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March 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Louisiana v. Christopher Cloudie

Supreme Court of Louisiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-KK-00471

• Judges: Hughes, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12.7K)

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Syllabus

(Parish of Orleans Criminal) REVERSED. SEE OPINION.

Combined Opinion

                        by [Jefferson D. Hughes III](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/4582/jefferson-d-hughes-iii/)

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #009

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 6th day of March, 2026 are as follows:

BY Hughes, J.:

2025-KK-00471 STATE OF LOUISIANA VS. CHRISTOPHER CLOUDIE (Parish of
Orleans Criminal)

REVERSED. SEE OPINION.

Weimer, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Hughes, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., dissents.
Cole, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Weimer, C.J.
Penzato, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-KK-471

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

CHRISTOPHER CLOUDIE

On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal

HUGHES, J.*

In this case, the defendant seeks review of the trial court’s ruling permitting

an expert witness to give her diagnosis at trial of child sexual abuse. For the

following reasons, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant, Christopher Cloudie, was charged with one count of first-

degree rape in violation of La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4) and one count of aggravated crime

against nature in violation of La. R.S. 14:89.1(A)(2). The State of Louisiana accuses

Mr. Cloudie of performing oral sex on his minor son while giving the child a bath

on December 16, 2023. The child was eight years old at the time.

The child was taken to the emergency department of a hospital on the evening

of the alleged abuse, and the medical exam revealed no physical findings.

Approximately one month later on January 19, 2024, the complaining witness was

seen at the Audrey Hepburn CARE Center in the New Orleans Children’s Hospital

by a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, Ongelle Bergeron, who diagnosed

the child with “child sexual abuse.”

The State filed a notice of intent to offer Ms. Bergeron as an expert at trial. At

the Daubert hearing, Ms. Bergeron testified as to her education and professional

experience as well as the procedure she follows for medical evaluations carried out

• Judge Allison H. Penzato of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, appointed as Justice pro tempore, sitting for the vacancy in the First District. at the CARE Center. Ms. Bergeron testified that her appointment with the child in

this case was not a forensic exam but rather a “medical assessment.” As to the

procedure, Ms. Bergeron testified that a medical evaluation begins with speaking to

the child and his or her caregiver to get a “past medical history,” which includes any

medical diagnosis, past surgeries, and medication. Then the interviewer speaks one-

on-one with the child to obtain a “medical incident history.” This includes building

rapport with the child, a discussion about private parts, private part rules, and

whether those rules were broken. After this, a physical examination is conducted,

where a child’s body is thoroughly examined to look for signs of injury. Based on

these steps and possibly others (such as reviewing lab results, reports previously

written by other healthcare providers, and consultation with other medical

specialists), a diagnosis is formed.

Ms. Bergeron testified that in 80 to 85 percent of cases, there are no physical

findings. She further testified that cases will be peer reviewed by her colleagues at

the CARE Center if there are any abnormalities found, but in this case there were no

abnormalities. Ms. Bergeron also testified that she takes what a child tells her as true.

She continued: “I make sure that there aren’t any ambiguities. I look for clear and

concise details, also, if there is any abnormalities in lab work. So it’s not just what

the patient is saying. It’s all of those factors.” Ms. Bergeron said that she follows the

diagnostic criteria in the book Child Abuse and Neglect by Crosson-Tower, 9th

edition. She also testified that there are no standardized checklists for diagnostic

criteria and that a diagnosis “all depends on your experience.” Ms. Bergeron could

not provide an error rate for the diagnosis of child sexual abuse for the method used

in this case. She testified that occasionally a child’s statement of sexual abuse would

later be confirmed with a positive pregnancy or STI test.

Ms. Bergeron stated that when it came to a diagnosis she would typically

consider “[w]hat was said by the patient” and “if there are any abnormal findings.”

2
In a case with no physical findings, she stated she’s “looking for a clear and concise

disclosure from the medical incident history from the patient.” According to Ms.

Bergeron, a clear and concise disclosure is important because what “[w]e found in

child abuse medicine is that the more clear and concise a child is, the more detail

they’re able to provide, that’s the least likely they are coached.” In this case, Ms.

Bergeron said that the child gave her a “clear and concise” disclosure.1 She found

no physical abnormalities on the child, and she did not see signs of coaching.

