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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Jackson

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 741
• Docket Number: 115292

• Judges: Groves

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.4K)

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Syllabus

Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; R.C. 2919.22(A); substantial risk. State failed to establish appellant created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child where the evidence at most established the possibility of a risk or the possibility of significant risk but failed to establish the type of substantial risk under R.C. 2919.22(A), i.e., an inexcusable failure to act in discharge of one's duty to protect a child where such failure to act results in a substantial risk to the child's health or safety.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2026-Ohio-741.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115292
v. :

SHAYNA JACKSON, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 5, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-25-699657-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Erica Sammon, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.

Chedid and Co., LLC, and Jed Chedid, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

Defendant-appellant Shayna Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals her

conviction for endangering children. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the

conviction.
Procedural and Factual History

In February 2025, a grand jury convened and issued an indictment

alleging that Jackson committed the following crimes against her ward, a 14-year-

0ld child: strangulation, a felony of the fifth degree (Count 1); domestic violence, a

misdemeanor of the first degree (Count 2); and endangering children, a

misdemeanor of the first degree (Count 3).

A trial commenced in June 2025. The child testified as follows. On

February 12, 2025, she was called to the principal’s office for drinking alcohol at

school. The child admitted that her friend had alcohol but denied drinking more

than a sip. The child testified that she was expelled from school. As a result of the

infraction, the school called Jackson who came to the school to pick up the child. On

the ride home, Jackson asked the child if the boy involved was her boyfriend. The

child replied that he was not her boyfriend. Jackson then stopped the car and pulled

the child’s hair.

The child testified that Jackson continued to drive, stopping at the

grocery store, before continuing to their home. There were no further incidents on

the ride home. Once they arrived home, they brought the groceries inside, and

Jackson asked the child to hand her a belt. The child complied with the request. The

child then went to her grandfather’s room to tell him what happened at school.

Jackson entered the room and told the child to go to her room, which scared the

child. Jackson followed the child into her room and closed the door. The child

testified that Jackson spoke to her but she did not remember what Jackson said.
After that, Jackson hit the child with the belt. The child testified that Jackson hit

her on her legs and arms. During the punishment, which lasted approximately two

minutes, the child remembered Jackson speaking but not what she said, and the

child remembered yelling for the child’s brother.

Afterward, Jackson left the room and the child went back to her

grandfather’s room. The child then heard Jackson get into an argument with the

child’s brother, and heard her brother leave. Prior to leaving, the brother called the

police. The child attempted to follow him but Jackson dragged her back from the

door, pulled her hair, and pushed her to the ground.

Sometime later, the child returned to her grandfather’s room. The

child was not permitted to have a phone, so she attempted to use her grandfather’s

phone to call the police because she was scared. Jackson entered the room, and the

three began talking. The child testified that Jackson put her hands on her throat for

approximately four seconds and then the child removed her hands. The child

recounted that Jackson did not squeeze her neck. When asked whether she had

difficulty breathing at that time, the child responded, “Yeah — no, I don’t — I don’t

remember.” Later Jackson put one hand over the child’s mouth and nose for

approximately six seconds. The child was unable to breath during that time.

Jackson removed her hands from the child’s face on her own volition.

Jackson later took the child to the police station. During the drive,

the child testified that Jackson was on the phone with the police station telling them

things that the child did not understand, such as, that “people don’t understand that
other people have lives outside of them.” The child testified that Jackson also called

the house phone and told the person who answered not to answer the door for

anyone.

When they arrived at the police station, Jackson and the child were

taken to an interview room. The child asked to speak to the police without Jackson

present. An officer’s body-camera video was admitted by the State and showed that

Jackson initially refused to leave, explaining that she had been to the police multiple

times regarding the child and her brother and that it was exhausting. Jackson

eventually left the room.

When asked if she still feared Jackson on the date of trial, the child

testified that she did. She explained that there had been other incidents where

Jackson hit her; however, the child denied being fearful that Jackson would hit her

again on the night of the incident. She felt that Jackson would levy other

punishments but would not get physical.

The child testified that the police arrested Jackson after her interview.

After Jackson was released from jail, the child left the home, although her brother

remained in Jackson’s custody.

On cross-examination, the child acknowledged that she had been

having problems at school for the past two years. When asked if she remembered

how many times she was suspended during the 2023-2024 school year, the child did

not remember; however, she would not disagree if she was told she was suspended

seven times. During the 2024-2025 school year, she acknowledged being suspended
but disagreed when asked if she was suspended ten times. When asked to describe

the punishments Jackson imposed for her misconduct, the child agreed she would

be forbidden to go outside and denied access to a phone or computer.

On redirect examination, the child testified that Jackson hit her with

the belt previously and with her hands on one occasion, but never put her hands on

the child’s neck or over her nose and mouth prior to February 2025.

