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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Daniel Joseph Georgianni v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 09-25-00213-CR
• Nature of Suit: Interference With Public Duties

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00213-CR

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DANIEL JOSEPH GEORGIANNI, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23CC-CR-00982

---

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Daniel Joseph Georgianni (Appellant or Georgianni) appeals his

conviction for the misdemeanor offense of Interference with Public Duties. See Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 38.15 (a). In the Information the State alleged that

on or about the 17th day of August, 2023, DANIEL JOSEPH
GEORGIANNI, did then and there, while Officer Charles Ortega, a
peace officer, was performing a duty or exercising authority imposed
or granted by law, to-wit: conducting a traffic stop, with criminal
negligence, interrupt, disrupt, impede, or interfere with the said Officer
Charles Ortega by refusing to exit the motor vehicle.

1
Georgianni pleaded “not guilty,” but a jury found Georgianni guilty of the offense

as charged in the information. Georgianni elected to have the jury assess punishment,

and the jury sentenced him to “zero (0) days” jail time and assessed a $2,000 fine.

The trial court accepted the jury’s finding of guilty and sentenced Georgianni in

accordance with the jury’s verdict. Georgianni timely filed a notice of appeal. For

the reasons outlined below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Arguments Made at Trial about Police Officer’s Oath of Office
and Voir Dire Outside the Presence of the Jury

Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court allowed the defense attorney

to cross-examine Officer Ortega about the oath Ortega took in 2016 and the language

in Article XVI, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. During the voir dire on that issue,

Officer Ortega testified that he took an oath of office on June 1, 2016, the day he

began his full-time employment with the City of Cleveland as a patrol officer, and

he had been with the City of Cleveland Police for about nine years and was recently

promoted to Corporal. Ortega agreed that he did not take another oath again until he

was promoted to Corporal on November 12, 2024. After the initial voir dire

testimony, the trial court asked defense counsel what relief he was seeking on that

point, and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Okay. [Defense counsel], . . . What relief -- are you
asking for some relief? What are you doing?

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, we want to establish if he is up to -- if
he’s truly a commissioned peace officer --
2
THE COURT: You mean at the time?

[Defense counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor. Not right now,
but whether at the time he was -- his oath was up to date and correct as
is necessary under the Texas State Constitution, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Say it’s not. What then?

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Are you asking me to make a determination?

[Defense counsel]: Ultimately, yes. Now, obviously the state can
establish him as a de facto peace officer, but whether there was any kind
of deficiency in his commission is, number one, a matter of law, which
is why I am approaching it in this manner and, second, a matter before
the judge.

....

THE COURT: Okay. Why don’t you just tell me what you think it is
and maybe, as a matter of law, I can give you the relief you want.

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, the Texas State Constitution, part one,
requires this official oath of office. It requires it to be taken every two
years. The statement that he has deviated slightly in the first paragraph,
and furthermore, it does not include a second paragraph as concerns
bribery and that he hasn’t received any bribes to be in it.
Furthermore, it must be renewed every two years. His, at the time
of the offense, would have been defective by seven years. There is case
law stating that even if it is otherwise defective, a peace officer’s
testimony, it may just be completely valid for purposes of --

THE COURT: De facto --

[Defense counsel]: For a de facto peace officer. However, that case law
concerns cases wherein the person being a peace officer was not an
element of the offense. This case, a person being a valid peace officer,

3
fully authorized under law, is explicitly in the elements of the offense
and therefore relevant as a matter of law in fact.

THE COURT: All right. Prosecutor, what have you got to say about
that?

Prosecutor: As Corporal Ortega stated, he has his TCOLE training.
He’s been certified by TCOLE and he has made his oath of office. He
has been employed with Cleveland P.D. for the past nine years, Your
Honor, and, at the time, he was employed with Cleveland P.D. at the
time of this offense so he was a peace officer at the time that this offense
occurred.

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

[Defense counsel]: I have not the slightest doubt that the state is going
to ultimately prove that he is effective as a de facto peace officer, it’s
just as a matter of fact whether he was a fully commissioned peace
officer for -- under the statute at the time.

THE COURT: All right. What’s -- then what’s the law on that? What
relief do you want or what --

[Defense counsel]: That he’s not a fully qualified expert witness as a
peace officer, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Expert -- are peace officers considered experts?

[Defense counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

....