At the conclusion of Ms. Bergeron’s testimony, the trial court found her to be

an expert in the field of pediatric child abuse medicine and stated that Ms. Bergeron

would be allowed to testify to the diagnosis she made as a result of her visit with the

child. The defendant sought review with the court of appeal. The court of appeal

denied his writ, citing State v. D.D., 18-891, p. 65 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/19), 288

So.3d 808, 854, which it said stood for the proposition that a nurse practitioner’s

diagnosis of chronic sexual abuse was admissible because it ‘“did not take the place

of the jury in determining the ultimate fact of Defendant’s guilt or innocence.”’2

Justice Lobrano dissented from the writ denial on the basis that Ms. Bergeron should

not be allowed to present a medical diagnosis of child sexual abuse without evidence

of peer review by a board-certified child abuse pediatrician.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The defendant challenges Ms. Bergeron’s diagnosis of child sexual abuse. He

argues that Ms. Bergeron’s diagnosis was improperly admitted because it was based

on insufficiently reliable methodology and because it goes to the ultimate issue of

his guilt, which is a judgment to be made by the jury. The State argues that Ms.

Bergeron’s diagnosis is admissible under the standards set forth in

1
Ms. Bergeron provided no details of what she considered “clear and concise.”
2
In D.D. the issue was whether the expert testimony went to the ultimate question of defendant’s
guilt or innocence (in contravention of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 704) not whether the
expert testimony bolsters the credibility of the complaining witness.
3
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 or Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.

Carmichael4 and that the diagnosis does not speak on the ultimate issue of the

defendant’s guilt.

In reviewing rulings on the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, the trial

court is accorded great discretion and, absent a clear abuse of that discretion, such

rulings will not be disturbed. State v. Wesley, 22-1312 (La. 8/27/22), 344 So.3d 647

(per curiam).

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702(A) provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not
that:
(1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue;
(2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(4) The expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Based on the testimony at the Daubert hearing, we determine that the State

has not met its burden of proof in demonstrating that Ms. Bergeron’s diagnosis “will

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue” nor

that it is “based on sufficient facts or data.”

Ms. Bergeron testified that her diagnoses of child sex abuse are based on any

abnormalities that might be present plus the statement given by the child. She

testified that she takes what the child says to her in the “medical incident history” to

be true. While Ms. Bergeron testified she evaluates the child’s statement based on

whether the language used was “clear and concise,” Ms. Bergeron did not provide a

basis or methodology for how that evaluation is made, nor did she provide any

3
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4
specifics of what was “clear and concise” in the child’s statement. Her diagnosis will

not help the trier of fact to understand the only evidence presented at trial (the child’s

statement), nor is it based on sufficient facts or data because the diagnosis is solely

based on the child’s account of the incident, which the jury will hear at trial from the

child himself.

The methodologies described by Ms. Bergeron also run afoul of the reliability

requirements in Article 702. When evaluating the reliability of expert evidence,

pertinent factors for a court to consider include: (1) the “testability” of the scientific

theory or technique, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer

review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the

methodology is generally accepted in the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S.

at 594; see also State v. Quatrevingt, 93-1644 (La. 2/28/96), 670 So.2d 197, 204.

Ms. Bergeron testified that she utilized criteria for her diagnosis as published in the

textbook Child Abuse and Neglect by Crosson-Tower. However, she also testified

that there is no known error rate for the methodology she followed and that there are

only a limited number of instances when a diagnosis of child sexual abuse can be

confirmed by physical evidence (such as an STI or pregnancy test).

Expert witness testimony has an important but limited place in criminal jury

trials and specifically child sexual abuse trials. As this court in State v. Chauvin

explained:

Expert testimony can assist a trier of fact in understanding the
significance of a child-witness’s demeanor, inconsistent reports,
delayed disclosure, reluctance to testify, and recantation. An expert
witness can explain to jurors that a child-witness’s seemingly abnormal
behavior—delayed reporting, inconsistent statements, and
recantation—is in fact normal for children who have been sexually
abused and can also dispel inaccurate perceptions held by jurors,
allowing them to better assess a child-witness’s testimony. Expert
testimony becomes problematic when it infringes upon other interests:
for example, when it is unduly prejudicial, when it invades the province
of the jury, when it bolsters a child-witness’s testimony, or when it
leads to a ‘battle of the experts.’

5
02-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 697, 702-03 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In Chauvin, this court held that an expert witness’ testimony regarding the

PTSD diagnosis of the child complainant in a sexual abuse case was inadmissible

because it exceeded the purposes for which expert testimony could be introduced.