Next, the State called Euclid Police Officer Gabrielle Crombie

(“Officer Crombie”) to testify. Officer Crombie testified that she was dispatched to

Jackson’s residence on a domestic violence call placed by the child’s brother

claiming his caregiver was “beating” his sister. Officer Crombie met the brother in

the lobby then proceeded upstairs to Jackson’s apartment.

After knocking on the door, a young child called through the door and

informed Officer Crombie and her partner that he was not permitted to open the

door. Six to eight minutes later, Jackson’s mother answered the door. Neither

Jackson nor the child was home. The officers returned to the station, where Jackson

and the child were waiting.

Officer Crombie interviewed the child and took pictures of injuries on

the child’s right and left thigh, calf, and neck, where a “puffy nail mark” was located.

Officer Crombie described the leg and calf injuries as fresh “welty” belt injuries. The

child told Officer Crombie that she had pain in her legs and neck as a result of the

injuries. She also told Officer Crombie that she could not breathe for a brief period.
Officer Crombie did not observe any other injuries except an old wound from a dog

bite.

On cross-examination, Officer Crombie testified that she did not

believe there was an immediate need for the child to receive medical care. She also

testified that she had been trained in observing the signs of strangulation, including

fingernail marks or imprints on the neck and petechia in the eyes. When asked

whether any of that was present in this case, Officer Crombie testified there was one

mark, a red dot depicted in the picture of the child’s neck.

The defense presented Jackson as its sole witness. Jackson testified

that she obtained custody of the child and her brother approximately five years prior

to the incident. At the time, she was living in a one-bed room apartment, which she

was informed was too small for her to house herself and two children. As a result,

Jackson testified that she and her parents agreed to share an apartment so the

children could live with them.

With respect to the incident, Jackson initially testified that the child

was expelled, then corrected herself and explained that the child was given a five-

day suspension. When she arrived at the school, Jackson observed police and an

ambulance. Jackson testified that they were there for another student, not the child.

Jackson denied going to the grocery store on the way home, rather, the groceries

were already in the car. On the way home, Jackson tried to talk to the child about

her choices and assess why the situation at school happened. The child did not

respond to Jackson’s questions.
When they arrived home, both of Jackson’s parents, the child’s

brother, and Jackson’s boyfriend’s children were present. Jackson denied arguing

with the child. She testified that she tried to talk to the child but she received more

information from the school than the child. After putting the groceries away,

Jackson testified that she told the child to go to her room for her “whipping.”

After the punishment, Jackson left the room and encountered the

child’s brother who was upset that Jackson had punished his sister. Jackson

testified that he was verbally abusive towards her. She told him that he was going

to respect her or he was going to have to leave her home. The brother then grabbed

his things and left. At that point, Jackson testified that she called the police to report

that the brother, a minor, had left her home.

Jackson eventually took the child to the police station. She believed

that the police did not want to talk to her, but wanted to talk to the child alone.

Jackson was arrested after the child’s interview. After she was released, the court

placed a no-contact order between Jackson and the child. Jackson arranged for her

sister to take the child. When her sister was hospitalized, Jackson arranged for her

best friend to take the child, which was where the child was staying at the time of

trial. Jackson testified that she retained custody of both children and that the child’s

brother still lived with her.

On cross-examination, Jackson testified that the child had been

transferred from four schools because of her behavior. When asked whether she

sought therapy for the children, Jackson originally testified that they had been in
therapy in the last year. When pressed about only obtaining therapy in the last year,

Jackson testified that the children had been going to therapy off and on for two to

three years. With respect to the incident, Jackson claimed that the child appeared

intoxicated, but denied taking the child for medical treatment. On further

questioning, Jackson testified she believed the child was intoxicated because that

was the information she received from the school.

In regards to the punishment, Jackson claimed she hit the child with

the belt four or five times and it lasted one minute. When the child tried to follow

her brother and leave the house, Jackson stated that she stopped her by grabbing

her coat and a “tussle” ensued because the child was determined to leave the house.

Jackson suggested that the neck injury occurred at that time and denied strangling

the child or covering her nose and mouth.

The jury ultimately found Jackson not guilty of the strangulation and

domestic-violence charges but guilty of the endangering-children charge. The trial

court placed Jackson on community control for a period of one year.

Jackson appeals raising the following assignment of error for our

review.

Assignment of Error

The State did not introduce sufficient evidence of substantial risk to the
health and safety of minor at trial to sustain a conviction for
[endangering children] under R.C. 2919.22(A).
Law and Analysis

In her sole assignment of error, Jackson argues that the trial court

erred when it denied her motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because the State

failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that she created a substantial risk to

the health and safety of the child. We find Jackson’s argument to be well taken.

