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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Wesley Romine v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A25A2156

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Combined Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION
MCFADDEN, P. J.,
HODGES and PIPKIN, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

March 4, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A25A2156. ROMINE v. THE STATE.

PIPKIN, Judge.

Appellant Wesley Labron Romine was convicted of two counts of rape, see OCGA

§ 16-6-1; aggravated sexual battery, see OCGA § 16-6-22.2; aggravated sodomy, see

OCGA § 16-6-2 (a) (2); aggravated child molestation, see OCGA § 16-6-4 (c); sexual

battery against a child under 16, see OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (d); and, three counts of child

molestation, see OCGA § 16-6-4 (a), all arising out of unlawful sexual acts he committed

on K. N. Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus an

additional 63 years, and he now appeals the denial of his motion for new trial as

amended; he argues on appeal, as he did below, that trial counsel was so constitutionally
ineffective that there was a constructive denial of counsel altogether. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

While Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his

convictions, a recitation of the State’s case is necessary to resolve Appellant’s sole

enumeration on appeal. Construed in a light most favorable to the verdicts, see Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III)(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence

adduced below established as follows. During the years relevant to the charges, K. N.’s

great-grandmother was married to Appellant, and, during the course of her childhood,

K. N. spent considerable time at the Romines’ residence in Walker County; she was

often there every day during the summer school break and on most weekends during the

school year. While K. N. does not know for certain when the abuse began, she testified

that “the first memory [she had] of it was when [she] was four years old.” According to

K. N., the abuse started with Appellant touching her genital area and inserting his finger

into her vagina, as well as sucking on her “chest.” The abuse progressed as she aged; K.

N. testified that Appellant performed anal sex on her when she eight or nine years of age,

that Appellant performed oral sex on her when she was 10 or 11, and that Appellant

began forcing her to engage in sexual intercourse when she was 11.

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As the abuse progressed, Appellant became increasingly violent; K. N. recounted

that Appellant threatened to kill her family and pets, that he choked her to

unconsciousness when she attempted to fight back during one incident, and that he

called her a “whore” and hit her on the head when she attempted to rebuff him on a

different occasion. In total, K. N. recounted nearly a decade of sexual abuse occurring

in numerous locations -- including in two different trucks, at various locations on the

Romines’ property, at a graveyard and campground, and at the home of various family

members -- and involving hundreds of various sexual acts, including groping, digital

penetration, manual stimulation, oral sex, anal sex, and intercourse. During the

incidents, Appellant would either use a condom or would use a handkerchief to “clean”

K. N.

Over the years, K. N. -- who was 14 years old at the time of trial -- was concerned

that she might not be believed, so, after seeing a true-crime documentary, she decided

to document the abuse; she subsequently took numerous photographs of Appellant in

compromising positions, such as trying to pull off her pants and sucking her toes. The

abuse came to light when K. N.’s father confiscated her cellular telephone as a

punishment and discovered a text message recounting the sexual abuse. After the abuse

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was discovered, she showed the photographs to her father, and a report was made to

police the following day. K. N. underwent a forensic interview, and that interview was

played for the jury. Appellant agreed to speak with investigators; his interview was

recorded and later played for the jury. While he generally denied the allegations made

by K. N., Appellant admitted to “wrestling” with K. N., to pulling her pants up when

they fell down while they were wrestling, to massaging and rubbing K. N.’s legs, and to

“biting” her toes when they were cold.

In addition to the damning photographs and testimony, the jury also heard from

K. N.’s great-grandmother -- Appellant’s wife of ten years -- who testified that she

discovered a package of condoms located in the bedroom used by K. N. when she visited.

The great-grandmother explained that she was infertile and postmenopausal and that,

to her knowledge, there would be no reason that she or Appellant would have had any

need of condoms. Appellant’s wife also testified that she had no idea that the abuse was

occurring but that, every once in a while, she heard Appellant yell at K. N., “If you don’t

want me to touch you, then go home and don’t come back.” Finally, the jury heard from

two of Appellant’s adult biological daughters -- both from a prior marriage -- who each

testified that, as minors, they were repeatedly sexually abused by Appellant.