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, just -- as is relevant, according to the
notes on Westlaw that’s coming from Vernon’s Annotated, Article
10.16, Subsection 30, or of the Texas Constitution, may require a home
rule city police officers to comply with the provisions of Article 16,
Section 1, which requires officers to take an oath of office and to sign
and file a statement before taking the oath of office every two years.
4
There is -- there is cases here stating that it may be a defect, but that
because they were a valid de facto officer, it didn’t matter in the case
of a --

THE COURT: So just basic jury argument, is that --

[Defense counsel]: I suppose so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: On your part? Okay. Well --

[Defense counsel]: If you don’t believe that this is the proper venue --

THE COURT: Well, I’m not sure. I’m not sure -- you’re not asking for
any relief, right?

[Defense counsel]: The only clarification as to his status as an officer
and whether he is entirely an expert in that regard and I would have
asked to have the oath of office admitted into evidence, and
furthermore, to have the Court recognize that portion of the Texas State
Constitution per judicial notice. That was the reason --

....

Prosecutor: Under Article 2A.001 is peace officers -- peace officers,
generally, it states that the following are peace officers under
Subsection 3 to include the marshall or police officer of a municipality
or reserve municipal police officer who holds a permanent peace officer
license, under -- issued under Chapter 1701, Occupations Code, and as
Corporal Ortega stated, he had his TCOLE training and licensure
through TCOLE, which he currently still holds.

So under the statute, I would argue that he is a municipal police
officer with Cleveland P.D. because he holds a permanent peace officer
license issued under Chapter 1701.

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I would refer back to Article 16,
Section 1, all elected or appointed officers, before they enter upon the
duties of their offices, shall take the following oath or affirmation and
so I don’t believe that that would override.
....
5
THE COURT: What’s the -- I can make a finding that he was a de facto
police officer?

[Defense counsel]: That’s essentially -- the request is -- I mean, I think
they would still have to prove that, but I don’t have the slightest doubt
that they’re going to prove it.

....

THE COURT: All right. Sit down. Call him as a witness, qualify him
if you want, y’all approach the bench. I’m going to make a ruling on
whether I think he’s --

[Defense counsel]: A de facto or de jour --

THE COURT: De facto and then we’ll take it from there.

Later during additional voir dire questioning, Ortega’s 2016 oath was

admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibit 1, and the trial court took judicial notice

of Article XVI, section 1 of the State Constitution. Near the end of Ortega’s cross-

examination, the defense made another argument outside the presence of the jury

about whether Ortega was a “peace officer,” and the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think the context of this is not -- and,
by the way, I don’t know if anybody has testified or I don’t know if you
can see what kind of uniform or what kind of uniform he had on. Has
he testified to that? He’s plainly dressed in that or not -- or whatever --
his vehicle is clearly marked with lights and stuff, it looks like I can
probably notice that, but I’m not sure of his uniform. I’m not sure. I’ll
address that in just a minute, but I think it looks like after this is settled,
just a little bit, I think that’s in some other context of maybe a --
somebody say with the Cattlemen’s Association or something, you
know, is that -- is that really a peace officer or not. I think this is -- I
think he’s clearly a de facto peace officer and I think -- I think -- I don’t
know how we get to this point, but I think -- I agree with that
6
procedurally and in law, that I do find that, so that’s not even an issue,
I don’t think.
With his testimony, coupled with the video and his testimony, I
think he’s clearly a peace officer and I don’t even think it’s an element.
Now, whether it’s an instruction or not, now we got to face that, but I
do find he’s a de facto peace officer and I find any further inquiry into
that is irrelevant so --

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, the defense objects to the --

THE COURT: Okay.

[Defense counsel]: -- finding of irrelevance and we move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: Well, I think what you -- all right. You can put a bill of
exception or something on if you want, that might be more appropriate,
but your request for a mistrial is overruled. So -- all right. What else?
You ready to move on?

[Defense counsel]: To be clear, the Court is finding that further inquiry
on the subject is not relevant?

THE COURT: You know, I guess I would have to take each question
as they come. Look -- look at this case.
[Defense counsel]: Can I get it before the jury?

THE COURT: Here’s what the case says: But failed -- failed to conform
to some precedent requirement, asked to take the oath, give a bond or
the like. So I don’t think it’s relevant because a de facto officer -- I don’t
think -- I think I’ve made a finding and so -- now, what was that -- what
does Williams say about an instruction?

