Jump To

Top Caption Syllabus Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Thomas

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 728
• Docket Number: CT2025-0075

• Judges: Baldwin

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Syllabus

Withdrawal of guilty plea

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Thomas, 2026-Ohio-728.]

COURT OF APPEALS
MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0075

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0243
WILLIAM THOMAS
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant – Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: March 4, 2026

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee;
APRIL F. CAMPBELL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant William Thomas appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On or about March 21, 2025, the appellant pulled his vehicle into a drive-

through when he was struck from behind by victim R.L., a man over the age of 65. The

appellant got out of his vehicle and approached victim R.L.’s car, and R.L. stepped out of

his vehicle. The appellant demanded money from R.L., who stated that he did not have

any. R.L. got back into his vehicle to get his insurance information, at which time the

appellant grabbed R.L.’s wallet. R.L. demanded that the appellant return his wallet, and

the appellant refused. R.L. attempted to get his wallet back, but the appellant struck R.L.,
sending R.L. up against his vehicle. R.L. then fell to the ground, and the appellant began

kicking him. The appellant’s co-defendant took R.L.’s wallet, and the appellant took the

money in R.L.’s wallet and used R.L.’s debit card. Victim R.L suffered lacerations to his

face and body.

{¶3} On March 26, 2025, the appellant was indicted on the following:

Count One: Aggravated Robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3),

a felony of the first degree, with a Repeat Violent Offender specification

pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A);

Count Three: Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a

felony of the second degree, with a Repeat Violent Offender specification

pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A);

Count Four: Theft from a Person in a Protected Class in violation of

R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and (B)(3), a felony of the fifth degree; and,

Count Five, Theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and (B)(2), a

felony of the fifth degree.1

The appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges at his April 2, 2025, arraignment, and the

matter was scheduled for trial. The parties thereafter entered into a plea agreement, and

the trial court scheduled a change of plea hearing.

{¶4} The change of plea hearing proceeded on June 6, 2025. The appellant

agreed to withdraw his not guilty plea and enter a plea of guilty to Count Three, felonious

assault and the repeat violent offender specification; Count Four, theft from a person in a

protected class; and, Count Five, theft. In exchange, the appellee agreed to dismiss

1
Count Two of the Indictment asserted the charge of Aggravated Robbery against the
appellant’s co-defendant.
Count One and refrain from making a sentencing recommendation at the time of the

appellant’s plea. Both parties agreed that each could argue for the sentence they felt was

appropriate at the time of sentencing. The appellant’s trial counsel stated that he had

reviewed the plea forms with the appellant, that the appellant signed the forms in his

presence, and that he believed the appellant was entering his pleas knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court engaged in a thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy

during which it explained in detail the rights the appellant was giving up with his guilty

plea, as well as the potential sentence he may receive. The appellant acknowledged his

understanding of all the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and that he understood

the potential sentence. The appellant stated that he was satisfied with his trial counsel,

and stated further “I know what I’m doing.” The trial court accepted the appellant’s guilty

plea, ordered a presentence investigation, and scheduled the matter for sentencing.

{¶5} The sentencing hearing proceeded on July 21, 2025. The appellant’s trial

counsel advised the trial court at the onset of the hearing that the appellant wished to

withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court proceeded to address, on the record, the

appellant’s oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The appellant stated that he was

pressured by his trial counsel to plead guilty, and said he was told that he would be

sentenced to only two years, but wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because he “didn’t

get the two years flat.” The trial court pointed out that the appellant had not yet been

sentenced, and inquired further about the appellant’s reason for wanting to withdraw his

guilty plea. The appellant stated that his trial counsel never explained to him what was

going on, and that he would like a jury trial. The trial court noted that it had taken the

appellant’s plea; had asked the appellant if he understood everything, to which the

appellant had answered “yes;” had asked the appellant if there were any promises or
pressure, to which the appellant had answered “no;” and, asked the appellant, again, on

what reasoning should the trial court allow the appellant to withdraw his plea. The

appellant stated “[b]ecause I would like a jury trial.” The appellant gave no other reason

upon which to base his desire to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the

appellant’s request, noted the appellant’s criminal history, and sentenced the appellant to

6 – 9 years in prison on Count Three, 11 months in prison on Count Four, and 11 months

in prison on Count Five, all to run concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of 6 – 9 years

in prison. The trial court thereafter issued an Entry memorializing the appellant’s

sentence.

{¶6} The appellant filed a timely appeal in which he sets forth the following sole

assignment of error:

{¶7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THOMAS TO

WITHDRAW HIS PLEA AND ERRED IN NOT SETTING A HEARING TO ADDRESS

THOMAS’ MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶8} A motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is addressed to the sound discretion of

the trial court, and the good faith, credibility and weight of the movant's assertions in

support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court.” State v. Smith, 49 Ohio

St. 2d 261 (1977), paragraph 2 of the syllabus. Thus, our review of the trial court’s

decision to deny the appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is based upon an abuse

of discretion standard. To find an abuse of discretion, we must find that the trial court's

decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law

or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
ANALYSIS

{¶9} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no

contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice

the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the

defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” The issue of a defendant’s withdrawal of a guilty

plea was addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in the seminal case of State v. Xie, 62

Ohio St.3d 521 (1992). The Xie Court stated:

Thus, the rule gives a standard by which postsentence withdrawals

of guilty pleas may be evaluated -- the "manifest injustice" standard.

However, the rule itself gives no guidelines for a trial court to use when

ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Ohio's Crim.R.