Standard of Review

Crim.R. 29(A) provides, “The court on motion of a defendant . . . after

the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal

of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the

evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” Because

“a Crim.R. 29 motion questions the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[the appellate court

applies] the same standard of review to Crim.R. 29 motions as [it uses] in reviewing

the sufficiency of the evidence.’” Fairview Park v. Peah, 2021-Ohio-2685, ¶ 37 (8th

Dist.), quoting State v. Tenace, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37.

A sufficiency challenge requires an appellate court to determine

whether the State has met its burden of production at trial and to consider not the

credibility of the evidence but whether, if credible, the evidence presented would

sustain a conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). The

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273

(1991), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
“When analyzing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing

court is neither permitted to assess the credibility of witnesses nor otherwise weigh

the evidence.” State v. Young, 2022-Ohio-3132, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), citing In re A.W.,

2016-Ohio-7297, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). Therefore, in a sufficiency — or Crim.R. 29(A) —

assessment, the reviewing court assumes that witnesses testified truthfully and

evaluates whether that testimony, along with any other direct or circumstantial

evidence presented at trial, satisfies each element of the offense. Cleveland v. Clark,

2024-Ohio-4491, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.), citing In re D.R.S., 2016-Ohio-3262, ¶ 23 (8th

Dist.), and State v. Wells, 2021-Ohio-2585, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).

In order to establish endangering children under R.C. 2919.22(A), the

State must present evidence that Jackson, while “having custody or control . . . of a

child under eighteen years of age . . . create[d] a substantial risk to the health or

safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.” The State

must further establish that she acted recklessly. Cleveland Hts. v. Cohen, 2015-

Ohio-1636, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.) (finding that the mens rea for endangering children is

recklessness).

“A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the

consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the

person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain

nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C). A “‘[s]ubstantial risk’ means a strong possibility, as

contrasted with a remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or

that certain circumstances may exist.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(8). Furthermore, a
conviction under R.C. 2919.22(A) may be the result of a single act, and “‘“[t]o prove

the requisite ‘substantial risk’ element . . . there must be some evidence beyond mere

speculation as to the risk of harm that could potentially occur due to a single

imprudent act.”’” Cleveland v. Alrefaei, 2020-Ohio-5009, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), quoting

Cohen at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Hughes, 2009-Ohio-4115, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting

Middletown v. McWhorter, 2006-Ohio-7030, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.).

Moreover, R.C. 2919.22(A) “is concerned with circumstances of

neglect.” State v. Boyd, 2020-Ohio-3450, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Kamel, 12

Ohio St.3d 306, 309 (1984). This “neglect is characterized by acts of omission rather

than acts of commission . . . [i.e.] an inexcusable failure to act in discharge of one’s

duty to protect a child where such failure to act results in a substantial risk to the

child’s health or safety.” Kamel at id. The harm a child suffered is relevant evidence

in a prosecution under R.C. 2919.22(A); however, it is not an element of the offense.

Cleveland Heights v. Cohen, 2015-Ohio-1636, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.) (finding “it is not

necessary to show an actual injury or a pattern of physical abuse by the defendant

in order to support a conviction under R.C. 2919.22(A)”); see generally State v.

Lewis, 2011-Ohio-187, ¶ 51 (5th Dist.) (finding sufficient evidence for conviction

under R.C. 2919.22(A) where a parent left a two-month-old child unattended in a

car in below freezing temperatures for 30 minutes despite the child suffering no

injury); State v. Crenshaw, 2020-Ohio-4922 (8th Dist.) (finding insufficient

evidence to support a conviction under R.C. 2919.22(A) where the evidence

established that the parent hit the child in the head with a spoon, pushed her head
into a wall, and struck her legs three times with an extension cord because although

there was some risk of a serious head injury there was not a substantial risk).

Jackson argues that regardless of whether this court were to find that

she breached a duty of care or protection to the child, the State’s evidence fails to

establish that she created a substantial risk to the health and or safety of the child.

In contrast, the State argues that the evidence established that Jackson created a

substantial risk to the health or safety of the child when she placed her hands around

the child’s neck; covered her mouth and impeded her breathing; pulled the child’s

hair while driving; pushed the child to the ground and pulled her hair when she

attempted to leave; and failed to obtain medical treatment for the child after the

child’s alleged intoxication and the resultant injuries from the belt lashes. The

State’s arguments lack merit.

Contrary to the State’s argument, the offender’s acts in and of

themselves are not sufficient to establish substantial risk. A “substantial risk” to the

health and safety of the child is more than a possibility, or even a significant chance;

it requires more than mere speculation of the injury that could have occurred based

on the defendant’s actions. R.C. 2901.01(A)(8); Alrefaei, 2020-Ohio-5009, ¶ 40

(8th Dist.). For example, this court found that the evidence was sufficient to

establish substantial risk where it established that the defendant, who was

intoxicated, attacked his girlfriend in the room where a three-month-old baby was

sleeping on a bed. The child was not harmed, but the evidence established that the

defendant’s actions were so turbulent that they caused a closet door to fall. Even
though the proximity of the door to the child was unknown, this court found that the

evidence was sufficient to establish a substantial risk of harm to the health or safety

of the child. State v. Jemison, 2025-Ohio-5629, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.).

