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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. F. Hinkle

Montana Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 MT 42
• Docket Number: DA 24-0206
• Nature of Suit: Direct Appeal

• Disposition: AFFIRMED

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (10.7K)

• PDF

Disposition

AFFIRMED

Combined Opinion

                        by [Jim Rice](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/4994/jim-rice/)

03/03/2026

DA 24-0206
Case Number: DA 24-0206

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 42

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

FELICIA MARIE HINKLE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDC-22-242
Honorable Elizabeth A. Best, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Britt Cotter, Cotter Law Office, P.C., Polson, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Joshua Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Stephanie Fuller, Deputy
County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 19, 2025

Decided: March 3, 2026

Filed:

---

Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Felicia Marie Hinkle (Hinkle) appeals the Sentencing Order and Judgment entered

by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, after a jury trial, convicting her of

the charges of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and criminal possession of drug

paraphernalia. She challenges the District Court’s denial of her motion to discharge the

jury panel without conducting a hearing. Thus, we consider:

Whether the District Court erred by denying Hinkle’s motion to discharge the jury
panel without conducting a hearing.

We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On April 15, 2022, after police found large quantities of illegal drugs and drug

paraphernalia at Hinkle’s home, she was charged with criminal possession of dangerous

drugs and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia. Hinkle’s trial was scheduled for

August 22, 2023, but after an emergent hearing the previous day concerning the process of

empaneling the jury, the District Court entered an order vacating the trial, noting that “it

was undisputed that several serious errors in providing notice to jurors and, therefore, in

empaneling the jurors have occurred in Cascade County.” The District Court’s order

directed the Clerk of Court and Cascade County Sheriff to follow a list of detailed

instructions for empaneling jurors for future trials. The District Court then rescheduled

Hinkle’s trial for November 28, 2023.

¶3 On November 20, 2023, Hinkle filed a motion to again discharge the jury, on the

grounds that two people listed on the panel had moved from Cascade County. She
2
requested an evidentiary hearing to discuss her arguments and provided an affidavit by her

attorney in support of her motion.

¶4 In its order, the District Court noted that the empaneling instructions outlined in its

earlier order were completed by mid-October 2023, and that a hearing concerning the

modified process that was thereafter utilized had been conducted before a different district

judge in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Judge Kutzman, in State v. Burden, Cause No.

DC-19-350, wherein Judge Kutzman had determined that the Clerk of Court and Sheriff

had substantially complied with the governing statutes. Noting that Judge Kutzman had

“made multiple well-reasoned findings of fact and conclusions of law,” the District Court

took judicial notice “of the record of proceedings at that hearing, including the testimony

and evidence taken,” reasoning that it was “not necessary to take the same evidence again

concerning the process the Clerk and Sheriff now use to form the jury pool (the same ‘pool’

used in this case) or the Sheriff’s service of jurors.” The District Court stated that “[t]he

statutory process used to form the pool necessarily results in a two year old list, with the

predictable incidental result that some of the citizens on the list will have moved before the

Clerk receives the list,” from which individual case panels are drawn, and further reasoned:

[T]his is a predictable but non-prejudicial and insubstantial consequence of
the process of collecting names by the Secretary of State. However, the
Court is satisfied that the process used to identify the large pool of jurors for
the term . . . substantially complied with relevant statutes. The Court is
further satisfied that the panel of potential trial jurors for this case was drawn
in accordance with statutory requirements.

3
The District Court thus denied the motion to discharge the jury panel and did not conduct

a hearing.1

¶5 After a jury trial on November 28, 2023, Hinkle was convicted of the charges. She

appeals, challenging the District Court’s failure to conduct a hearing on her motion to

discharge the jury.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 A trial court’s decision to strike the venire is a question of law which we review for

correctness. State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, ¶ 14, 298 Mont. 358, 2 P.3d 204 (citation

omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Whether the District Court erred by denying Hinkle’s motion to discharge the jury
panel without conducting a hearing.

¶8 The jury pool selection process covers a considerable period of time due to detailed

statutory procedures. See §§ 3-15-402 through -509, MCA (2021).2 An objection to the

1
In Burden, the court held a hearing regarding the Defendant’s objection to the jury panel that
arose when several jurors on the panel failed to appear for voir dire. The panel drawn for the case
originally consisted of 93 potential jurors, 36 of which failed to appear for voir dire. At the hearing,
the Clerk and the Sheriff testified about the actions taken by themselves and their staff in the jury
selection process. In his conclusions of law, Judge Kutzman analyzed the statutes governing juror
selection and service, and concluded that officials had not only complied with statutory
requirements but also took additional permissible actions to contact jurors. Judge Kutzman
reasoned that, “[t]he Clerk cannot reasonably be faulted for substantially complying with statutory
requirements that do actually exist or for not substantially complying with statutory requirements
that do not actually exist[,]” and denied the objection. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appendix
B, Order, State v. Burden, No. DC-19-350 (Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Nov. 10, 2023).
2
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to the 2021 version of the Montana Code
Annotated.
4
manner in which a jury panel has been selected or drawn must be raised by a motion to

discharge the jury panel. Section 46-16-112(1), MCA. A motion to discharge must be

made in writing and supported by an affidavit that “state facts that show that the jury panel

was improperly selected or drawn.” Section 46-16-112(2), MCA. “If the motion states

facts that show that the jury panel has been improperly selected or drawn, it is the duty of

the court to conduct a hearing.” Section 46-16-112(3), MCA.

