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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Fard Muhammad v. State of Arkansas

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 148

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (13.2K)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 148
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-25-264

FARD MUHAMMAD Opinion Delivered March 4, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ASHLEY
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 02CR-24-137]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE CREWS PURYEAR,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge

Fard Muhammad appeals his misdemeanor conviction for third-degree battery. The

same jury acquitted him of first-degree terroristic threatening, a Class D felony, Ark. Code

Ann. § 5-13-301 (Repl. 2024), after a trial where Muhammad represented himself. He

argues on appeal, through appointed counsel, that the record did not establish a knowing

and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),

and the Arkansas precedent applying it. We disagree and affirm.

Muhammad was a custodian at Ashley County Medical Center. He was charged

with punching and threatening to kill his supervisor in July 2024 during an argument about

why he was waxing the floor during a shift change. At arraignment, he told the circuit

court he has a third-grade education. He was living in a minivan. He did not disclose any
previous experience with the criminal justice system. 1 And from the outset, Muhammad

said, politely and consistently, that he wished to represent himself.

The circuit court’s efforts to ensure Muhammad’s waiver of his right to counsel was

knowing and intelligent—and to persuade him to accept counsel without violating his right

to refuse it—were exemplary. 2 They leave no doubt that Muhammad knew what he was

doing in the sense Faretta requires—even though he admitted, then demonstrated, that he

did not know what he was doing in the technical criminal-procedure sense. Because the

circuit court’s finding that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver was not clearly against

the preponderance of the evidence, Shabazz, 2018 Ark. App. 399, 557 S.W.3d 274, we

affirm.

At the September 2024 plea and arraignment, after advising Muhammad of the

charges he faced and the penalties that might apply, the court asked if he understood “there’s

rules of evidence, there’s rules of criminal procedure, there’s certain things that you have to

follow during a jury trial as far as how to make objections, how to pick a jury, jury

instructions, things of that nature.” He responded, “No, I don’t understand all that.” He

said he could do his best to get prepared.

The court informed him that he had a right to appointed counsel at no cost and that

a lawyer would know how jury selection, trial objections, the rules of evidence, and the

1
Muhammad admitted in his sentencing testimony that he had been to prison in
Wisconsin on an escape charge. Because the circuit court did not know that when it let
him proceed to trial without counsel, we do not consider it in this analysis. Shabazz v.
State, 2018 Ark. App. 399, at 11 n.1, 557 S.W.3d 274, 280 n.1.
2
Judge Crews Puryear handled the pretrial proceedings; Judge Robert B. Gibson III
filled in at trial because Judge Puryear was sick with the flu.

2
rules of criminal procedure worked. Muhammad acknowledged, but declined, those

advantages. The court warned it would have to hold him to the same standards as a lawyer,

and would not be able to advise him to object if, for example, the State tried to bring in

inadmissible evidence. Further, it warned that if he became frustrated by the court’s rulings,

the jury might hold his courtroom behavior against him. Muhammad said he understood.

The court asked whether, knowing all that, he still wanted to proceed without counsel. He

said yes.

That’s not all. The court read from written waiver forms that acknowledged

Muhammad knew he had a right to free appointed counsel and was declining anyway. One

form included thoughtful warnings such as, “You don’t have experience in the legal system

to compare your case to, so the opinions you have may not be firmly rooted in reality.” It

explained the education and knowledge a lawyer has, including “how to make a record for

appellate review of any errors that may arguably be made by the court or the jury at your

trial.” It also informed Muhammad that this experience would allow the lawyer to give an

opinion Muhammad could consider in making “choices the law requires you to make in

your case,” including whether to testify or plead guilty. The other form told Muhammad

that, despite the waiver, he could change his mind and ask for counsel any time before trial:

I understand further that this Court will not continue further in this proceeding
until counsel is provided if I request it, and knowing this, I hereby voluntarily and
with knowledge of the above rights, waive counsel. I further understand that
my waiver of counsel at this time shall not preclude me from claiming a right to counsel
in future proceedings in this cause, and I have been so informed orally of this by the
court.

3
(Emphasis added.) The court reiterated orally that “right now you’re waiving counsel, but

you understand at any future pre-trial settings you do have the right to request counsel if

you change your mind?” Belt and suspenders.

Muhammad said, “All right.” At an October 21 omnibus and bond-reduction

hearing, the court asked if everything was “going okay” with his self-representation.

Muhammad replied, “So far.” The court allowed him to make an oral motion for discovery

and told the State to get the discovery to him by the November 25 pretrial conference. At

that conference, the court asked if Muhammad had questions about the trial process or

“about jury selection and how that process will work?”

Muhammad replied, “How does it work?”

The court gave a thorough explanation. It concluded with this exchange:

THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me about that?

MUHAMMAD: No.

THE COURT: And you do acknowledge that I’ve -- several times tried to
encourage you to have counsel represent you in this case?

MUHAMMAD: You have.

THE COURT: Sir?

MUHAMMAD: You have.

THE COURT: And you’ve declined that request?

MUHAMMAD: I have.

THE COURT: And you still wish to proceed pro se on this matter?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

4
Six days before trial, at a pretrial hearing, the State made a record of an offer to let

Muhammad plead guilty to third-degree battery in exchange for three years’ probation. The

court asked Muhammad if he wanted to speak to a public defender about the plea offer or

any questions about trial, or to have standby counsel at trial to answer his questions then.

Muhammad said no. The State invited him to make a counter plea offer. He responded:

I assaulted Ms. Winston with a lot of bad words. That’s what I did. I
don’t know what your fees, or fines, or punishments, are for calling people
out their names, but that’s all I’m guilty of. I’m not guilty of threatening Ms.
Winston, or putting my hands on her in any way shape or form. That’s the
only offer I will stick with, so whatever punishment I have is more disrespect.

(His testimony at trial was the same.) The court again offered standby counsel:

THE COURT: Again, I can offer you standby counsel that would assist you
with questions you may have, or the process of how this trial
may work, but I understand that you are rejecting that offer.
Is that correct?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I don’t know how many more times I can make a
record. I think I’ve gone into detail how dangerous this can
be and the pitfalls of representing yourself. You do
acknowledge that, correct?

MUHAMMAD: I do.

We acknowledge facts that could (and did) raise concern. For example, though a

lawyer might have been proud of the verdict (acquitted of the felony, sentenced for the

misdemeanor to about time served), Muhammad was not much of an advocate for himself

at trial. He wore his orange jumpsuit from jail. He declined the court’s offer to get him

some street clothes after the jail lost those he had been arrested in. He was used to the

jumpsuit, he said. In voir dire he asked one question: “Is there any one of you that don’t

5
want to be here today? (Hands Raised.) That’s all.” He waived opening statement and

called no witnesses but himself.

The altercation occurred in a breakroom. The State called three witnesses who saw

or heard it: Sharee Winston, who was the complaining victim; Tina Carpenter, whom he

called “her assistant”; and Janessa Stafford, a hospital employee who was in the breakroom

at the time. This was Muhammad’s testimony:

On July 18th, after all — I’m just going to get right to the criminal
offenses. I had given Ms. Winston my notice that I intended to quit. It was
an immediate decision. She got upset. She called me a bunch of racial
derogatory names. She used the word “nigger.” Of course, I got upset, and
I did start calling her a bunch of names. She directed her assistant to call the
police. The assistant ran out of the room. I handed Ms. Winston my keys
and my badge. She continued on with her insults, and I continued back at
her with insults.

She ran to the phone. She tried to pick up the phone, and back up
with the phone, and as she backed up with the telephone, the telephone was
pulled out of the wall by the cord. It’s a standard push button phone, it’s not
a cell phone or anything to that nature. Phone fell to the floor. She tried to
hoist herself over a chair that Ms. Janessa Stafford was sitting in — and by
putting her hand on the back of her chair, and the back of the metal supply
cabinets that is here and listed in the picture. She then picked up this blue
office chair and tried to throw it at the defendant. Tried to throw it at me,
and it landed on the table and knocked Ms. Stafford’s computer to the floor.

She then ran to the end of the table, tried to pick up another chair. I
do believe that’s it right there, and she attempted to throw that one, but I did
rush her and grab that chair and that chair did subsequently fly across the
room.

The table had been pushed out right before this nightstand here, where
time clock is sitting on top of Ms. Winston ran to the table. She tried to hoist
herself over that table by placing her hand on the nightstand and the table. I
was trying to grab her arm in the event that she was trying to go for another
chair, but I ended up grabbing her foot and she ran out of the door.

That is my testimony.

6
A brief cross-examination followed:

PROSECUTOR: Did you threaten to kill her if she called the police?

MUHAMMAD: No, sir, I did not.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. Did you punch her in the side of the head?

MUHAMMAD: No, sir, I did not.

When asked if he wanted to respond to the State’s closing argument, he replied, “No, sir,

Your Honor. I’ve said what I need to say.”

The jury returned a verdict in twelve minutes convicting him of misdemeanor third-

degree battery and acquitting him of the felony. It fixed his sentence at six months in the

county jail and no fine.

The circuit court informed Muhammad that he had the right to appeal and to request

counsel for appeal. He again declined:

THE COURT: [W]e are through with the trial. Appellate work is a
different, it’s a different burden. Do you — you are still
indigent. You’ve elected to represent yourself thus far.
I’m not encouraging you or discouraging you from
appealing. It’s your right. My question is, do you want
me to appoint counsel at this time to examine — so that
you can examine filing for appeal purposes?

MUHAMMAD: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. I just want to — are you sure?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to make sure that you understood
that I will do that right now if you want someone to
talk to about filing an appeal. Okay? Do you
understand that?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

7
THE COURT: Okay. If you change your mind, you would need to
notify the Court and probably file a written motion that
says “I would like counsel;” okay?

MUHAMMAD: All right.

THE COURT: I am unsure of the law and where it goes, because this
is a rather unique circumstance. It doesn’t always
happen. But that would be my suggestion to you if you
wake up in the middle of the night and you want to do
it, that you put it in writing and you get it filed in this
case so that Judge Puryear is notified of it; okay? And
that he could take the steps to appoint counsel so that
you can make a decision on whether or not you want
to appeal or have counsel appeal your case; okay?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

A written request for counsel dated December 12 was filed December 18. This appeal

followed.

---

Of the three considerations our supreme court has prescribed for allowing a criminal

defendant to represent himself, Jarrett v. State, 371 Ark. 100, 104, 263 S.W.3d 538, 541

(2007), only one—whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to

counsel—is a real issue on these facts. “Significantly,” we have held, “every reasonable

presumption must be indulged against the waiver” of that fundamental right. Mattingly v.

State, 2025 Ark. App. 461, at 8, 721 S.W.3d 819, 824 (cleaned up). A request to waive

counsel “must not leave any doubt that the waiver of counsel is what the defendant wants.”

Madison v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 273, at 16, 712 S.W.3d 765, 774 (citing Reed v. State, 2017

Ark. 246, 524 S.W.3d 929). But a decision to waive the right to counsel can be “knowingly

and intelligently made” despite being a bad idea. It almost always will be a bad idea. What

8
the Sixth Amendment requires is proof the defendant knew it was a bad idea, and why, but

made it anyway. The inquiry is a holistic one, and the outcome depends on the facts and

circumstances of each case. Reed, 2017 Ark. 246, 524 S.W.3d 929.

In Yarberry v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 40, we reversed on a Faretta issue where the State

conceded that the right to counsel had been violated. Though the circuit court had

confirmed the defendant wanted to proceed pro se, it had not informed him first of the

“advantages of having a lawyer and the dangers and disadvantages of going to trial without

one.” Id. at 3. At his request, we prepared and attached a model inquiry to assist future

courts presented with a Faretta issue. See id. at 5 app. A. But we warned the model inquiry

might not be necessary or even sufficient in every case. This one illustrates well why that

is so.

In Faretta, the Supreme Court of the United States followed the “nearly universal

conviction” among the courts that “forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is

contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.” 422 U.S. at 817.

He must be “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the

record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes

open.’” Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).

But in that analysis, the defendant’s “technical legal knowledge, as such” is not relevant. Id.

at 836.

If there is a typical defendant in these appeals, it is one who has firm but delusional

ideas about the law and doubts the loyalty or relative competence of appointed counsel,

perhaps because he doesn’t share them. E.g., Madison v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 273, 712

9
S.W.3d 765. That was not Muhammad. He acknowledged a lawyer would know how the

trial process worked, and he himself did not know. He acknowledged that knowing those

things was important. He just didn’t want a lawyer. The circuit court did nothing but

discourage him from representing himself. It did not, for example, force him to choose

between a quick trial without counsel or a delayed trial with one, as the circuit court had

in Shabazz, supra.

To the contrary, the circuit court told Muhammad he could request counsel at any

time, and offered repeated chances to change his mind. 3 We find somewhat probative that

Muhammad declined to request counsel even as the progress of the case through discovery

and the circuit court’s exhaustive explanations of the trial process must have brought home

some of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se. As we alluded to earlier, this record is a

standout effort by a circuit court. The ultimate choice on self-representation was, in the

end, Muhammad’s to make.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

3
Though we can imagine facts on which this assurance could seem like a temptation
to waive counsel at an early but critical stage by minimizing the consequences, (1) that was
not the case here, and (2) we highly approve of this practice in general.

10