Substantial risk was also established in State v. Jackson. There, after

being beaten with an extension cord, the child suffered visible damage to the eye

causing a discharge to flow from the injury, requiring medical attention. This court

found that the offender created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child

when despite the obvious evidence of an injury, the offender failed to take the child

for medical treatment, resulting in the child suffering a loss of vision. State v.

Jackson, 2004-Ohio-2332, ¶ 3-4, 24 (8th Dist.). Consequently, it was the offender’s

failure to provide treatment for the injury that created substantial risk to the health

or safety of the child.

In contrast, in State v. Phillips, the court of appeals found that the

State failed to establish substantial risk where the evidence established that the

mother’s conduct was disciplinary and transitory, State v. Phillips, 2014-Ohio-5322,

¶ 2, 26 (5th Dist.) In that case, the mother decided to discipline the oldest of her five

children when he became unruly while they were shopping. The mother took her

son back to her van, holding him by the neck and upper torso according to witnesses

and videotaped evidence. She later returned to the store, and there were no more

issues with the children. Employees called the police, and the mother was charged

and convicted for endangering children. The appellate court found that the State
failed to establish that the mother’s conduct created a substantial risk to the health

and safety of the child. Id.

In Crenshaw, 2020-Ohio-4922 (8th Dist.), a case with facts similar

to this one, the court found that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish

a violation of R.C. 2919.22(A). There the parent hit the child on the head with a

spoon, shoved the child into a wall, and lashed her legs two-three times with a belt

after discovering the child had created a mess in the bathroom and failed to clean it

up. Notably, the minor child did not suffer physical harm that necessitated medical

attention. The evidence established that the child was taken to a physician two days

after the incident and the physician did not order tests for head trauma because she

did not believe they were necessary. Id. at ¶ 52. This court found that the evidence

failed to establish Crenshaw created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the

child.

Comparing these cases to the facts here, we find that the record fails

to reflect that any of Jackson’s actions caused a substantial risk to the health or

safety of the child. The testimony established that Jackson placed her hands on the

child’s neck for four seconds and did not squeeze. The child did not remember

whether that act impeded her breathing. Next, Jackson covered the child’s mouth

and nose for six seconds, which did impede her breathing. The child testified that

Jackson removed her hands and did not indicate loss of consciousness, dizziness, or

other aftereffects of Jackson’s actions. Assuming the child’s breath was impeded in

both instances, the State did not present any evidence to establish that the very brief
incidents created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, rather than a

remote or significant possibility of risk.

While the child testified that Jackson pulled her hair while they were

in the car, she also testified that Jackson stopped the car before doing so. Other than

the fact that Jackson pulled her hair, there was no testimony that Jackson lost

control of the car, swerved in traffic, or in any other way created a substantial risk to

the child at that time. With respect to the incident when the child tried to leave, the

child testified that Jackson grabbed her, threw her to the ground, and pulled her

hair. Other than the fact that it happened, the child did not testify regarding any

pain or injury as a result of that incident, which would have created a substantial

risk to her health or safety. While Jackson’s methods of discipline are concerning,

the record reflects that even the child believed that Jackson was acting to stop her

from leaving the home.

Finally, we examine whether Jackson’s failure to obtain medical

treatment because of the child’s consumption of alcohol or lashes from the belt

created a substantial risk to the health and safety of the child. During oral argument,

the State argued that the child had been consuming alcohol all day and Jackson

breached a duty when she failed to take the child for medical treatment. This

argument is counterfactual. The child testified that she had a sip of alcohol. Even if

we credit Jackson’s testimony that she believed the child was intoxicated, she based

that statement in large part on what the school told her. Moreover, there was no

evidence that the child suffered ill effects that required medical treatment. For
example, there was no testimony that the child vomited, was unsteady on her feet,

or lost consciousness. Regarding the belt lashes, the child did not testify regarding

her pain or any treatment she received. Officer Crombie testified that the child told

her that the injuries “hurt.” Notably, Officer Crombie testified that after Jackson

was arrested, Jackson’s boyfriend was permitted to take the child back to Jackson’s

apartment. When asked whether she felt there was an immediate need for the child

to obtain medical treatment, Officer Crombie testified that she “did not believe so.”

Based on the foregoing, we find that the State failed to present

sufficient evidence that Jackson recklessly created a substantial risk to the health

and safety of the child. Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the State,

we cannot find that the State established that Jackson’s actions or omissions were a

violation of a duty of care that created a substantial risk to the health and safety of

the child.

Judgment reversed.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR