
both of which were granted.

II.

It is well-established that “[a] temporary injunction may be
entered if the party seeking the injunction establishes the
following criteria: (1) the likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) the
unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (3) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) considerations of the
public interest.” Yardley v. Albu, 826 So. 2d 467, 470 (Fla. 5th DCA
2002). “A movant’s ‘[f]ailure to prove any one of the four elements
mandates denial of the motion for temporary injunction.’” Wayne’s
Aggregate & Materials, LLC v. Lopez, 391 So. 3d 633, 636 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2024) (quoting Holland M. Ware Charitable Found. v. Tamez
Pine Straw LLC, 343 So. 3d 1285, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)).

Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610, a “trial court
must provide ‘[c]lear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual
findings to support each of the four elements.’” Wayne’s Aggregate,
391 So. 3d at 636 (quoting Housman v. Housman, 370 So. 3d 1006,
1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)). Due to the nature of a judicial
injunction, “[s]trict compliance with Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.610 is required because a temporary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy that Florida courts should sparingly issue.”
Wayne’s Aggregate, 391 So. 3d at 636 (internal citation and

5
quotations omitted). Importantly, “[a] mandatory injunction
should be issued in only the rarest of circumstances where the
rights are clear and certain.” Blue Earth Sols. v. Fla. Consol.
Props., LLC, 113 So. 3d 991, 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). Moreover,
when issuing a temporary injunction, “[r]ule 1.610 requires that
the trial court’s order ‘specify the reasons for entry [and] describe
in reasonable detail the act or acts restrained without reference to
a pleading or another document.’” Wayne’s Aggregate, 391 So. 3d
at 626 (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(c) (emphasis added)).

The trial court’s order granting the temporary injunction
fails for multiple reasons. First, the trial court’s written order fails
to set forth sufficient factual findings to support each of the four
elements necessary to grant the issuance of a temporary
injunction. See Dickerson v. Senior Home Care, Inc., 181 So. 3d
1228, 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that the “trial court’s
order does not sufficiently specify the reasons for the entry of the
temporary injunction”). The trial court’s written order must specify
the reasons for entry. Id. (“A trial court must delineate factual
findings to support each of the four criteria that must be
established in order to issue the temporary injunction.”); see also
Williams v. Cook ex. rel. Advanced Orthopedics, P.A., 50 Fla. L.
Weekly D587c (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 7, 2025), No. 5D2024-1531, 2025
WL 728266, at *3 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 7, 2025) (“If the four criteria
are met, the court must make clear and sufficient factual findings
in the order granting the injunction to support each of the four
elements.” (emphasis added)); Housman, 370 So. 3d at 1009
(stating that “[i]f a motion for temporary injunction meets the four
criteria, the court must make findings in the order granting the
injunction as to each of the criteria”).

In sharp contrast to these legal requirements, the injunction
order is perfunctory and conclusory: a few pages with only four
sentences of purported analysis in a complex antitrust case. At the
end of its analysis section, the trial court says it arrived at its
decision “for the reasons stated on the record,” which is inadequate
and not a substitute for compliance with the procedural rule and
precedent. See Wayne’s Aggregate, 391 So. 3d at 636. Moreover, the
order’s limited factual findings are unsupported by competent
substantial evidence, which is necessary as to each of the elements
but lacking in the record. Fla. Ass’n of Realtors v. Orange County,

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350 So. 3d 115, 123 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“The injunction’s
proponent must establish each element with competent
substantial evidence.”).

Second, the trial court’s four-sentence legal analysis is
deficient, particularly in a fact-intensive antitrust case. It is well-
established that “reciting legal aphorisms or parroting the
essential criteria of a temporary injunction and proclaiming that
they have been established . . . will not suffice.” Yardley, 826 So.
2d at 470. An order granting a temporary injunction which does
“little more than state that the movant had satisfied each prong of
the test . . . is facially insufficient.” Eldon v. Perrin, 78 So. 3d 737,
738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Here, the trial court’s analysis falls far
short of what is legally required by making far-reaching legal
conclusions with little more than a few conclusory statements.

Third, the trial court’s order erred as to the likelihood of
irreparable harm and the unavailability of an adequate remedy at
law. The order placed dispositive weight on the notion that
Bradley, despite his track record over the course of his six-year
collegiate career, had a right to compete on the BCU basketball
team and that his contribution to the team and his NBA prospects
outweighed all else. The evidence established, however, that if
Bradley were to prevail on his antitrust claim, following a full trial,
he would be granted eligibility for another year; he conceded as
much. Bradley failed to present any evidence of how he would be
irreparably injured if he were not allowed to play at BCU during
this season. For this reason, it cannot be concluded that Bradley is
irreparably harmed by awaiting trial, which could result in a
potential additional year of eligibility.