Prosecutor: It says that the trial court required the jury in this case to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Martin was a deputy sheriff
pursuant to the requirement in that statute of peace officer and the
evidence -- the court further found in this case that the evidence was
sufficient to support that finding and then the appeals court held
accordingly the trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion
for an instructed verdict contending otherwise.

7
THE COURT: What did you just say? That what? The appeals court
said that that was proper to give an instruction?

Prosecutor: That the court -- the trial court did not err in overruling
the appellant’s motion for an instructed verdict contending --

THE COURT: That he wasn’t?

Prosecutor: -- otherwise. Exactly.

THE COURT: That he wasn’t?

Prosecutor: That he wasn’t.

THE COURT: So he didn’t give an instruction? They didn’t give an
instruction?

Prosecutor: They did not give an instruction.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. But he wanted an instruction that he
wasn’t and the court denied that and that was not error?

THE COURT: Is that right? So I don’t give an instruction, but I can
deny the defendant’s request for, one, that’s he’s not a peace officer?

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, that’s not -- the request is basically as
soon as the jury comes back, I’m going to get on the subject and go. Is

that going to be allowed by the Court or will an objection be sustained

THE COURT: All right. What do y’all say? I think it’s irrelevant. I
think it’s irrelevant. I think he’s a de facto police officer, and therefore,
all those things -- and the like, oath and bond are irrelevant.

[Defense counsel]: And thus the defense is not allowed to go into that
line of questioning before the jury?

THE COURT: Yes. Yes.
8
[Defense counsel]: The defense objects.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

Prosecutor: I mean, Your Honor, just going back to Williams here,
this -- it says the trial court required the jury to find and so I think you
could even go so far as that, but -- I mean, we feel very confident in the
finding that you’ve already made as well, that --

THE COURT: Well, I’m not -- I’m not going to put it in the charge and
I’ve made the finding. I’m just going to leave it at that.

[Defense counsel]: All right.

The trial court stated on the record, outside the presence of the jury, that

“Officer Ortega was a de facto officer on August 17, 2023. . . . he was at least a de

facto officer, if not a full-fledged valid officer.” “[H]e’s a de facto police officer and

that included his direct testimony, plus . . . voir dire. I’ve made [my] ruling. …. I do

find he’s a de facto peace officer and I find any further inquiry into that is

irrelevant[.]” The defense objected to the trial court stating it was “irrelevant” and

moved for a mistrial. The motion for a mistrial was overruled.

Summary of Evidence Presented to the Jury

Testimony of Officer Ortega

At trial, Officer Charles Ortega (Ortega) testified that he began his

employment as a patrol officer with the Cleveland Police Department on June 1,

2016, where he has worked for almost nine years. He completed his basic peace

9
officer academy course in 2015, obtained his license through the Texas Commission

on Law Enforcement (TCOLE) and maintains that license with updated training.

According to Ortega, on August 17, 2023, he was working on a traffic incident

involving a vehicle and a motorcycle at the 400 block of Belcher Street in the City

of Cleveland, Texas. Ortega was coordinating the exchange of information between

both drivers before the injured motorcycle driver was transported to a hospital via

ambulance and getting information on the drivers involved in the accident. During

his investigation, Ortega returned to his patrol car to work on the information

exchange and detail for the crash report. Ortega had parked his marked patrol car in

the middle of the street with its lights activated while he was working to investigate

the motorcycle-car accident. A honking horn distracted Ortega. Ortega determined

that the honking originated from the vehicle located directly behind his patrol car.

The first time he heard the honking, Ortega did not approach the honking vehicle

and continued to perform his duties relating to the accident investigation. As he was

walking from the ambulance across the street to the location of the driver at fault in

the accident, Ortega heard the same vehicle honking again. Ortega then stopped what

he was doing, and he went to speak with the driver who was honking his horn. The

honking was coming from a truck hauling an oversized load, and the driver of the

truck was Georgianni. Ortega instructed Georgianni to step out of the cab of the

truck, due to the height difference of Georgianni in the cab of the vehicle compared

10
to Ortega being on the ground, the need to speak to Georgianni without the sound of

the truck’s engine interfering, and for officer safety because Ortega could only see

part of Georgianni’s face. Ortega testified that as a police officer, he can request

anyone to step out of their vehicle when conducting a traffic stop. Based on Ortega’s

experience with multiple traffic stops involving 18-wheelers, drivers usually step out

of the vehicle and meet him at his patrol car. Georgianni refused to step down out of

the vehicle. Ortega explained that he was conducting an initial investigation based

on the honking being in violation of the City of Cleveland’s Ordinance Code Section