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After his trial, Appellant asserted in his motion for new trial, as amended, that trial

counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Following a hearing, the trial

court denied Appellant’s motions. Now, on appeal, Appellant reiterates his claim of

ineffectiveness. The now-familiar standard, established in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U. S. 688, 687-95 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), provides as follows:

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant generally must show not only that counsel’s
performance was deficient, but also that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant—in other words, a
reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s
deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been
different.

Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63, 68 (3) (823 SE2d 749) (2019). Here, Appellant claims

that trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing.” In support of this position, Appellant asserts that trial

counsel failed to adequately cross-examine witnesses and failed to lodge a single

objection during trial. According to Appellant, “the circumstances of his case were so

egregious that prejudice should be presumed because he was effectively denied effective

assistance of counsel at a critical stage of his trial. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

648, 659 (104 SCt 2039, 80 LE2d 657) (1984).” Wainwright, 305 Ga. at 68 (3).

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As to the “constructive denial of counsel” discussed in Cronic, the Georgia

Supreme Court has explained as follows:

Cronic’s “constructive denial of counsel” exception to the general
Strickland standard is a “narrow” one that applies only when “‘there was
a breakdown in the adversarial process,’ such that ‘counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.’”
Charleston v. State, 292 Ga. 678, 682-683 (743 SE2d 1) (2013) (quoting
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 662). Moreover, the Cronic exception requires an
“‘attorney’s failure [to] be complete’ and must occur throughout the
proceeding and not merely at specific points.” Charleston, 292 Ga. at
682 -683 (quoting Turpin v. Curtis, 278 Ga. 698, 699 (606 SE2d 244)
(2004)).

Wainwright, 305 Ga. at 68 (3). We have no trouble concluding that there was no

constructive denial of counsel in this case.

Here, while the transcript reflects that trial counsel may have taken a softer

approach to cross-examination, trial counsel did, in fact, cross-examine the vast majority

of the State’s witnesses. Trial counsel had a tough row to hoe in light of the

overwhelming evidence against his client, but the transcript plainly reflects that trial

counsel used cross-examination in an attempt to sow doubt as to K. N.’s credibility and

to suggest that her testimony may have been influenced. To this end, trial counsel asked

numerous witnesses -- including members of K. N.’s family and at least one police

officer -- whether they had discussed the allegations with K. N., and trial counsel then
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elicited testimony from the State’s expert concerning the “danger” of untrained

individuals questioning an alleged victim about possible sexual abuse. Additionally, trial

counsel used his cross-examination of Appellant’s biological children to sow doubt as to

their allegations; specifically, trial counsel highlighted that, while the daughters’ mother

was apparently aware of the alleged abuse, she never divorced Appellant and, further,

only temporarily moved with the daughters from the family residence before returning

home with one of the girls.

Finally, while Appellant faults trial counsel for failing to object during trial,

Appellant has failed to identify any specific testimony or evidence to which trial counsel

failed or refused to object. Given trial counsel’s obvious participation at trial -- including

making an opening statement and a closing argument -- and his active pursuit of a

defense, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that he was constructively denied counsel

at trial. See Calloway v. State, 313 Ga. App. 708, 712-13 (2) (722 SE2d 422) (2012).

Because Appellant has not established that trial counsel failed to subject the

State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing -- and, thus, that he was constructively

denied counsel -- we do not apply the presumption of prejudice discussed in Cronic;

instead, the second prong of Strickland’s two-part test remains applicable to Appellant’s

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claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Vendrel v. State, 318 Ga. 233, 240 (1) (897

SE2d 751) (2024). Appellant, however, makes no argument as to prejudice, and the

record would not support such a position. Here, even presuming that trial counsel’s

performance was constitutionally deficient -- which is highly doubtful -- Appellant has

failed to demonstrate what, if anything, could have been elicited from the State’s

witnesses with a more thorough cross-examination, see Traughber v. State, ___ Ga. ___,

___ (2) (923 SE2d 57) (2025), and he has failed to identify what unobjected-to-evidence

or testimony affected the outcome of this trial, see Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 330 (b)

(877 SE2d 202) (2022). Consequently, there is no merit to Appellant’s enumeration of

error on appeal, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. McFadden, P. J., and Hodges, J., concur.

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