To the contrary, the NCAA—a private organization—could
have substantial harm to its intercollegiate sports programs by
ineligible players being judicially granted eligibility status to
which they are not entitled; the organization’s purpose could be
undermined if courts interject their own notions of fair play. In
addition, Bradley’s $192,000 NIL contract with BCU is a purely
financial one; any claimed loss of NIL payments due to his lack of
eligibility is between him and the college and amounts to a purely
economic loss that could be remedied by money damages. See
Barclays Am. Mortg. Corp. v. Holmes, 595 So. 2d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th

7
DCA 1992) (finding “irreparable harm does not exist where the
potential loss is compensable by money damages”); see also Tamez
Pine Straw, 343 So. 3d at 1289 (“Irreparable injury is defined as
injury that cannot be cured by money damages.”).

Fourth, Bradley failed to establish a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of his claim under the Florida Antitrust Act,
which complements and is interpreted in accord with federal
antitrust laws. § 542.32, Fla. Stat. (2025) (“It is the intent of the
Legislature that, in construing this part, due consideration and
great weight be given to the interpretations of the federal courts
relating to comparable federal antitrust statutes.”).

Bradley’s claim is that the NCAA’s regulation and control over
intercollegiate sports amounts to an illegal “contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.” Id. § 542.18. To
establish a violation, a claimant must plead and prove under a
“rule of reason” analysis that an alleged restraint on balance
results in anticompetitive effects that outweigh pro-competitive
effects. St. Petersburg Yacht Charters, Inc. v. Morgan Yacht, Inc.,
457 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (“‘Rule of reason’
antitrust violations require proof relating to anticompetitive
effects of the conduct alleged.”).

The Supreme Court has provided a brief but thorough
overview of how courts evaluate alleged restraints on trade:

Determining whether a restraint is undue for purposes of
the Sherman Act “presumptively” calls for what we have
described as a “rule of reason analysis.” Texaco Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–62 (1911). That manner of
analysis generally requires a court to “conduct a fact-
specific assessment of market power and market
structure” to assess a challenged restraint’s “actual effect
on competition.” [Ohio v. Am. Express, 585 U.S. 529, 541
(2018).] Always, “the goal is to distinguish between
restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to
the consumer and restraints stimulating competition
that are in the consumer’s best interest.”

8
Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 81 (2021) (citation
modified). As indicated, rule of reason analysis requires much
more than showing that a restraint affects one competitor; instead,
a detailed assessment of the relevant market, market power, and
the overall effects on competition itself is required.

Here, the trial court did not conduct a rule of reason analysis;
it did not “conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power and
market structure” or assess the challenged restraint’s “actual
effect on competition.” Alston, 594 U.S. at 81. The written order
has no findings defining the relevant market or how the Five-Year
Rule has an overall anticompetitive effect. Instead, the trial court
determined that Bradley was likely to succeed on the merits of his
antitrust claim simply because the NCAA “is the sole arbiter of
who is eligible to compete in college sports, for which, as [the
NCAA] contends, athletes have no other recourse.” But every
business is the sole arbiter of its own product or service, rendering
this statement meaningless. Rather than conduct the requisite
market-based antitrust analysis and examine both pro- and anti-
competitive effects, the trial court focused instead on the NCAA’s
application of its Five-Year Rule to one person, Bradley. Little to
no effort was made by Bradley or the trial court to undertake the
necessary market analysis underlying the rule of reason. For these
reasons, this element was not met.

Moreover, although the trial court attempted to transform
this single claim antitrust case into multiple unpled claims
challenging the fairness of the NCAA’s procedures, which was
improper, no such showing was made. Indeed, our sibling court in
National College Athletic Ass’n v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d 1081,
1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), concluded in a similar case “that there is
no showing that the NCAA’s own internal procedures were either
inadequate or unfair.” Like this case, it stated:

The NCAA has adopted a procedure which allows a
student athlete to apply for a waiver of the five-year rule.
Under the NCAA procedure, the university submits a
waiver request on behalf of the student-athlete to the
eligibility staff. If the staff turns the waiver request
down, then the university may submit an appeal on
behalf of the student-athlete to the Eligibility Committee.

9
In this case, after a rejection by the Eligibility
Committee, the Committee also entertained a request for
reconsideration. As we view the matter, these procedures
are both adequate and fair.

Id. In that case, the student argued that even if the NCAA
procedures were fair, the outcome was not, a theme the trial court
in this case pursued. But Bradley only raised an antitrust claim,
not a generalized “unfairness” claim. As in Brinkworth, the
fairness issue was not properly raised and “is beyond our province
to review. It is up to the NCAA to interpret its own rules, not the
judiciary.” Id.

Fifth, the trial court’s order fails to make any mention of the
fourth element—considerations of the public interest. Bradley’s
counsel conceded this point at the emergency hearing this Court
held on the motion to stay. This deficiency alone warrants reversal.
See Wayne’s Aggregate, 391 So. 3d at 636 (“[T]he order fails to set
forth sufficient factual findings as to each of the four elements . . .
required to prove to warrant the issuance of the temporary
injunction.”). Bradley offered no independent proof on this
element. Instead, he asserts that the trial court’s finding of a
substantial likelihood of success on his antitrust claim “naturally
supports” the public interest; this argument, however, would
eliminate the public interest factor altogether and is thereby
insufficient.

For all the foregoing reasons, the temporary injunction is
facially invalid and its findings unsupported by competent
substantial evidence; it is thereby quashed.

III.

Finally, the transcript of the proceedings below demonstrates
that the trial judge favored Bradley by raising claims and issues
that Bradley did not plead and advocating positions adverse to the
NCAA on these unpled matters, essentially acting as additional
counsel for Bradley. In characterizing the NCAA’s regulatory
authority, he interjected his view that the NCAA is the “judge,
jury, and executioner” akin to King John, whose conduct led to the
Magna Carta. Transcript at 1026−27 (THE COURT: “It was King

10
John, wasn’t it? Wasn’t it because he was pretty much the judge,
the prosecutor, and the executioner? Isn’t that one of the main
reasons why the Magna Carta came into being? . . . And isn’t that
what the NCAA is . . . is pretty much the prosecutor, the judge, the
jury, and the executioner?”). The totality of this conduct raises a
serious concern as to judicial partiality. See Fla. Code Jud.
Conduct, Canon 3. In an abundance of caution, therefore, a
different judge shall be assigned to the case on remand to preclude
any appearance that the proceedings are anything other than fair
and impartial. See Gillespie v. State, 392 So. 3d 239, 241 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2024) (ordering sua sponte reassignment to another judge on
remand); Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC v. Nicolas, 343 So. 3d 605,
611 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (same).

INJUNCTION QUASHED; REVERSED and REMANDED.

EDWARDS, J., concurs.
EISNAUGLE, J., concurs in part, and dissents in part, with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.

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Case No. 5D2026-0128
LT Case No. 2025-014323-CICI

EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part, with
opinion.

I agree that the temporary injunction was entered in error.
However, I conclude only that the evidence and the trial court’s
findings are insufficient to establish a likelihood of success on the
merits. See Yardley v. Albu, 826 So. 2d 467, 470 (Fla. 5th DCA
2002). I do not reach the other issues discussed by the majority.1

The “rule of reason” applies to the anti-trust violation alleged
in this case. § 542.18, Fla. Stat. (2025). Yet, Bradley offered no
evidence below—and the trial court made no finding—that the
alleged restraint had any effect on the market itself. Parts Depot
Co., L.P. ex rel. Parts Depot Co., Inc. v. Fla. Auto Supply, Inc., 669
So. 2d 321, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (explaining that the rule of
reason requires a showing that “exclusion from the market did
affect or was intended to affect the price or supply of goods in that
market”); see also Procaps S.A. v. Patheon, Inc., 845 F.3d 1072,
1084 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Applying the rule of reason, we ask
whether Procaps has shown that the alleged restraint has had an
anticompetitive effect on the market.”). “It is not enough to allege

1 The NCAA argues that Bradley will not suffer irreparable

harm. But the NCAA’s initial brief does not clearly explain how
participating next season is an adequate remedy for the denial of a
legitimate interest in competing this season. The NCAA also
argues that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits application
of Florida’s statute altogether but fails to answer several key
questions to establish this claim. Therefore, I do not reach the
substance of these issues because the NCAA’s initial brief is not
sufficient to demonstrate error on appeal. Lynn v. City of Ft.
Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955) (“It is elementary that
when a decree of the trial court is brought here on appeal the duty
rests upon the appealing party to make error clearly appear.”).

12
that [Bradley was] injured; there must be . . . harm to competition
in general.” 669 So. 2d at 326 (citation omitted).2

That said, I dissent from the majority’s instruction that “a
different judge shall be assigned to the case on remand.” The
NCAA did not argue on appeal that the trial judge improperly
raised issues in the proceedings below. Nor did the NCAA ask that
we order reassignment of the case. We should not raise the issue
on its behalf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)
(“In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the
first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party
presentation.”). While I take no position on the propriety of the
trial court’s activity below, in fairness to the trial judge, I note that
the reference to the “judge, jury, and executioner” was simply a
way to describe the NCAA’s exclusive control over athlete
eligibility and eligibility waivers. This commentary does not
indicate partiality.

2 Nor did the evidence, or the trial court’s findings, address

the public interest.

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