50.32, Enumeration of a Specific Noise, and Georgianni refused to step down out of

the cab and speak with Ortega. When Ortega requested Georgianni’s driver’s

license, Georgianni asked what he was being stopped for, and after being informed

that he was being detained for excessive noise, Georgianni still refused to step down

out of the vehicle. Ortega received assistance at the scene from his partner, Corey

Greer, and others, and he also called and requested assistance from Captain Scott

Felts.

Georgianni’s refusal to step down out of his vehicle resulted in a police

standoff that lasted between one to two hours. Georgianni finally exited his vehicle,

and an un-holstered firearm was located on the floor behind the front right passenger

seat.

11
On cross-examination, while the video footage from the scene was playing,

the defense questioned Ortega about the honking sound. Ortega identified the

honking sounds on the video and stated the noise was coming from the 18-wheel

vehicle directly behind Ortega’s patrol vehicle. Ortega agreed that when he first

approached Georgianni and asked him to step out of the cab of his truck, Ortega did

not identify himself as a police officer or say his name or say Georgianni was being

detained. Ortega agreed that Georgianni’s vehicle was marked as an oversized load

and it was a commercial vehicle hauling a front-end loader.

According to Ortega, in the video Georgianni can be seen inside the cab of his

truck talking on his phone, and Ortega believed Georgianni was on the phone with

the hostage negotiator. Ortega stated that Georgianni was never charged with a noise

violation, but he was charged with “interference with public duty, resisting and

unlawful carry of a weapon.”1 According to Ortega, Georgianni was placed under

arrest after he exited his vehicle, and when Georgianni was placed in the patrol

vehicle, he was using profanity.

1
According to the record, Georgianni was charged with three offenses by
separate complaints: interference with public duties, unlawful carrying of a weapon,
and resisting arrest, search, or transportation. The interference with public duties
trial cause number is 23CC-CR-00982, the unlawful carrying of a weapon is trial
cause number 23CC-CR-00870, and the trial cause number for the resisting arrest
charge is not in our record on appeal. The record indicates that the jury found
Georgianni not guilty of the misdemeanor offense of unlawfully carrying a weapon.
There is no additional information in our record about the resisting arrest, search, or
transportation charge.
12
Ortega testified on redirect examination that on the day of this incident he was

wearing his police uniform, which looked much like the one he was wearing during

his testimony. The uniform he was wearing at the scene had an insignia showing he

was a police officer, indicated where he worked (the City of Cleveland), and had his

badge displayed on it. Additionally, Ortega’s patrol vehicle was clearly marked, and

he had his lights on, and Ortega noted it can be seen in the video footage which

shows it is parked in front of Georgianni’s vehicle. Ortega identified Georgianni as

the person who committed the offenses in question. Other officers on the scene,

including Captain Felts, were also wearing their respective uniforms and badges, and

their black-and-white vehicles were marked.

Testimony of Captain Felts

Captain Scott Felts with the Cleveland Police Department, testified that he

was at the police department when he received the call from Ortega requesting a

supervisor come to the scene because a driver was refusing to exit a vehicle. When

Felts arrived on the scene, he could see the 18-wheeler in the road and Officers

Ortega, Greer, and Crowell nearby, and he approached and asked Ortega if the driver

(Georgianni) was under arrest. After speaking with Ortega, Felts turned his attention

to Georgianni, and Felts personally instructed Georgianni that he was under arrest

and instructed him to get out of the vehicle. Georgianni refused to step out of his

vehicle or identify himself.

13
Felts explained that at the time of the incident, he had been employed with the

City of Cleveland for over twenty years, and he had never had a driver of an 18-

wheeler refuse to step down and talk to him. Felts assessed the situation noting that

18-wheel vehicles are large and can be used as weapons, a farm to market roadway

was blocked, and a school with traffic was nearby. Felts told Georgianni that if he

did not step out of the vehicle a pepper ball gun with kinetic rounds would be used

to pop the vehicle window open. When Georgianni still verbally refused to comply,

Felts asked Georgianni if he had a firearm. Georgianni confirmed that he did have a

firearm, and Georgianni told Felts he would “use it” if he felt his safety was

threatened.