32.1 is very similar to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d), which was construed in Barker

v. United States (C.A.10, 1978), 579 F.2d 1219:

"Even though the general rule is that motions to withdraw guilty pleas

before sentencing are to be freely allowed and treated with liberality, * * *

still the decision thereon is within the sound discretion of the trial court. * *

• Thus, unless it is shown that the trial court acted unjustly or unfairly, there

is no abuse of discretion. * * * One who enters a guilty plea has no right to

withdraw it. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine

what circumstances justify granting such a motion. * * *" (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 1223, quoted in State v. Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 213-

214, 22 O.O.3d 341, 343, 428 N.E.2d 863, 865.

Id. at 526. The Court held that presentence motions to withdraw should be freely and

liberally given. Id. However, the Court also stated that such motions are not automatically
granted, as “a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior to

sentencing.” Id. at 527.

{¶10} The issue was discussed by this Court in State v. Foster, 2008-Ohio-29 (5th

Dist.) as follows:

Although Xie states that a hearing is mandatory, it does not define

the type of hearing that is required. However, we can logically determine

that the hearing must comply with the minimum mandates of due process,

i.e., the trial court must afford the defendant meaningful notice and a

meaningful opportunity to be heard. State v. Wright (June 19, 1995),

Highland App. No. 94 CA 853, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2963; State v Davis,

Lawrence App. No. 05CA9, 2005 Ohio 5015. However, the scope of the

hearing is within the trial court's discretion. Wright, Supra. "Accordingly, the

scope of the hearing should reflect the substantive merits of the motion."

Id., citing State v. Smith (Dec. 10, 1992), Cuyahoga App. No. 61464, 1992

Ohio App. LEXIS 6259. "The motion to withdraw the plea must, at a

minimum, make a prima facie showing of merit before the trial court need

devote considerable time to it. This approach strikes a fair balance between

fairness to the accused and the preservation of judicial resources." Wright.

"Bold assertions without evidentiary support simply should not merit the

type of scrutiny that substantiated allegations would merit." Smith, supra.

Id. at ¶27. The Foster Court went on to state:

In this case, at the re-sentencing hearing, appellant argued that in

order to preserve a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea he must be re-

sentenced to a minimum concurrent two year sentence. Included within this
presentation, was the argument that at the time of the original no contest

plea, [State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856 ] had not been

decided. Appellant argued that the Foster decision modified the sentencing

scheme by increasing penalties beyond a minimum, concurrent for first time

offenders. Therefore, if the minimum, concurrent was not imposed,

appellant should be permitted to withdraw his no contest plea as being

unintelligent, involuntary and not knowledgeable of the potential

consequences upon a finding of guilt. Upon hearing the substance of

appellant's argument to withdraw his plea, the trial court concluded that the

arguments lacked merit and denied appellant's motions for a continuance

and effectively denied appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

We find that the trial court provided appellant with an opportunity to

be heard and sufficiently inquired into the reasons for the motion to

withdraw. We further find that at the time of the plea appellant was informed

about the potential sentences for each individual offense and that the

potential sentencing ranges remained the same both before and after the

Foster decision. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err when it

denied appellant's motions without granting a continuance of the re-

sentencing and without conducting a full hearing on a motion to withdraw

appellant's no contest plea. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second

assignment of error.

Id. at ¶28-29.

{¶11} In the case sub judice, the trial court engaged in a complete and thorough

Crim.R. 11 colloquy prior to accepting the appellant’s guilty plea. The court outlined with
specificity the charges to which the appellant was pleading guilty and the possible

sentences for each. The court also outlined with specificity the constitutionally protected

rights the appellant was giving up in pleading guilty. The appellant stated on the record

at the change of plea hearing that he understood the charges to which he was pleading

guilty, and the rights he was giving up by entering a guilty plea, including the right to a

jury trial. Indeed, the appellant specifically stated during his change of plea hearing, “I

know what I’m doing.”

{¶12} When presented with the appellant’s oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

the trial court heard the appellant’s arguments on the record. The court - which was the

same court that presided over the change of plea hearing, conducted the Crim.R. 11

colloquy, and accepted the appellant’s guilty plea - told the appellant that he had to

provide the court with a reason why he wished to withdraw his plea, and asked the

appellant to provide the court with that reason. The appellant, despite having discussed

the waiver of his right to a jury trial at his change of plea hearing and stating that he

wanted to waive that right, said “[b]ecause I would like a jury trial.” The trial court denied

the appellant’s motion to withdraw.

{¶13} The trial court addressed the appellant’s motion to withdraw during a

hearing, provided the appellant with an opportunity to be heard on his motion to withdraw,

and inquired into the reasons for his motion. As in Foster, we can logically determine that

the appellant herein was provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard. However,

he “must still make a prima facie showing of merit before the trial court need devote

considerable time to” his motion. See, Foster. We find that the trial court devoted sufficient

time to the appellant’s motion during the sentencing hearing to determine that the
appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea had no merit. Accordingly, we find his

assignment of error to be without merit.

CONCLUSION

{¶14} We find that the trial court provided the appellant with an opportunity to be

heard and sufficiently inquired into the reasons for his motion to withdraw. We find further

that at the time he entered his guilty plea the appellant was informed about the potential

sentences for each individual offense and the potential sentencing ranges. Thus, we find

that the trial court did not act unjustly or unfairly, and did not abuse its discretion in denying

the appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The appellant’s sole assignment of error

is without merit, and it is therefore overruled. The decision of the Muskingum County

Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.

{¶15} Costs to appellant.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Montgomery, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.