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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

CARE AND PROTECTION OF LATIFA (And a Companion Case).

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0376

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-376

CARE AND PROTECTION OF LATIFA (and a companion case1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial, a Juvenile Court judge found that the

mother was unfit to parent her two children and ordered entry of

decrees terminating her parental rights to them. In a

consolidated appeal from the decrees and from an order denying a

motion to vacate the decrees, the mother contends that the

evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that she is

currently unfit or that she will remain unfit to parent her

children in the future. She further argues that termination of

her parental rights was excessive and unnecessary where the

judge ordered the Department of Children and Families

(department) to create a reunification plan for the children

1Care and Protection of Annette. The children's names are
pseudonyms.
with the father and also allowed the mother posttermination

visitation. We affirm.

Background. In May 2022, the department filed a care and

protection petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, and the

department received emergency custody of the two children named

therein, Latifa and Annette. A trial on the merits was held

over five days in July, August, and September 2023. We set

forth the facts found by the judge after trial, saving some

facts for later discussion.

The mother and the father were married in 2017. At the

time of trial, Annette was eight years old, and Latifa was four

years old. Although the mother and the father were still

legally married at that time, the father filed for divorce in

April 2023, and a judgment of divorce nisi since entered in the

Probate and Family Court. The mother is diagnosed with mental

health conditions and "alcohol dependence/abuse." She

experienced postpartum depression following the birth of Latifa

in May 2019. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the mother

and the father increased their consumption of alcohol. By

October 2021, both drank alcohol on a daily basis, including in

the presence of the children. Domestic violence was prevalent

in their relationship, particularly when they consumed alcohol.

2
The department first became involved with the family in May

2020 when a report under G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report), was

filed alleging neglect of the children by the mother and the

father following a domestic disturbance in the family's home.

Although the report was not substantiated, the investigation

raised concerns about the mother's alcohol dependence and

domestic violence in the couple's relationship. Multiple

reports and investigations of domestic disturbances in the

household followed. On Halloween night in 2021, the police

responded to a residence following a report of a 911 hangup.

After an officer saw a bruise on the mother's arm and a welt on

her forehead, the mother stated that the father had physically

and mentally abused her on a daily basis for the past three to

four years. The police arrested the father for domestic assault

and battery, the mother posted bail for him, and he returned to

the family home. A 51A report was subsequently filed alleging

neglect of the children due to the ongoing domestic violence

between the mother and the father, and the department

investigated and supported those allegations. Its investigation

also raised concerns about the parents' truthfulness, substance

abuse, domestic violence, and the mother's poor judgment.

The instability in the mother's life continued into 2022.

In January, the police responded to a report of a domestic

3
disturbance at the family's residence. In February, the father

was arrested for domestic assault, threat to commit a crime, and

witness intimidation based on text messages he sent the mother.

The mother obtained an abuse prevention order against him

pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 3, on February 3, but asked the

court to vacate the order on April 29. In March, the mother

relocated with the children to a new residence with another man,

with whom she had entered into a relationship. This

relationship ended in May after an incident of domestic violence

at the home in which the mother was the aggressor. The children

were left in the second man's care after the mother was

arrested. A 51A report was filed against both the mother and

the second man regarding the incident and ultimately supported.

The children were taken to their maternal grandfather's home. A

few weeks later, the mother dropped the children off with the

father in the morning, promised to return in an hour, but did

not. With the assistance of the police, the father dropped the

children off at the maternal grandfather's home in advance of

his sober home's nightly curfew. A department worker then

visited the maternal grandfather's home on an emergency basis

and found the mother intoxicated and acting in an abrasive and

aggressive manner. An emergency removal of the children was

conducted on May 16, 2022.

4
Following the children's removal, the department developed

action plans for the father and the mother to assist them in

reunifying with the children and developing skills needed to

provide for the children's safety and security. The mother's

action plan required her to, among other things, attend

parenting classes, engage in domestic violence services, engage

in weekly counseling, refrain from substance use, participate in

weekly substance treatment, engage in alcoholic's and narcotic's

anonymous meetings ("AA" and "NA") at least twice a week, meet

with the department each month, and obtain stable housing. The

mother did not successfully complete most of these tasks. She

did not consistently meet with the department on a monthly

basis. She did not consistently engage in domestic violence

services and lacked insight into the effects of domestic

violence on the children and the "detrimental effect" of

remaining in a relationship with the father. The mother largely

attended visits with the children, but was late for several

visits. She continued to use alcohol after the children's

removal. She was admitted to a treatment center for alcohol

dependency for approximately a week in May 2022, stayed at sober

homes for the rest of 2022, then left those supports in February

2023 to move to a boarding home to be near the father. She

relapsed on alcohol and opiates in April 2023, entered an

5
addiction treatment facility the following month, then entered a

sober home where she remained during trial. The mother did not

consistently attend weekly substance abuse treatment and

counseling meetings, did not follow her relapse prevention plan,

and did not consistently engage in AA meetings. The judge

concluded that the mother "has not made a serious commitment to

maintaining a sober lifestyle."

After the trial, the mother's rights were terminated. In

March 2024, the judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of

law in support of the decision to terminate the mother's

parental rights. In her decision, the judge concluded that the

department "sustained its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that [the mother] is currently unfit to

further the welfare and best interest of [the children] and that

her unfitness will continue for the indefinite future to a near

certitude." The judge found that the department "sustained its

obligation to make reasonable efforts" as to the mother,2 and

"that termination of her parental rights [was] in the children's

best interests." As for the father, the judge concluded that

although he "is presently unable and/or unavailable to assume

2 We note that even though the judge found that "in
totality" the department made reasonable efforts to assist the
mother, it did not make efforts to assist her with housing.

6
parental responsibility for the children," his present unfitness

was based on the department's failure to employ reasonable

efforts to assist him in reunification. In particular, the

judge found that "[b]oth prior to and following the removal,"

the father was "engaged in services designed to ameliorate the

concerns with his parenting deficiencies," but the department

was unwilling or resistant to assist him with housing. The

judge ordered the department to create a reunification plan for

the children with the father and provide a "30-day letter" to

the father to allow him to obtain suitable housing for the

children. The judge allowed the mother bimonthly visitation

with the children after termination, with visits to be

supervised by the department while the children remain in its

custody and at a visitation center following their reunification

with the father. The mother appealed from the decrees

terminating her rights and also filed a motion for relief from

the judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828

(1974), which a second judge denied.

Discussion. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial

judge erred in finding that the mother is not currently fit to

care for the children and that her unfitness will likely persist

in the foreseeable future. "In deciding whether to terminate a

parent's rights, a judge must determine whether there is clear

7
and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the

parent is unfit, whether the child's best interests will be

served by terminating the legal relation between parent and

child" (citation omitted). Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. 630,

637 (2022). "We give substantial deference to a judge's

decision that termination of a parent's rights is in the best

interest of the child, and reverse only where the findings of

fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of

law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53,

59 (2011).3

Here, the judge found the mother unfit due to a number of

factors, including her failure to provide the children with a

safe, stable environment free from substance abuse and domestic

violence; failure to maintain a sober lifestyle; failure to

follow action plans and attend necessary counseling and

treatment programs; and failure to benefit from the services in

which she engaged. The mother does not directly challenge the

judge's factual findings as clearly erroneous. Rather, she

contends that the determination of unfitness is inconsistent

3 Although the mother acknowledges the substantial deference
standard, much of her brief contends that we should instead
apply strict scrutiny in this case. The mother does not cite
any authority for this position other than a law review article,
and we decline to depart from controlling precedent.

8
with the fact that her visits with the children "uniformly went

well," and that the judge's findings regarding her character and

temperament reflect an outdated "common scold view of women."

We are not persuaded.

The judge found that, when the mother attended visits with

the children after their removal, she was engaging and playful

and she and the children reciprocated affection. At the same

time, the mother had difficulty confirming her visits in

advance, arrived late at several visits, and missed or canceled

others. The judge concluded that the mother did not understand

the children's needs for "a consistent, sober caretaker" and

"placed her own needs above those of the children when she

failed to visit instead opting to relapse on substances."

As for the mother's claim that the judge found her unfit

based on archaic social norms about women "whose speech and

emotions annoy the powerful," it has no basis in the judge's

findings and conclusions. Rather, the judge properly focused on

the mother's severe parental shortcomings and inability to

protect the children from abuse and neglect. While the judge

considered the mother's disruptive behavior at trial as a factor

in assessing her credibility, the judge also noted that only the

"endangerment of the child" warrants termination of parental

rights because the State "does not act to punish misbehaving

9
parents." See Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. at 639. In

concluding that the mother was unfit based on her inability to

provide for the children's needs, the judge took into

consideration the mother's history of domestic violence, mental

instability, substance abuse, and home environment, among other

factors. The judge's findings and conclusions are amply

supported by the record.

Nor do we discern any error or abuse of discretion in the

judge's conclusion that the mother's "unfitness will continue

for the indefinite future to a near certitude." See Adoption of

Ilona, 459 Mass. at 60 ("Because childhood is fleeting, a

parent's unfitness is not temporary if it is reasonably likely

to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate period"). The

judge found that the mother's life remained unstable; her home

environment remained unsafe; and she failed to complete action

plan tasks, embrace mental health or substance abuse counseling,

or regularly visit the children. She only sporadically engaged

in domestic violence services, had not benefited from the

services in which she engaged, and lacked insight into the

effects of domestic violence on the children.4 Additionally, the

4 We recognize that there may have been reasons why the
mother stayed in her domestic relationships despite the presence
of violence. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 322,
333 n.13 (2015). At the same time, "a parent who continues to

10
mother's mental health conditions "inhibit[ed] her ability to

assume parental responsibility for the children," and she had

not been forthright in sharing information with her therapists.

She also failed to consistently engage in substance abuse

treatment and relapsed just months before trial, leading the

judge to conclude that "her substance abuse will continue

undiminished into the foreseeable future, placing the children's

welfare at hazard." Although the mother did complete a twelve-

week parenting class, she derived no tangible benefit from it.

The judge did not err in concluding that it was in the best

interests of the children to terminate the mother's parental

rights.5 "While courts protect the rights of parents, the

expose a child to an environment imbued with domestic violence
endangers [the] child." Adoption of Arianne, 104 Mass. App. Ct.
716, 723 (2024).
5 Contrary to the mother's suggestion that the "[s]ua
sponte" termination of her parental rights was not "legally
sound," the fact that this case began with a care and protection
petition did not preclude the judge from entering decrees
terminating the mother's parental rights. As the judge noted,
the mother received in-hand service of the care and protection
petition a few days after it was filed in May 2022. Consistent
with G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b) (4), the summons gave explicit
notice that a possible result of the proceedings was
dispensation with the need for the mother's consent to adoption
of the children and the termination of her parental rights.
"The express language of G. L. c. 119, § 26 b, permits,
and in some instances mandates, that the judge, upon a finding
of the need of care and protection, consider and order the
dispensation of the need for parental permission to adopt."
Adoption of Donald, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 909 (2000).

11
parents' rights are secondary to the child's best interests and

. . . the proper focus of termination proceedings is the welfare

of the child" (quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of

Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61. The mother argues that termination of

her parental rights was unnecessary because "[t]his is not an

adoption case," since the judge did not terminate the father's

parental rights. The mother does not challenge the children's

reunification with the father, and asserts that placement with

him "is a viable alternative to termination of [her] parental

rights." It was within the judge's authority, however, to

terminate the parental rights of one, but not both, of the

children's parents. See Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 645-

647 (2001). Although the judge found the father "currently

unfit to further the children's welfare and best interests as he

lacks adequate housing despite his strenuous efforts to locate

housing," she also found that his unfitness was temporary

because "the Department has failed to make reasonable efforts to

assist [him] in reunification." The father was largely

compliant with his action plan, completed domestic violence

prevention and anger management programs, consistently engaged

in substance use treatment and mental health counseling, and

remained sober through the proceedings. The judge contrasted

the father's willingness and future ability to carry out his

12
parental responsibilities with the mother's failure to

demonstrate "a substantial and permanent improvement in the

issues that led to the filing of this petition."

Lastly, it was not inconsistent, much less error, for the

judge to terminate the mother's parental rights while allowing

her posttermination visitation with the children. A judge may

"order limited post[termination] contact, including visitation,

between a child and a biological parent where such contact is

currently in the best interests of the child." Adoption of

Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 553 (2000). Such an order "is grounded in

the over-all best interests of the child, based on emotional

bonding and other circumstances of the actual personal

relationship of the child and biological parent, not in the

rights of the biologic parent nor the legal consequences of

their natural relation." Id. at 562. Here, the judge found

that the mother and the children "appeared bonded" during the

visits the mother attended and concluded that some

posttermination contact and visitation between the mother and

the children was in the children's best interests. The purpose

of such contact and visitation "is not to strengthen the bonds

between the [children] and [their] biological mother," but to

13
assist the children as they negotiate the transition to a more

stable home environment. Id. at 564-565.

Decrees affirmed.

Order denying motion to
vacate decrees affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, C.J.,
Hand & Toone, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: March 5, 2026.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

14