At that point, Felts stated he decided to “back off” and he contacted Liberty

County’s Special Response Team (“SRT”) to respond to what Felts described as a

“barricaded subject” situation. A hostage negotiator with the county’s mental health

department was also called, along with the SWAT Team. In addition to the

negotiator, the Chief of Police, the police department dispatcher, and a 9-1-1

operator also communicated with Georgianni by telephone. The area surrounding a

nearby church was evacuated. By the end of the stand-off, at least twenty personnel

were called to the scene.

14
Other Evidence Admitted During the Trial

Video footage taken from Ortega’s and Felts’s body cameras was admitted as

evidence and the jury viewed the videos. Additionally, one photograph of the truck

and three photos of the firearm were also admitted into evidence.

Remainder of Trial

After the testimony of Captain Felts, the State rested its case. The defense

attorney moved for a directed verdict, arguing to the trial court that Ortega’s

testimony showed the officer failed to tell Georgianni he was conducting a traffic

stop for excessive noise, the State failed to show the mens rea for “criminal

negligence” or explain why Georgianni had to get out of his vehicle, and no case law

exists supporting the position that failing to get out of your vehicle is sufficient

conduct to constitute interference with public duties. The trial court denied the

motion for directed verdict. The defense called no witnesses.

The attorneys discussed the charge outside the presence of the jury, and no

record was provided of that discussion. After the jury returned to the courtroom, the

defense stated on the record that the defense had no objections to the jury charge.

The State and the defense gave closing arguments to the jury, the trial court read the

charge to the jury, and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict

of guilty to the charge of the misdemeanor offense of Interference with Public

Duties. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15 (a). The defense moved for a judgment

15
notwithstanding the verdict based on “similar reasons that were listed in the directed

verdict[]” and the motion was denied. Georgianni timely filed a notice of appeal.

Issue on Appeal

In his table of contents to his appellate brief, Georgianni states his sole issue

on appeal as follows: whether “the trial court abuse[d] its discretion by not allowing

[defense] counsel to submit evidence regarding Officer Ortega’s certifications for

his peace officer’s license to the jury[.]” In the “Issues Presented” section of his

brief, Georgianni states his issue differently, as whether:

[t]he Trial Court erred in prohibiting trial counsel from submitting
evidence regarding an element of the offense to the jury. This violated
the due process guarantees of the United States Constitution and the
Texas Constitution. The Trial Court placed itself in the position of
finder of fact, abusing its discretion.

Analysis

Appellant argues that the trial court’s refusal to allow the defense attorney to

submit evidence to the jury on “an element of the offense” violated Georgianni’s

constitutional due process rights. The evidence Appellant wanted to submit at trial

pertains to his argument that Ortega had failed to take an oath every two years as

required in Article XVI, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. 2

2
At trial the defense attorney also argued that Officer Ortega had failed to
post a bond, but on appeal the defense makes no argument about the significance of
the lack of a bond.
16
Georgianni’s defense attorney argued at trial, outside the presence of the jury,

that Ortega was not a “peace officer” because he had failed to comply with the oath

requirements, and he stated that being a “valid peace officer[]” was “an element of

the offense.” When asked by the trial judge what relief he was seeking from the trial

court, and whether he was asking the trial court to determine if Ortega was a “de

facto” peace officer, the defense attorney stated the defense believed the lack of an

oath went to the qualifications of Ortega as an “expert” and whether he was a “peace

officer” because he had failed to file his oaths as outlined in Article XVI, section 1.

That said, the defense failed to make any argument or objection in the trial

court stating that by not allowing the defense to submit the evidence to the jury about

Officer Ortega’s alleged failure to take an anti-bribery oath or renew his oath every

two years, the trial court was violating his due process rights, and he did not argue

in the trial court that the trial court was violating his right or ability to present a

complete defense. 3

The trial court found that Ortega was a “de facto” police officer and that the

issue of whether the officer took another oath every two years (or posted a bond)

every two years “are irrelevant.” The trial court refused to allow the defense attorney

3
On appeal, the Appellant argues in his Brief that the trial court invaded the
province of the jury and substituted its own determination on a fact issue that should
have been decided by the jury. That argument was not made in the trial court and
was not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
17
to submit evidence to the jury about Ortega’s alleged failure to take an anti-bribery

oath or the failure to renew his oath every two years, and the trial court concluded it

would not submit that issue to the jury. The record shows that the defense attorney

did not object to the jury charge, nor did the defense attorney request any jury

instructions regarding that issue.