Id. at 709. In Chauvin, the State sought to use the expert testimony of a licensed

clinical social worker to establish that the child’s clinical symptoms were “consistent

with a sexual abuse victim; in other words, to use her testimony as substantive

evidence of sexual abuse.” Id. at 699. Citing State v. Foret, infra, the court in

Chauvin reasoned that expert testimony of general characteristics that would explain

delays in reporting, recantations, and omissions of details would be admissible;

however, those situations were not present in that case. Id. at 708. This court

concluded:

We find [the] expert testimony went beyond the limited purpose of
explaining the superficially bizarre behavior of a victim of child sexual
abuse. We further find [that the] testimony deprived defendant of a fair
trial by imbuing the [victims’] testimony with an undeserved
scientific aura of truth. This testimony impermissibly bolstered the
testimony of both [victims]. There was absolutely no indication that this
testimony was necessary to explain to the jury the significance of a
child-witness’s demeanor, inconsistent reports, reluctance to testify or
recantation.

Id. (Emphasis added.)

The Chauvin and Foret cases were both concerned about an expert witness

bolstering the testimony of the complaining witness. In Foret, which adopted the

United States Supreme Court’s standards for determining reliability of expert

scientific testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509

U.S. 579 (1993), a child psychologist qualified as an expert testified that the victim

was telling the truth due to the detailed accounts she gave of the incident and

conversations with the defendant, her feelings of disgust and sadness, her report that

the defendant was possessive of her and told her to keep the incident a secret, and

6
that the victim felt she had done something wrong. State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116,

1119 (La. 1993). The psychologist, Dr. Janzen, further explained:

And then on the basis of what I get from the child, the type of detail
that I get from the child to make some conclusions about whether or not
what she is telling me suggests that she has been sexually abused, or
another way of putting it, on the basis of what I get from the child I
make some conclusions about whether or not what she is telling me is
consistent with what we know about the dynamics of sexual abuse.

Id.

This court wrote that based “largely on the testimony of the victim, as

bolstered by Dr. Janzen, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of attempted

molestation.” Id. at 1120.

In reversing the conviction, the Foret court reasoned that this type of expert

testimony should focus on explaining seemingly unusual or inconsistent reactions

(such as delayed reporting) of the complaining witness to the jury. Id. at 1130. Such

testimony on psychological dynamics and behavior patterns is of assistance to the

jury because the child’s behavior is not within the common experience of the average

juror. Id. The Foret court emphasized that such opinion testimony should be general

in nature without giving testimony directly on the complaining witness’ credibility.

Id. With the expert’s scientific perspective, the jurors can evaluate the child’s

testimony for themselves. Id. In reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, the Foret

court concluded:

The rationales for excluding the evidence all seem to focus on the
factfinding role of juries and that [ ] this role involves a determination
as to the credibility of each witness. Testimony by an expert is not
particularly helpful to a jury that must rely upon its own common sense
as a barometer for the evaluation of truthfulness. The cases all seem to
focus on, in the face of such expert testimony, fears of ‘the jury
surrender[ing] its own common sense in weighing [victim] testimony
and deferr[ing] to [a] diagnosis [of sexual abuse] without knowing that
the diagnosis was nothing more than a subjective opinion favoring [the
victim].’

7
Id. at 1127 (quoting United States v. Whitted, 994 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1993)

(rehearing granted on other grounds).5

Furthermore, the introduction of the diagnosis in the instant case would also

be admitted in contravention of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 403. As Foret

ruled, “[t]his bolstering of credibility has the effect of unfairly prejudicing a criminal

defendant,” and, thus the use of such medical expert testimony “for the purpose of

bolstering a witness’ credibility creates a risk of prejudice that outweighs its

questionable probative value.” Id. at 1129.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the trial court erred in ruling that Ms. Bergeron was allowed

to testify to the diagnosis of child sexual abuse because, under the facts of this case,

such an opinion is prohibited by Louisiana Code of Evidence article 702(A) and

would improperly bolster the complaining witness’ testimony.

DECREE

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we reverse the ruling of the trial court.

REVERSED.

5
On rehearing the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Whitted wrote:

Dr. Likness could not base his diagnosis solely on L.’s allegations of abuse. See
Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987) (doctor’s opinion
based solely on patient’s oral history is nothing more than patient’s testimony
‘dressed up and sanctified’); Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th
Cir. 1988) (expert opinion lacking objective factual support cannot help jury and
thus is inadmissible under Rule 702).

United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1993) (on rehearing).
8
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-KK-00471

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHRISTOPHER CLOUDIE

On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court,
Parish of Orleans–Criminal

WEIMER, C.J., concurring.

Child abuse cases are always a tragedy. Often these matters involve

diametrically conflicting testimony of the accuser and the accused. Abuse mostly

occurs in private with the accused and the alleged victim having some relationship.