¶9 A person who is not a resident for at least 30 days of the county in which they are

called for jury duty is not competent to act as a juror in said county. Section 3-15-301(2),

MCA. Additionally, “[i]f the clerk of court is satisfied that a person whose name is

drawn . . . has permanently moved from the county, . . . the person’s name must be omitted

from the jury list.” Section 3-15-404(7), MCA.

¶10 On March 25, 2025, this Court decided State v. Hillious, 2025 MT 53, 421 Mont.

72, 565 P.3d 1218. The Court explained that, “we are not required to ‘reverse every case

where a violation occurs in the statutory process governing the formation of a trial jury.’”

Hillious, ¶ 17 (quoting LaMere, ¶ 55). Rather, we apply a “substantial compliance”

standard, which requires reversal only “if the lack of compliance affects the randomness

and objectivity of the jury pool selection.” Hillious, ¶ 17 (citation omitted). A substantial

failure impacts a defendant’s “right to a fair and impartial jury--which is what the statutes

are designed to protect.” Hillious, ¶ 18. Conversely, “[t]echnical departures from the jury

selection statutes and violations which do not threaten the goals of random selection and

objective disqualification do not constitute a substantial failure to comply.” Hillious, ¶ 18

5
(citing LaMere, ¶ 58). Though decided prior to Hillious, a substantial compliance standard

was presciently applied by Judge Kutzman in his analysis of the compliance with the jury

selection statutes in Burden, and likewise applied by the District Court in this case.3

¶11 Hinkle argues that her motion to discharge the jury panel was sufficiently pled to

necessitate a hearing because the inclusion of individuals in the pool who no longer lived

in the county “was not a minor procedural defect but an alleged structural error affecting

the fundamental integrity of jury selection.” She takes exception to the District Court’s

reliance on Burden, because that case involved different summoning issues, and argues that

the District Court violated § 46-16-112(3), MCA, by failing to conduct a hearing on her

motion. The State answers that “Hinkle did not meet her burden to state facts showing that

the jury was not properly selected,” failing to allege a statutory violation in the jury panel

selection process because “nothing in Mont. Code Ann. § 3-15-405 prevents a person who

has moved from being included in the annual jury pool from which the panel is drawn.”

Further, the State argues that the District Court’s taking of judicial notice of the Burden

proceeding was appropriate.

¶12 The District Court considered Hinkle’s objection concerning the two members of

the pool who had moved from the county, the statutes, and the decision in Burden, to

3
Subsequent to our decision in Hillious, the Legislature enacted 2025 Mont. Laws ch. 428,
approved and effective on May 5, 2025, which revised the juror notification and selection process,
and provided that, “[a] motion to discharge a jury must be founded only on a material departure
from the law in respect to the selection, drawing, notification, or summoning of the jury panel.”
Section 46-16-112(5), MCA (2025). These changes were made applicable “to jury pools noticed
on or after May 1, 2026,” 2025 Mont. Laws ch. 428, § 7, and thus are not applicable in this case.
6
conclude that the objection here was a “predictable but non-prejudicial and insubstantial

consequence of the process of collecting names,” and that the process used “substantially

complied with relevant statutes.” We concur with the District Court, as Hinkle’s objection

did not rise to a substantial failure impacting a defendant’s “right to a fair and impartial

jury--which is what the statutes are designed to protect.” Hillious, ¶ 18. The two

individuals did not serve on the jury nor interact in any way with the selection process.

While Hinkle is correct that a person who is not a resident of a county cannot serve on a

jury in that county, that problem did not develop in this case, and, as the District Court

stated, “[t]he appearance of those [non-county residents’] names in the jury term pool is,

at worst, a non-prejudicial error.” We see no reason here why it was error for the District

Court to take judicial notice of the testimony of the Clerk of Court and the Sheriff in Burden

about the process they had utilized following the court’s earlier order, and thereafter enter

its own conclusions of law based thereon, including application of an appropriate

substantial compliance standard. Consequently, we agree with the State that, based upon

the allegations set forth in the motion, the District Court did not err by failing to hold a

hearing.

¶13 Affirmed.

/S/ JIM RICE

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
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