At most, the record before us shows that the defense attorney sought to

introduce evidence that Ortega’s status as a “peace officer” was “deficient because

of his failure to renew his oath of office every two years and to swear to an anti-

bribery statement[,]” and Ortega’s defense attorney stated in his argument to the trial

court that establishing that Ortega was a “peace officer” was an element of the

offense.

With respect to an evidentiary challenge, we apply an abuse-of-discretion

standard of review, and the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence will

not be reversed if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Tillman v. State,

354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In Georgianni’s appellate brief, he

does not provide any substantive argument about how the trial court abused its

discretion in refusing to allow the defense to submit the evidence he wanted to

introduce to the jury. Here, the Appellant does not support his argument regarding

an abuse of discretion with appropriate citations to any authorities and does not

adequately explain how his complained-of error resulted in harm. See Tex. R. App.

18
P. 38.1. Where, as here, a party fails to adequately brief a complaint on appeal, the

complaint is waived. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 100 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 38.1).

Rather on appeal, Georgianni contends that the trial court erred by

“prohibiting trial counsel from submitting evidence regarding an element of the

offense to the jury[]” which he contends “violated the due process guarantees of the

United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution[,]” and “[t]he Trial Court

placed itself in the position of finder of fact[]” on the issue of whether Officer Ortega

was acting as a “peace officer.” He then argues we should review his issue on a “de

novo” basis.

“It has long been held that a failure to lodge a timely objection to evidence

offered during trial precludes a defendant from later complaining, even if the alleged

error were of constitutional dimension.” Hill v. State, 633 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1981) (citing Gibson v. State, 516 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);

Ex parte Bagley, 509 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Shumake v. State, 502

S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)). As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint on

appeal, the record must show that the complaint or argument made during the trial

comports with that made on appeal or the alleged error is forfeited. Tex. R. App. P.

33.1(a); Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). If a party fails

to properly object to constitutional errors at trial, the errors may be forfeited. Clark,

19
365 S.W.3d at 339. To determine if the complaint Georgianni made at trial comports

with the complaint being made on appeal, we look at the context of the objection

and the shared understanding of the parties at the time, as shown in the record. See

id.

After examining the entire record, we find nothing to indicate that either the

judge or prosecutor understood Georgianni’s evidentiary complaint or requests to be

complaints of a denial of due process. See id. at 340. Similarly, we find nothing in

the record that indicates the judge or prosecutor understood Georgianni’s complaint

to be that the trial court was usurping the role of the jury or that Georgianni was

being denied the ability to present a defense. Therefore, we conclude that Appellant

never put the trial court on notice of the complaints he now articulates in his appellate

brief, and those complaints were not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

Appellant’s argument in his brief does not comport with his objection at trial. See

id. An objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different legal

theory on appeal. See Sterling v. State, 800 S.W.2d 513, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990);

Hawkins v. State, 964 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. ref’d)

(constitutional claims were forfeited because they were not raised during trial).

Georgianni’s attorney argued at trial that Ortega had failed to file his oath, and

Georgianni initially explained at trial that he wanted to present that argument to the

jury because it would go to whether Ortega was “an expert[.]” Georgianni’s attorney

20
stated at trial that he had no doubt that the State would prove that Officer Ortega was

at least a “de facto peace officer[,]” and defense counsel agreed at trial that the trial

court could make a finding on that issue. The trial court eventually ruled that even if

Ortega had not filed his oath, the State proved that Ortega was a “peace officer” as

defined in the statute, or at a minimum a “de facto peace officer[,]” and the filing of

the oath was irrelevant. Based on the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused

its discretion by not allowing Georgianni to present the oath-of-office evidence to

the jury. See Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 435.