Physical evidence is rare. Many children delay reporting abuse and often do not

include details; they may recant or alter their testimony because of threats, fear, or

confusion. Against this backdrop, judges and juries must assess the admissibility of

expert testimony that assists–but does not supplant–the jury in its fact-finding role

regarding credibility.

The testimony of the proposed expert, Ms. Bergeron, demonstrates that she has

sufficient expertise and experience to testify in certain cases, but that does not show

that she has the requisite knowledge to testify in this specific case, on this record.

Most problematic is Ms. Bergeron’s testimony that, in her evaluation, she accepts

what the child tells her as true. An expert’s testimony that she believes the child is

particularly troubling in cases involving abuse to juveniles where one party testifies

against another, and the expert’s testimony would merely “prop up” the testimony of

the alleged victim. This court addressed a similar predicament in State v. Foret, 628

So.2d 1116, 1130-31 (La. 1993), holding that an expert’s testimony, giving his
opinion that a victim was telling the truth, was an impermissible comment on the

victim’s credibility, making that testimony inadmissible. The court reasoned that an

expert giving a “stamp” of truthfulness on a victim’s/witness’s testimony has the

effect of bolstering credibility and artificially increasing its probative strength with

the jury, thereby prejudicing the defendant. Id. at 1129. Instead, the evidence should

be admissible for the limited purpose of explaining, in general terms, certain reactions

of a child to abuse (late reporting, recanting statements) that would be used to attack

the victim’s credibility. Id. at 1131. Such expert evidence must be restricted to

providing a scientific context to the jury on matters outside its experience that the jury

can use to assess credibility on its own. Id. at 1130.

Thus, while Ms. Bergeron has ample educational qualifications and skill in

evaluating child abuse medically, I find testimony offered at the pretrial hearing that

she believes the child is in conflict with Foret. The jury’s role is to evaluate the

credibility of the alleged victim and the accused if the accused chooses to testify.

The majority cites State v. Chauvin, 02-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So.2d 697,

which relied on Foret, citing broad principles that expert testimony must not

improperly bolster the complaining witness’s testimony by imbuing it with an

expert’s endorsement of truthfulness or invade the province of the jury to determine

the credibility of witnesses. I dissented in Chauvin related to the discrete issue of

admissibility of evidence related to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Although I dissented in Chauvin, that case involved a PTSD diagnosis, which this

case does not involve. The victims-witnesses were also older–teenagers–not young

children. Further, unlike this matter, Chauvin did not invoke an expert’s assessment

of a victim-witness’s credibility. My dissent in Chauvin is distinguishable from this

case.

2
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

3
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-KK-00471

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

CHRISTOPHER CLOUDIE

On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal

Hughes, J., additionally concurring.

Respectfully, the dissent’s reference to a “sweeping ruling” and the adoption

of a “bright-line rule” is misguided. This court does not have the power to change

the provisions of Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 403 and 702(A) and the

Opinion is clearly limited “under the facts of this case.”
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2025-KK-00471

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VS.

CHRISTOPHER CLOUDIE

On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans Criminal

PENZATO, Justice Pro Tempore, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that a properly qualified

medical expert cannot testify to a diagnosis based on patient history.

Healthcare providers routinely rely on patient history to diagnose conditions

that do not necessarily manifest in physical findings. In those instances, the patient

history is a vital source of information needed to make the diagnosis. This is not a

novel or otherwise unreliable method of reaching a medical opinion. This Court has

long recognized that reliance on patient history is widely accepted in the medical

community and often the only basis for making a diagnosis:

Physicians rely upon a patient’s history, his candor in relating that
history, observations of reactions to false tests as well as accurate tests,
observations of normal activity and demeanor during examination and
treatment, and many non-clinical factors. Laymen are certainly able to
relate their own observations of the activity and demeanor of one
claiming injury and pain.

In many cases, including the one we consider, much of the medical
evaluation must be based upon subjective symptoms. All diagnoses
cannot be objectively supported. Physicians recognize that medical
diagnoses, although not clinically established, may be correct. In most
countries of the world, and in the medical treatment of the greatest
portion of the world’s population, physicians seldom resort to
laboratory analyses for diagnoses and treatment of illness.

Tantillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 315 So. 2d 743, 747 (La. 1975).
The threshold reliability requirement of Louisiana Code of Evidence article

702 is satisfied when, as here, an expert’s opinion is based on their extensive

experience in a scientific field and is the product of a methodology generally

accepted in that field. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592;

113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796; 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (“Widespread acceptance can be an

important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible.”).