De Facto Peace Officers and Sufficiency of the Evidence

In Freeman v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a conviction for

capital murder of a peace officer, even though the record demonstrated the officer

had not filed a notarized oath of office with the county clerk. 556 S.W.2d 287, 303-

04 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The Court determined that based on the evidence the

victim was a “de facto” deputy sheriff and hence was a peace officer under the capital

murder statute. Id. at 304. In Williams v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed a conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer because the victim

was shown to be a “de facto” deputy sheriff. 588 S.W.2d 593, 594-95 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1979). Similarly, our Court in McGowen v. State, 885 S.W.2d 285, 287-89

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, no pet.), affirmed the convictions of the defendant for

escaping from a peace officer and for aggravated assault on a peace officer when the

21
officer was shown to be a “de facto” officer. And in Teevan v. State, the Fourteenth

Court of Appeals found the officer was a “de facto” peace officer and it overruled a

sufficiency challenge to a conviction of attempted capital murder made by the

appellant arguing the evidence was insufficient to show an officer was a “peace

officer” when the officer failed to show he had taken the oath and posted a bond.

No. 14-02-01051-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6993, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Aug. 14, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

In Williams, the Court of Criminal Appeals used the following definition of a

“de facto” peace officer:

one who has the reputation of being the officer, and yet is not a good
officer in point of law; in other words, the de facto officer is one who
acts under color of a known and valid appointment, but has failed to
conform to some precedent requirement, as to take the oath, give a
bond, or the like.

588 S.W.2d at 595 (quoting Weatherford v. State, 21 S.W. 251 (Tex. Crim. App.

1893). Officer Ortega was not an elected or appointed officer, but assuming without

deciding that Article XVI, section 1,4 applies to Ortega and that it requires a patrol

4
Article XVI, section 1 states as follows:
(a) All elected and appointed officers, before they enter upon the duties
of their offices, shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:
“I, __, do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will faithfully
execute the duties of the office of __ of the State of Texas, and will
to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
and laws of the United States and of this State, so help me God.”
22
officer in his position to file the oath as outlined therein every two years, on this

record, we agree with the trial court that Ortega was a “de facto” peace officer. The

record conclusively establishes that Ortega was a duly trained and licensed “peace

officer,” held a TCOLE commission, that he was employed by the City of Cleveland

Police Department as a patrol officer, and he was conducting the duties of that job

at all relevant times.

On the date of the alleged offense, section 1.07(36) of the Texas Penal Code

defined a “peace officer” as a person, elected, employed, or appointed as a peace

officer as stated in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.12. Article

(b) All elected or appointed officers, before taking the Oath or
Affirmation of office prescribed by this section and entering upon the
duties of office, shall subscribe to the following statement:
“I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have not directly
or indirectly paid, offered, promised to pay, contributed, or promised to
contribute any money or thing of value, or promised any public office
or employment for the giving or withholding of a vote at the election at
which I was elected or as a reward to secure my appointment or
confirmation, whichever the case may be, so help me God.”
(c) Members of the Legislature, the Secretary of State, and all other
elected and appointed state officers shall file the signed statement
required by Subsection (b) of this section with the Secretary of State
before taking the Oath or Affirmation of office prescribed by
Subsection (a) of this section. All other officers shall retain the signed
statement required by Subsection (b) of this section with the official
records of the office.

Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 1.

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2.12(3) defined “peace officers” to include “police officers of an incorporated city,

town, or village, and those reserve municipal police officers who hold a permanent

peace officer license under Chapter 1701, Occupations Code.”5

Georgianni does not dispute that Ortega was fully certified and licensed by

the State of Texas as a peace officer at the time in question, and he was employed

by the City of Cleveland as a police officer. Rather, Georgianni argues that because

Ortega had failed to file an oath of office since he first filed his original oath and

began working as a police officer with the City of Cleveland, he was not a “valid

peace officer.” Georgianni’s defense attorney stated to the trial judge that he had “no

doubt” that the State could show that Ortega was a “de facto peace officer,” but even

after the State proved Ortega was at a minimum a “de facto peace officer,” the

defense counsel requested that the trial court allow him to present evidence to the

jury that Ortega had not filed the oaths that are required under Article XVI, section

1 of the Texas Constitution.

A person commits the misdemeanor offense of Interference with Public

Duties if the person with criminal negligence interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or

otherwise interferes with a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty

5
Effective January 1, 2025, article 2.12(3)’s “peace officer” definition was
repealed and replaced with substantively the same definition included in Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2A.001(3)). See Act of June 12, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 765
§ 1.001, 2023 Tex. Gen. Laws 1839, 1841 (codified at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 2A.001(3)).
24
or exercising authority imposed or granted by law. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15 (a),

(b). The elements of the offense are: “‘(1) A person (2) With criminal negligence (3)

Interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or otherwise interfered with (4) A peace officer (5)

While the peace officer was performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or

granted by law.’” Galynsky v. State, No. 09-23-00238-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS

4673, at **11-12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 2, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem op., not

designated for publication) (quoting Roemisch v. State, No. 11-15-00090-CR, 2017

Tex. App. LEXIS 12112, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication)).

During a traffic stop, a police officer, as a matter of routine, can order a person

to get out of a vehicle. See Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 727 (Tex. Crim. App.

1990). The Goodwin Court expressly noted that police officers are allowed to order

drivers to get out of their cars when they have been lawfully stopped. See id. Notably,

the Goodwin Court cites to Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977),

wherein the Supreme Court found that an officer’s safety is a legitimate reason for

asking a driver to get out of the car, and any additional intrusion can only be

described as de minimis. In Mimms, the Supreme Court stated, “What is at most a

mere inconvenience to the driver cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate

concerns for the officer’s safety.” See 434 U.S. at 111. The Goodwin Court found

that “[a]n officer is allowed to establish a ‘face-to-face confrontation’ which

25
‘diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, that the driver can make

unobserved movements; this, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the officer will be

the victim of an assault.’” 799 S.W.2d at 727 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110); see

also Laurent v. State, No. 01-16-00350-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2272, at *8

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (concluding that the Goodwin Court’s reasoning applies equally to

an officer’s instruction to a driver to get back into his vehicle).

Here, Officer Ortega testified that Georgianni continued honking his horn

while the City of Cleveland police officers were in the middle of an accident

investigation, that Officer Ortega instructed Georgianni to get out of the vehicle

because he wanted to communicate with Georgianni face-to-face, and the honking

was a noise violation. Ortega also explained that for safety reasons he needed

Georgianni to exit the cab of his truck because the officer could not see into the cab

due to the height of the cab, but Georgianni refused to exit and get out. Captain Felts

also testified that he told Georgianni he was under arrest, and he ordered Georgianni

to exit the vehicle, and Georgianni still refused to exit his vehicle.

To the extent, if any, Georgianni is challenging the legal sufficiency of the

evidence, we note that the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the

evidence and the weight to be given to that evidence. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d

847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). As such, the jury is responsible for resolving

26
conflicts in the testimony, is free to believe some, all, or none of the testimony, and

may assign as much or as little weight to a witness’s testimony as it sees fit. Id. Jurors

may also draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Hooper v. State, 214

S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by

considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. at 16.

When examining whether a criminal conviction is supported by legally sufficient

evidence, we compare the evidence to the elements of the offense as defined by a

hypothetically correct charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). We consider all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict, along with the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We do not assess the credibility of the evidence, reweigh

the evidence, nor substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See Williams v. State,

235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The evidence is legally sufficient to

support the conviction if a rational trier of fact could have found each of the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). “Each fact need not point directly and independently to a

defendant’s guilt, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d

756, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Garcia v. State, 667

S.W.3d 756, 761-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citation omitted) (“A proper review of

27
evidentiary sufficiency considers the cumulative force of the evidence.”). A

“hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or

unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577

S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “As authorized by the indictment” means

the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument. Id.

On the record before us, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officer

Ortega was a “peace officer” performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or

granted by law at the time he instructed Georgianni to exit his vehicle. Ortega was

wearing his police uniform, he was in a police vehicle, and his overhead lights were

flashing when he stopped his vehicle in the roadway to investigate a motorcycle-

automobile accident. It is undisputed that Georgianni stopped his truck directly

behind Ortega’s police vehicle, the police vehicle’s emergency lights were flashing,

and Georgianni honked his horn while sitting in his truck. When Officer Ortega

approached and asked Georgianni to step out of his vehicle because of the honking,

which Officer Ortega explained was a noise violation, the matter then escalated

because Georgianni refused to comply. Both Officer Ortega and Captain Felts

exercised their lawful authority as peace officers and ordered Georgianni to exit the

vehicle and Georgianni refused to comply. Viewed in a light most favorable to the

28
verdict, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Georgianni,

with criminal negligence interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or otherwise interfered

with a peace officer, while the peace officer was performing a duty or exercising

authority imposed or granted by law. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15 (a); Hooper,

214 S.W.3d at 13.

Having overruled Appellant’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice

Submitted on December 22, 2025
Opinion Delivered March 4, 2026
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.

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