The majority’s reliance on State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La.1993) and State

v. Chauvin, 02-1188 (La. 5/20/03), 846 So. 2d 697 is misplaced. In both cases, an

expert diagnosed other psychological conditions that, according to the expert, were

caused by the abuse and thus substantiated the victim’s testimony. The Foret and

Chauvin courts excluded the opinions because the causal link between the abuse and

the other conditions was not supported by sufficient scientific evidence.

In Foret, the expert used a “psychological phenomenon” known as child

sexual abuse accommodation syndrome to opine that the victim’s sexual abuse

accusation was truthful. The syndrome itself was diagnosed based on the victim’s

behavior and emotional state. But the use of the syndrome as a tool to diagnose

sexual abuse “is seen as having highly dubious value by many members of the

psychological treatment community” and “fails to satisfy the . . . general acceptance”

element of Daubert. See Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1125. This Court further found “the

results of psychoanalysis are rife with the potential for inaccuracy,” and “studies . .

. suggest that evidence based on psychodynamic formulations are unreliable . . .

[which] contributes to the inefficient, misleading, and prejudicial nature of this

testimony.” Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1125-26 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

syndrome-related evidence was “of highly questionable scientific validity, and fails

to unequivocally pass the Daubert threshold test of scientific reliability.” Foret, 628

So. 2d at 1127.

2
Even assuming the evidence met the Daubert standard, the Foret court

alternatively found the expert could not rely on the syndrome findings to opine the

victim was telling the truth. The court explained:

[T]he use of [the syndrome]-based testimony for the purpose of
bolstering a witness’ credibility creates a risk of prejudice that
outweighs its questionable probative value. Given the near unanimity
of other jurisdictions’ disapproval of [the syndrome]-based testimony
as a determinant of abuse, coupled with our observations of the risk of
prejudice inherent in [the syndrome], this court now concludes that such
opinion testimony as a determinant of a victim/witness’ credibility is
not admissible.

Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1129.

In Chauvin, a social worker testified that the victim’s post-traumatic stress

disorder (PTSD) was consistent with sexual abuse. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 700.

Finding the trial court erred in allowing the testimony, this Court emphasized the

lack of scientific evidence establishing a link between sex abuse and PTSD:

Although PTSD is widely accepted among professionals as an anxiety
disorder attributable to some type of trauma, it has not been proven to
be a reliable indicator that sexual abuse is the trauma underlying the
disorder or that sexual abuse has even occurred.

Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 707.

As indicated, the experts in Foret and Chauvin diagnosed the victim with a

psychological condition and, in an effort to bolster the victim’s credibility, testified

the psychological condition was consistent with sex abuse. The experts used the

secondary condition as purported proof the victim was telling the truth. The problem

with that approach, as this Court made clear, was the lack of scientific evidence

establishing a causal link between the psychological conditions and sex abuse.

Absent that link, the experts were simply “imbuing the girls’ testimony with an

undeserved scientific aura of truth . . . [that] impermissibly bolstered the testimony

of both girls.” Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 708 (emphasis added).

Ms. Bergeron did nothing of the sort. She is a highly qualified healthcare

provider who diagnosed a patient with child sexual abuse. She confirmed her

3
methodology for conducting the examination, obtaining the patient history, and

making the diagnosis consistent with her training, education, and experience. She

did not diagnose a second condition and attempt to “impermissibly bolster” the

victim’s credibility by maintaining, without support, that the second condition is

caused by sexual abuse. Ms. Bergeron likewise did not vouch for the victim’s

credibility. Like any competent healthcare provider, she accepted the patient history

as true absent anything indicating otherwise. Again, this is a widely accepted

practice in the medical field. Any inconsistencies in the patient history, which might

undermine Ms. Bergeron’s opinion, can be fully developed on cross-examination.

The majority adopts a bright-line rule that excludes a diagnosis of sexual

abuse not supported by physical findings. The unfortunate reality is that “physical

evidence of the abuse is rare.” Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 702. Today’s holding

effectively eliminates critical testimony by treating healthcare providers in 80 to 85

percent of all abuse cases. Article 702 does not require this blanket exclusion,

particularly in a pre-trial ruling without the benefit of the actual testimony presented

to the jury.

The majority’s sweeping ruling is counter to the deference granted to trial

courts to act as gatekeepers for expert testimony. “[T]he trial judge must have

considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining

whether particular expert testimony is reliable.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,

526 U.S. 137, 152; 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176; 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The trial court

is thus afforded broad discretion in determining whether expert testimony is

admissible, and its decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.

Melerine v. Tom's Marine & Salvage, LLC, 20-00571 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So. 3d 806,

818.

4
I find no abuse of discretion in this case and would affirm the trial court’s

ruling permitting the state’s expert to testify to her diagnosis. For these reasons, I

respectfully dissent.

5